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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Two adjoining commercial premises at the Mall, Kanpur, bearing municipal numbers 18/53 and 18/54, were occupied respectively by the defendant-applicant Bishan Das (No. 18/53; business: "Kashmir Fruit Mart", selling fresh and dried fruits) and the plaintiff Lakshmi Narain (No. 18/54; general merchant trading as Messrs Chotey Lal and Sons). The rent of No. 18/53 exceeded that of No. 18/54 by Rs. 15 per month. When Bishan Das moved to another shop (No. 18/169) and learned of negotiations for a rival fruit-selling business at another shop, he persuaded Lakshmi Narain to take No. 18/53 on rent.

The parties executed a registered agreement dated 11 April 1935 under which Lakshmi Narain agreed (inter alia) to occupy No. 18/53 for at least three years, not to carry on the business of selling fresh and dried fruits, and to pay damages at Rs. 15 per month if he failed to occupy No. 18/63 during the three-year period. In return, Bishan Das agreed to pay Rs. 16 per month while Lakshmi Narain remained in occupation of No. 18/58 (to compensate for excess rent). Bishan Das paid Rs. 15 monthly under the agreement until December 1937 and then stopped payments.

Lakshmi Narain sued in the Court of Small Causes, Kanpur (suit No. 416 of 1940) to recover amounts due under the agreement for January 1938–December 1939. The defendant defended principally on the ground of novation. The trial court found novation proved and awarded Rs. 45 (covering three months within the original three-year term). On civil revision (No. 285 of 1942), this Court (3 Nov 1943) held evidence of novation inadmissible and that Bishan Das's liability continued beyond three years.

After further non-payment, a subsequent suit (the present matter in revision) sought recovery for the three years preceding that suit. The trial court below overruled defenses that (1) the contract was unenforceable beyond three years and (2) there was no consideration for the post-three-year period, and held those pleas barred by res judicata relying on the earlier suit (No. 416 of 1940). Bishan Das brought the present revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the defendant's plea that the contract was not enforceable for more than three years could be maintained in the subsequent suit, or whether it was barred by res judicata by reason of the earlier litigation (suit No. 416 of 1940).
  2. Whether there was consideration for enforcement of the agreement in respect of the period after the stipulated three years (as raised below).
  3. Whether, when raised for the first time in revision, the argument that the contract was void as a restraint of trade under Section 27 of the Contract Act could be admitted, or whether that point was barred by res judicata.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Defendant Bishan Das) Arguments

  • Initially defended the suit in suit No. 416 of 1940 on the ground of novation of the 11 April 1935 contract; the trial court accepted novation, but this was later rejected on revision.
  • In the suit giving rise to this revision, the defendant pleaded that the contract was not enforceable beyond three years and that there was no consideration for enforcement in respect of any period after the stipulated three years.
  • In this Court (in revision), counsel sought to raise a fresh point not argued below: that the contract was void under Section 27 of the Contract Act as being in restraint of trade.

