The Juristic God and the Earthly Trespasser: An Analysis of Adverse Possession Against Hindu Idols in Indian Law

Introduction

The Indian legal system presents a fascinating confluence of temporal law and spiritual concepts, nowhere more pronounced than in the legal status of the Hindu idol. Recognised as a juristic person, an idol can own property, sue, and be sued. This creates a unique legal paradox: can a perpetual, divine entity lose its earthly property to a mortal trespasser through the doctrine of adverse possession? This doctrine, which the Supreme Court has described as a potentially "dishonest way to obtain title" (*State Of Haryana v. Mukesh Kumar And Others*, 2011), allows a person in wrongful possession to acquire title if the true owner fails to assert their rights within a statutorily prescribed period. The application of this principle to property dedicated to a deity involves a complex interplay between the idol's juristic personality, the duties of its manager (the shebait or mahant), and the overarching supremacy of the Limitation Act. The Supreme Court's declaration in the Ayodhya dispute that an "Idol cannot claim exemption from the law of limitation" (*M Siddiq (D) Thr Lrs v. Mahant Suresh Das And Others*, 2019) has cemented a long-evolving judicial position. This article seeks to critically analyse the jurisprudential framework governing adverse possession against Hindu idols, examining the rejection of the "perpetual minority" theory, the critical distinction between possession by a shebait and a stranger, and the procedural rigours required to successfully establish such a claim.

The Legal Personality of the Hindu Idol

The foundation of any discussion on this topic rests upon the unique legal status of a Hindu idol. Under Hindu law, once an idol has been consecrated through the appropriate ceremonies (pran pratistha), it acquires the status of a juristic person (*Ram Jankijee Deities And Others v. State Of Bihar And Others*, 1999). This legal fiction allows the deity to hold property dedicated to it for its worship and upkeep. A seminal decision by the Privy Council in Vidya Varuthi Thirtha Swamigal v. Baluswami Ayyar And Others (1922) clarified that the property vests in the idol itself, not in its manager or shebait. The shebait acts merely as a manager, holding the property for the idol's benefit, and is distinct from a trustee under English law in whom legal ownership would vest. This distinction is crucial, as it defines the nature of possession and the framework for its potential adversity. The idol is the legal owner, and any claim of adverse possession must be established against this divine, juristic entity, represented on earth by its manager. This is in contrast to the position under Mohammedan Law, where the Privy Council, in Mosque Known As Masjid Shahid Ganj And Others v. Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (1940), held that a mosque is not a juristic person capable of suing or being sued in its own name.

Applicability of Limitation and Adverse Possession to Idols

The Decisive Rejection of the "Perpetual Minor" Doctrine

An early argument against the application of adverse possession to idols was the theory of "perpetual minority." This analogy, advanced in cases like Kama Reddy v. Ranga Dasan (1925), posited that since an idol is conceptually always a minor, it should benefit from the exemptions provided to minors under the Limitation Act, rendering any adverse possession ineffective. However, this view has been systematically and authoritatively rejected. The Madras High Court, in Periyanan Chetti v. Rao Bahadur M.R. Govinda Rao (1931), critically re-examined this theory and found it "illogical to extend to idols the privileges as to limitation of actions conferred on minors in the Limitation Act," noting that the minority which may affect limitation is that of the shebait, not the idol. This position was echoed by other High Courts, such as the Patna High Court in Naurangi Lal v. Mahanth Ram Charan Das (1930), which held that an "idol does not suffer from any disability under the Limitation Act." The final word on this debate came from the Supreme Court in M Siddiq (2019), which unequivocally affirmed that idols are subject to the law of limitation. The law, therefore, is settled: the divine character of an idol does not place it beyond the reach of secular laws governing property rights and their extinguishment over time.

The Commencement of Adverse Possession

Once it is established that limitation runs against an idol, the critical question becomes: when does possession become adverse? The general principle, affirmed in a long line of cases, is that upon an invalid alienation of debutter (dedicated) property by a shebait, the possession of the alienee becomes adverse to the idol from the very date of the transfer. The rationale is that the shebait is the complete representative of the idol, and an act of alienation, which is hostile to the endowment, initiates the period of limitation. This view was upheld by various High Courts, including in Dasami Sahu v. Param Shameshwar (1929), Naurangi Lal v. Mahanth Ram Charan Das (1930), and Sarabdeo Bharthi v. Ram Bali (1932). The courts reasoned that since the property vests in the idol, a transfer by a manager without legal necessity is void, and the transferee's possession is, from its inception, adverse to the true owner—the idol. An alternative theory, suggesting that limitation would only begin upon the death of the alienating shebait, has been largely discarded, as it would imply that each succeeding shebait gets a fresh start, a proposition rejected in cases like Gopalcharjya Goswami v. Bhim Kali Chaudhury (1926).

