The Scope and Application of Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in Indian Law

The Scope and Application of Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in Indian Law

Introduction

Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) stands as a repository of the inherent powers of civil courts in India. It is a provision of profound significance, designed to empower courts to act ex debito justitiae (out of a debt of justice) to prevent injustice and ensure the smooth administration of the judicial process. The section provides:

"151. Saving of inherent powers of Court.—Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court."

The interpretation of this provision has been a subject of extensive judicial scrutiny. While its language is wide, the judiciary has, through a catena of decisions, delineated its contours, establishing principles that govern its invocation. This article seeks to analyze the scope of Section 151 CPC, drawing upon landmark judgments and statutory interpretations to provide a comprehensive understanding of its nature, application, and limitations within the Indian legal framework.

The Legislative Intent and Nature of Section 151 CPC

The Supreme Court of India and various High Courts have consistently held that Section 151 CPC does not confer any new powers on the courts; rather, it saves or recognizes the powers that are inherent in every court by virtue of its duty to administer justice. As observed in Padam Sen And Another v. State Of Uttar Pradesh (1961 AIR SC 0 218), the inherent powers are in addition to and complementary to the powers specifically conferred by the Code. This sentiment was echoed in Subho Ram Kalita v. Dharmeswar Das Koch (Gauhati High Court, 1986), which stated that Section 151 does not clothe the civil court with inherent powers but only saves those it already possesses. Similarly, the Kerala High Court in Beeravu And Others v. Kathiymma And Others (1973 SCC ONLINE KER 20) noted that the section assumes the existence of power in every court to act as necessary to meet the ends of justice.

The nature of this power is supplementary, not substantive. It does not create or confer any power or jurisdiction on courts but merely recognizes a discretionary power inherent in every court (K.K Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy, 2011 SCC 11 275; Alok Sinha v. Smt. Anita Bhatnagar, Madhya Pradesh High Court, 2024). It is not intended to give any right to a party nor does it confer any jurisdiction that is not otherwise vested in the court (Mrs. Santosh Chopra Petitioner v. S/Shri Teja Singh Sardul Singh S, Delhi High Court, 1976). The Supreme Court in State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others v. Roshan Singh (Dead) By Lrs. And Others (Supreme Court Of India, 2008) and the Delhi High Court in MS CHARU AGRAWAL v. MR ALOK KALIA & ORS. (Delhi High Court, 2023) emphasized that the object of Section 151 CPC is to supplement and not to replace the remedies provided for in the Code.

The exercise of power under Section 151 CPC is discretionary (K.K Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy, 2011 SCC 11 275) and should be invoked only in rare and exceptional cases where the established procedure may not be sufficient to give relief (Beeravu And Others v. Kathiymma And Others, 1973 SCC ONLINE KER 20).

Guiding Principles for Invocation of Section 151 CPC

The judiciary has laid down several guiding principles for the exercise of inherent powers under Section 151 CPC. These principles act as checks and balances to ensure that the power is not used arbitrarily.

Primacy of Express Provisions

The most fundamental limitation on the exercise of inherent powers is that they cannot be invoked where there is an express provision in the CPC or any other statute dealing with the matter. If the Code contains specific provisions that would meet the necessities of the case, such provisions should be followed, and inherent jurisdiction should not be invoked (Nain Singh v. Koonwarjee And Others, 1970 SCC 1 732; A. Sathyapal And Others v. Smt. Yasmin Banu Ansari And Another, Karnataka High Court, 2004).

The Supreme Court in Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal (1962 AIR SC 0 527) clarified that inherent powers should not contravene the express provisions of the CPC and should only be exercised in exceptional circumstances where no statutory provision applies. This was reiterated in Ram Chand And Sons Sugar Mills Private Ltd., Barabanki (U.P) v. Kanhayalal Bhargava And Others (1966 AIR SC 0 1899), stating that inherent powers must not override specific provisions. The Court in Padam Sen (1961 AIR SC 0 218) also held that inherent powers should not be exercised in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intention of the legislature. This principle is consistently followed, emphasizing that inherent jurisdiction cannot be used to nullify the provisions of the Code (Subho Ram Kalita v. Dharmeswar Das Koch, Gauhati High Court, 1986; Maharashtra State Electricity Board v. Niranjan Alloys Steels Pvt. Ltd., Bombay High Court, 2006, citing Ram Chand). The court has no power to do that which is prohibited by the Code (Nain Singh v. Koonwarjee And Others, 1970 SCC 1 732).

Absence of Alternative Remedy

Generally, Section 151 CPC will not be available when there is an alternative remedy provided under the Code or any other statute (State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others v. Roshan Singh, 2008; MS CHARU AGRAWAL v. MR ALOK KALIA & ORS., Delhi High Court, 2023). The inherent powers are not to be used for the benefit of a litigant who has a remedy under the CPC but has failed to avail it (Bhushan Dattatrayay Kedar v. Dipti Bhushan Kedar, Bombay High Court, 2018, citing Roshan Singh). However, the Orissa High Court in Bhaktisara Ramanuj Das v. Bouri Bandhu Panda (1963 SCC ONLINE ORI 8), interpreting Manohar Lal Chopra, suggested that in "very very exceptional circumstances," inherent power might be exercised even with an alternative remedy, though this is a nuanced view against the general trend.