Respondent's (Plaintiff Lakshmi Narain) Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the plaintiff's legal arguments beyond the fact that the plaintiff sought recovery of amounts payable under the 11 April 1935 agreement and relied on the prior judgment and decree sustaining his claim.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gnanada Govindo v. Nalini Bala Debi, A.I.R. 1926 Cal. 650 (94 I.C. 837) Held (by Calcutta High Court) that an issue decided for determining liability for one period does not operate as res judicata for liability for a different period. The Court rejected the applicability of this case to the present matter, disagreed with its reasoning (as expressed by Mukerji J.), and declined to follow it in preference to binding authority of this Court.
Krishna Behari Roy v. Bunwari Lall, 1 Cal. 144 (2 I.A. 283 P.C.) Passage used in earlier decisions relating to the doctrine of res judicata under the old Code (Act VIII of 1859), where the bar depended on identity of causes of action. The Court explained that the Judicial Committee's reasoning under the old Code (Section 2, Act VIII of 1859) differs from the present law under Section 11 of the CPC, and therefore the old formulation cannot be read as authoritative for issues of res judicata under the present Code.
Nubo v. Foyzbuksh, 1 Cal. 202 (24 W.R. 403); Vishnu v. Banding, 26 Bom. 25 (3 Bom. L.R. 450); Natesa v. Venkatarama, 30 Mad. 510 (17 M.L.J. 518); Dwarlea Das v. Akhay Singh, 30 All. 470 (5 A.L.J. 407) Examples cited by Mukerji J. for the proposition that in suits for recurring liabilities res judicata applies only if the question of liability for all times was directly and substantially in issue and decided. The Court noted these cases as part of the Calcutta judgment's exposition but treated Mukerji J.'s reliance upon the identity-of-cause approach as unsuited to the present Code; the Court preferred an issue-identity approach under Section 11 CPC.
Lilabati Misrain v. Bishun Chobey, 6 C.L.J. 621 Support for the principle that an estoppel from a judgment extends to all facts essential to sustain that judgment. The Court invoked this authority to support the view that a general question decided necessarily for determination of liability is directly and substantially in issue and thus operates as res judicata.
Narayanan Chatty v. Kannammai Achi, 28 Mad. 338; Pahalwan Singh v. Maharaja Muhessur Buksh, 12 Beng. L.R. 391 (18 W.R. 182 P.C.); Burbi v. Shannon (1868) 99 Mass. 200; United States v. County Court (1886) 122 U.S. 306 Authorities supporting that estoppel from judgments extends to necessary groundwork and facts involved in the judgment. These authorities were cited by the Court to reinforce the proposition that findings essential to the earlier decision are binding in later proceedings between the same parties.
Natesa Gramani v. Venhatarama Reddi, 30 Mad. 510 Illustration that a decision on a question essential to a pronouncement is res judicata in later suits between the same parties, absent peculiar events making the question inapplicable later. The Court relied on this reasoning to analogise that it would be intolerable to allow repeated litigation on the same substantive question where it had earlier been already established between the parties.
Bishunupada Samanta v. Munshi Muhammad Esmail, 157 I.C. 381 (61 C.L.J. 301) Explains the principle of constructive res judicata and that a decree inconsistent with a plea which might and ought to have been raised operates as a final decision by necessary implication. The Court used this authority to hold that issues which might and ought to have been raised earlier are constructively in issue and thus barred in the subsequent suit; it applied this to bar the defendant's newly raised argument.
Har Sarup v. Anand Sarup, 1912 A.L.J. 506 at p. 523 (A.I.R. (29) 1942 All. 410) Decision of this Court interpreting res judicata and constructive res judicata principles; cited as binding authority. The Court declared Har Sarup binding and preferred it over the Calcutta decision (Gnanada Govindo v. Nalini Bala Debi), applying its ratio to hold the defendant's plea barred by constructive res judicata.
Dwarka Das v. Akhay Singh, 30 All. 470 (5 A.L.J. 407) Illustration that liability decided in an earlier suit (even if based on concession) is res judicata for subsequent periods. The Court relied on this decision to reject the defendant's contention that a point conceded earlier (and not argued) prevents res judicata; the prior concession in the earlier suit was held to operate as res judicata.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the defendant's attempt to raise fresh legal defences in revision against the background of res judicata principles under the present procedural code (Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908). The reasoning proceeded in the following steps, relying only on material and authorities referred to in the opinion:

  1. Distinction between old and new procedural rules: The Court observed that certain earlier authorities (notably decisions applying Section 2 of the 1859 Code) treated the bar of res judicata as depending on identity of causes of action. The present Code (Section 11) instead focuses on identity of issues, and additionally includes constructive res judicata (Explanation IV), which deems matters that might and ought to have been advanced in the earlier suit as directly and substantially in issue.
  2. Critique of the Calcutta decision relied upon by the defendant's counsel: The opinion examined Mukerji J.'s formulation in Gnanada Govindo v. Nalini Bala Debi (Calcutta) that in suits for recurring liabilities res judicata applies only if the question of liability “for all times or once for all” was directly and substantially in issue. The Court rejected Mukerji J.'s approach to the extent it rests on the identity-of-cause concept appropriate to the old Code and concluded that it does not correctly interpret Section 11 CPC.
  3. Substance over form — when a general question is decided it is directly and substantially in issue: The Court held that when a general question of right or liability is decided because it is necessary to determine the liability in the earlier suit, that general question is directly and substantially in issue (i.e., not merely incidentally decided). The Court relied on authorities recognizing that estoppel from a judgment extends to findings and facts necessary to sustain the judgment.
  4. Recognition of narrow exception: The Court acknowledged that if liability for a subsequent period can be determined on some ground peculiar only to that subsequent period (i.e., an intervening event or a new fact peculiar to the later period), the subsequent decision will be determined by that distinct ground and will not be precluded by the earlier decision. The Court did not find such peculiar grounds in the present case.
  5. Constructive res judicata and matters which might and ought to have been raised earlier: The Court emphasized the operation of constructive res judicata (Explanation IV to Section 11 CPC) and followed earlier authority (Bishunupada Samanta v. Munshi Muhammad Esmail and Har Sarup v. Anand Sarup) holding that a decree inconsistent with a plea which might and ought to have been raised earlier must be treated as a final decision by necessary implication.
  6. Concession in earlier proceedings does not defeat res judicata: The Court rejected the defendant's contention that a point is not res judicata because it was conceded earlier and thus not heard. The Court relied on authorities showing that a liability decided on concession is nevertheless res judicata and binds the parties in later proceedings.
  7. Application to the present case: Applying the foregoing principles, and particularly the binding authority of Har Sarup's case, the Court concluded that the plea sought to be raised (including the contention under Section 27 of the Contract Act when belatedly raised in revision) was barred by constructive res judicata. The Court therefore refused to admit and entertain the fresh contention raised only in revision.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The application/revision is dismissed. The Court held that the pleas the defendant sought to raise in revision (including the new contention under Section 27 Contract Act and the contention that the contract was unenforceable beyond three years or lacked consideration for the post-three-year period) were barred by res judicata, including constructive res judicata, in view of the earlier litigation (suit No. 416 of 1940). The application was dismissed with costs and the revision was dismissed.

Implications: The direct effect is that the defendant-applicant's attempt to relitigate or to raise new points in revision against enforcement of the 11 April 1935 agreement was rejected; the earlier adjudication between the parties operates to bar those points. The Court applied and reaffirmed the scope of constructive res judicata under Section 11 CPC and followed binding authority (including Har Sarup v. Anand Sarup and Bishunupada Samanta v. Munshi Muhammad Esmail) rather than the Calcutta decision cited by defendant's counsel. The opinion does not state that it was laying down any new legal precedent beyond applying and preferring existing authorities on res judicata to the facts of this case.

    L. Bishun Das v. L. Laxmi Narain

    1. Of the two adjoining premises situate at the Mall, Kanpur, and bearing municipal Nos. 18/53 and 18/54, the former was being occupied by the defendant-applicant Bishan Das, who carried on the business of selling fresh and dried fruits under the name and style of “Kashmir Fruit Mart”, the latter was in the occupation of the plaintiff opposite party, Lakshmi Narain, who carried on the business of a general merchant under the name and style of Messrs Chotey Lal and Sons. The rent of No. 18/53 was higher than the rent of No. 18/54—the difference between the rent of the two premises being Rs. 15 per month. It appears that the business of Bishan Das prospered and he found No. 18/53 too small for his requirements. Bishan Das, accordingly, shifted to another nearby shop bearing municipal No. 18/169. He then came to know that certain other persons were negotiating with the land-lord of No. 18/58 for taking it on rent with a view to set up a rival business of selling fresh and dried fruits. Bishan Das thought that his custom would be affected to his prejudice, if a rival business was set up in No. 18/63. He, there, fore, persuaded plaintiff Lakshmi Narain to take No. 18/63 on rent and occupy it himself for his business. The parties entered into an agreement on 11th April, 1935 which was subsequently registered. According to this agreement in consideration of Lakshmi Narain promising: (1) to occupy No. 18/53 as a tenant and to keep it in his occupation for a period of not less than three years; (2) not to carry on the business of selling fresh and dried fruits; and (3) to pay damages to Bishan Das at the rate of Rs. 15 per month for the period during which Lakshmi Narain did not remain in occupation of No. 18/63 during the period of three years from the date of the agreement. Bishan Das agreed to pay Rs. 16 a month to Lakshmi Narain so long as Lakshmi Narain remained in occupation of No. 18/58, to compensate Lakshhmi Narain for the excess rent which Lakshmi Narain would be required to pay on account of shifting from 18/54 to 18/53. Bishan Das continued to pay Rs. 15 a month to Lakshmi Narain in accordance with the agreement up to December 1937, when he stopped the payment. Lakshmi Narain, therefore, brought a suit in the Court of Small Causes at Kanpur, which was registered as suit No. 416 of 1940, for the recovery of the amount payable under the agreement for two years beginning from January 1938, to December 1939. The suit was defended mainly on the ground that there was a novation of the contract dated 11th April, 1935, as a result of which the liability for payment of any amount under that contract, after the expiry of three years from the date of the contract, was given up. The Court of first instance found that the novation was proved and, therefore, decreed the suit for a sum of Rs. 45 only, being the amount payable for the period of three months which fell within the period of three years stipulated under the agreement dated 11th April, 1935. The decree of the Court of first instance was modified by this Court in civil Revision No. 285 of 1942 on 3rd November, 1943, and it was held that evidence of novation was inadmissible and, therefore, novation was not proved. It was further held that the liability of Bishan Das continued even after the expiry of three years. The actual words used in the judgment of this Court were:

    “It has to he conceded that it the terms of the original contract remain intact, the plaintiff would be entitled to the amount claimed by him.”

    2. Bishan Das again failed to make the payments in accordance with the contract and the suit giving rise to this application in revision was instituted to recover the amount payable under the agreement for the period of three years preceding the suit. The suit was defended on the ground that the contract was not enforceable for more than three years, and, further, that there was no consideration for the agreement sought to be enforced in respect of the period after the expiry of the stipulated period of three years. Both these pleas have been overruled by the Court below. The Court below has further held that the plea to the effect that the liability under the contract is not enforceable after the expiry of three years is barred by the rule of res judicata in view of the decision in suit No. 416 of 1940. Aggrieved by this decision the defendant Bishan Das has come up in revision to this Court under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The pleas urged in the Court below against the plaintiff's claim have not been repeated before me. Mr. Pearey Lal Bannerji sought to attack the judgment and the decree of the Court below on a fresh ground which was not pleaded nor argued before the learned Small Cause Court Judge. He wanted to contend that the contract was void under Section 27 of the Contract Act, being in restraint of trade. He began by stating that there was a stumbling block in his way, namely, that this point was not argued in the Court below. I was willing to permit him to raise this point, inasmuch as it related to a pure question of law arising out of admitted facts, if there was no other bar to this plea being put forward. It appeared to me, however, that this plea was barred by the rule of res judicata, and I indicated this to Mr. Banerji. Mr. Banerji contends that the plea is not barred by the rule of res judicata and he relies on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Gnanada Govindo v. Nalini Bala Debi, A.I.R (13) 1926 Cal. 650 : (94 I.C 837) in which it was held that an issue decided for the purposes of determining the liability for the payment of rent for a particular period does not operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit where the liability for the payment of rent for a different period is required to be determined. Mr. Banerji contends that the ratio of this decision applies to the present case. With profound respect to the learned Judges who decided this Calcutta case, I am unable to concur with their views. The judgment of the Court was delivered by Mukerji J., and Suhrawardy, J. agreed with it. Mukerji, J. stated the rule of res judicata as applicable to such cases in the following words:

    “The essence of the doctrine of res judicata is that where a material issue has been tried and determined between the same parties in a proper suit and in a proper Court as to the status of one of them in relation to the other or as to the right or title claimed by one of them against the other, the same question cannot be agitated by them again in another suit: Krishna Behari Roy v. Bunwari Lall, 1 Cal. 144 : (2 I.A 283 P.C). In the case of suits for rent or other recurring liability, the causes of action for suits for successive periods are different. In the case of such suits, for the doctrine to apply, it will have to be shown that the question of right or liability not merely for the period in the previous suit, but that for all times or once for all was directly and substantially in issue and was tried and determined. If a direct issue on the point was raised and decided the decision would be res judicata in respect of any suit for a subsequent period: Nubo v. Foyzbuksh, 1 Cal. 202 : (24 W.R 403); Vishnu v. Banding, 26 Bom. 25 : (3 Bom. L.R 450); Natesa v. Venkatarama, 30 Mad. 510 : (17 M.L.J 518); Dwarlea Das v. Akhay Singh, 30 All. 470 : (5 A.L.J 407). If the decision falls short of that requisite and if the general question was gone into and decided merely for the purpose of deciding the right or liability for the period involved in the suit, then the issue was raised not directly and substantially but collaterally or Incidentally. In a suit for rent, no issues need be framedi but where issues are framed the non-existsne of a direct issue of this character has to be seriously taken into account in determining whether the question of right of liability for all times was really directly and substantially in issue.”

    3. The first petition of the statement of the rule is taken from a passage in the judgment of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Krishna, Behari Roy v. Bunwari Lall, 1 Cal. 144 : (2 I.A 283 P.C). It is to be noted in this connection that their Lordships of the Judicial Committee were interpreting Section 2 of the CPC of 1859, being Act VIII of 1859; the language of this section materially differs from the language of S. 11 of the present Code of 1908. Under the old Code of 1859, the bar of res judicata depended upon the identity of causes of action, whereas under the present Code the bar depends upon the identity of issues raised in the two cases. Moreover, S. 2 of the old Code did not include the rule of constructive res judicata, whereas S. 11 has been enacted to give a statutory recognition to the rule of constructive res judicata also. Explanation 4 appended to the section provides:

    “Any matter which might and ought to have been made a ground of defence and attack in such former suit shall be deemed to have been directly and substantially in issue in such suit.”

    4. Mukerji, J. appears to have been of the opinion that the applicability of the rule of res judicata depends upon the identity of causes of action and this is the basis of his entire decision. This was so under the old law, but this is not so under the present Code. This decision cannot, therefore, be regarded to contain an authoritative interpretation of Section 11 of the CPC, whereunder the applicability of the rule depends upon the identity of the issue requiring determination with the issue previously determined, either expressly or constructively. The learned Judge has referred to no authority in support of his observation that if the general question was gone into and decided merely for the purpose of deciding the right or liability for the period involved in the suit, then the issue was raised not directly and substantially but collaterally and incidentally.

    5. In my judgment, if the general question was decided for the purpose of determining the right or liability, even though only for the period involved in the earlier suit, it cannot be regarded to have been decided merely incidentally and collaterally. The general question would be a matter directly and substantially in issue because its decision would be necessary for determining the right or liability required to be determined in the suit and it would not be possible to determine such right or liability without adjudicating upon the issue relating to the general question. As pointed out by Sir Ashutosh Mookerji, J. in Lilabati Misrain v. Bishun Chobey, 6 C.L.J 621 at p. 630.

    “an estoppel is not confined to the judgments but extends to all facts involved in it as necessary steps or ground work, and as explained by the learned Judges of the Madras High Court in Narayanan Chatty v. Kannammai Achi, 28 Mad. 338, a judgment operates by way of estoppel as regards all the findings which are essential to sustain the judgment. This principle has been recognised by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Pahalwan Singh v. Maharaja Muhessur Buksh, 12 Beng. L.R 391 : (18 W.R 182 P.C) and by the Supreme Court of the United States in Unite & States v. County Court, (1886) 122 U.S 306. The latter case affirmed the view taken in Burbi v. Shannon, (1868) 99 Mass. 200, that the estoppel is not confined to the judgment but extends to all facts involved in it as necessary steps or the groundwork upon which it must have been founded.”

