Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

Criminal Misc. Case No. 1684 of 1951

Attorney(S)

P.C. Chaturvedi
D.P. Uniyal
D.G.A.

Judges

Raghubar Dayal, J.

Acts

Sub-sections (1), (2) and (5) of Section 17 of the Cr PC, are:17(1).
Sub-ss. (1) and (2) of Section 14 of the Cr PC are:14(1)
Ss. 192(1), 407(2) and 528, sub ss. (2) and (3). Section 12
section of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Section 9, sub-s. (2) and sub-s. (4)
SECTION 161 PENAL CODE
sub-section and S. 437.13.
sub divisions. Section 9
Sub-section (2) of S. 9
Code. Sub-section (2)

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Application of Lalta Prasad Saxena under ss. 526 & 561-A, CrPC

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an application by Lalta Prasad Saxena under Sections 526 and 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking either:

transfer of the criminal case against him (an offence alleged under s. 161 of the Penal Code) from the Court of Sri G.S. Misra, Magistrate 1st Class at Lucknow, to the Court of some other Magistrate in the district of Farrukhabad; or
a direction that Sri G.S. Misra hold his Court in the district of Farrukhabad.

The affidavit in support states that the applicant was a booking clerk in charge at Pakhna railway station (Farrukhabad district), that the alleged offence under s.161 IPC occurred on 6-7-1950, and that the Special Police Establishment (SPE), Lucknow, investigated and submitted a charge-sheet on 6-4-1951 in the Court of Sri G.S. Misra. The applicant alleges that a government notification dated 21-1-1950, conferring magisterial powers on Sri G.S. Misra to try or commit cases investigated by the Government of India Special Police Establishment throughout the United Provinces, is wholly illegal and therefore that Misra lacked jurisdiction. The affidavit also states that trial in Lucknow causes hardship and expense to the accused and his Farrukhabad-based defence witnesses.

The High Court considered the application, discussed statutory provisions and precedent, expressed views on the legality of the notification, and ultimately ordered transfer of the case to the Court of the District Magistrate, Farrukhabad, with liberty for the District Magistrate to transfer it for trial to any other competent Magistrate. The application was allowed.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether, in the interests of justice and convenience, the criminal case against the applicant should be transferred from the Court of Sri G.S. Misra at Lucknow to the Court in Farrukhabad (or whether Sri G.S. Misra should be directed to hold Court in Farrukhabad).
Whether the government notification (dated 21-1-1950) conferring powers under Section 14 of the CrPC on a Special Magistrate to try or commit cases investigated by the Government of India Special Police Establishment throughout the United Provinces was legally valid (i.e., whether a Special Magistrate may be appointed for the entire province/state under the expression "in any local area").
How the territorial principles of trial and appellate/revisional jurisdiction under the CrPC (notably ss. 14, 16, 17, 177 and the provisions dealing with sessions divisions and districts) affect the place of trial, the place of sitting of a Magistrate, and the proper forum for appeal or revision.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

The notification dated 21-1-1950 is wholly illegal and did not confer jurisdiction on Sri G.S. Misra to try the applicant's case.
Trial in Lucknow amounts to harassment of the accused: he must travel from Farrukhabad to Lucknow on each hearing date; his income is small (Rs. 80 per month); most defence witnesses reside in Farrukhabad and attendance in Lucknow would be inconvenient and costly.
The notification is an abuse of the power conferred on the State Government as it appears to afford facility only to the prosecution (because SPE headquarters are at Lucknow) while disregarding convenience of the accused.
For these reasons the case should be tried in Farrukhabad, the ordinary place where the offence would have been tried.

