Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Beg, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Four persons — Krishna Madho (Pradhan, Gram Sabha Aurahwa), Balak Ram (Up-Pradhan), Chunni Lal (Prantiya Raksha Dal leader) and Manni Ram (Panch) — were called to show cause why they should not be punished for contempt of Court pursuant to an order of a single Judge dated 12-3-1951.

On 24-1-1950 Krishna Madho and Balak Ram applied to the Deputy Commissioner, Gonda, alleging that certain named persons were habitually stealing and requesting preventive action; on the same day they and the other two applicants applied to the Panchayat Officer with similar complaints. No prior reports against those persons existed before 24-1-1950. Subsequently numerous reports were made and proceedings under Section 110 CrPC were initiated against some of the named persons.

The four applicants (Krishna Madho, Balak Ram, Chunni Lal and Manni Ram) appeared as prosecution witnesses in the Section 110 proceedings (they were P.Ws. 7–10). During the pendency of the case they sent a letter to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Utraula, appending a list of 40 defence witnesses and asserting that those witnesses were related or partial and should be disbelieved.

The Section 110 case resulted in an order binding the accused; appeals were dismissed by the Sessions Judge. A revision (Criminal Revision No. 227 of 1950) was allowed by Kidwai J. on 12-3-1951, who discharged the applicants and, in his judgment, strongly criticized the statements and conduct of P.Ws. 7–10 (the four contemners) and directed that a notice be issued to them to show cause why they should not be punished under the Contempt of Courts Act. The present proceedings follow that notice.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to punish the alleged contempt of a subordinate criminal Court (a Sub-Divisional Magistrate) under Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act.
  2. Whether the conduct of the four persons in sending a letter to the Magistrate during pendency of the Section 110 proceedings amounted to contempt of Court (and, if so, whether it was of a grave character).
  3. Whether the apology submitted on behalf of the four contemners should be accepted under Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act.
  4. If contempt is established and the apology is rejected, what sentence or punishment should be imposed.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicants' (Contemners') Submission

  • The four persons submitted an application apologizing for their conduct; the application (as presented by their counsel) contained a statement (para. 2) that they "did not intentionally want to cause a prejudice in the mind." The apology was presented to the Court at the hearing.
  • On questioning, counsel informed the Court that the application (apology) had been drafted by them (the counsel).
  • The Court records the impression from statements made on behalf of the applicants that they believed they had a right to interfere in cases under Section 110 CrPC pending before Magistrates.

The opinion does not contain a detailed, adversarial presentation of the State's submissions in the contempt hearing; the record refers to the prosecution counsel earlier in the Section 110 proceedings but does not set out an advanced argument by the State in the contempt hearing itself.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Advocate General v. Maung Chit Maung, A.I.R. (27) 1940 Rang. 68 Supports the proposition that High Courts have jurisdiction to punish contempt of subordinate Courts after the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926; the term "subordinate Court" is used broadly. The Court relied on this authority to conclude that, under Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, the High Court has jurisdiction to punish contempt of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate in question.
Additional Sessions Judge, Hardoi v. Banwari Lal, AIR (35) 1948 Oudh 114 Holds that a private communication by a stranger or a witness addressed to a Judge calculated to influence its decision in a pending case constitutes the grossest form of contempt. The Court treated the facts of that case as very similar and applied the principle to find that the letter sent by the four persons was contempt of the gravest kind; it relied on this precedent to characterize the offence and justify a severe response.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Jurisdiction:

The Court examined Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act and construed the words "subordinate Court" and the phrase "appellate jurisdiction" broadly. The opinion explains that "appellate jurisdiction" is not confined to a narrow technical meaning and includes a superior court's power to revise and correct the judgment of an inferior tribunal. On this basis, and following the view in Advocate General v. Maung Chit Maung, the Court concluded that the High Court has jurisdiction to punish contempt committed in relation to proceedings before a Sub-Divisional Magistrate.

