The Right to Property under the Constitution of India: An Evolving Jurisprudence

Introduction

The right to property has undergone a significant transformation within the Indian constitutional framework since its inception. Initially enshrined as a fundamental right, its contours have been reshaped through numerous constitutional amendments and judicial pronouncements, reflecting the persistent tension between individual property rights and the State's socio-economic objectives. This article seeks to analyze the trajectory of the right to property under the Constitution of India, from its original formulation as a fundamental right to its current status as a constitutional and human right under Article 300A. It will delve into key legislative changes and landmark judicial interpretations that have defined its scope, limitations, and the protections it affords to individuals against state action.

The Original Constitutional Scheme: Property as a Fundamental Right

The Constitution of India, as adopted in 1950, recognized the right to property as a fundamental right through two primary provisions: Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31. Article 19(1)(f) guaranteed to all citizens the right "to acquire, hold and dispose of property," subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribe, as per Article 19(5) (Coffee Board, Bangalore v. Joint Commercial Tax Officer, Madras And Another, 1969). This provision acknowledged the institution of private property and the citizen's freedom concerning it (Coffee Board, Bangalore v. Joint Commercial Tax Officer, Madras And Another, 1969).

Article 31 provided a two-fold protection: Clause (1) stipulated that "No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law," ensuring that executive fiat could not lead to deprivation. Clause (2) dealt with compulsory acquisition or requisitioning of property for public purposes, mandating the payment of "compensation." The Supreme Court, in early cases like State Of West Bengal v. Bela Banerjee And Others (1953), interpreted "compensation" under Article 31(2) to mean a "just equivalent" or "full indemnification" of the loss of the owner. The Court held that fixing compensation based on the market value as of a distant historical date was arbitrary and violated Article 31(2). Furthermore, the existence of a "public purpose" was deemed justiciable (State Of West Bengal v. Bela Banerjee And Others, 1953).

The interplay between Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31 was explored in State Of West Bengal v. Subodh Gopal Bose And Others (1953), where the Court distinguished between the abstract right to own property under Article 19(1)(f) and the concrete protection against deprivation under Article 31. It was held that not every regulation of property rights amounted to "deprivation" or "acquisition" requiring compensation under Article 31(2); some could be valid restrictions under Article 19(5).

Constitutional Amendments and Judicial Scrutiny

The expansive interpretation of "compensation" and "public purpose" by the judiciary was perceived by the government as an impediment to its socio-economic reform agenda, particularly agrarian reforms. This led to a series of constitutional amendments aimed at curtailing the scope of judicial review over property rights.

Early Amendments and the Ninth Schedule

The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951, introduced Articles 31A and 31B, along with the Ninth Schedule. Article 31A protected laws providing for the acquisition of estates, etc., from challenge on grounds of inconsistency with Articles 14, 19, and 31. Article 31B provided a blanket immunity to acts and regulations specified in the Ninth Schedule from being challenged on the ground that they violated any fundamental right. The Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1955, further amended Article 31(2) to make the adequacy of compensation non-justiciable and modified Article 31A. The Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act, 1964, expanded the definition of "estate" in Article 31A and added more laws to the Ninth Schedule.

The validity and protective ambit of these provisions, particularly in the context of agrarian reforms, were consistently upheld by the courts, recognizing the legislative intent to facilitate social and economic equity (Waman Rao And Others v. Union Of India And Others, 1980; Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar And Others v. State Of Gujarat And Another, 1994).

The Bank Nationalisation Case and "Compensation"

A significant moment in the interpretation of property rights came with Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union Of India (1970), commonly known as the Bank Nationalisation case. The Supreme Court struck down the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1969. It held that the Act violated Article 31(2) because the principles laid down for determining compensation were not relevant to the "just equivalent" of the property acquired and were illusory. The Court also found the Act violative of Article 14 for hostile discrimination and Article 19(1)(f) and (g) for unreasonable restrictions. This judgment reiterated that "compensation" meant the market value of the property at the date of acquisition and underscored the interconnectedness of fundamental rights.

