The Evolution of Coparcenary Rights for Daughters under Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956: A Judicial Trajectory in India

The Evolution of Coparcenary Rights for Daughters under Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956: A Judicial Trajectory in India

Introduction

Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (hereinafter HSA, 1956) has been a focal point of legal discourse and reform in India, particularly concerning the rights of daughters in Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) property. Historically, the Mitakshara school of Hindu law, which governs a majority of Hindus, recognized coparcenary as an exclusive domain of male members, who acquired an interest in the joint family property by birth. Daughters, while members of the joint family, were not coparceners and thus did not possess a birthright to this property. The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 (hereinafter Amendment Act, 2005) brought about a revolutionary change by seeking to eradicate this gender discrimination, elevating daughters to the status of coparceners in their own right. This article traces the legislative evolution of Section 6, analyzes the complex interpretative challenges faced by the judiciary, particularly regarding the retrospectivity and applicability of the 2005 amendment, and examines the current legal position as consolidated by landmark Supreme Court pronouncements.

The Original Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956

Prior to the 2005 amendment, Section 6 of the HSA, 1956, governed the devolution of interest in Mitakshara coparcenary property. The section, as it stood before the amendment, read (P. Vijayalakshmi v. P. Susheela & Others, Madras High Court, 2012; Commissioner Of Wealth-Tax, Gujarat Ii v. Kantilal Manilal, Gujarat High Court, 1972):

"6. Devolution of interest in coparcenary property. - When a male Hindu dies after the commencement of this Act, having at the time of his death an interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property, his interest in the property shall devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary and not in accordance with this Act: Provided that, if the deceased had left him surviving a female relative specified in class I of the Schedule or a male relative specified in that class who claims through such female relative, the interest of the deceased in the Mitakshara coparcenary property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under this Act and not by survivorship. Explanation 1. - For the purposes of this section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not."

This provision essentially retained the principle of survivorship for devolution of coparcenary interest, except where the deceased coparcener left behind Class I female heirs (or male relatives claiming through them). In such cases, the proviso mandated that the deceased's interest would devolve by intestate or testamentary succession under the Act, not by survivorship. Explanation 1 introduced a legal fiction of a notional partition immediately before the coparcener's death to ascertain his share for such devolution. However, daughters were not coparceners by birth and could only inherit a share from their father's determined interest upon his demise, if the proviso applied.

The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005: A Paradigm Shift

The discrimination inherent in the original Section 6 was a subject of considerable criticism and calls for reform. The Law Commission of India, in its 174th Report, recommended comprehensive changes to grant equal property rights to women (Badrinarayan Shankar Bhandari And Others v. Omprakash Shankar Bhandari, Bombay High Court, 2014). The Statement of Objects and Reasons for the Amendment Act, 2005, explicitly stated its intent: "to remove the discrimination as contained in section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 by giving equal rights to daughters in the Hindu Mitakshara coparcenary property as the sons have" (Badrinarayan Shankar Bhandari And Others v. Omprakash Shankar Bhandari, Bombay High Court, 2014).

The amended Section 6, effective from September 9, 2005, fundamentally altered the nature of coparcenary rights. The substituted Section 6(1) reads (Prakash And Others v. Phulavati And Others, Supreme Court Of India, 2015):

"6. Devolution of interest in coparcenary property.—(1) On and from the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, in a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law, the daughter of a coparcener shall—
(a) by birth become a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son;
(b) have the same rights in the coparcenary property as she would have had if she had been a son;
(c) be subject to the same liabilities in respect of the said coparcenary property as that of a son,
and any reference to a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to include a reference to a daughter of a coparcener:"

This amendment conferred upon daughters the status of coparceners by birth, granting them rights and liabilities in the coparcenary property identical to those of sons. However, the phrase "On and from the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005" led to significant judicial debate regarding its temporal application.

Judicial Interpretation and the Conundrum of Retrospectivity

The primary challenge before the courts was whether the amended Section 6 applied retrospectively, prospectively, or retroactively. This had profound implications for daughters whose fathers had died before the amendment's commencement date (September 9, 2005) and for partitions that had already occurred.

