The Doctrine of Substantive Ultra Vires in Indian Administrative Law

The Doctrine of Substantive Ultra Vires in Indian Administrative Law: A Jurisprudential Analysis

Introduction

The doctrine of substantive ultra vires is a cornerstone of administrative law in India, embodying the principle that governmental authorities and statutory bodies must act strictly within the confines of the powers conferred upon them by law. The term 'ultra vires' literally translates to "beyond powers" (Anand Prakash And Another v. Assistant Registrar, Co-Operative Societies And Others, Allahabad High Court, 1966). Substantive ultra vires, specifically, pertains to situations where an authority acts without the substantive power to do so, or exceeds the limits of such power, as opposed to merely failing to follow prescribed procedures (procedural ultra vires). This doctrine serves as a critical mechanism for judicial review, enabling courts to invalidate actions that lack legal sanction, thereby upholding the rule of law and ensuring accountability in governance. This article undertakes a critical analysis of the doctrine of substantive ultra vires as it has been interpreted and applied by the Indian judiciary, with particular emphasis on its application to executive actions and delegated legislation, drawing upon a range of seminal case law.

Conceptual Framework of Substantive Ultra Vires

Meaning and Scope

The essence of substantive ultra vires lies in the "lack of power" or an act done "in excess of the powers possessed by the person in law" (Anand Prakash And Another v. Assistant Registrar, Co-Operative Societies And Others, 1966). It is distinct from "illegality" in its broadest sense; while an ultra vires act is necessarily illegal, not all illegal acts are ultra vires. Illegality can arise from various factors such as fraud or public policy contraventions, whereas ultra vires specifically points to the capacity or authority to perform the act itself (Anand Prakash And Another v. Assistant Registrar, Co-Operative Societies And Others, 1966). The Madras High Court in V. Ramiah v. The State Bank Of India By Its Secretary And Treasurer (1966) identified "Excess of power (or ‘substantial’ ultra vires)" as a key ground for judicial review, predicated on the allegation that an agency has exceeded its powers. Any act performed "outside the defined limits (ultra vires) is an act unjustified by law" (S.R Dass Petitioner, v. State Of Haryana And Ors., Punjab & Haryana High Court, 1988).

Basis of the Doctrine

The doctrine is fundamentally rooted in the principle of the rule of law, which dictates that all governmental power must derive from and be exercised in accordance with law. As articulated by J.F. Garner and cited in V. Ramiah v. The State Bank Of India (1966), "All Governmental power must be recognised by the law... and that recognition is given only to power that emanates from a single source, the Queen in Parliament" (adapted to the Indian context, the Constitution and validly enacted legislation). It also reflects the principle of limited government, where public authorities possess only those powers that are conferred upon them by statute, either expressly or by necessary implication.

Application

Substantive ultra vires applies broadly to various forms of state action. This includes:

  • Executive or Administrative Acts: Decisions, orders, and actions taken by government departments, officials, or administrative bodies in the purported exercise of statutory powers.
  • Delegated Legislation: Rules, regulations, bye-laws, notifications, and schemes formulated by an authority to whom the legislature has delegated law-making power. Such legislation must remain within the scope and purpose of the enabling (parent) Act.

Substantive Ultra Vires in Relation to Executive and Administrative Actions

Executive and administrative actions are susceptible to challenge on grounds of substantive ultra vires if they are performed without legal authority or if they transgress the permissible limits of a duly conferred power.

Acting Without Legal Authority

This occurs when an authority undertakes an action for which no power has been granted by any statute. A notable example is found in Bimal Chandra Banerjee v. State Of Madhya Pradesh Etc. (1970 SCC 2 467), where the Supreme Court held that the Madhya Pradesh Government had overstepped its statutory authority by imposing an excise duty through an executive notification. The Court emphasized that taxation powers are inherently legislative and can only be levied based on clear legislative authorization; any attempt by the executive to impose a tax without such backing is ultra vires. Similarly, in Hukam Chand Shyam Lal v. Union Of India And Others (1976 SCC 2 128), the Supreme Court found that orders issued by the Delhi Administration for the temporary possession and disconnection of telephone lines were "issued without proper jurisdiction and contrary to the provisions of the Act and the Rules," rendering them invalid.