    6. Of course if the liability for a subsequent period can be avoided or fastened on some ground, peculiar to the subsequent period, it would be determined in accordance with that peculiar ground and in spite of the previous adjudication being res judicata. The basis of the subsequent decision will not be a finding opposed to the earliar finding on that very issue, but the finding on a different issue which did not arise in the former suit. I find myself in respectful agreement with the following observations to be found in Natesa Gramani v. Venhatarama Reddi, 30 Mad. 510 at p. 514:

    “The decision of a Revenue Court as to the propriety of a particular condition in a patta when, such decision does not pressed on any considerations peculiar to the particular fasli is, we think, res judicata between the parties in subsequent suits in the same Courts just as much as the question whether the relation of landlord and tenants exists between the parties—a question which was held to be res judicata in Venkatachelapati v. Krishna, 13 Mad. 287. Subsequent events may arise to determine the landlord's title or render the condition in a patta inapplicable, but other wise the title of the landlord and the propriety of the condition must alike be held to be res judicata. As remarked by the Court in that case it would be intolerable if a defendant who has been declared by a competent Court to be tenant of the plaintiff and as such bound to accept a patta and grant a muchillka were to be permitted to put his landlord year by year to the proof of his title. It would, we think, be equally intolerable if a landlord or a tenant were to be entitled year by year to question a condition in a patta, the propriety of which had been established in litigation between the parties.”

    7. In my opinion it would be equally intolerable if the applicant were to be entitled to question from time to time the propriety or the validity at the agreement which has been established in a previous litigation between the parties.

    8. Not only that an issue expressly raised and decided for the purpose of determining the right or liability for a particular period is to be regarded to be directly and substantially in issue and not only collaterally and incidentally in issue, but also where the right or the liability has been determined without such an issue haring been raised and decided, such an issue will be Seemed to have been directly and substantially in issue and to have been impliedly decided. The rule of constructive res judicata will operate as a bar to such an issue being raised and decided otherwise in a subsequent suit. As observed in Bishunupada Samanta v. Munshi Muhammad Esmail, 157 I.C 381 at p. 382: (61 C.L.J 301):

    “The correct principle seems to me to be that it the decree made in the earlier suit is such as would be inconsistent with the plea which might and ought to have been raised, but not actually raised, it must be taken that there has been, for the purpose of res judicata, a final decision by necessary implication. Actual decision on a plea not taken cannot be possible and unless the principle be as formulated the rule of constructive res judicata as formulated in S. 11 of the Code would be rendered almost nugatory. In questions of res judicata identity of the issues and not identity at the subject-matter is relevant. To hold that there would not be a constructive res judicata unless the subject-matter be identical would be to introduce. In Expl. IV to Section 11 of the CPC, words which are not to be found there.”

    9. These observations were approved by a Division Bench of this Court in Har Sarup v. Anand Sarup, 1912 A.L.J 506 at p. 523: (A.I.R (29) 1942 ALL. 410), where a reference to certain other cases on the point was also made. The decision in Har Sarup's case, 1942 A.L.J 506 : (A.I.R (29) 1942 ALL. 410), (supra) is binding upon me and has to be followed in preference to the decision in Gnanda v. Nalini Bala Debi, A.I.R (13) 1926 Cal. 650 : (94 I.C 837). Applying the ratio of Har Sarup's case, 1942 A.L.J 506 : (A.I.R (29) 1942 ALL. 410), the pies sought to be put forward by Mr. Banerji is barred by the rule of constructive res judicata.

    10. Mr. Bannerji next contended that the provinces judgment does not operate as res judicata because the point was conceded and it was not heard and decided. That this contention is without merit will appear from the observations already quoted from Bishnupada Samanta v. Munshi Muhammad Ismail, 157 I.C 381 : (61 C.L.J 301), and also from a decision of this Court in Dwarka Das v. Akhay Singh, 30 ALL. 470 at p. 474: (5 A.L.J 407), which was a case for the recovery of a share of an annuity wherein it was observed:

    “The root of the matter between the parties, whether it related to 1306, 1307 and 1308 Fasli, or to 1309, 1310 and 1311 Fasli, was in both cases the same, and the liability of the defendant to pay to the plaintiffs the share of the annuity amounting to Rs. 151/8/- was decided in the former suit.”

    11. In this case also the liability in the former suit was decided on a concession made by the defendant.

    12. There is thus no force in the contention put forward on behalf of the applicant that the plea sought to be raised is not barred by the rule of res judicata. It cannot, therefore, be allowed to be raised in this revision. No other point has been argued.

    13. This application is dismissed with costs.

    14. Revision dismissed.

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    Comments

    L. Bishun Das v. L. Laxmi Narain
    (Dec 9, 1948)