Early Interpretations and Conflicting Views

In Prakash And Others v. Phulavati And Others (2016 SCC 2 36), the Supreme Court held that the 2005 Amendment Act does not have retrospective effect. It ruled that the rights under the amendment are applicable to living daughters of living coparceners as on September 9, 2005, irrespective of when such daughters were born. Crucially, it held that if the coparcener (father) had died prior to this date, the daughter could not claim the benefits of the amended Section 6, as succession would have already opened and rights vested under the unamended law. The Court emphasized that the amendment applies prospectively and does not interfere with vested rights established before its enactment.

However, in Danamma Alias Suman Surpur And Another v. Amar And Others (2018 SCC 3 343), a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court appeared to take a somewhat different view. While acknowledging Prakash v. Phulavati, the Court in Danamma held that daughters alive when the amendment came into force were entitled to coparcenary rights, even if their father had died before 2005, provided the suit for partition was pending. This decision created ambiguity and led to conflicting interpretations across High Courts. The Court in Danamma stated, "The amendment is applicable to living daughters of living coparceners as on 9-9-2005 irrespective of when such daughters are born... It is not necessary that the father coparcener should be alive on the date of the amendment." This was seen as being in partial conflict with the ratio in Prakash v. Phulavati.

Prior to these, in Ganduri Koteshwaramma And Another v. Chakiri Yanadi And Another (2011 SCC 9 788), the Supreme Court had affirmed that the benefits of the 2005 Amendment Act are applicable to pending suits for partition. It held that preliminary decrees in partition suits could be amended to incorporate legislative changes occurring during the pendency of the suit, as a partition suit is not finalized until a final decree is passed. This principle was reaffirmed in Smt Honamma v. Sri C H Honnegowda (Karnataka High Court, 2015).

The Bombay High Court in Badrinarayan Shankar Bhandari And Others v. Omprakash Shankar Bhandari (2014 SCC ONLINE BOM 908), in a comprehensive judgment, had held that clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of the amended Section 6 are retroactive, conferring rights on daughters born before the amendment, provided they were alive on September 9, 2005, while clause (a) was prospective for daughters born on or after that date. This nuanced interpretation also highlighted the complexities involved.

The Clarificatory Stance: Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma

The conflicting interpretations were finally settled by a larger three-judge bench of the Supreme Court in Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma And Others (2020 SCC 9 1). The Court comprehensively analyzed the legislative intent and prior judgments, overruling the decision in Prakash v. Phulavati to the extent it held that the father (coparcener) must be alive on September 9, 2005, for the daughter to claim coparcenary rights. The key findings in Vineeta Sharma are:

  • The provisions of substituted Section 6 confer status of coparcener on the daughter by birth in the same manner as a son.
  • The right is conferred by birth, and the condition for its recognition is that the daughter must be alive on the date of the amendment (September 9, 2005). The father need not be alive on this date.
  • The amendment is retroactive in its operation, meaning it applies to daughters born before September 9, 2005, as long as they were alive on that date. The rights are recognized from the date of the amendment, but they are rooted in the birth of the daughter.
  • The Court clarified that "on and from the commencement of the Act" in Section 6(1) means that the rights are prospective in the sense that they are recognized from September 9, 2005, but they are based on the antecedent event of birth.
  • The Court explicitly stated that its decision in Danamma was correct in its outcome but not in its reasoning that relied on a pending suit. The rights accrue by birth, not by the pendency of a suit.

This judgment, as noted in SOMALINGAPPA S/O BASAPPA KOTAGI v. SOU.SANGAWWA @ SAROJINI (Karnataka High Court, 2023), effectively overruled Prakash v. Phulavati on the critical point of the father's survival on the date of amendment.

Impact on Partitions and Alienations

The amended Section 6 contains provisos to protect past transactions. Section 6(1) has a proviso stating: "Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall affect or invalidate any disposition or alienation including any partition or testamentary disposition of property which had taken place before the 20th day of December, 2004."

Furthermore, Section 6(5) states: "Nothing contained in this section shall apply to a partition, which has been effected before the 20th day of December, 2004." The Explanation to Section 6(5) clarifies that "partition" for this purpose means any partition made by execution of a deed of partition duly registered under the Registration Act, 1908, or partition effected by a decree of a court (Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma, 2020). This was intended to prevent the reopening of genuine, finalized partitions and to avoid frivolous claims based on alleged oral partitions.