State's Arguments

The learned counsel for the State did not dispute that trial at Farrukhabad would be more convenient to the accused but suggested that the Government's order (placing SPE cases before a Special Magistrate at Lucknow) may have been made because the SPE's headquarters are at Lucknow and it would have been inconvenient for the investigating staff to travel to other places to produce evidence.
No particular legal necessity was advanced that made trial at Lucknow "very desirable and necessary" in the specific case; the State could not suggest special reasons making Lucknow the only appropriate forum.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Lakshman Chavji v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1931 Bom. 313	Observation that public and parties' confidence in the court is vital; a reasonable apprehension amounting to lack of confidence may render transfer advisable; a special judge or special venue may be used to destroy confidence.	The Court quoted this passage and agreed that the possibility of loss of confidence or appearance of unfairness supports transferring the case to the ordinary venue (Farrukhabad) in the absence of strong countervailing considerations.
Lakhmi Chand v. Emperor, 24 Pun. Re. 1901 Cr. p. 59	Held that the expression "in any local area" (in s.14) is wide enough to include the entire State.	The Court noted this authority as stating that "in any local area" may include the entire State, but proceeded to analyse the statutory scheme and to qualify how a magistrate appointed for a wide area should be understood.
Hira Lal v. Emperor, 19 Cri. L.J. 310 (Lah.)	Also held that the expression "in any local area" can include the entire province/state.	Referenced alongside Lakhmi Chand to show that courts have accepted a wide meaning of "in any local area"; the Court nevertheless developed its interpretation that a Special Magistrate with statewide powers is to be regarded as a distinct Special Magistrate for each district/area in which he exercises jurisdiction.
Valia Ambu Poduval v. Emperor, 30 Mad. 136	Held that appeals from a 1st class Magistrate "holding his Court at Calicut" (in relation to matters in another part of the district) should lie to the Sessions Court within whose local limits the Magistrate's Court is situate; interpreted "situate" as referring to the place where the Court ordinarily sits.	The Court expressed disagreement with that Madras view, declining to accept that "situate" must be read as location-based rather than as relating to the inferior Court exercising jurisdiction within the local limits of the superior Court's jurisdiction.
Queen-Empress v. Fazl Azim, 17 All. 36 (Full Bench)	Observed it was irregular for a Sessions Judge to hear appeal outside the local area of his sessions division; judicial acts limited as to locality should be done within the locality to which authority is limited.	The Court relied on this principle to support the conclusion that Special Magistrates must exercise jurisdiction within the areas conferred on them and that their subordination and appellate/revisional links follow territorial jurisdiction, not merely the physical place of sitting.
Public Prosecutor v. Sadananda Patnaih, 13 Cr. L.J. 850 (Mad.)	Held that where a Magistrate has jurisdiction over two areas under different Sessions Courts, appeals should lie to the Sessions Judge who has territorial jurisdiction over the particular case — appellate forum depends on territorial jurisdiction of the case, not on the Magistrate's physical location.	The Court found this case supportive of its view that appellate and revisional jurisdiction depend on the territorial jurisdiction relating to the offence/case, not the Magistrate's place of sitting; it used this to reject an interpretation that would allow a Magistrate to choose his own appeal or revision forum based on his physical sitting place.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two linked strands of analysis: (A) the question of convenience and whether transfer should be ordered in the present case; and (B) the broader legal question on the validity and effect of the notification purporting to confer statewide magisterial powers on a Special Magistrate under Section 14 of the CrPC.

A. Convenience and transfer in the present case

The Court accepted that it would be much more convenient for the accused that the case be tried at Farrukhabad because the alleged offence occurred within that district and most defence witnesses would be there; trial at Farrukhabad would avoid repeated journeys and expense for the accused and witnesses.
The State's counsel could not point to any particular reason making trial at Lucknow "very desirable and necessary," beyond a possible administrative convenience to the investigating Special Police Establishment located at Lucknow.
The Court weighed the potential inconvenience to the investigating agency against the inconvenience to an accused forced to defend himself in another district and found the latter to be the more persuasive consideration against forcing the accused to litigate away from the ordinary venue.
The Court also relied on the principle (quoted from Lakshman Chavji) that public and party confidence in the court is vital and that the use of a special venue or special judge can undermine that confidence; absent strong necessity, the ordinary course of justice (trial in the ordinary place) should be preserved.

