The Evidentiary Value and Judicial Scrutiny of Fingerprint Expert Evidence in India

Introduction

Fingerprint evidence has long been recognized as a crucial tool in the administration of criminal justice in India. Rooted in the premise that each individual possesses unique fingerprint patterns, the science of dactyloscopy offers a potent means of linking an accused to a crime scene or incriminating articles. However, despite its scientific underpinnings, the admissibility, evidentiary weight, and judicial handling of fingerprint expert testimony are subject to rigorous legal standards and scrutiny. This article endeavors to analyze the multifaceted dimensions of fingerprint expert evidence within the Indian legal framework, drawing upon statutory provisions, seminal case law, and the principles governing expert testimony.

Legal Framework for Admissibility

The admissibility of fingerprint expert evidence in Indian courts is primarily governed by the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, supplemented by procedural guidelines under the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920, and constitutional safeguards.

Section 45, Indian Evidence Act, 1872

Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, is the cornerstone for the admissibility of expert opinions. It states that when the Court has to form an opinion upon a point of foreign law, or of science, or art, or as to identity of handwriting or finger impressions, the opinions upon that point of persons specially skilled in such fields are relevant facts. Such persons are termed "experts." The inclusion of "finger impressions" explicitly brings the testimony of a fingerprint expert within the ambit of this section. As noted in The State Of Madhya Pradesh v. Sitaram Rajput And Others (Madhya Pradesh High Court, 1977), the opinion of a fingerprint expert was made relevant by an amendment to Section 45 in 1899, recognizing the specialized nature of this field.

The Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920

The Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920, provides the legal framework for law enforcement agencies to collect identifying particulars, including fingerprints, from accused persons. Section 4 of this Act empowers a police officer to take measurements (which includes fingerprints) of any person arrested in connection with an offence punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term of one year or upwards. Section 5 stipulates that if any person who is required to allow his measurements or photograph to be taken resists or refuses to allow the taking of the same, it shall be lawful to use all necessary means to secure the taking thereof. It also provides that a Magistrate may order a person to allow measurements or photographs to be taken for the purpose of any investigation or proceeding under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

The Supreme Court, in Mohd. Aman And Another v. State Of Rajasthan (1997 SCC 10 44), emphasized the desirability of obtaining specimen fingerprints under a Magistrate's order to dispel suspicion regarding bona fides and eliminate the possibility of fabrication. The Court noted that although Section 4 allows police to take fingerprints, taking them before or under a Magistrate's order, as per Section 5, is "eminently desirable." This sentiment was echoed in Prakash v. State Of Karnataka (2014 SCC 12 133), where the Court, referencing Mohd. Aman, reiterated that the appropriate course for an Investigating Officer, to avoid suspicion of subterfuge, is to approach the Magistrate for necessary orders. The Rajasthan High Court in Mahendra Singh And Anr v. State Of Rajasthan Through P P (2015) and Manoj Singh v. State Of Rajasthan Through P P (2015), quoting these Supreme Court decisions, reinforced this position. Historically, in State Of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Babu Misra (1980 SCC CRI 444), the Supreme Court had observed the lack of explicit power for a Magistrate to direct an accused to give specimen writings during investigation under Section 73 of the Evidence Act (prior to amendments and specific legislation like the Criminal Procedure (Identification) Act, 2022, which has now replaced the 1920 Act and broadened these powers), and suggested suitable legislation analogous to Section 5 of the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920.

Constitutional Safeguards: Article 20(3)

A significant constitutional consideration is Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, which protects an accused person from being compelled to be a witness against himself. The Supreme Court, in the landmark case of State Of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad (1961 AIR SC 1808), clarified that compelling an accused to provide specimen handwriting, thumb impressions, or fingerprints does not violate Article 20(3). The Court distinguished between "being a witness" in the sense of imparting personal knowledge (testimonial compulsion) and furnishing material evidence for comparison, holding that the latter does not amount to self-incrimination. This judgment provides the constitutional bedrock for the compulsory taking of fingerprints for investigative purposes.

Evidentiary Value and Judicial Approach

While admissible, the evidentiary value of fingerprint expert opinion is a subject of careful judicial assessment.