Exceeding the Scope of Granted Power

Even where an authority possesses a certain power, its exercise may be ultra vires if the specific action taken goes beyond the defined boundaries or conditions of that power. In Hukam Chand Shyam Lal (1976), the authorities were found to have "overstepped their powers" by invoking Section 5 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, and Rule 422 of the Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951, on grounds (such as alleged involvement in illegal forward trading) that were not aligned with the statutory framework for such actions, which pertained to "public emergency" or other specified emergencies. The principle that "a repository of power acts ultra vires... when he acts in excess of his power in the narrow sense" has been affirmed in cases like JUBILANT INGREVIA LIMITED v. -DESIGNATED AUTHORITY DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF ANTI-DUMPING AND ALLIED DUTIES (CESTAT, 2021) and Sukhalal Munda Petitioner v. State Of Odisha And Others (Orissa High Court, 2017).

Improper Purpose or Irrelevant Considerations

While often discussed under the rubric of abuse of power or Wednesbury unreasonableness, acting for an improper purpose or on irrelevant considerations can also be construed as a form of substantive ultra vires if the enabling statute confers power for specific purposes or based on specified considerations. If power granted for purpose A is used for purpose B (not authorized), the authority has acted beyond the scope of the power granted. The Punjab & Haryana High Court in S.R Dass Petitioner (1988) observed that the ultra vires doctrine "also governs abuse of power as where something is done for the wrong reasons." Conversely, in Gulam Mustafa And Others v. State Of Maharashtra And Others (1976 SCC 1 800), a land acquisition for a "mondha" (country fair or market) was held to be *intra vires* the municipality's powers, as providing a market was a legitimate public purpose falling within its statutory functions. This illustrates that if the purpose is valid and authorized, the action is not ultra vires on this ground.

Substantive Ultra Vires in Relation to Delegated Legislation

Delegated legislation, such as rules or regulations framed under an enabling statute, is a frequent subject of substantive ultra vires challenges. The fundamental principle is that such legislation must be consistent with, and strictly confined by, the provisions of the parent Act that authorizes its creation.

Core Principle: Conformity with the Parent Act

The judiciary has consistently held that delegated legislation cannot transgress the boundaries set by the enabling Act. In Agricultural Market Committee v. Shalimar Chemical Works Ltd. (1997 SCC 5 516), the Supreme Court struck down Rule 74(2) and Bye-law 24(5) made under the Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural Produce and Livestock) Markets Act, 1966. These provisions created a legal fiction by presuming that copra weighed within the market area was sold or purchased there. The Court found that these presumptions "overstepped the boundaries set by the primary Act" and "extended beyond the legislative intent," rendering them ultra vires. Similarly, in Kerala Samsthana Chethu Thozhilali Union v. State Of Kerala And Others (2006 SCC 4 327), Rules 4(2) and 9(10)(b) of the Kerala Abkari Shops Disposal Rules, 2002, which mandated the employment of erstwhile arrack workers in toddy shops, were declared ultra vires the Kerala Abkari Act. The Supreme Court reasoned that these rules "extended beyond the legislative intent and statutory provisions" of the Act, which was primarily concerned with regulating trade in intoxicants, not imposing such employment conditions. In Global Energy Limited And Another v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (2009 SCC 15 570), certain clauses of Regulation 6-A of the CERC regulations, imposing disqualifications for inter-State trading licenses, were held ultra vires the Electricity Act, 2003, because they "imposed substantive obligations beyond the delegated authority."

The Supreme Court in State Of T.N And Another v. P. Krishnamurthy And Others (2006 SCC 4 517), reiterating its stance in Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd. And Others v. Union Of India And Others (1985 SCC 1 641), outlined several grounds for challenging subordinate legislation, including "Failure to conform to the statute under which it is made or exceeding the limits of authority conferred by the enabling Act." This principle is also clearly articulated in A.V Educational Society v. Govt. Of A.P, Education Deptt. And Others (Andhra Pradesh High Court, 2002), stating, "When delegated legislation goes beyond the scope of the authority conferred by, or it is in conflict with, the parent statute it is invalid and this is known as substantive ultra vires." The Gujarat High Court in State Of Gujarat v. Karimbhai Dadamiya Pirzada And Others (2019) affirmed that rules can be struck down if they are "beyond the scope of the relevant provision in the Statute" or "irreconcilably inconsistent with the relevant enactment in the Statute."