B. Legality and interpretation of the notification under Section 14 and related provisions

The Court examined Section 14(1)–(2) (power to confer magisterial powers in "any local area" and appointment of Special Magistrates), and surrounding provisions in Chapters dealing with districts, sessions divisions and the appointment and subordination of magistrates (ss.7–17, 177 etc.).
Although earlier authorities (Lakhmi Chand and Hira Lal) treated "in any local area" as wide enough to include a State, the Court developed a nuanced interpretation: while the Government can confer magisterial powers that extend over several districts or even the entire State, the same person so empowered will, in effect, be treated as a distinct Special Magistrate for each district or area in which he exercises jurisdiction.
The Court emphasized statutory subordination: a Special Magistrate appointed under s.14 is subordinate to the District Magistrate and, within sub-divisions where he exercises jurisdiction, to the Sub-divisional Magistrate. This subordination depends on the areas where magisterial powers are actually exercised and is not dependent on the magistrate's place of sitting.
Section 177's principle — that every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction it was committed — was applied as relating to the Court exercising jurisdiction, not to the physical place of sitting of that Court.
The Court rejected the Madras view (as represented in Valia Ambu Poduval) that the word "situate" in provisions referring to inferior criminal courts necessarily required fixation of the location of a Magistrate's Court for appellate/revisional purposes; instead, the Court read those provisions to focus on territorial jurisdiction of the Court rather than mere physical sitting.
Relying also on Public Prosecutor v. Sadananda Patnaih and Queen-Empress v. Fazl Azim, the Court concluded that appellate and revisional jurisdiction should follow the territorial jurisdiction relevant to the particular case and not be determined by where a Special Magistrate happens to hold his Court.
On these grounds the Court held there was nothing illegal in the Governor conferring upon Sri Girja Shanker Misra powers of a Magistrate of the first class to try or commit cases investigated by the SPE throughout the entire United Provinces, so long as he held the office — but such a magistrate will be subordinate and his jurisdiction understood in territorial terms (distinct special magistrate persona for each district/area).

The Court's reasoning combined statutory construction of the CrPC provisions with considerations of convenience and public confidence in judicial administration, balancing administrative convenience of the investigating agency against fairness and practicality for the accused.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The application was allowed. The Court ordered that the case pending against Lalta Prasad Saxena be transferred from the Court of Sri Girja Shanker Misra, Magistrate First Class (Lucknow), to the Court of the District Magistrate, Farrukhabad, with the direction that the District Magistrate may transfer it for trial to any other competent Magistrate.

Implications:

Direct effect on the parties: the accused's case is to be tried in Farrukhabad (or before a Magistrate competent thereunder as the District Magistrate may direct), removing the need for repeated attendance in Lucknow and reducing expense and inconvenience to the accused and his witnesses.
On the legality of the notification: the Court concluded that it is not illegal for the Governor to confer powers under s.14 of the CrPC that, in effect, extend across the entire province/state, provided that such a Special Magistrate's jurisdiction is to be understood territorially (a distinct persona for each district), and that subordinations and appellate/revisional links operate on the basis of territorial jurisdiction rather than mere place of sitting.
The Court's analysis clarifies that (i) a Special Magistrate may exercise jurisdiction over wide areas, (ii) such a magistrate remains subordinate to District and Sub-divisional Magistrates in respect of the areas in which he exercises jurisdiction, and (iii) the ordinary territorial principle (s.177) and the structure of appeal/revision govern forum questions rather than a rigid notion of the magistrate's physical place of sitting.
The decision resulted in the transfer ordered in this case; it also expressed legal conclusions about the scope and limits of s.14 appointments and about how territorial jurisdiction principles operate in the CrPC context.

Disposition: Application allowed; case transferred as directed by the Court.

(Signed in the opinion: V.S.B.)

Show full summary ...

