Case Title: State of Gujarat v. Mansukhbhai Kanjibhai Shah
The Supreme Court ruled in a key decision that a "deemed institution" shall fall under the purview of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
A three-judge panel made up of Justices NV Ramana, Mohan M Shantanagoudar, and Ajay Rastogi upheld this conclusion and overturned a decision by the High Court of Gujarat that had granted the discharge of trustees of a deemed university from the prosecution of a corruption case.
The Supreme Court stated that, "We are of the opinion that the High Court was incorrect in holding that a "Deemed University" is excluded from the ambit of the term "University" under Section 2(c)(xi) of the PC Act."
The lawsuit involved charges that the trustees of "Sumandeep Vidyapeeth," a deemed university, demanded a payment of Rs 25 lakhs in exchange for allowing a student to sit for the MBBS course exams. Trustees were charged in 2017 with violations of Sections 7, 8, 10, and Sections 13(1)(b) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, as read with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. Although the accused filed a discharge petition with the trial court pursuant to Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it was denied.
They appealed that by submitting a criminal revision petition to the High Court. According to Section 2(c)(xi) of the PC Act, trustees of a considered institution would not be "public officials," hence the High Court granted the revision petition. The State of Gujarat appealed the High Court’s decision to the Supreme Court.
Questions for the Supreme Court:-
The Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the ensuing inquiries,
Does the respondent-trustee fall under the definition of "public servant" as stated in Section 2(c) of the PC Act?
Is the accused-respondent eligible for release under Section 227 of the CrPC?
The Supreme Court had to decide whether a "deemed university" qualified as "any university." However, the UGC Act's technical definitions cannot be incorporated into the PC Act.
The SC rejected the respondent's argument that only "University" as that term is used in the UGC Act can be covered by Section 2(c)(xi) of the PC Act.
"It is a settled law that technical definitions under one statute should not be imported to another statute which is not in pari materia with the first. The UGC Act and the PC Act are enactments which are completely distinct in their purpose, operation and object", observed the judgment authored by Justice Ramana.
According to the ruling, the term "University" as used in the PC Act needs to have its own definition. The Court further pointed out that the aim of the provision is to give a broad definition of "public servant," and that the definition under Section 2(c)(xi) was comprehensive in character.
The bench also made reference to the PC Act's goal of eradicating corruption and bribery and making it relevant to people who would not often be regarded as public officials.
Keeping in mind this objective, the court said, "it cannot be stated that a "Deemed University" and the officials therein, perform any less or any different a public duty, than those performed by a university simpliciter, and the officials therein".
The panel also cited the Supreme Court's CBI v. Ramesh Gelli, ruling, which determined that Directors and Officers of Private Banks can be prosecuted under the PC Act as Public Servants.
The significance of the term "public responsibility" was emphasised in order to understand the scope of the term "public servant." According to Section 2(b) of the PC Act, "public responsibility" is defined as a "public obligation" in which the State, the general public, or the community at large have an interest.
In light of this context, the Court noted:
"Evidently, the language of Section 2(b) of the PC Act indicates that any duty discharged wherein State, the public or community at large has any interest is called a public duty".
The Court stated that, based on the facts, a prima facie case was established as several incriminating papers were confiscated. The Court further stated that the High Court erred by using its revisionary authority to investigate a discharge claim under Section 227 of the CrPC by conducting a "roving inquiry."