Specific Grounds for Delegated Legislation Being Substantively Ultra Vires

1. Inconsistency with Provisions of the Parent Act

A rule or regulation is substantively ultra vires if it directly contradicts or is repugnant to any provision of the enabling statute, or if it seeks to achieve an object not contemplated by the Act. The aforementioned cases of Agricultural Market Committee (1997), Kerala Samsthana (2006), and Global Energy (2009) are prime examples. In Umesh Kumar Bohare v. State Of Madhya Pradesh And Others (Madhya Pradesh High Court, 2019), Rule 15A of the M.P. Municipal (Development of Coloniser's Rule) 1998, providing for regularization of unauthorized colonies, was challenged as ultra vires the parent Municipal Acts. The argument was that the rule sought to regularize what the Acts essentially prohibited, thereby changing the essential features of the substantive provisions. Furthermore, executive instructions or rules cannot alter the clear mandates of a statutory notification, as established in State Of Madhya Pradesh And Another v. M/S G.S Dall And Flour Mills (1992 SUPP SCC 1 150); by extension, rules that attempt to modify the parent Act's provisions without authority would be ultra vires.

2. Exceeding the Scope of Rule-Making Power

Delegated legislation may be ultra vires if its subject matter falls outside the specific field for which the rule-making power was conferred by the parent Act. The Act usually specifies the purposes for which rules can be made. If a rule addresses matters not covered by this grant, it exceeds the delegated authority. In Bimal Chandra Banerjee (1970), the Supreme Court held that the general rule-making power under Section 62(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act, 1915, could not be utilized to frame rules for imposing an excise duty that was not otherwise leviable under the specific charging sections (Sections 25 and 26) of the Act. The Orissa High Court in STATE OF ORISSA v. NAKULA CHANDRA SINGH (2024) explicitly states that delegated legislation is substantively ultra vires if it is inconsistent with the parent Act.

3. Excessive Delegation in the Parent Act

Substantive ultra vires can also arise if the parent Act itself suffers from the vice of excessive delegation. If an Act delegates essential legislative functions to an executive authority without laying down any policy, standard, or guidance for the exercise of that power, the delegation itself may be unconstitutional. Consequently, any rules made pursuant to such an unconstitutional delegation would be ultra vires. A classic illustration is Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf) Lal Kuan, Delhi And Another v. Union Of India And Others (1960 AIR SC 554). The Supreme Court struck down Section 3(d) of the Drug and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisement) Act, 1954, which empowered the Central Government to add to the schedule of diseases (for which advertising remedies was prohibited) by making rules. This was held to be an excessive delegation of legislative power because the Act provided no criteria or guidance for specifying such diseases. In contrast, the delegation of taxing power to the Municipal Corporation in Municipal Corporation Of Delhi v. Birla Cotton, Spinning And Weaving Mills, Delhi And Another (1968 SCC 3 251) was upheld because the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, provided sufficient guidelines, limits, and safeguards (such as government sanction and budgetary constraints), thereby preventing the delegation from being excessive. The absence of such safeguards could lead to a finding of excessive delegation, rendering the rules ultra vires. The Orissa High Court in STATE OF ORISSA v. NAKULA CHANDRA SINGH (2024) includes "Where parent Act delegates essential legislative functions" as a ground for challenging delegated legislation as substantively ultra vires.

4. Violation of the Constitution

Although often treated as a separate ground for challenge, if a piece of delegated legislation violates Fundamental Rights or any other provision of the Constitution of India, it is inherently ultra vires. The legislature cannot delegate a power it does not possess, nor can it authorize the making of rules that are unconstitutional. This ground was noted in State Of T.N And Another v. P. Krishnamurthy And Others (2006).