Lalta Prasad Saxena v. State

1. This is an application by Lalta Prasad Saxena under Sections 526 and 561-A of the Cr PC, for either transferring a criminal case against him under Section 161 of the Penal Code, from the Court of Sri G.S Misra, Magistrate 1st class, Uttar Pradesh to the Court of some other Magistrate in the district of Farrukhabad or to direct Sri G.S Misra to hold his Court in the district of Farrukhabad. The affidavit accompanying the application shows that the applicant was employed as booking clerk in charge as Pakhna railway station in the district of Farrukhabad, that he was alleged to have committed an offence under Section 161 of the Penal Code on 6-7-1950, and that the police of the Special Police Establishment Branch, Lucknow, investigated the offence and submitted a charge-sheet against the applicant on 6-4-1951, in the Court of Sri G.S Misra. It is alleged in the affidavit that the notification dated 21-1-1950, conferring powers on Sri G.S Misra of a Magistrate of the first class to try or commit cases, investigated by the Government of India, Special Police Establishment throughout the United Provinces, was wholly illegal and did not confer any jurisdiction on him in the eye of law and that, therefore, Sri G.S Misra had no jurisdiction to try the applicant's case. It was further alleged that the trial of the case at Lucknow amounts to an harassment of the accused who has to appear at Lucknow on every date fixed for the case, he getting Rs. 80 per month. All the defence witnesses would be from Farrukhabad district and the applicant expects to produce about ten witnesses. It is further alleged that the notification aforesaid is an abuse of the power conferred by the Code of Criminal Procedure on the State Government as this Court had been created to afford facility and advantage only to the prosecution apparently because the headquarters of the Special Police Establishment are at Lucknow, disregarding the facility or the convenience of the accused. It is alleged that the convenience of the parties requires that the case be tried in Farrukhabad district.

2. There is no doubt that it would be mush more convenient to the accused applicant that the case be tried at Farrukhabad where ordinarily the case would have been tried as the alleged offence under s. 161, I.P.C, took place at a place within Farrukhabad district. The learned counsel for the State has not been able to suggest that trial at Farrukhabad would not be convenient to the accused. Trial there will avoid his visits to Lucknow on the dates fixed for hearing and on some of the dates on which the case might have to be adjourned for any good reason. He will have to incur more expenses in summoning witnesses to Lucknow from Farrukhabad. Such witnesses may also feel it inconvenient to go to Lucknow. The learned counsel for the State has not been able to suggest any particular reason which makes it very desirable and necessary that the case should be tried at Lucknow. It appears to me that what is alleged in the affidavit filed with this application is a possible reason for the order of the Government that cases, investigated by the Government of India, Special Police Establishment throughout the United Provinces, should be tried by the Special Magistrate, the reason being that this establishment is located at Lucknow and it might have been considered inconvenient for the limited staff to go to or produce evidence at other places. To my mind this possible inconvenience to the investigating the does not outweigh the inconvenience to which an accused from another district is subject when he has to undertake his defence in another district. Farrukhabad is not very far from Lucknow, but I can imagine an accused of Dehra Dun or Deoria or other places distant from Lucknow being tried at Lucknow in view of this notification.

3. In this connection I may refer to another aspect of the matter and in that connection would simply quote the observations of Madgavkar J. in Lakshman Chavji v. Emperor, A.I.R(18) 1931 Bom. 313:

“Confidence in the Court administering justice on the part of both parties and of the public is also a vital element in the administration of justice, so much so that a reasonable apprehension, tantamount to lack of confidence, has been held by the Courts to render a transfer advisable. A Special Judge or a special venue directed by the Local Government is apt or at least is capable of being used to destroy this confidence, and except where the supreme need of justice is clearly such as to ??? these considerations, the ordinary course of justice is best left untouched.”

4. With respect I agree with these remarks and in the absence of any suggested considerations on behalf of the State for the necessity of the trial of this case at Lucknow I am of opinion that this consideration would also justify an order transferring the case to the Court at Farrukhabad, i.e, the ordinary place where the case would be tried.

5. As a much wider question about the legality of the notification itself has been raised and argued, I would like to express my opinion on that question as well. Sub-ss. (1) and (2) of Section 14 of the Cr PC are:

“14(1) The Local Government may confer upon any person all or and of the powers conferred or ??? by or under this Code on a Magistrate of the first, second or third class in respect to particular cases, or to a particular class or particular classes of cases, or in regard to cases generally in any local area outside the Presidency towns.

(2) Such Magistrates shall be called Special Magistrate, and shall be appointed for such term as the Local Government may by general or special order direct.”