The Basic Structure Doctrine and Property Rights

The power of Parliament to amend the Constitution, especially fundamental rights including the right to property, came under intense scrutiny in His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State Of Kerala And Another (1973). The Supreme Court, by a narrow majority, propounded the doctrine of "basic structure," holding that while Parliament has the power to amend any part of the Constitution under Article 368, this power does not extend to altering its basic structure or framework. In this case, the Court upheld the validity of the Constitution (Twenty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1971 (which restored Parliament's power to amend fundamental rights) and parts of the Constitution (Twenty-Fifth Amendment) Act, 1971 (which substituted the word "amount" for "compensation" in Article 31(2) and introduced Article 31C). However, the second part of Article 31C, which sought to oust judicial review of laws declared to implement Directive Principles under Article 39(b) or (c), was struck down as violative of the basic structure.

Subsequently, in Minerva Mills Ltd. And Others v. Union Of India And Others (1980), the Supreme Court struck down Section 4 of the Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976, which had amended Article 31C to give primacy to all Directive Principles over fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 19. The Court also invalidated Section 55 of the same amendment, which sought to confer unlimited amending power on Parliament and remove judicial review of constitutional amendments. These judgments reinforced the supremacy of the basic structure doctrine. It was also observed in Maddukuri Venkatarao And Others v. The State Of A.P And Another (1975) that the right to property as conferred by Articles 19 and 31 did not form part of the basic structure of the Constitution.

The Forty-Fourth Amendment: A Paradigm Shift

A monumental change in the status of the right to property occurred with the Constitution (Forty-Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978. This amendment repealed Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31 from Part III (Fundamental Rights) of the Constitution. In its place, a new provision, Article 300A, was inserted in Chapter IV of Part XII, titled "Right to Property." Article 300A states: "No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law."

This amendment transformed the right to property from a fundamental right to a constitutional or legal right (Guru Nanak Vidya Bhandar Trust v. Union Of India, 2006; Om Prakash v. Rajasthan State Road Transport, 1997). While it is no longer a fundamental right, it remains a valuable constitutional right (B.K. Ravichandra And Others (S) v. Union Of India And Others (S), 2020). The Supreme Court has emphasized its importance, noting that "some amount of property right is an indispensable safeguard against tyranny and economic oppression of the Government" (B.K. Ravichandra And Others (S) v. Union Of India And Others (S), 2020, quoting Delhi Airtech Services Pvt. Ltd. v. State of U.P. (2011)).

The Right to Property under Article 300A

Nature and Scope

Article 300A mandates that deprivation of property can only occur through the "authority of law." The term "property" in this context is comprehensive, indicative of every possible interest a party can have (Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar And Others v. State Of Gujarat And Another, 1994; Narayan Prasad v. State Of Chhattisgarh, 2017). The term "law" means a validly enacted law, i.e., an Act of Parliament or a State Legislature, a rule, or a statutory order having the force of law, and not a mere executive fiat (Guru Nanak Vidya Bhandar Trust v. Union Of India, 2006, citing Bishamber Dayal Chandra Mohan v. State of U.P., AIR 1982 SC 33; Narayan Prasad v. State Of Chhattisgarh, 2017).

The Supreme Court has characterized the right under Article 300A not only as a constitutional right but also as a human right (Tukaram Kana Joshi And Others Through Power-Of-Attorney Holder v. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation And Others, 2012; Smt. Kalawati Petitioner v. State Of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. S, 2016; RAJU ALIAS RAJINDER SINGH v. STATE OF HP AND OTHERS, 2024). Forcible dispossession of a person from their private property without following due process of law is violative of this right (Om Prakash v. Rajasthan State Road Transport, 1997; RAJU ALIAS RAJINDER SINGH v. STATE OF HP AND OTHERS, 2024).

While the right to property under Article 300A is not considered part of the basic structure of the Constitution (Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar And Others v. State Of Gujarat And Another, 1994), the procedure for deprivation must be fair and reasonable, and the actions of the State must stand the test of constitutional scrutiny, potentially including aspects of Article 14 and Article 21 concerning arbitrary action and the right to livelihood (Durga Prasad And Others v. State Of U.P And Others, 1999; SAMY PROPERTY DEVELOPERS v. VSP PROPERTY PROMOTERS, 2024).

