“Justice Must Be Seen to Be Done” – Doctrinal Evolution and Contemporary Application in Indian Law

“Justice Must Be Seen to Be Done” – Doctrinal Evolution and Contemporary Application in Indian Law

1. Introduction

The maxim that “justice must not only be done but must manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done” is a cornerstone of common-law adjudication and lies at the heart of India’s constitutional promise of the rule of law.[1] The aphorism reflects two intertwined objectives: first, guaranteeing fair and impartial decision-making (justice done); and secondly, cultivating public confidence in adjudicatory processes (justice seen). Its normative force permeates constitutional, criminal, civil, administrative and even military jurisprudence. The following article traces the Indian judiciary’s engagement with the maxim, unpacks its doctrinal contents, and evaluates its contemporary salience through leading authorities and statutory frameworks.

2. Constitutional and Jurisprudential Foundations

2.1 Articles 14 and 21 – Procedural Fairness as a Fundamental Right

After Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India expanded Article 21 to include “fair, just and reasonable” procedure,[2] the Court has repeatedly invoked the visibility aspect of justice to strike down opaque or arbitrary governmental action.[3] Article 14’s equality norm, when read with Articles 19(1)(a) and 21, demands both objective fairness and a perception of fairness.

2.2 Articles 129 and 142 – Supervisory and Corrective Jurisdiction

The Supreme Court’s constitutional status as a court of record (Art. 129) and its “complete justice” mandate (Art. 142) enable it to fashion remedies where invisibility or perceived bias threaten legitimacy. The invention of the curative petition in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra typifies such corrective jurisdiction, allowing the Court ex debito justitiae to revisit a final judgment where appearance of justice is compromised.[4]

3. Key Judicial Elucidations

3.1 Natural Justice in Administrative Decision-Making

  • A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India transformed the boundary between administrative and quasi-judicial functions, invalidating a selection process because a candidate-cum-selector’s presence appeared unfair, even absent proof of actual prejudice.[5]
  • S. Parthasarathi v. State of A.P. adopted the “real likelihood of bias” test, holding that a tribunal must be disqualified if reasonable persons would apprehend bias; surmise is insufficient, but certainty is unnecessary.[6]
  • State of Punjab v. V.K. Khanna reaffirmed that administrative action could be set aside where a “real likelihood of bias” is established, insisting on cogent evidence and underscoring that perception of impartiality is integral to reasonableness.[7]
  • Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India voided a court-martial for non-compliance with procedural safeguards and for the presiding officer’s personal involvement, emphasising that in military justice appearance of fairness is as vital as substantive propriety.[8]

3.2 Judicial Bias and Recusal

Recent jurisprudence continues to calibrate the line between necessary adjudication and recusal:

  • BHARTI ARORA v. State of Haryana (2024) reiterates that a litigant is entitled to relief even when the outcome would likely be identical; the decisive factor is the institutional imperative that the process be seen to be impartial.[9]
  • The Supreme Court’s order in In re Deepak Khosla (2023) cautions against unsubstantiated allegations of judicial impropriety, balancing the visibility of justice with the judiciary’s duty to decide cases.[10]
  • Narender Bhutani v. Anjali Bhutani (Delhi HC 2023) clarifies that over-readiness to recuse may itself undermine justice; the trigger remains a reasonable apprehension of bias, not strategic forum shopping.[11]

3.3 Open Courts and Public Confidence

Transparency forms an indispensable limb of the maxim:

  • Sahara India Real Estate Corp. v. SEBI underscores that public scrutiny is a deterrent against judicial error and perjury, citing comparative jurisprudence to affirm that court proceedings are presumptively open.[12]
  • Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation links the right to be heard with the symbolic assurance that justice is visible, situating participatory due process within the broader architecture of dignity.[13]

3.4 Statutory Exceptions and Constitutional Balancing

While the maxim operates as a default rule, certain statutes confer explicit power to depart from natural-justice norms. The Supreme Court in Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel upheld dismissals without inquiry under the proviso to Article 311(2) yet stressed that such departures must fall squarely within the constitutional text and cannot be justified by administrative convenience alone.[14]

3.5 Corrective Mechanisms and Contempt Context

  • The curative petition (originating in Rupa Ashok Hurra) functions as an extraordinary device to cure invisible injustices after exhaustion of review.[4]
  • Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India refined the Court’s contempt powers, ruling that professional disciplinary jurisdiction lies with Bar Councils. The decision avoided the perception of corporatist adjudication by ensuring compliance with statutory procedures.[15]

4. Thematic Synthesis

4.1 Appearance versus Reality

Indian courts consistently privilege the appearance of fairness even at the cost of administrative efficiency.[16] This is evident in quashing decisions where procedural defects are “merely technical” but taint the process with a cloud of suspicion.

4.2 Doctrinal Tensions

The judiciary nevertheless recognises competing values—finality, efficiency, and national security. Tulsiram Patel illustrates willingness to tolerate invisible justice in exceptional scenarios, while curative jurisdiction tempers finality in the opposite direction. The dialectic reveals a dynamic equilibrium rather than absolutism.

4.3 Comparative Glimpses

Indian courts often cite English authorities (R. v. Sussex Justices, R. v. Thames Magistrates’ Court) to reinforce the visibility norm, yet indigenise the principle within constitutional guarantees of equality, dignity and freedom of expression.

5. Conclusion

The maxim that justice must be seen to be done is neither rhetorical ornament nor discretionary courtesy—it is an enforceable legal standard embedded in Articles 14 and 21, guiding statutes and informing judicial remedies. Through doctrines of bias, open courts, curative review and proportionality, Indian jurisprudence operationalises the ideal, ensuring that legitimacy of adjudication rests not merely on its intrinsic correctness but on its outward transparency. As courts confront emerging challenges—digital hearings, media trials, algorithmic decision-making—the centrality of visible justice will remain the litmus test for public trust in the legal order.

Footnotes

  1. Lord Hewart C.J. in R. v. Sussex Justices, ex p McCarthy (1924) 1 KB 256; adopted in Indian context in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan (1981) 4 SCC 379.
  2. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248.
  3. See, inter alia, Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti v. Radharaman Agrawal (1987 MP HC).
  4. Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra (2002) 4 SCC 388.
  5. A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India (1969) 2 SCC 262.
  6. S. Parthasarathi v. State of A.P. (1974) 3 SCC 459.
  7. State of Punjab v. V.K. Khanna (2001) 2 SCC 330.
  8. Ranjit Thakur v. Union of India (1987) 4 SCC 611.
  9. BHARTI ARORA v. State of Haryana (2024 SC).
  10. In re Court on its Own Motion v. Deepak Khosla (2023 SCC OnLine SC 312).
  11. Narender Bhutani v. Anjali Bhutani (2023 Delhi HC).
  12. Sahara India Real Estate Corp. Ltd. v. SEBI (2012) 10 SCC 603.
  13. Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation (1985) 3 SCC 545.
  14. Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3 SCC 398.
  15. Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India (1998) 4 SCC 409.
  16. See dicta of Lord Widgery C.J. in R. v. Thames Magistrates’ Court, ex p Polemis (1974) 1 WLR 1371, repeatedly relied upon by Indian courts (e.g., State of U.P. v. Saroj Kumar Sinha (2010) 2 SCC 772).