The court in Vineeta Sharma emphasized that oral partitions are not recognized as valid partitions for the purpose of saving them from the operation of the amended Section 6, unless they were subsequently acted upon and backed by documentary evidence. This ensures that daughters' rights are not defeated by sham claims of prior oral partitions.

State Amendments and their Interplay with Central Legislation

Prior to the central amendment in 2005, several states, including Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, and Maharashtra, had already amended the HSA, 1956, to grant daughters coparcenary rights. For instance, Karnataka inserted Section 6A (vide Karnataka Act No. 23 of 1994), which provided equal rights to daughters in coparcenary property (Smt. Nanjamma & Anr. v. State Of Karnataka, Karnataka High Court, 1998). Similarly, Tamil Nadu introduced Section 29-A (Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1989), conferring coparcenary rights on unmarried daughters as of March 25, 1989 (P. Hemamalini v. K. Palani Malai And Others, Madras High Court, 2021).

The 2005 central amendment, being a parliamentary enactment on a subject in the Concurrent List (Entry 5, Schedule VII of the Constitution), has overriding effect over state laws to the extent of any repugnancy, unless the state law has received Presidential assent after the central law. The Supreme Court in Vineeta Sharma clarified that the central amendment of 2005 is comprehensive and its provisions would prevail. The rights conferred by the central amendment are wider, particularly as they do not typically impose conditions like the daughter being unmarried (as some state amendments did initially).

Scope and Application: Devolution of Interest and Nature of Property

It is crucial to distinguish the devolution of interest under Section 6 from succession under Section 8 of the HSA, 1956. Section 6 applies to a Hindu's interest in Mitakshara coparcenary property. Section 8, on the other hand, lays down general rules of succession for the property of a male Hindu dying intestate, which includes his separate or self-acquired property, or his share in coparcenary property obtained through a notional partition under the proviso to the (old) Section 6.

The Supreme Court in Uttam v. Saubhag Singh And Others (2016 SCC 4 68) clarified that when a male Hindu's interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary devolves by succession under the proviso to the unamended Section 6 (or if property is inherited under Section 8), it becomes the separate property of the heir. If such an heir is a male, his own son does not acquire a birthright (coparcenary interest) in it vis-à-vis him, unless it forms part of a coparcenary with his own sons. The property inherited by a son from his father, grandfather, or great-grandfather was ancestral property under traditional Hindu law. However, post-1956, property inherited by a son from his father under Section 8 is treated as his separate property, and his sons do not automatically become coparceners in it (Govindan & Another v. Revathi & Others, Madras High Court, 2019, referencing this principle).

In Sheela Devi And Others v. Lal Chand And Another (2006 SCC 8 581), the Supreme Court dealt with a case where succession opened before the 1956 Act for one part of the family and after for another. It affirmed that Section 8 is not retrospective and applies only to succession post its enactment. The case underscored the distinction between property that remains coparcenary and property that devolves by succession, thereby losing its coparcenary character in the hands of the successor for the purpose of forming a new coparcenary with his own issue automatically.

The effect of the 2005 amendment is that the daughter becomes a coparcener by birth. Therefore, her interest in the coparcenary property is akin to that of a son, and it devolves according to the principles of coparcenary law, subject to the provisions of Section 6 itself.

Conclusion

Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, has undergone a transformative journey, culminating in the landmark 2005 amendment and its definitive interpretation by the Supreme Court in Vineeta Sharma v. Rakesh Sharma. The judiciary has played a pivotal role in navigating the complexities arising from the amendment, particularly concerning its temporal application. The current legal position firmly establishes that daughters, by virtue of their birth, are coparceners in a Mitakshara joint Hindu family, with rights and liabilities equal to those of sons, provided they were alive on September 9, 2005, irrespective of whether their father (the coparcener) was alive on that date. This interpretation has retroactively applied the benefits of the amendment, ensuring that the legislative intent of achieving gender equality in property rights is substantially realized.

While the provisos to Section 6 protect bona fide partitions and alienations that occurred before December 20, 2004, the stringent definition of "partition" safeguards daughters' rights against sham claims. The evolution of Section 6 marks a significant stride towards social justice and the constitutional ideal of equality, fundamentally reshaping the landscape of Hindu succession law in India and ensuring that daughters are no longer denied their rightful share in ancestral property merely on account of their gender.