Merits — Whether contempt was committed:

The Court compared the present facts with the principle from Additional Sessions Judge, Hardoi v. Banwari Lal and held that a private communication by witnesses/strangers to a judge calculated to influence his decision in a pending case is among the grossest forms of contempt. The letter sent by the four persons (signed by them and accompanied by a list of 40 witnesses with comments alleging partiality) was found to be of that character. The Court observed that the four witnesses "laid the foundation for the whole proceedings" and that their conduct — sending the letter while defence evidence was being produced — was not the conduct of mere witnesses but an attempt to procure adverse orders "whether by legitimate means or by resort to unlawful tactics."

Apology and sentencing approach:

The applicants tendered an apology. Under Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act the Court was not bound to accept it. The Court evaluated the apology and concluded it was not a sincere, penitent admission: para. 2 of the apology claiming that the applicants "did not intentionally want to cause a prejudice in the mind" was described by the Court as a wrong statement of fact and an attempt to justify the conduct. The apology was characterized as halting, hesitating and vacillating, and therefore rejected.

The Court also considered deterrence and the growing incidence of such unauthorised interference. It held that fines alone had insufficient deterrent effect and that imprisonment was necessary in the ends of justice. The Court took into account that the application had been drafted by counsel and that the contemners were literate and some held responsible positions in the Panchayat, indicating an expectation that they should have known better. The Court further criticized earlier judicial officers (the trial Magistrate and the Sessions Judge) for not taking a serious view and observed that such matters should be promptly reported to the High Court.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court found that contempt of the gravest kind was committed by the four persons. It refused to accept the apology tendered on their behalf and sentenced each of the four opposite parties to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month and to pay Rs.160 as costs of the State Counsel.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: Each of the four contemners was ordered to undergo one month's simple imprisonment and to pay Rs.160 as costs.
  • Administrative and deterrent message: The Court emphasized that such unauthorized private communications aimed at influencing judicial proceedings are a serious offence, that fines may be inadequate as deterrence, and that such conduct should be promptly reported to the High Court for speedy action. The Court expressed the view that persons in responsible village positions are expected to know better and must be disillusioned of any belief that they have a right to interfere in pending magistrate proceedings.
  • No suggestion in the opinion that a new legal principle was invented; the decision rests on application of existing statute (Contempt of Courts Act) and precedents cited.

Order: "Order accordingly." (recorded in the judgment).

D.R.R

    The State v. Krishna Madho And Others Opposite Parties.

    Beg, J.:— In pursuance of an order made by a single Judge of this Court on 12-3-1951, four persons — Krishna Madho, Balak Ram, Chunni Lal & Manni Ram — appeared before us to show cause why they should not be punished for having committed contempt of Court. Krishna Madho is the Pradhan & Balak Ram, the Up-Pradhan of the Gram Sabha of village Aurahwa, police station Pachperwa, district Gonda, Chunni Lal is a Prantiya Raksha Dal leader & Manni Ram is a Panch of the Panchayat.

    2. The background of this case may be shortly stated. On 24-1-1950, Krishna Madho & Balak Ram applied to the Deputy Commissioner, Gonda alleging that Basdeo, Jageshwar, Ishaq & others were bad characters habitually addicted to the committing of thefts & that preventive action should be taken against them. On the same day they as well as Chunni Lal & Manni Ram applied to the Panchayat Officer making a similar request. No report of any date prior to 24-1-1950, the date of the above application, existed against any of the persons named in the applications. After the two applications a large number of reports, one after the other, were made against the persons named in the applications & they culminated in proceedings under Section 110 of the Cr PC against Ishaq, Basdeo & others. The case under Section 110 of the Cr PC was tried by Sri Ghulam Husain, Sub-Divisional Magistrate Utraula, and Magistrate 1st Class Gonda. It must be noted at this stage that Krishna Madho, Balak Ram, Chunni Lal & Manni Ram appeared as prosecution witnesses in the said case. They are P. Ws. 7, 8, 9 & 10 respectively. During the pendency of the case the aforesaid four persons, namely Krishna Madho, Balak Ram, Chunni Lal & Manni Ram sent a letter to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Utraula. This letter which is the basis of the present charge is to the following effect:

    The S.D.O, Utraula,

    State v. 1. Ishaq s/o Kailu

    2. Pujabe s/o Wirey

    3. Kallu s/o Gaya Ram

    4. Sakrullah s/o Namdar

    5. Basdeo s/o Ramdhani resident of village Aurahwa P.S Pachhperwa, U/S 10 I.P.C

    3. Sir,

    It is submitted that we belong to Gramsabha of Aurahwa. Against the above mentioned accused persons a complaint was made to the district officer Police Superintendent by our Panchayat Officer of Gonda on 24-1-50. The case is now pending against the said accused in your Hon'ble Court. Prosecution evidence has been finished. The defence evidence is going on. The witnesses produced so far & those that will be produced on 4-10-50 are all relations of the accused, a list whereof is herewith filed. This fact may be given due consideration. These people defraud Court. The list is contained on two pages. It may be brought on the file.”

    4. The above letter is signed by Krishna Madho, Pradhan, Gram Sabha Aurahwa, Balak Ram, Up-Pradhan, Chunni Lal Group Leader Aurahwa & Manni Ram, Gram Rakshak. It does not bear any date tout the contents of the letter indicate that it was sent after the prosecution case was closed & just before the defence evidence was going to be produced. Appended to this letter is long list of 40 witnesses with comments against the name of each witness giving reasons why he is an interested or partial witness in the case & should, therefore be, disbelieved. The case resulted in an order binding down all the persons against whom the proceedings were taken. Pour of the persons bound down appealed before Sri Abdul Qasim Zaidi, Ses. J. Gonda, who dismissed the appeal. A revision against the said order of dismissal was filed in this Court (Criminal Revision No. 227 of 1950). This application was heard by Kidwai J., who delivered judgment in the case on 12-3-1951, allowing the revision & ordering the discharge of the applicants. In the course of his judgment, he observed as follows:

    “The statements of Krishna Madho P.W 7, Balak Ram P.W 8, Chunni Lal P.W 9 & Manni Ram P.W 10 are not entitled to any weight at all inspite of the position which they occupy, because they have shown themselves to be clearly prejudiced witnesses. They laid the foundation for the whole proceedings and it appears from the record that when defence evidence was being produced & the counsel cross-examining the defence witnesses had failed to establish any relationship or connection between the defence witnesses & the accused which might in any way go to shake the credit of the defence witnesses, they had the temerity to address a letter to the Court pointing out what they alleged to be the relationship between the witnesses & the accused. This is not the conduct of mere witnesses, but indicates an endeavour on their part to have orders adverse to the applicants passed whether by legitimate means or by resort to unlawful tactics.”

    5. After discussing the prosecution evidence, he went on as follows:

    “On the other hand, the defence has been able to produce no less than 35 witnesses, all coming from the same village. The learned Ses. J. has not considered this evidence at all & the consideration of this evidence by the trial Court is very cursory & it is unfortunate that it appears that the learned Magistrate has allowed himself to be influenced not by evidence on the record but by allegations made by Krishna Madho, Balak Ram, Chunni Lal & Manni Ram in the letter which they addressed to him stating that the witnesses for the defence were related either to one or the other accused or to each other.

    I have been taken through the evidence of each of these witnesses & the learned counsel appearing for the State has been unable to indicate what the evidence on the record is to show the relationship of any of the defence witnesses to the accused, except D.W 4 Abdul Razzaq & D.W 29 Drigpal.”

    6. In view of the remarks made in his judgment, he passed a separate order on the same day directing that a notice should be issued against Krishna Madho, Balak Ram, Chunni Lal, & Manni Ram to show cause why they should not be punished under the Contempt of Courts Act & the present proceedings against the applicants are the result of that notice.

    7. On the date of hearing the four persons against whom notices were issued were present in person. They were also represented by their counsel, who presented an application submitting an apology.

