The Power of Review in Indian Law: A Study of Inherent Limitations and Statutory Grants

The Power of Review in Indian Law: A Study of Inherent Limitations and Statutory Grants

Introduction

The principle of finality of judgments, encapsulated in the doctrine of res judicata, is a cornerstone of the Indian judicial system, ensuring certainty and stability in legal proceedings. However, the pursuit of justice occasionally necessitates a departure from this finality through the mechanism of review. The power of a court, tribunal, or quasi-judicial authority to review its own order is an exception, not the rule. This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the power of review under Indian law, arguing that this power is not inherent but must be explicitly conferred by statute. It will explore the statutory framework governing review, the judicial interpretation of its limited grounds, and the crucial distinction between a substantive review on merits and the inherent power of a court to recall or rectify orders to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Drawing upon a wide array of precedents from the Supreme Court and various High Courts, this analysis seeks to delineate the precise contours of this exceptional jurisdiction.

The Foundational Principle: Review as a Creature of Statute

The unequivocal position of Indian law is that the power to review is not an inherent power of any judicial or quasi-judicial body. This principle was authoritatively established by the Supreme Court in Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji (1970), where the Court held, "It is well settled that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication." This foundational rule has been consistently reiterated and applied across various legal contexts. In Kewal Chand Mimani (D) By Lrs. v. S.K Sen And Others (2001), the Supreme Court reaffirmed this stance, underscoring that in the absence of a statutory provision, a court cannot nullify its own earlier order.

This principle extends with equal force to administrative bodies and tribunals. For instance, in S.D N. Roy And S. K. Bannerjee And Others v. State Of Bihar And Others (1970), it was held that the Central Government, acting under the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, had no power to review its own order as the statute did not confer such authority. Similarly, various tribunals have been held to lack review powers unless expressly granted. The State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commissions, for example, were found to have no power of review under the repealed Consumer Protection Act, 1986, a position that changed only with the enactment of the 2019 Act which explicitly grants a limited review power under Section 50 (Mrs. Sushil Miglani v. VAR Realtors Pvt. Ltd, 2021; Manu sharma and another v. Dr. Kulwant singh and another, 2021). Likewise, the Allahabad High Court in Vishwamitra Bajpai v. State Information Commission U.P. (2024) held that the State Information Commission has no power to review its own orders.

The Statutory Framework: Section 114 & Order 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure

Where the power of review is granted, its scope is strictly circumscribed by the statute. The primary source for the power of review for civil courts is Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), with the procedural grounds enumerated in Order 47, Rule 1. As clarified by the Supreme Court in State Of West Bengal And Others v. Kamal Sengupta And Another (2008), a tribunal whose power of review is stated to be akin to that of a civil court is bound by the same limitations. Order 47, Rule 1 permits a review on the following grounds:

  • The discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant's knowledge or could not be produced at the time the order was made;
  • On account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or
  • For any other sufficient reason (which has been judicially interpreted to mean a reason analogous to the other two grounds).

The most frequently invoked ground is "error apparent on the face of the record." The judiciary has consistently held that this does not mean an erroneous decision. A review is not an appeal in disguise. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aibam Pishak Sharma (1979), the Supreme Court explained that an error which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. This was echoed in Varun Thakur v. State Of M.P. (2020), where the National Green Tribunal noted that a review lies only for a "patent error" which "stares one in the face." Furthermore, the Explanation to Order 47, Rule 1 explicitly states that the subsequent reversal or modification of a decision by a superior court, which was relied upon in the original judgment, is not a ground for review (Union Of India v. Postmaster General Bareily Region, 2013).

Distinguishing Review from Inherent Powers of Rectification and Recall

While substantive review on merits is strictly statutory, courts and tribunals possess certain inherent powers to recall or rectify their orders to secure the ends of justice. This power is not for re-adjudication but for correcting fundamental flaws in the judicial process. This distinction is critical and manifests in several contexts.

Procedural Review v. Substantive Review

In Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal And Others (1980), the Supreme Court drew a vital distinction. It held that while a tribunal may not have the power to review its order on merits, it possesses an ancillary or inherent power to set aside an ex parte award if a party was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing. This is a matter of procedural fairness, exercised ex debito justitiae (as a matter of right to justice), to ensure that no party is condemned unheard. This power is inherent in every quasi-judicial body to prevent a violation of the principles of natural justice.