The Question of Compensation

Unlike the erstwhile Article 31(2), Article 300A does not explicitly mention "public purpose" or "compensation" as prerequisites for the deprivation of property. However, judicial interpretation has largely filled this gap. In K.T Plantation Private Limited And Another v. State Of Karnataka (2011), the Supreme Court, while upholding an acquisition act, recognized the necessity of public purpose and compensation in land acquisition. It was observed that the state has the power of eminent domain to acquire property for public use, but this must be accompanied by compensation. The Court also noted that while the adequacy of compensation might not be justiciable in the same way as under the old Article 31(2), an illusory amount could be challenged.

More recently, in NATHU RAM AND OTHERS v. STATE OF HP AND OTHERS (2023), the Himachal Pradesh High Court, citing Supreme Court precedents, held that the obligation of the State to pay compensation to a person deprived of property is "in-built" in Article 300A. The State cannot acquire private property for a public purpose and deny compensation. This aligns with the view that deprivation of property without just compensation would be arbitrary and unfair.

Judicial Review and the Ninth Schedule Post-Kesavananda

The Ninth Schedule was created to protect certain laws, primarily agrarian reforms, from judicial review on the grounds of violating fundamental rights. However, the scope of this protection has been clarified over time. In Waman Rao And Others v. Union Of India And Others (1980), the Supreme Court held that laws included in the Ninth Schedule before the date of the Kesavananda Bharati judgment (April 24, 1973) were protected, but laws added thereafter would be open to challenge on the ground that they damage or destroy the basic structure of the Constitution.

This position was definitively settled in I.R Coelho (Dead) By Lrs. v. State Of T.N . (2007). The Supreme Court ruled that all constitutional amendments, including those placing laws in the Ninth Schedule after April 24, 1973, are subject to scrutiny based on the basic structure doctrine. If a law inserted into the Ninth Schedule abrogates or abridges fundamental rights that form part of the basic structure (such as Article 14, Article 19 (in its current form), or Article 21), such a law can be declared unconstitutional. This landmark judgment ensures that the Ninth Schedule cannot be used as a means to completely bypass judicial review and undermine the foundational principles of the Constitution, even in the context of property-related legislation.

Contemporary Understanding and Significance

Despite its demotion from a fundamental right, the right to property under Article 300A remains a critical safeguard against arbitrary state action. It ensures that the State cannot dispossess individuals of their property without the sanction of a valid law and, as interpreted by the judiciary, without fulfilling the requirements of public purpose and just compensation, at least in cases of acquisition. The right to property is increasingly seen as intertwined with other fundamental rights, such as the right to livelihood and shelter, which are facets of the right to life under Article 21 (Durga Prasad And Others v. State Of U.P And Others, 1999; Smt. Kalawati Petitioner v. State Of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. S, 2016; KAUSHALYA DEVI ALIAS KUSHALIYA DEVI v. STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER, 2023 where pension was treated as property).

The judiciary continues to play a vital role in balancing the State's power of eminent domain and its socio-economic objectives with the individual's right to hold and enjoy property. The requirement of "authority of law" under Article 300A serves as a procedural and substantive check on state power, ensuring adherence to the rule of law in matters of property deprivation.

Conclusion

The journey of the right to property in the Indian Constitution is a testament to the dynamic interplay between individual rights, societal needs, and constitutional evolution. From its robust protection as a fundamental right under Articles 19(1)(f) and 31, through its significant curtailment and eventual removal from Part III by the Forty-Fourth Amendment, to its current incarnation as a constitutional and human right under Article 300A, the right to property has constantly adapted to changing socio-political landscapes. While no longer a fundamental right, it continues to be a potent shield against arbitrary executive action, fortified by judicial interpretations that read into it the requirements of due process, public purpose, and fair compensation. The evolution underscores the judiciary's role in ensuring that even as the State pursues its developmental goals, the constitutional commitment to protecting individual property rights, within the bounds of law and reason, is not diluted.