Nature of Expert Opinion: Advisory, Not Conclusive

The opinion of a fingerprint expert, like any other expert, is advisory in nature and not conclusive proof. The Karnataka High Court in Parappa And Others v. Bhimappa And Another (2008) observed that expert opinion on fingerprints has the same value as any other expert opinion, serving as a guide to the court, which is at liberty to use its own discretion. Similarly, the Patna High Court in Basgit Singh v. King-Emperor (1926 SCC ONLINE PAT 192) stated that the expert's evidence is only a guide, and the Court can affirm or differ from the expert's view. The Supreme Court in Murari Lal v. State Of Madhya Pradesh (1979 SCC 3 612), while dealing with handwriting expert evidence but drawing parallels, noted that expert opinion is opinion-evidence and not substantive in itself. This was also affirmed in S. Gopal Reddy v. State Of A.P (1996 SCC 4 596) concerning handwriting experts, emphasizing that expert opinions require corroboration and are not conclusive.

Corroborative v. Substantive Evidence

There is a consistent line of judicial thought that expert evidence, including fingerprint analysis, is primarily corroborative. The Allahabad High Court in Abdul Rahman Deceased By Lrs. v. District Judge, Hamirpur Mahoba & Ors. (2012), citing the Supreme Court in Musheer Khan Alias Badshah Khan And Another v. State Of Madhya Pradesh (2010 SCC CRI 2 1100), stated that fingerprint expert evidence is not substantive evidence and can only be used to corroborate other substantive evidence on record. However, Murari Lal v. State Of Madhya Pradesh (1979) offered a more nuanced view, suggesting that while caution is necessary, there is no inflexible rule that expert evidence can never form the sole basis for conviction, especially if the expert's reasoning is sound and the evidence is of high quality. The Court in Murari Lal did distinguish fingerprint science as having attained "near perfection" compared to handwriting analysis.

The "Exact Science" Debate

Fingerprint identification is often referred to as an "exact science." The Karnataka High Court in Parappa And Others v. Bhimappa And Another (2008) stated that "the science of identifying thumb impression is an exact science and does not admit of any mistake or doubt." The Punjab & Haryana High Court in Chotti v. Maya Devi And Ors. (2011 RCR CIVIL 5 639) described the science of fingerprint comparison as a "perfect science" in contrast to handwriting comparison. The State Of Madhya Pradesh v. Sitaram Rajput And Others (MP HC, 1977) also acknowledged that the branch of fingerprinting is a "highly developed and technical subject." Despite this, courts maintain that the opinion derived therefrom is still an opinion and subject to judicial scrutiny.

Judicial Scrutiny and the Court's Role

Courts are not bound to accept an expert's opinion blindly. The Madras High Court in Rajendran v. State By Ramanayakenpalayam Police Station (1992) held that the court is not bound to accept the evidence of a fingerprint expert even if there are no special reasons for not accepting it, and it is proper for the court to satisfy itself by personal examination. The expert must also explain the reasons for their opinion in detail to enable the court to form a sound judgment. The Punjab & Haryana High Court in Chamkaur Singh v. Mithu Singh (2013) (and Chamkaur Singh Petitioner v. Mithu Singh, 2013) emphasized that the Court is the "expert of experts" and should make a thorough study when comparing prints, avoiding casual perusal. This aligns with the Supreme Court's view in Murari Lal that the judge should independently evaluate the expert's findings.

Conviction Based Solely on Fingerprint Evidence

The general rule of prudence is that it is unsafe to base a conviction solely on the uncorroborated testimony of a fingerprint expert. The Patna High Court in Basgit Singh v. King-Emperor (1926) articulated this caution, stating, "it is not safe to convict an accused upon the sole testimony of an expert," though adding that "each case, however, must depend on its own circumstances." If the fingerprint evidence is clear, cogent, and leaves no room for doubt, and the expert's reasoning is robust, it can carry significant weight. The Supreme Court in Himachal Pradesh Administration v. Shri Om Prakash (1972 SCC 1 249) considered fingerprint analysis as part of the circumstantial evidence chain leading to conviction.

Procedural Integrity in Handling Fingerprint Evidence

The reliability of fingerprint evidence is heavily dependent on the integrity of the procedures followed in its collection, preservation, and analysis.

Lifting and Preservation of Chance Prints

The proper lifting and preservation of chance fingerprints from a crime scene are critical. In State By Rural Police Shimoga v. B C Manjunatha @ Manju (Karnataka High Court, 2013), the court noted the procedure followed by the expert in using powder, lifting prints with adhesive tapes, and developing photographs. Conversely, in Ayyappan v. State Of Kerala (2004 SCC ONLINE KER 325), the Kerala High Court found the fingerprint evidence unsatisfactory due to a lack of authentic data showing that chance prints were properly lifted and made available for examination. The court noted, "The chance or specimen finger prints have not been proved in any manner known to law."

