The Supremacy of the Statute: An Analysis of the Doctrine that Rules Cannot Override the Parent Act in Indian Jurisprudence

The Supremacy of the Statute: An Analysis of the Doctrine that Rules Cannot Override the Parent Act in Indian Jurisprudence

I. Introduction

In the constitutional framework of India, the hierarchy of laws is a foundational tenet of the rule of law. Primary legislation, in the form of Acts passed by the Parliament or State Legislatures, occupies a superior position. To facilitate the implementation of these Acts, the legislature often delegates power to the executive or other statutory bodies to frame subordinate legislation, such as rules, regulations, and bye-laws. This delegation is a practical necessity in a modern administrative state. However, this delegated power is not absolute. A cardinal principle of Indian administrative law, consistently upheld by the judiciary, is that subordinate legislation must conform to the provisions of the parent Act under which it is framed. A rule cannot supplant the Act, travel beyond its scope, or be repugnant to its provisions. Any such transgression renders the rule *ultra vires*—beyond its powers—and consequently, void and unenforceable.

This article provides a comprehensive analysis of this fundamental doctrine. It examines the constitutional and statutory basis for delegated legislation and its inherent limitations. Drawing upon a wealth of jurisprudence from the Supreme Court of India and various High Courts, it deconstructs the doctrine of *ultra vires* and explores the various grounds on which a rule can be challenged for being inconsistent with its parent Act. Finally, it addresses the nuanced exception where the parent Act itself confers an overriding effect upon the rules, thereby demonstrating the ultimate supremacy of legislative intent.

II. The Foundation and Limits of Delegated Legislation

The power to make subordinate legislation is derived from the enabling Act. It is a fundamental principle that the delegate on whom such power is conferred must act within the limits of the authority conferred by the Act. As the Supreme Court articulated in St. Johns Teachers Training Institute v. Regional Director, National Council For Teacher Education And Another (2003), the need for delegated legislation arises from the legislature's inability to foresee and provide for all possible contingencies. The purpose of rules is to "fill up the details" and provide for the practical application of the statutory policy. However, this power is ancillary. In S.V. Narasimhulu Naidu And Another v. Government Of Andhra Pradesh And Others (2013), the High Court reiterated that "Rules cannot be made to supplant the provisions of the enabling Act but to supplement it."

The legislature cannot abdicate its essential legislative functions. A rule-making authority cannot formulate policy or enact provisions of a substantive nature that are not contemplated by the parent Act. The validity of any subordinate legislation is, therefore, tested on the anvil of the parent Act. As established in cases like State Of T.N And Another v. P. Krishnamurthy And Others (2006), the grounds for challenging subordinate legislation are manifold, including lack of legislative competence, violation of fundamental rights, failure to conform to the statute, repugnancy to other laws, and manifest arbitrariness.

III. The Doctrine of *Ultra Vires*: Policing the Boundaries of Delegated Power

The primary legal tool for invalidating a rule that oversteps its authority is the doctrine of *ultra vires*. A rule can be challenged as being substantively *ultra vires* if its content is inconsistent with the Act, or procedurally *ultra vires* if the mandatory procedure for its enactment was not followed.

A. Substantive *Ultra Vires*: When Rules Exceed the Act's Scope

A rule is substantively *ultra vires* if it deals with a matter outside the scope of the parent Act or is directly contradictory to its provisions. The Indian judiciary has consistently struck down rules that impose new conditions, create new liabilities, or regulate areas that the Act either does not cover or explicitly exempts.

  • In State of Karnataka And Another v. H. Ganesh Kamath And Others (1983), the Supreme Court invalidated a rule under the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules that required applicants for a heavy vehicle license to have two years of prior experience with medium vehicles. The Court found this rule to be inconsistent with Section 7 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, which laid down the complete set of qualifications and did not contemplate such a prerequisite. The rule, therefore, imposed an additional qualification beyond what the Act permitted.
  • Similarly, in Kerala Samsthana Chethu Thozhilali Union v. State Of Kerala And Others (2006), the Court struck down rules under the Kerala Abkari Act that mandated toddy shop licensees to employ displaced arrack workers. It held that the Abkari Act was intended to regulate the liquor trade, not to legislate on labour welfare. The rule was thus *ultra vires* as it ventured into a subject matter not authorized by the Act.
  • A stark example is found in Kunj Behari Lal Butail And Others v. State Of H.P And Others (2000), where the Himachal Pradesh government amended rules under the Ceiling on Land Holdings Act to restrict the transfer of land used for tea plantations. Since the Act itself, under Section 5(g), explicitly exempted tea estates from its purview, the Court held that the rule-making power could not be used to regulate these exempted lands. The rule was a clear case of overreach.
  • The principle also extends to rules that contradict the foundational policy of the Act. In Indian Young Lawyers Association And Others v. The State Of Kerala And Others (2018), the Supreme Court examined Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules, 1965, which barred women of a certain age group from entering the Sabarimala temple. The Court found the rule to be *ultra vires* Section 3 of the parent Act, which mandated that places of public worship be open to all sections and classes of Hindus without discrimination. The rule directly contradicted the Act's non-discriminatory mandate.

