The Rules for Administration of Justice and Police in Nagaland, 1937: A Legal Analysis

The Enduring Legacy and Evolving Interpretation of the Rules for Administration of Justice and Police in Nagaland, 1937

Introduction

The Rules for the Administration of Justice and Police in Nagaland, 1937[14] (hereinafter "the 1937 Rules"), stand as a unique and pivotal legal framework governing the administration of justice in Nagaland. Promulgated during the colonial era, these Rules have demonstrated remarkable resilience, continuing to shape legal procedures and judicial structures in the state long after India's independence. This article undertakes a scholarly analysis of the 1937 Rules, examining their historical genesis, key features, application, and interpretation by the judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court of India and the Gauhati High Court. It delves into the interplay between these special rules, general Indian procedural laws, customary practices, and constitutional mandates, drawing extensively from provided reference materials.

Historical Context and Genesis of the 1937 Rules

The 1937 Rules were not an isolated creation but rather the culmination of a series of administrative and legal instruments designed for the Naga Hills region. The historical progression is detailed in State Of Nagaland v. (In All The Appeals) (1966)[2]. Initially, under an Act of 1869, and its application to the Naga Hills, Rules for the Administration of Justice and Police in the Naga Hills Agency were first published in 1872 ("the Rules of 1872"). These rules vested administration in the Commissioner of Assam, the Political Agent, and various local functionaries.[2]

Subsequently, under Section 6 of the Scheduled Districts Act, 1874[18], the Lieutenant Governor prescribed revised Rules in 1906 ("the Rules of 1906"). These largely mirrored the 1872 Rules but adapted to political changes, replacing "Political Agent" with "Deputy Commissioner." A significant aspect retained was that in criminal trials, the "spirit of the Criminal Procedure Code"[15] was to be followed, as the Code itself was not formally in force.[2]

The definitive 1937 Rules were prescribed on March 25, 1937, by the Governor of Assam, again under Section 6 of the Scheduled Districts Act, 1874. These Rules explicitly cancelled "all previous orders on the subject."[2] The administrative structure was reaffirmed, vesting authority in the Governor of Assam, the Deputy Commissioner, Additional Deputy Commissioners, Assistants to the Deputy Commissioner, Mouzadars, Gaonburahs, etc.[2] Rule 15-A equated the powers of an Additional Deputy Commissioner with that of a Deputy Commissioner, and Rule 15-B clarified that terms like District Magistrate in any law in force would refer to the Deputy Commissioner or equivalent.[2] Crucially, for offences under the Indian Penal Code or other laws, expressions defined in Section 4 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, were to have the same meanings.[2]

The State Of Nagaland v. (In All The Appeals)[2] further notes the assimilation of laws in the Tuensang Frontier Division through the Tuensang Frontier Division (Assimilation of Laws) Regulation, 1955[21]. This regulation extended the applicability of laws like the 1937 Rules (if valid and in force) to the Tuensang area, ensuring uniformity, while the Criminal Procedure Code remained not in force.[2]

Key Features and Administrative Structure under the 1937 Rules

The 1937 Rules established a distinct administrative and judicial hierarchy. As highlighted in State Of Nagaland v. (In All The Appeals)[2] and affirmed in Tagi, G.B And Others v. Additional Dy. Commissioner And Others[3], the administration of the Naga Hills district was vested in the Governor of Assam (and subsequently the Governor of Nagaland), the Deputy Commissioner, Additional Deputy Commissioners, and Assistants to the Deputy Commissioner, alongside traditional village authorities like Mouzadars and Gaonburahs.

A central tenet of the 1937 Rules is the principle that officers were to "guide themselves by the spirit of the laws prevailing in British India"[2] or, more specifically, the "spirit of the Criminal Procedure Code"[2] where the Code itself was not formally extended. This principle was notably upheld in Mowu v. Superintendent, Special Jail, Nowgong, Assam And Others[1], where the Supreme Court observed that the Magistrate in Kohima operated under these local rules, which were "deemed to align with the spirit of the CrPC."

The Deputy Commissioner held significant authority, including control over the police, acting on behalf of the Governor.[3] The 1937 Rules also delineated powers for criminal and civil justice, with Assistants to the Deputy Commissioner often invested with powers equivalent to First Class Magistrates under the CrPC.[2]

Application and Interpretation by Courts

The application of the 1937 Rules has been extensively litigated, leading to important judicial interpretations regarding their scope, the jurisdiction of authorities established or recognized thereunder, and their relationship with general Indian laws.

Non-applicability of CrPC/CPC and the "Spirit of the Law"

A foundational aspect confirmed by the judiciary is the non-applicability of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC)[15] and the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC)[16] in their full statutory force in areas governed by the 1937 Rules. In Mowu v. Superintendent[1], the Supreme Court explicitly noted that the CrPC was not in force in Nagaland and that local procedural rules, i.e., the 1937 Rules, took precedence. This was based on earlier precedents like State of Nagaland v. Rattan Singh[13].

However, the absence of these codes does not imply a procedural vacuum. The Gauhati High Court in Sabu Kehie… v. Sesei And Ors.…[12] described the 1937 Rules as "skeletal rules which is not exhaustive." It argued that where the 1937 Rules are silent, "such issues can only be resolved by taking recourse to adopting the provisions of the CPC which is applicable in spirit in the State." The Court reasoned that failing to do so would lead to a "confused legal system" and leave many issues unresolved, especially when customary laws are also inapplicable. This pragmatic approach emphasizes the adoption of the "spirit" of the CPC to ensure justice.

Jurisdiction of Various Authorities

The 1937 Rules empower various authorities, and their precise jurisdiction has been a subject of judicial scrutiny.