Chain of Custody

Maintaining an unbroken chain of custody for fingerprint evidence is paramount to ensure its integrity. The Supreme Court in Mohd. Aman And Another v. State Of Rajasthan (1997) acquitted the accused, partly because the prosecution failed to establish that seized articles were untampered before being examined by the Fingerprint Bureau. Discrepancies in handling and the absence of marked seals raised doubts about the authenticity of the fingerprint evidence.

Documentation and Presentation

Proper documentation and presentation of fingerprint evidence in court are essential. In Manepalli Anjaneyulu And Others v. State Of A.P (1999 SCC ONLINE AP 1093), the Andhra Pradesh High Court noted weaknesses in the fingerprint evidence, such as the non-examination of the photographer who took the chance prints and the failure to file the fingerprint photographs. Such lapses can significantly diminish the evidentiary value of fingerprints.

The Supreme Court in Musheer Khan Alias Badshah Khan And Another v. State Of Madhya Pradesh (2010) found that fingerprints presented by PW23 lacked substantive relevance as they did not directly link the accused to the crime scene in a meaningful manner, contributing to the acquittal.

Analysis of Key Judicial Pronouncements

Several Supreme Court judgments have shaped the jurisprudence on fingerprint evidence. State Of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad (1961) remains foundational, affirming the constitutionality of obtaining fingerprint specimens. Mohd. Aman And Another v. State Of Rajasthan (1997) is a critical authority on procedural integrity, chain of custody, and the desirability of magisterial oversight in obtaining specimen prints. The lapses highlighted in this case serve as a cautionary tale for investigative agencies. Prakash v. State Of Karnataka (2014) further underscored the need for meticulous handling and verification of fingerprint evidence, criticizing dubious procedures and emphasizing that mere recovery without proper linkage is insufficient. The Court noted the absence of voluntary fingerprint submission and procedural lapses. Murari Lal v. State Of Madhya Pradesh (1979), while primarily on handwriting, provides important observations on the nature of expert evidence generally, suggesting that while fingerprint science is more exact, judicial scrutiny remains paramount. In State Through Spe & Cbi, Andhra Pradesh v. M. Krishna Mohan And Another (2007), the Supreme Court found no reason to discredit the testimony of a qualified fingerprint expert who had deposed in numerous cases, highlighting the importance of expert credibility.

Challenges and Considerations

Despite its utility, fingerprint evidence is not without challenges. The possibility of fabrication, as alluded to in Mohd. Aman and Mahendra Singh, necessitates stringent procedural safeguards. Conflicting opinions from experts, though more common in handwriting analysis, can also arise, requiring the court to act as an "expert of experts" (Chamkaur Singh v. Mithu Singh, 2013). Ensuring the expert is genuinely "specially skilled" (Section 45, Evidence Act) and impartial is crucial. The method of comparison and the number of identical characteristics required for a positive match, while often standardized within bureaus, can sometimes be a point of contention, as discussed in The State Of Madhya Pradesh v. Sitaram Rajput And Others (MP HC, 1977), which noted that no hard and fast rule on the number of points can be laid down and that "six points or even less may be sufficient" in certain circumstances.

Conclusion

Fingerprint expert evidence holds a significant place in the Indian criminal justice system, recognized for its scientific basis and potential to establish identity conclusively. However, its journey from the crime scene to the courtroom is fraught with potential pitfalls. Admissibility under Section 45 of the Evidence Act is clear, and constitutional challenges under Article 20(3) have been settled by Kathi Kalu Oghad. The judiciary has consistently maintained that such evidence, while valuable, is opinion evidence, advisory in nature, and generally requires corroboration. The emphasis on procedural integrity during collection (preferably under magisterial supervision as per Mohd. Aman and Prakash), preservation, and analysis cannot be overstated. Courts retain the ultimate authority to evaluate the expert's opinion, scrutinize the reasoning, and even conduct their own examination. While the science of dactyloscopy is considered highly reliable, its application in the legal sphere demands a cautious and meticulous approach to ensure that justice is not only done but is also seen to be done, safeguarding against errors and miscarriages of justice.