Correction of Orders Passed Per Incuriam or Without Jurisdiction

The Supreme Court, in the landmark case of A.R Antulay v. R.S Nayak And Another (1988), exercised its power to recall its own earlier direction. The Court found that its prior order transferring a case from a Special Judge to the High Court was passed per incuriam (in ignorance of the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the Special Judge by statute) and in violation of the appellant's fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21. The Court held that an order passed without jurisdiction is a nullity and must be corrected to prevent a miscarriage of justice. This power is rooted in the principle that an act of the court should prejudice no one (actus curiae neminem gravabit), a doctrine also referenced in Board Of Control For Cricket In India v. Netaji Cricket Club (2005).

Recall of Orders Obtained by Fraud or Misrepresentation

It is a settled principle that fraud vitiates all solemn acts. Consequently, even a body without a statutory power of review can recall an order that was procured by fraud. In Devendra Gurunath Khedgikar v. Scheduled Tribe Certificate Scrutiny Committee (2009), the Bombay High Court upheld the power of a scrutiny committee to review its decision upon discovering that the original certificate was obtained through misrepresentation. Similarly, in Balaji Fabricators P. Ltd. And Another v. Mrs. S. Rehana Rao And Others (2005), the Company Law Board, despite lacking an express power of review, acknowledged its authority to recall an order obtained through fraud, citing the Supreme Court's decision in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh.

Rectification to Prevent Injustice

The Supreme Court has also invoked its inherent power to rectify orders based on flawed or misleading information to prevent grave injustice. In S. Nagaraj And Others v. State Of Karnataka And Another (1993), the Court rectified its earlier orders which were passed based on misleading affidavits filed by the State. It reasoned that "Justice is a virtue which transcends all barriers" and that no court can "allow itself to be perpetrated to injustice by holding that it is helpless to rectify the error." This power stems from the fundamental principle that the court's primary duty is to prevent irremediable injustice.

Jurisprudence in Flux: The Case of the Competition Commission of India

The tension between the rule against inherent review power and the need for corrective jurisdiction is evident in the jurisprudence concerning the Competition Commission of India (CCI). In Google Inc. v. Competition Commission Of India (2015), a Single Judge of the Delhi High Court held that the CCI had the power to recall its order directing an investigation under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act, 2002, invoking the principles laid down in Grindlays Bank. However, in a later decision, Cadila Healthcare Limited v. Competition Commission Of India (2018), a Division Bench of the same High Court expressed "misgivings" about the correctness of the Google decision. The Bench noted that the express power of review originally vested in the CCI (Section 37) had been repealed by Parliament, which it viewed as a clear expression of legislative intent to deny such a power. Despite these reservations, the Bench ultimately held that the CCI does possess the power to recall or review a Section 26(1) order, but only within the narrow parameters of procedural defects, thus aligning the power with the exceptions carved out in cases like Grindlays Bank and Budhia Swain, rather than a broad, substantive review.

Conclusion

The jurisprudence on the power of review in Indian law is built upon a fundamental dichotomy. On one hand, the principle of finality dictates that the power of substantive review is not inherent and must be expressly conferred by statute, as laid down in Patel Narshi Thakershi. Where conferred, as under Order 47 of the CPC, its exercise is restricted to narrow grounds, primarily a patent error on the face of the record. A review cannot be a substitute for an appeal. On the other hand, courts and tribunals retain an inherent or ancillary jurisdiction, distinct from substantive review, to recall or rectify their orders to prevent a miscarriage of justice. This corrective power is exercised in limited circumstances, such as a breach of natural justice (Grindlays Bank), orders passed without jurisdiction or per incuriam (A.R. Antulay), or orders procured by fraud (Devendra Gurunath Khedgikar). The high threshold for interfering with a final order is consistently maintained, as evidenced by the dismissal of review petitions in cases like M/S Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor Of Delhi (1979) and Lily Thomas v. Union Of India (2000). While the general principles are well-established, their application in specific statutory contexts, such as that of the Competition Commission, continues to evolve, demonstrating the judiciary's ongoing effort to balance the imperative of finality with the supervening duty to do justice.