    8. So far as the question of jurisdiction is concerned, under Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, the High Courts of judicature established by Letters Patent have the same jurisdiction powers & authority in respect of contempt of Courts subordinate to them as they have in respect of contempts of themselves. The Court in which the proceedings under Section 110 of the Cr PC took place was a criminal Court. The words “subordinate Court” seem to have been used in a wide sense so as to include any Court which the High Court has appellate jurisdiction, though as a matter of fact an appeal may not lie to the High Court in any particular case. The term “appellate jurisdiction” is not understood in the narrow technical sense in contradiction to revisional jurisdiction. The appellate jurisdiction implies a resort from an inferior tribunal of justice to a superior for the purpose of revising & correcting the judgment of the inferior tribunal. There seems, therefore, to be no doubt that after the passing of Contempt of Courts Act of 1926, the High Court has jurisdiction to punish contempt of Court of a sub-divisional Magistrate. This view of law is in consonance with the view taken in ‘Advocate General v. Maung Chit Maung,’ (A.I.R(27) 1940 Rang. 68).

    9. So far as the merits of the case are concerned, it is equally clear that contempt of Court of the gravest possible kind has been committed in this case. In Additional Sessions Judge ‘Hardoi v. Banwari Lal’, AIR (35) 1948 Oudh 114 it was laid down by a Bench of the late Chief Court of Oudh that “a private communication by a stranger or a witness addressed to a Judge calculated to influence its decision in a pending case constituted the grossest form of contempt”. The facts of that case were very similar to that of the present case & the law relating to the contempt of Court laid down in that case applies fully to this case. We have no doubt that the offence is of a very serious nature.

    10. The persons proceeded against have, however, submitted an application submitting an apology & the question before us is whether we should accept this apology. Under Section 3 of the Contempt of Courts Act, this Court is not bound to accept the apology. The question whether the Court should or should not accept the apology would depend upon the circumstances of each particular case. Even if the Court accepts an apology, it may still inflict punishment upon an accused person.

    11. We have examined the contents of the application submitted on behalf of the accused. Para. 2 of the application states that the applicants “did not intentionally want to cause a prejudice in the mind.” This is obviously a wrong statement of fact & an attempt on the part of the contemners to justify their conduct. This apology is not a free & frank confession of their guilt indicating a penitent attitude on their part, but an attempt to justify their conduct under the cover of bona fides. A haulting, hesitating & vacillating apology of this nature deserves to be rejected & thrown out. We accordingly refuse to accept this apology & pass on to consider the question of sentence.

    12. It may be noted that offences of this kind, committed by unauthorised persons, are becoming more & more rampant. Mere infliction of sentence of fine does not seem to have deterrent effect. Under the circumstances we think that it is necessary to pass a sentence of imprisonment.

    13. On putting question to the counsel appearing for the accused we were informed that this application was drafted by them. They are obviously literate persons. Some of them seem to hold responsible position in the Panchayat of the village. They are expected to know better. The statements made on their behalf by their counsel before us indicated that they thought that they had some sort of right to interfere in cases under Section 110 of the Cr PC pending before Magistrates. This is certainly a very sorry state of affairs & the sooner they are disillusioned the better for them as well as for the administration of justice in the State.

    14. It is unfortunate that neither the Magistrate, before whom the trial took place, nor the Ses. J., before whom the appeal went up, took a serious view of the matter. Cases of this kind should immediately be reported to the High Court for speedy & quick action. In the larger interest of the administration of justice they should never be allowed to go unnoticed. The matter came to light only accidentally when the proceedings came up in revision before this Court & we take a very serious view of the circumstances of this case. We feel that in the ends of justice nothing less than a sentence of imprisonment should be awarded to enable the applicants to purge their guilt. We accordingly order that each of the opposite parties should undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month & in addition pay Rs. 160/- as costs of the State Counsel appearing in the case.

    D.R.R

    15. Order accordingly.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    The State v. Krishna Madho And Others Opposite Parties.
    (Jul 24, 1951)