Unreasonable Delay as a Bar to Matrimonial Relief: A Study of Section 23(1)(d) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

Unreasonable Delay as a Bar to Matrimonial Relief: A Study of Section 23(1)(d) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

1  Introduction

Section 23 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (“HMA”) codifies the court’s ex debito justitiae duty to scrutinise every petition for matrimonial relief, “whether defended or not”.[1] Clause (d) of sub-section (1) mandates refusal of relief if “there has been any unnecessary or improper delay in instituting the proceeding.” Although barely twenty-one words, the clause has generated a distinct body of jurisprudence on the temporal limits within which aggrieved spouses must approach the court. This article critically analyses Section 23(1)(d) through statutory interpretation, doctrinal evaluation, and an integrated discussion of leading Indian case law—including the seminal decisions on cruelty and desertion supplied in the reference materials—to illuminate how delay intersects with substantive matrimonial grounds.

2  Statutory Framework and Legislative Purpose

2.1  Textual Setting

Section 23(1) enumerates six cumulative conditions precedent to the grant of any decree under the HMA. Clause (d) is the fourth limb:

“there has not been any unnecessary or improper delay in instituting the proceeding… the Court shall decree such relief accordingly.”[2]
Unlike Sections 14 and 29(3) HMA, which provide explicit limitation bars or savings, Section 23(1)(d) operates as an equitable filter rather than a rigid limitation period.

2.2  Legislative Intent

Parliament intended the clause to curb stale, vindictive, or speculative litigation and to preserve whatever residual prospects of reconciliation might survive between estranged spouses.[3] By leaving the expression “unnecessary or improper” undefined, the legislature entrusted wide discretion to the matrimonial court, subject to appellate review.

3  Doctrinal Foundations

3.1  Standard of Proof and Judicial Vigilance

In Dr. N. G. Dastane v. Mrs. S. Dastane the Supreme Court underscored that matrimonial causes are civil in nature, governed by the “preponderance of probabilities” standard.[4] Yet the Court simultaneously emphasised “utmost vigilance, care and circumspection”, echoing earlier academic commentary that Section 23 embodies a sui generis public-interest obligation.[5] This judicial vigilance logically extends to inquiries under clause (d): the court must ascertain whether laches indicate collusion, condonation, or abuse.

3.2  Confluence with Substantive Grounds

Delay rarely exists in isolation. Its legal relevance depends on the ground invoked—cruelty, desertion, nullity, or others. The Supreme Court’s cruelty trilogy—V. Bhagat,[6] Naveen Kohli,[7] and K. Srinivas Rao[8]—demonstrates that petitions will not be dismissed merely because parties have been separated for long periods; rather, prolonged separation can itself reinforce an inference of mental cruelty or irretrievable breakdown. Conversely, desertion demands proof of continuous abandonment “for the statutory period” coupled with animus deserendi (Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani).[9] An unexplained delay well beyond the statutory desertion period may belie the petitioner’s plea of intent or point to condonation.

4  Judicial Construction of Section 23(1)(d)

4.1  Early Jurisprudence: Emphasis on Vigilant Prosecution

  • Gurmej Singh v. Jasbir Kaur (Rajasthan HC, 1975):
    The court upheld a wife’s petition for restitution despite a four-year gap, holding that her conciliatory attempts justified the delay, whereas clause (d) aims only at “unnecessary & improper” delay.[10]
  • Mohan Lal v. Shanti Devi (P&H HC, 1985):
    An eleven-year unexplained hiatus after dismissal of a restitution suit was fatal; the husband’s divorce petition was dismissed solely under Section 23(1)(d).[11]

4.2  Post-1976 Liberalisation and Persistent Stringency

The 1976 Amendment liberalised substantive divorce grounds (e.g., insertion of Section 13(1-A) and Section 13-B), yet Parliament left Section 23 untouched. Courts have therefore balanced liberalised dissolution policies with clause (d)’s gate-keeping:

  • Vandana Mandlik v. Vithal Mandlik (Bombay HC, 1999) upheld restitution despite a two-and-half-year gap, distinguishing Ramakrishna Pillai (Kerala) where a seven-year delay was held fatal.[12]
  • A. R. Indira v. N. Kadappan (Madras HC, 2019) reiterated that a seventeen-year delay in filing for divorce on desertion warranted dismissal; the court labelled the petition “belated and mala fide”, explicitly invoking Section 23(1)(d).[13]
  • Most recently, Madhav Giri v. Anandi Devi (Rajasthan HC, 2018) rejected a cruelty petition filed twenty-four years after alleged separation, affirming the continuing rigour of clause (d).[14]