B. Inconsistency with Statutory Provisions and Procedures

Subordinate legislation must yield to the specific mandates and procedures enshrined in the parent statute. A rule cannot create a parallel mechanism or bypass a statutory requirement.

  • In Babaji Kondaji Garad v. Nasik Merchants Co-Operative Bank Ltd. (1983), the Supreme Court held that bye-laws of a cooperative society could not override the mandatory provision of Section 73-B of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, which required reservation of seats through election. The bye-laws could not provide for co-option as an alternative to the statutorily prescribed method of election.
  • The judgment in State Of T.N And Another v. P. Krishnamurthy And Others (2006) is particularly instructive. The Court upheld the legislative part of Rule 38-A of the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules, which created a state monopoly on sand quarrying, as this was within the State's power. However, it struck down the part of the rule that provided for the automatic termination of existing private leases, as it contravened the mandatory requirement of a hearing under Section 4-A(3) of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957. The rule could not bypass the procedural safeguard guaranteed by the parent Act.
  • The principle that what is to be done in a particular way must be done in that way and no other, as established in *Nazir Ahmed v. Emperor* and reiterated in STATE OF U.P. v. VIRENDRA KUMAR (2022), is central to this issue. If an Act provides that regulations can be overridden only by framing rules, they cannot be overridden by any other means, such as an executive order.

C. The Prohibition on Retrospective Operation

The power to legislate retrospectively is a sovereign power of the legislature. A delegate cannot frame rules with retrospective effect unless the parent Act explicitly or by necessary implication confers such authority. In Dr. Indramani Pyarelal Gupta v. W. R. Nathu And Others (1962), the Supreme Court invalidated a bye-law made under the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952, because it retrospectively affected existing contracts without any statutory authorization for such an action.

D. Sub-Statutory Instruments and Circulars

The hierarchy of laws extends below the level of statutory rules. Executive instructions, circulars, or press notes, which lack statutory force, cannot override or qualify the provisions of either the Act or the rules framed thereunder. In Commissioner Of Income-Tax, A.P-I, Hyderabad v. Autofin Limited (1984), the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that a circular issued by the Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs could not be read as overriding the Income Tax Rules, as it was not issued under any statutory authority provided by the Income Tax Act.

IV. The Exception: When the Act Itself Grants Overriding Power

While the general principle is that rules are subservient to the Act, this principle is itself subject to the supreme will of the legislature. If the parent Act contains a provision that explicitly grants overriding effect to the rules made under it, then such rules can prevail over the provisions of the Act itself. This is not an instance of the delegate overriding the principal, but rather the principal (the legislature) expressly authorizing the delegate to do so.

The Patna High Court in R.G Holdings Private Limited v. The State Of Bihar (2008) cogently explained this exception: "when the enabling Act itself permits its modification by rules, the rules made prevail over the provision in the Act." This can occur when a statutory provision is framed with phrases like "subject to the rules" or when the Act contains a non-obstante clause empowering the rules.

A clear judicial affirmation of this principle is found in State Of Uttaranchal And Others v. C.S.R.K.S Medical Health Services (2014). In this case, Rule 2 of the Uttaranchal Health and Family Welfare Department (Group 'D') Service Rules, 2004, contained a non-obstante clause stating that the rules "shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other service rules." The Supreme Court gave full effect to this clause, holding that the 2004 Rules would have an overriding effect on all prior service rules. The overriding power flowed not from the rule itself, but from the legislative sanction embedded within it.

V. Conclusion

The doctrine that rules cannot override the parent Act is a cornerstone of Indian administrative law, essential for maintaining constitutional order and preventing executive overreach. The judiciary, through its power of judicial review, acts as a vigilant guardian, ensuring that delegated legislation remains within the "four corners of the Act" (State Of Gujarat v. Karimbhai Dadamiya Pirzada And Others, 2019). The jurisprudence, as evidenced by landmark cases from H. Ganesh Kamath to Kunj Behari Lal Butail, has consistently affirmed that rules are meant to supplement, not supplant, the statute. They cannot introduce substantive policies, impose obligations, or curtail rights beyond what the Act sanctions.

This principle ensures that the legislative policy, as determined by the elected representatives, is not subverted by the executive branch. While the legislature can, in its wisdom, permit rules to modify statutory provisions, such instances are exceptions and must be explicitly provided for. In the absence of such express authorization, the supremacy of the Act remains inviolable, reinforcing the rule of law and ensuring that governance by rules operates in service of, and not in opposition to, the law.