Writ Petitions Seeking Registration of FIR in India: Jurisdiction, Remedies, and Judicial Restraint

Writ Petitions Seeking Registration of FIR in India: Jurisdiction, Remedies, and Judicial Restraint

1. Introduction

In contemporary Indian practice, litigants frequently invoke writ jurisdiction under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution to compel the police to register a First Information Report (“FIR”) or to quash one already registered. The Supreme Court and several High Courts have repeatedly cautioned against such direct recourse, insisting upon the procedural hierarchy embedded in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”). This article critically analyses the maintainability of writ petitions for FIR-related relief, synthesising the prevailing statutory framework and leading authorities such as Sakiri Vasu, Lalita Kumari, and Bhajan Lal, while highlighting narrow exceptions where writ intervention is justified.

2. Statutory Framework

2.1 Mandatory Registration: Section 154 CrPC

Section 154(1) CrPC imposes an unequivocal duty upon a police officer to record information disclosing a cognisable offence. The Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari v. Government of U.P.[1] affirmed that the word “shall” eliminates police discretion, subject only to narrowly-defined preliminary enquiry categories (e.g., matrimonial disputes, medical negligence).

2.2 Supervisory Powers of the Magistrate: Sections 156(3), 190, 200 CrPC

When a Station House Officer (“SHO”) fails to perform the Section 154 duty, the informant may:

  • Approach superior police officers under Section 154(3) or Section 36 CrPC;
  • Invoke the Magistrate’s supervisory jurisdiction under Section 156(3) CrPC to direct investigation or registration of FIR;
  • File a private complaint under Sections 190 and 200 CrPC.

The Supreme Court in Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P.[2] broadly construed Section 156(3), holding that it embodies an implied power to order registration of an FIR and monitor investigation, thereby obviating the need for writ petitions in routine cases.

2.3 Inherent and Constitutional Powers

Section 482 CrPC reserves inherent jurisdiction to High Courts for preventing abuse of process, while Articles 32 and 226 confer constitutional remedies. However, judicial self-restraint—especially in criminal investigation—remains a guiding norm (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal[3]).

3. Judicial Pronouncements Shaping Writ Jurisdiction

3.1 Sakiri Vasu: Relegation to Statutory Remedies

Justice Katju, speaking for the Court, emphasised that aggrieved persons “should not rush to the High Court” but exhaust the CrPC’s layered remedies before seeking writ relief.[2] The decision relies on the doctrine of implied powers (ITO v. M.K. Mohammad Kunhi) to enlarge the Magistrate’s authority, thereby reinforcing decentralised investigative oversight.

3.2 Aleque Padamsee v. Union of India: Article 32 Petition Dismissed

The Supreme Court dismissed a writ under Article 32 demanding FIR registration for hate speech, reiterating that Chapter XII CrPC provides an efficacious alternative and that constitutional courts are not investigative agencies.[4]

3.3 Lalita Kumari: Strengthening the Duty to Register

While primarily addressing police obligations, the Constitution Bench indirectly undercut the rationale for writs by rendering the statutory remedy more certain: once information reveals a cognisable offence, non-registration itself becomes unlawful, actionable before the Magistrate.[1]

3.4 Sudhir Bhaskarrao Tambe v. Hemant Dhage

The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order appointing a Special Investigating Officer, holding that Magistrates should decide complaints uninfluenced by such directions.[5] The ruling condemns premature supervisory interference by constitutional courts.

3.5 Exceptional Invocation: Malafide or Abuse

In Divine Retreat Centre v. State of Kerala the Court recognised that Articles 226/32 may be invoked in the “rarest of rare cases” where the investigative power is exercised mala fide or in patent disregard of Chapter XII CrPC.[6] Even then, courts cannot dictate how investigation is conducted, only ensure legal compliance.

4. Writs for Quashing an FIR: The Bhajan Lal Guidelines

Seven illustrative categories in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal delineate circumstances warranting quashment, including manifest absence of cognisable offence or clear abuse of process.[3] Later decisions caution that this extraordinary relief must be sparingly exercised (Neeharika Infrastructure v. State of Maharashtra).

The Supreme Court in T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala quashed a second, redundant FIR, holding that multiple FIRs for the same transaction undermine procedural fairness.[7] Such cases validate Article 226 intervention because statutory remedies may not cure the foundational illegality.

5. Transparency and Ancillary Relief

In Youth Bar Association of India v. Union of India, the Supreme Court, acting on a public interest writ, directed States to upload FIRs on official websites within 24–72 hours.[8] The order illustrates that constitutional courts may issue systemic directives to enhance procedural rights without intruding into individual investigations.

6. High Court Trends

Recent High Court pronouncements (e.g., Ram Prakash Katiyar v. State of Chhattisgarh; Ku. Poonam Malviya v. State of M.P.) uniformly dismiss writs seeking FIR registration, echoing Sakiri Vasu and directing litigants to Section 156(3) or complaints under Section 200 CrPC.[9]

7. Critical Appraisal

The jurisdictional restraint championed by the judiciary serves three normative objectives:

  1. Preservation of Investigative Autonomy. Police independence in fact-finding shields criminal justice from premature judicial influence.
  2. Institutional Efficiency. Overburdening constitutional courts with routine grievances dilutes their capacity to safeguard fundamental rights.
  3. Hierarchical Consistency. The CrPC’s layered remedies reflect legislative intent; bypassing them erodes procedural architecture.

Conversely, absolute refusal of writ scrutiny risks impunity where police abdicate statutory duties. The present doctrine therefore balances deference with corrective oversight—writ relief survives, but only to remedy glaring illegality or constitutional violations.

8. Conclusion

A writ petition seeking direction to register an FIR is ordinarily not maintainable. Aggrieved persons must:

  • First pursue Section 154(3)/Section 36 CrPC remedies;
  • Then move the Magistrate under Section 156(3) or file a complaint under Sections 190/200 CrPC;
  • Approach constitutional courts only if statutory mechanisms fail due to demonstrable mala fides, patent illegality, or abuse of process, and even then only for limited corrective directions.

This calibrated approach, grounded in Sakiri Vasu, Lalita Kumari, and Bhajan Lal, secures both the rule of law and institutional competence within India’s criminal justice system.

Footnotes

  1. Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 2 SCC 1.
  2. Sakiri Vasu v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2008) 2 SCC 409.
  3. State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335.
  4. Aleque Padamsee v. Union of India, (2007) 6 SCC 171.
  5. Sudhir Bhaskarrao Tambe v. Hemant Yashwant Dhage, (2016) 6 SCC 277.
  6. Divine Retreat Centre v. State of Kerala, (2008) 3 SCC 542.
  7. T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 181.
  8. Youth Bar Association of India v. Union of India, (2016) SCC OnLine SC 914.
  9. See, e.g., Ram Prakash Katiyar v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2020 SCC OnLine Chh 4; Ku. Poonam Malviya v. State of M.P., 2024 (High Court of M.P.).