4.3  Void and Voidable Marriages: An Exception to the Rule?

Where the petition seeks a decree of nullity (Sections 11 or 12), courts incline towards the view that delay is legally irrelevant because an invalid marriage is a continuing violation of personal law. In Aina Devi v. Bachan Singh (Allahabad HC, 1980) the court held that “no amount of delay” can breathe life into a void marriage; hence Section 23(1)(d) has diminished potency.[15] A similar rationale animated the Calcutta High Court in Harendra Nath Burman (1988) while interpreting the pari materia provision under the Special Marriage Act.[16]

4.4  Interface with Cruelty and Desertion: Lessons from Leading Supreme Court Decisions

Although the Supreme Court has seldom invoked Section 23(1)(d) explicitly, its analysis in modern cruelty and desertion cases supplies guiding principles:

  • Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh (2007) treats prolonged non-cohabitation as evidence of mental cruelty, thereby converting “delay” into a substantive ground assisting, rather than defeating, relief.[17]
  • In desertion cases such as Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey (2002) and Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani (1964), petitioners succeeded because they instituted proceedings promptly after the statutory two-year desertion period and demonstrated animus deserendi—satisfying both substantive and procedural requirements.[18]

These authorities collectively reveal that where the factual matrix evidences continuing wrongs or irreparable breakdown, courts are reluctant to penalise delay, lest procedural equity defeat substantive justice.

5  Comparative and Policy Perspectives

Unlike the Limitation Act, 1963—expressly excluded by Section 29(3)—Section 23(1)(d) functions as a flexible equitable doctrine akin to laches in Anglo-American jurisprudence. The Law Commission of India, in its 71st Report, had recommended introduction of irretrievable breakdown as an independent divorce ground—an idea echoed by the Supreme Court in Naveen Kohli. If such a reform materialises, the policy rationale for maintaining a stringent delay bar may weaken, especially where delay itself evidences breakdown.

6  Critical Appraisal

While clause (d) serves a salutary purpose, its current indeterminacy risks inconsistent outcomes:

  1. The absence of statutory benchmarks allows subjective judicial determinations, generating forum-shopping and unpredictability.
  2. In cruelty-based petitions, an over-zealous application may paradoxically protect the tormentor by penalising the victim’s coping delay.
  3. Conversely, unrestricted stale claims can resurrect moribund marriages, undermining legal certainty.

A calibrated legislative clarification—perhaps a rebuttable presumption of prejudice after a defined outer limit, subject to exceptions for continuing offences—could harmonise equity with certainty.

7  Conclusion

Section 23(1)(d) embodies the HMA’s balancing act between protecting the institution of marriage and ensuring fair litigation. Judicial experience, traced from Gurmej Singh to Madhav Giri, shows that the clause remains a potent procedural checkpoint. Yet its open-textured language demands nuanced, fact-sensitive application aligned with evolving social realities and substantive matrimonial jurisprudence on cruelty, desertion, and breakdown. Until legislative reform crystallises clear temporal thresholds, judicial prudence under Section 23(1)(d) must continue to reconcile the imperatives of diligence, equity, and substantive justice.

Footnotes

  1. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, s. 23(1).
  2. Ibid., s. 23(1)(d).
  3. Statement of Objects and Reasons, Hindu Marriage (Amendment) Bill, 1963; see also Vatsala v. Niranjan Gulwade, 1980 Bom HC.
  4. Dr. N. G. Dastane v. Mrs. S. Dastane, (1975) 2 SCC 326.
  5. Smt. Puspalata Rout v. Damodar Rout, 1986 Ori HC.
  6. V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat, (1994) 1 SCC 337.
  7. Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli, (2006) 4 SCC 558.
  8. K. Srinivas Rao v. D. A. Deepa, (2013) 5 SCC 226.
  9. Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, AIR 1964 SC 40.
  10. Gurmej Singh v. Jasbir Kaur, 1975 WLN 456 (Raj).
  11. Mohan Lal v. Shanti Devi, 1985 SCC OnLine P&H 16.
  12. Vandana Vithal Mandlik v. Vithal Mandlik, 1999 Bom HC.
  13. A. R. Indira v. N. Kadappan, 2019 SCC OnLine Mad 8863.
  14. Madhav Giri v. Anandi Devi, 2018 Raj HC.
  15. Smt. Aina Devi v. Bachan Singh, 1980 SCC OnLine All 862.
  16. Harendra Nath Burman v. Suprova Burman, 1988 Cal HC.
  17. Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511.
  18. Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey, (2002) 2 SCC 73.