Judicial Approach to Interpretation

When assessing a challenge of substantive ultra vires against delegated legislation, courts meticulously interpret the enabling statute to ascertain the precise scope and limits of the delegated power (M/S.SGS MINES AND INDUSTRES PVT LTD v. STATE OF ORISSA, Orissa High Court, 2022, citing Daymond v. S.W. Water Authority, (1976) 1 All E.R. 1039 (H.L.)). There is also a principle that rules should, if possible, be read harmoniously with the substantive provisions of the Act to avoid rendering them ultra vires, though this cannot save a rule that is clearly beyond power (Commissioner Of Income-Tax v. Koodathil Kallyatan Ambujakshan, Bombay High Court, 2008).

Distinction from Procedural Ultra Vires and Unreasonableness

Procedural Ultra Vires

Procedural ultra vires occurs when an authority fails to comply with mandatory procedural requirements prescribed by the statute for the exercise of its power or the making of rules (e.g., requirements for prior publication, consultation with affected parties, or granting a hearing). The Orissa High Court in Sukhalal Munda Petitioner v. State Of Odisha And Others (2017) discussed procedural ultra vires in the context of the mandatory requirement of previous publication before a rule is enacted. Substantive ultra vires, in contrast, concerns the existence or scope of the power itself (the "what"), rather than the manner or procedure of its exercise (the "how").

Unreasonableness (Wednesbury Doctrine)

An administrative action or a piece of delegated legislation might be intra vires in the narrow substantive sense (i.e., the authority has the power, and the subject matter is within scope) but may still be struck down if it is "so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it" (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 K.B. 223, cited in JUBILANT INGREVIA LIMITED, 2021). While some Indian judgments appear to integrate gross unreasonableness into the concept of ultra vires, suggesting that Parliament never intended to grant authority to make such unreasonable rules (JUBILANT INGREVIA LIMITED, 2021; Sukhalal Munda, 2017), the classic doctrine of substantive ultra vires involves a more direct inquiry into the existence and defined limits of power. State Of T.N And Another v. P. Krishnamurthy And Others (2006) lists "Manifest arbitrariness/unreasonableness (to an extent where the court might well say that the legislature never intended to give authority to make such rules)" as a distinct ground from "Failure to conform to the statute... or exceeding the limits of authority conferred by the enabling Act," thereby suggesting a conceptual separation, even if outcomes can overlap.

Consequences of an Act Being Substantively Ultra Vires

An act, whether executive or legislative (delegated), that is found to be substantively ultra vires is treated as null and void ab initio. It is deemed to have no legal force or effect from the very beginning. As stated in M/S.SGS MINES AND INDUSTRES PVT LTD v. STATE OF ORISSA (2022), quoting Schwartz Administrative Law (1984), "If an agency acts outside (ultra vires), it is invalid." Consequently, any orders passed, rules framed, or actions taken under such ultra vires exercise of power are liable to be quashed by the courts (as seen in Hukam Chand Shyam Lal, 1976; Agricultural Market Committee, 1997; Kerala Samsthana, 2006).

Conclusion

The doctrine of substantive ultra vires plays an indispensable role in the Indian legal system by ensuring that public authorities operate within the four corners of the law. It is a vital instrument of judicial control over the executive and over bodies exercising delegated legislative powers, thereby safeguarding against arbitrary governance and upholding the supremacy of the Constitution and enacted statutes. The rich tapestry of Indian jurisprudence, as illustrated by landmark decisions such as Hukam Chand Shyam Lal v. Union Of India And Others, Agricultural Market Committee v. Shalimar Chemical Works Ltd., Kerala Samsthana Chethu Thozhilali Union v. State Of Kerala And Others, Bimal Chandra Banerjee v. State Of Madhya Pradesh Etc., and Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union Of India And Others, consistently reinforces the fundamental principle that all power must have a clear legal pedigree and its exercise must not transgress the limits imposed by law. As the administrative state continues to expand, the vigilance of the judiciary in applying the doctrine of substantive ultra vires remains crucial for maintaining a system of governance that is accountable, transparent, and faithful to the rule of law.