Village Councils: Rule 24 of the 1937 Rules empowers "Mauzadars, gaonburas, chiefs, headmen of Khels...or other village authorities sitting with the village elders in council" to try certain cases.[6], [10] However, SHRI. R.C. ANGAMI v. SHRI. TEKUO KHAWAKHRIE[6] highlighted a limitation under Rule 24(a), stating that a Village Council lacks jurisdiction if the parties to a dispute belong to different villages. The interplay with the Nagaland Village and Tribal Councils Act, 1978[19], is also relevant, as discussed in BENATHUNG ODYUO v. THE STATE OF NAGALAND AND 5 ORS.[10], particularly concerning the adjudication of disputes over cadastral land.

Dobashi (DB) Courts: The status and jurisdiction of Dobashi Courts have generated considerable debate. In Atenjenba And Others v. State Of Nagaland And Others[7], the petitioners challenged a DB Court decision, arguing that DB Courts were not mentioned in the 1937 Rules. The State contended that these were customary tribal courts exercising powers for a long time. This illustrates the tension between codified rules and entrenched customary practices.

Regarding civil cases, Rule 23A of the 1937 Rules, as noted in Lanu Jamir And Anr. v. Bendangtoshi (Ungma)[8], stipulates that Dobashis "shall have jurisdiction to try and decide such civil cases only as may be referred to them by the Deputy Commissioner or Addl. Deputy Commissioner or the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner as the case may be."

The appellate jurisdiction of Dobashi Courts over Village Council decisions was examined in ALEMTEMSHI JAMIR AND 3 ORS. v. THE STATE OF NAGALAND AND 6 ORS.[9]. The Gauhati High Court considered whether a DB court can sit in appeal over a Village Council's verdict, even if referred by the Deputy Commissioner or his assistants. The Deputy Commissioner's communication in that case suggested that DB courts do possess such appellate jurisdiction if the case is appropriately referred under the 1937 Rules and the Nagaland Village and Tribal Councils Act, 1978.[9]

Deputy Commissioner and Assistants: These officials remain central to the administration of justice under the 1937 Rules, possessing both executive and judicial powers.[2], [3], [8] Their role in referring cases to Dobashis, as per Rule 23A, underscores their supervisory capacity.[8]

High Court's Supervisory Role

The High Court retains significant supervisory powers over the functioning of the judicial system under the 1937 Rules. Rule 32 of the Rules for Administration of Justice and Police in Nagaland (as amended in 1984, often referred to as "New Rule 32") grants the High Court revisional jurisdiction. In SHRI. R.C. ANGAMI v. SHRI. TEKUO KHAWAKHRIE[11] (a separate discussion within the same case document as Ref 6), the Gauhati High Court affirmed that under this rule, it "has the power to look into correctness of any order passed any officer subordinate to it under the Rules for Administration of Justice and Police in Nagaland, 1937." The Court also noted that quoting a wrong provision of law does not invalidate an application if the Court otherwise possesses the requisite jurisdiction.

The 1937 Rules in the Modern Constitutional Framework

The continued operation of the 1937 Rules in contemporary Nagaland presents unique challenges and interactions with India's constitutional framework.

One significant area of tension relates to Article 50 of the Constitution of India[17], which mandates the separation of the judiciary from the executive. The cases of Registrar General Of Gauhati High Court v. Union Of India And Ors.[4] and Registrar General Of Gauhati High Court Rep. By The Registrar General v. The Union Of India Others[5] highlight this issue. The Gauhati High Court noted that in certain areas, including Nagaland, the administration of justice was entrusted to Deputy Commissioners and other executive functionaries under rules like the 1937 Rules. Citing its Full Bench decision in Subhasis Chakraborty v. State of Meghalaya, the Court emphasized the constitutional mandate that "administration of justice be entrusted to judicial officers under the control of the High Court in accordance with the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code and Civil Procedure Code" to preserve the rule of law and liberty. These judgments reflect ongoing efforts to establish a formal separation of judicial and executive functions in Nagaland.

The 1937 Rules also operate within a landscape rich in customary laws. As seen in the context of DB Courts[7] and Village Councils[10], there is a continuous interplay, and sometimes ambiguity, regarding the hierarchy and interaction between the procedures laid down by the 1937 Rules and uncodified traditional dispute resolution mechanisms.

The "skeletal" nature of the 1937 Rules, as described in Sabu Kehie[12], necessitates judicial creativity and adaptation, often by invoking the "spirit" of general Indian laws to fill procedural gaps. This ensures that the administration of justice remains dynamic and responsive, albeit within a framework established in a different historical era.

Conclusion

The Rules for the Administration of Justice and Police in Nagaland, 1937, represent a fascinating example of legal pluralism and historical continuity within the Indian legal system. Born out of colonial administrative exigencies, they have survived and adapted, largely due to judicial interpretation that has sought to balance their unique provisions with the broader principles of Indian law and constitutional mandates. The emphasis on the "spirit" of the CrPC and CPC, the evolving understanding of the jurisdiction of traditional and quasi-formal bodies like Village Councils and Dobashi Courts, and the overarching supervisory role of the High Court, all point to a dynamic legal environment.

However, the inherent fusion of executive and judicial functions under the 1937 Rules continues to pose challenges in light of Article 50 of the Constitution. The ongoing efforts towards separating the judiciary from the executive, as directed by the Gauhati High Court, signify a gradual transition. The 1937 Rules, while historically significant and still influential, are part of an evolving legal tapestry in Nagaland, one that seeks to harmonize its unique legal heritage with the imperatives of modern constitutional governance and the uniform administration of justice.

References