6. The contention for the applicant is that the expression “in any local area” in sub-s. (1) contemplates a defined area within a district and cannot include the entire province or State and that, therefore a Special Magistrate cannot be appointed for the entire State. The expression is certainly wide enough to include the entire State land it has been so held in Lakhmi Chand v. Emperor, 24 Pun. Re. 1901 Cr. p. 59 and Hira Lal v. Emperor, 19 Cri. L.J 310 (Lah.). I am, however, of opinion that the Code contemplated the appointment of a Special Magistrate having jurisdiction within the entire district or a certain area within it. This seems to me to be apparent from the various provisions to which reference will be made hereafter. That, however, should not mean that conferring jurisdiction on a person with respect to cases in the entire S. are is outside the purview of S. 14. It is possible that the same person may have conferred on him magisterial powers with respect to cases arising within an area of several districts as well, but in that case he will combine in himself the offices of a Special Magistrate in each district, though as a Special Magistrate for each district he will have a distinct personality. I am, therefore, of opinion that the Government can confer magisterial powers on a person in the entire area of the State, but the Magistrate would be considered to be a distinct special Magistrate for each district.

7. Section 7 provides for the existence of sessions divisions and districts in a province. A sessions division must consist of one or more districts. Section 8 provides for the division of a district into sub divisions. Section 9 provides for the establishment of a Court of Session for every sessions division and for the appointment of a Judge of such Court. Sub-section (2) of S. 9 empowers the State Government, by general or special order in the Official Gazette, to direct at what place or places the Court of Session shall hold its sitting. Sub-section (3) empowers the Provincial Government to appoint Additional Sessions Judges and Assistant Sessions Judges to exercise jurisdiction in one or more such Courts. Sub-section (4) provides for appointing a Sessions Judge of one sessions division as an Additional Sessions Judge of another sessions division and also for the Government to direct as to where he was to sit for the disposal of cases in either division. Section 10 deals with the appointment of a District Magistrate in every district and also with the appointment of any Additional District Magistrate who by virtue of sub s. (3) is to be subordinate to the District Magistrate for the purpose of Ss. 192(1), 407(2) and 528, sub ss. (2) and (3). Section 12 deals with the appointment of other Magistrates in any district and empowers the State Government or the District Magistrate, subject to the control of the State Government, to define local areas within which such persons may exercise all or any of the powers with which they may respectively be invested under this Code. Sub-section (2) provides that if no such local area be defined such Magistrates will have jurisdiction throughout the district to which they are appointed section 13 deals with the appointment of Sub-divisional Magistrates in charge of a sub-division. Section 15 deals with the appointment of Bench Magistrates. It also authorises the State Government to fix the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Bench Magistrates. Section 16 authorizes the State Government or the District Magistrate to make rules with respect to several matters including the times and places of sitting of the Benches. Sub-sections (1), (2) and (5) of Section 17 of the Cr PC, are:

“17(1). All Magistrates appointed under Ss. 12, 13 and 14, and all Benches constituted under 8. 15, shall be subordinate to the District Magistrate, and he may, from time to time, make rules or give special orders consistent with this Code as to the distribution of business among such Magistrates and benches; and

(2) Every Magistrate (other than & Sub-divisional Magistrate) and every Bench exercising powers in a subdivision shall also be subordinate to the Sub-divisional Magistrate, subject, however, to the general control of the District Magistrate.

(5) Neither the District Magistrate nor the Magistrates or Benches appointed or constituted under Ss. 12, 13, 14 and 15 shall be subordinate to the Sessions Judge, except to the extent and in the manner hereinafter expressly provided.”

