Case Title: Mathews J. Nedumpara and Ors. v. Shri Fali S. Nariman and Ors.
The Delhi High Court rejected Attorney Mathews J. Nedumpara's request to "dismiss" Senior Advocate Fali S. Nariman from testifying before the Apex Court. A lawyer is only prohibited from appearing before a specific Court where a relative of a lawyer is a Presiding Judge, the bench made up of Chief Justice Rajendra Menon and Justice V. Kameswar Rao noted, and not before the "entire court." In other words, the bench intended to say that the Senior Advocate is not prohibited from coming before the Supreme Court simply because his son, Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman, is a member of that court.
According to Advocate Nedumpara, the term "court" in Rule 6 of the Bar Council of India Rules, 1975, "should apply to the entire Court where the relative is a Judge, not just the particular Court where the kin of a lawyer is a Presiding Judge." In addition to asking for Senior Advocate Fali S. Nariman's "disqualification," Advocate Nedumpara also requested that the Judicial Representatives of the Supreme Court and the Government of India be directed to take the necessary action to secure the transfer of Judges of High Courts who are related to lawyers to another High Court. As stated by the petitioner in his writ petition, "justice should not only be done, but should indisputably and unmistakably be seen to be done" and that "allowing the family members of sitting Judges to practise in the very Court where his father or uncle is a Judge chops the concepts of fairness, independence, and fairness in the administration of justice at their very root."
The petitioner claims that this justification demonstrates the absolute meaning of nemo debet esse judex in propria causa and that the declaration should be made to include all courts where a judge's relative is a lawyer as part of the definition of "court." The Hon’ble High Court opined that the law forbids them from doing so. If the provisions of Rule 6 and its interpretation as stated in the statutory rules are taken into consideration, it clearly explains the scope and trade of the word "Court" used therein, and if the petitioner's argument is accepted, the Court would be rewriting the statute inconsistent with the legal principles.
The bench dismissed the argument, stating that after the legislative authority provided an explanation of the word "Court" in the rule in a specific way, providing an explanation that would give it a completely distinct meaning would be incongruent with and against the rules of law and the rules governing how statutes should be interpreted. A fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to interpret the legislation as it is written in the statute book, furthering the legislative intent, rather than to interpret it or give it a meaning that is in conflict with that intention.