Distinguishing the Claimant: Shebait, Stranger, and Donor

The success of an adverse possession claim against an idol depends heavily on the identity of the claimant and their relationship with the endowment. The law draws a sharp distinction between possession by a shebait and that by a stranger.

The Shebait as Claimant: A Fiduciary Bar

The law is firmly established that a shebait, so long as they hold the office, cannot claim adverse possession against the very idol they are duty-bound to protect. The Supreme Court in Sree Sree Ishwar Sridhar Jew v. Sushila Bala Dasi And Others (1954) held that such a claim would be a "premium on dishonesty and breach of duty." The shebait's possession is, by its very nature, possession on behalf of the idol; it is permissive and fiduciary, not hostile. To allow a shebait to convert this representative possession into an adverse one would undermine the very foundation of religious endowments. This principle was reiterated in cases like Committee Of Muslim Aukaf v. Anayatullah And Others (1973) and Surendrakrishna Roy v. Shree Shree Ishwar Bhubaneshwari Thakurani (1932), which clarified that while there can be adverse possession against an idol, there can be "no adverse possession by the shebaits."

The Stranger and Donor as Claimants

In stark contrast, a stranger to the endowment can acquire title by adverse possession. A stranger includes a trespasser or a person who takes possession under an invalid alienation from the shebait. Their possession is, from the outset, hostile to the idol's title. As held in Palaniandi Gramani Manickammal v. V. Murugappa Gramani (1935), "Possession adverse to the manager of property dedicated to an idol is adverse to the idol, and will extinguish the idol's right to the property." Even a person who might have been a shebait but has repudiated the office can be treated as a stranger for this purpose (*Surendrakrishna Roy*, 1932). Similarly, the original donor of the property is not precluded from acquiring title by adverse possession. In Dasami Sahu (1929), the Allahabad High Court held that after a valid dedication, if the donor revokes the deed and holds the property in assertion of their own proprietary interest, such possession, if continued for the statutory period, can mature into title against the idol.

Procedural and Evidentiary Hurdles

While the law permits adverse possession against an idol, succeeding in such a claim is fraught with procedural and evidentiary challenges. A claimant must satisfy the classical requirements of possession that is nec vi, nec clam, nec precario (not by force, not in secret, not by permission). As articulated in Berhampur Municipality v. Sri Kothari Thakurani (2018), a person pleading adverse possession must clearly establish the date they came into possession, the hostile nature of that possession, the fact that it was open and known to the true owner (represented by the shebait), and its continuous and undisturbed nature for the full statutory period. Mere long possession is insufficient (*Brundaban Ghanta & Another v. Nirasa Pati*, 2018).

Furthermore, the legal framework ensures that the idol is not left without a remedy. Even if there is no appointed shebait, limitation does not cease to run. As held in Monmohan Haldar v. Dibbendu Prosad Roy Choudhury (1948), any person interested in the endowment can bring a suit as the next friend of the idol, and therefore, the absence of a shebait does not create a legal vacuum that halts the running of time. Interestingly, while a stranger can claim adverse possession against a deity, the reverse is considered legally untenable. The Orissa High Court in Berhampur Municipality (2018) found it "highly inconceivable that deity would file the suit for declaration of title by way of adverse possession," highlighting a unique limitation on the idol's juristic actions.

Conclusion

The jurisprudence on adverse possession against Hindu idols represents a pragmatic balancing act by Indian courts. It upholds the sanctity of religious endowments by preventing fiduciaries like shebaits from profiting from their own breach of duty, while simultaneously subjecting these endowments to the secular legal principles of limitation that promote certainty of title and repose. The "perpetual minor" theory has been conclusively discarded in favour of a view that treats the idol as a juristic person subject to the same laws of limitation as any other, save for the specific disabilities of its human representatives. The law is clear: a stranger's open, hostile, and continuous possession for the statutory period can extinguish an idol's title to its property. This legal position, while perhaps unsettling from a purely theological perspective, reinforces the principle that once a deity enters the legal realm as a property owner, it must accept the corresponding vulnerabilities inherent in that system, ensuring that divine rights do not entirely displace the temporal legal order.