8. It should appear that a Special Magistrate appointed under s. 14 is subordinate to the District Magistrate who can give direction about the distribution of work among him and other Magistrates and is also subordinate to the Sub-divisional Magistrate within whose sub-division he exercises jurisdiction. This should mean, to my mind, that when magisterial powers are conferred on a person under S. 14 for cases within a district he will be subordinate to the various Sub-divisional Magistrates in the district within whose sub divisions he exercises jurisdiction, and that, therefore, each individual Sub-divisional Magistrate will be competent to exercise the various powers which are conferred on a Sub-divisional Magistrate with respect to cases before a Court subordinate to him. Of course, a particular Sub-divisional Magistrate will exercise such powers with respect to the cases which arise in his sub-division and not with respect to such cases pending in the Court of the Special Magistrate which arose within some other sub-division. Similarly, if the local area over which a Special Magistrate appointed under S. 14, exercises jurisdiction ??? over several districts he will be subordinate to the District Magistrates of the various districts with respect to the cases arising in their respective districts and also sub-ordinate to the various Sub-divisional Magistrates with respect to the cases arising within their respective sub-divisions and pending before him. This subordination of a Special Magistrate appointed under S. 14 is not dependent on his place of sitting, whether that be a fixed place or not. His subordination is dependent on his exercising magisterial powers within certain sub divisions and districts. In view of sub-s. (5) such a Special Magistrate is not subordinate to the Sessions Judge except to the extent and in the manner expressly provided in subsequent sections. In whatever circumstances he may be subordinate to the Sessions Judge under subsequent provisions the subordination, to my mind, would be dependent on the same principle, i.e, he will be sub-ordinate to a particular Sessions Judge with respect to the cases of that sessions division and not with respect to the cases of another sessions division if he as a Special Magistrate has jurisdiction over several sessions divisions.

9. Section 177 of the Cr PC, provides that:

“Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction it was committed.”

10. It also has reference to the Court and not to the place of sitting of the Court.

11. The various sections dealing with appeals in chap. XXXI of the Cr PC, just mention that certain orders from certain Courts will be appealable to such and such a superior Court and make no reference to the place of sitting of the Court. A superior Court, be it of the District Magistrate or the Sessions Judge, has also territorial jurisdiction and is competent to hear appeals with respect to cases arising within its territorial jurisdiction. It is not to heir an appeal in a case which related to an offence committed outside its jurisdiction. It was not, therefore, necessary to mention in this chapter that the appeals will go to the Courts of such District Magistrates and Sessions Judges as have jurisdiction. The Code contemplated that trial Courts will have territorial jurisdiction over the cases tried and that appeals from such Courts would go to the District Magistrates and Sessions Judges within whose jurisdiction those Co-arts exercised jurisdiction and the cases decided by them arose. Exceptional cases can arise when cases are transferred from the Courts having territorial jurisdiction over them to some other Courts by the High Court in the exercise of its powers under Section 526 of the Cr PC. It may be mentioned that S. 526, sub-s. (1) authorises the High Court to order that any offence be inquired into or tried by any Court not empowered under Ss. 177 to 184 (both inclusive) but in other respects competent to inquire into or try such offences. It is in view of this particular provision that the High Court can transfer a case to a Court which has no territorial jurisdiction over it. Appeals against original orders in such cases by the Court which had no territorial jurisdiction over them would be entertainable as a special case by the superior Court within whose jurisdiction the trial Court exercises jurisdiction.

12. It was held in Valia Ambu Poduval v. Emperor, 30 Mad. 136 that appeals against orders of the first class Magistrate holding his Court at Calicut situate within the local limits of the South Malabar Sessions Court in cases relating to North Malabar will lie to the Court of Session of South Malabar and not to the Court of Session of North Malabar. This decision was arrived at in view of Section 408 of the Cr PC, which simply states that appeals from first class Magistrates would lie to the Court of Session, and s. 435, which dealt with revisions and provided that the Sessions Judge might call for and examine the records of any inferior criminal Court situate within the local limits of his jurisdiction. It was said that the word “situate” meant fixed or located, and when applied to a Court it must be taken to refer to the place where the Court ordinarily sits. I am not inclined to agree with this view. Section 435 is the only section which could have some reference to the location of a criminal Court. Sub-section (1) empowers the High Court or a Sessions Judge or District Magistrate or any Sub-divisional Magistrate empowered by the State Government in this behalf to call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior criminal Court situate within the local limits of its or his jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order recorded or passed, and also provides that

“all Magistrates, whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and S. 437.”