For the Ends of Justice

The primary objective for invoking Section 151 CPC is "for the ends of justice." This allows courts to address situations where procedural rules might otherwise lead to injustice. In K.K Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy (2011 SCC 11 275), the Supreme Court acknowledged that Section 151 CPC empowers courts to make orders necessary for rendering justice in accordance with law, "to do what is right and undo what is wrong." This principle has been applied, for instance, to allow the acceptance of documents at a later stage if necessary for the ends of justice (Hindustan Paper Corporation Ltd. & Ors. v. Saikia & Associates, Gauhati High Court, 2008), to correct mistakes in judgments or decrees to ensure parties are not deprived of their rights (Mohd. Shamsuddin Quadri v. The State Bank Of Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh High Court, 1983; MR. RAJEGOWDA v. SMT. SAVITHRAMMA, Karnataka High Court, 2022), and to implement court orders effectively where other provisions are insufficient (Rayapati Audemma v. Pothineni Narasimham, Andhra Pradesh High Court, 1969).

To Prevent Abuse of the Process of the Court

The second limb of Section 151 CPC allows courts to make orders "to prevent abuse of the process of the Court." This is a crucial safeguard against frivolous, vexatious, or mala fide litigation or actions by parties that undermine the judicial process. The Bombay High Court in Maharashtra State Electricity Board v. Niranjan Alloys Steels Pvt. Ltd. (2006), citing Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. v. Machado Brothers (AIR 2004 SC 2093), noted that if no specific provision prohibits the grant of relief, courts have necessary powers under Section 151 CPC to make suitable orders to prevent abuse of process.

Procedural Matters versus Substantive Rights

The Supreme Court in Padam Sen (1961 AIR SC 0 218) clarified that inherent powers under Section 151 CPC do not extend to actions that infringe upon substantive rights or overstep defined procedural boundaries. The Orissa High Court in Bhaktisara Ramanuj Das (1963 SCC ONLINE ORI 8) also noted, based on Manohar Lal Chopra, that inherent power should primarily be used for procedural matters and not where substantive rights of parties are likely to be affected.

Judicial Application and Interpretation: Key Case Law Analysis

The Supreme Court has played a pivotal role in shaping the understanding of Section 151 CPC.

  • In Padam Sen And Another v. State Of Uttar Pradesh (1961 AIR SC 0 218), the Court held that a Munsiff had no inherent power to appoint a commissioner to seize account books, as such power was not conferred by Sections 75 and Order XXVI CPC, and inherent powers cannot be used to create new procedures or affect substantive rights not covered by the Code.
  • Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal (1962 AIR SC 0 527) dealt with temporary injunctions. The majority held that courts could grant injunctions under Section 151 CPC in circumstances not covered by Order XXXIX, but only if necessary for the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of process, and not in conflict with express provisions. Justice Shah, dissenting in part, opined that inherent powers cannot be exercised to nullify Code provisions.
  • Ram Chand And Sons Sugar Mills Private Ltd. v. Kanhayalal Bhargava And Others (1966 AIR SC 0 1899) reiterated that Section 151 CPC is supplementary and cannot be used to strike out a company's defense solely due to a director's non-appearance without evidence of collusion, as Order XXIX Rule 3 provided a mechanism. The judgment cited Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar (1964 AIR SC 993) for the principle that inherent powers cannot contravene express statutory provisions.
  • In Nain Singh v. Koonwarjee And Others (1970 SCC 1 732), the Court held that inherent powers under Section 151 CPC cannot be exercised as an appellate power and should not be invoked if the Code provides specific provisions.
  • K.K Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy (2011 SCC 11 275) affirmed that Section 151 CPC could be invoked to reopen evidence or recall witnesses post the deletion of Order XVIII Rule 17-A, if the evidence was material and essential for just adjudication, thereby addressing procedural gaps.
  • State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others v. Roshan Singh (Dead) By Lrs. And Others (2008) firmly established that Section 151 CPC supplements, not replaces, remedies and is unavailable if an alternative remedy exists or if express provisions cover the topic. This was also cited in UNION OF INDIA v. M/S PARISHUDH MACHINES PVT. LTD (Delhi High Court, 2023).

High Courts have applied these principles in various contexts. For instance, the Delhi High Court in Mrs. Santosh Chopra (1976) clarified that Section 151 CPC may be availed of read with some other provision or where no provision covers a contingency, but not for substituting legal representatives after judgment and decree. The Gauhati High Court in Jitendra Kumar Dhar And Ors. v. Sibu Paul And Anr. (2007 GLT 2 68) considered the exhaustive scope of Section 151 CPC to meet the ends of justice, while acknowledging the limitations set by the Supreme Court.

Limitations and Cautions in Exercising Inherent Powers

Despite its wide ambit, the exercise of inherent power is subject to significant limitations:

Conclusion

Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, embodies a vital principle of justice, recognizing the inherent power of courts to act in situations not explicitly covered by procedural law to ensure justice and prevent abuse of its process. The Indian judiciary, through consistent interpretation, has established that this power is discretionary, supplementary, and must be exercised with utmost caution. The cardinal rule remains that inherent powers cannot be invoked to override or conflict with express statutory provisions or when an alternative remedy is available. It is a tool to aid justice, not to subvert the legislative framework. The careful delineation of its scope ensures that while courts retain the flexibility to address unforeseen procedural lacunae and prevent injustice, the exercise of such power remains anchored in legality and judicial propriety, thereby maintaining the delicate balance between the ends of justice and the rule of law.