13. I am of opinion that there should not be any difficulty in interpreting the expression “inferior criminal Court situate within the local limits of its or his jurisdiction” to mean an inferior Court exercising jurisdiction within the local limits of its or his jurisdiction. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not provide for the location of the Courts of Magistrates and does not authorise anyone to order such location. Section 9, sub-s. (2) and sub-s. (4) empower the State Government to direct at what place or places the Court of Session shall hold its sitting or a Session Judge who is an Additional Sessions Judge of another sessions division shall sit for the disposal of casts. Section 16 authorises the Government to fix the places of sitting of Bench Magistrates, but Ss. 10, 12, 13 and 14, which deal with the appointment of Magistrates and Special Magistrates, do not authorise the State Government or any one else to fix the place of sitting of those officers, though they do provide for the specification of the area in which those officers will exercise jurisdiction. It should not, however, be taken that Magistrates can hold their Courts anywhere they like. They are to hold their Courts within the area in which they are to exercise jurisdiction. It was observed in the Full Bench case of Queen-Empress v. Fazl Azim, 17 All. 36, at p. 37:

“We have no hesitation in saying that the Sessions Judge did commit an irregularity in hearing the appeal outside the local area which constitutes his sessions division, for, it is a general and well known rule that all judicial acts exercised by persons whose judicial authority is limited as to locality should be done within the locality to which such authority is limited. It is an irregularity which should not be allowed to recur.”

14. It follows, therefore, that a Special Magistrate appointed under S. 14 can hold Court anywhere within his jurisdiction. He cannot, however, be: ordered by anyone to hold his Court at any particular place, as no such power is given to anyone under s. 14 or any other section of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the Madras view mentioned above be accepted, it would mean that a Special Magistrate whose jurisdiction extends to several districts or to the entire province will have the freedom to choose his own Court of appeal and revision. I do not think that this could have been contemplated by the Legislature.

15. My view finds support from the case of Public Prosecutor v. Sadananda Patnaih, 13 Cr. L.J 850 (Mad.). The old Ganjam Collectorate was divided into an agency district and a non-agency district and the agency district was also a sessions division, the Sessions Judge of which was the agent himself. The non-agency district was quite distinct from the agency district though the same person was the Sub-divisional Magistrate of both. Similarly, the Gumsoor sub-division consisted of a part of the non-agency district and of a part of the agency district and the same first class Magistrate had jurisdiction is both. It was held that the Magistrates of the agency district were not as such in any way subordinate to the sessions Court of the non-agency sessions division of Ganjam and that the mere fact that the same person was a first class sub-divisional Magistrate in both districts did not make him subordinate to the Sessions Court of the Ganjam sessions division in regard to his jurisdiction in the agency district. It was, therefore, held that the Sessions Judge of the non-agency district had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal, which should have been made not to him but to the agent who was the Sessions Judge of the agency district. The earlier Madras case reported in 30 Mad. 136 was distinguished in this case on the ground that there one district consisted of two sessions divisions. With respect, I am not able to see the distinction but it is clear from this later case of the Madras High Court that if a Magistrate has jurisdiction over two areas, one of which is within the jurisdiction of one Sessions Court and the other within the jurisdiction of another Sessions Court, his orders will be appeal-able to that Sessions Judge who has territorial jurisdiction over that particular case. The appellate forum was not held to be on the basis of the location of the Magistrate's Court.

16. Considering the question in its various aspects as discussed above, I am of the opinion that there is nothing illegal in the Governor's conferring upon Sri Girja Shanker Misra powers of a Magistrate of the first class to try or commit cases investigated by the Government of India Special Police Establishment throughout the entire United Provinces for so long as he holds the office of Special Magistrate.

17. In view of the above, I am of opinion that it is desirable on the ground of convenience that the case pending against Lalta Praead Saxena, the applicant, be transferred from the Court of Sri Girja Shanker Misra, Magistrate first class, to the Court of the District Magistrate, Farrukhabad. I, therefore, order that this case be transferred to the Court of the District Magistrate, Farrukhabid, with the direction that he can transfer it for trial to any other competent Magistrate.

V.S.B

18. Application allowed.

Lalta Prasad Saxena v. State

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Application of Lalta Prasad Saxena under ss. 526 & 561-A, CrPC

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

State's Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

A. Convenience and transfer in the present case

B. Legality and interpretation of the notification under Section 14 and related provisions

Holding and Implications

Lalta Prasad Saxena v. State

Comments