The Doctrine of Pleasure concerning the President and Governor in India

The Doctrine of Pleasure concerning the President and Governor in India: A Constitutional Analysis

Introduction

The doctrine of pleasure, a concept inherited from English common law, finds significant expression within the constitutional framework of India. It postulates that certain public offices are held at the pleasure of the appointing authority, typically the Crown in England, and in India, the President or the Governor. This doctrine governs the tenure of various constitutional functionaries, including Governors of States, Union and State Ministers, the Attorney General for India, Advocates General for States, and members of the civil services. This article seeks to provide a comprehensive analysis of the doctrine of pleasure as it pertains to the President and the Governor under the Indian Constitution. It will delve into the constitutional provisions, scope, judicially evolved limitations, and the distinction from its English counterpart, drawing extensively upon landmark judicial pronouncements and relevant statutory principles.

Constitutional Framework of the Doctrine of Pleasure

The Constitution of India incorporates the doctrine of pleasure in several Articles, defining the tenure of key executive and administrative officials. The exercise of this pleasure, however, is not uniform and is conditioned by other constitutional provisions and judicial interpretations.

Tenure of Governors (Article 156)

Article 156(1) of the Constitution stipulates that "the Governor shall hold office during the pleasure of the President." Clause (3) of the same Article provides that, "subject to the foregoing provisions of this article, a Governor shall hold office for a term of five years from the date on which he enters upon his office." The interplay between these clauses was extensively analyzed by the Supreme Court in B.P. Singhal v. Union Of India And Another (2010 SCC 6 331). The Court clarified that the five-year term in Article 156(3) is subject to the President's pleasure under Article 156(1) (B.P. Singhal v. Union Of India And Another, 2010, citing its own judgment text). The Court held that while the President can remove a Governor at any time without assigning reasons, this power is not unfettered or a license to act arbitrarily, whimsically, or capriciously. A cause for withdrawal of pleasure must exist, though it need not be disclosed (B.P. Singhal v. Union Of India And Another, 2010 SCC 6 331, as per provided material). The removal should not be for reasons that are "arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or mala fide" (B.P. Singhal v. Union Of India And Another, 2010 INSC 286, Summary of Judgment). The Governor holds a "high constitutional office with important constitutional functions and duties" and is not merely an employee of the Union Government (B.P. Singhal v. Union Of India And Another, 2010, citing its own judgment text; Kasturi Radha Krishnan v. President Of India, 1989 SCC ONLINE MAD 209, as per provided material).

Tenure of Union and State Ministers (Articles 75(2) and 164(1))

Under Article 75(2), "the Ministers [of the Union] shall hold office during the pleasure of the President." Similarly, Article 164(1) states that "the Chief Minister shall be appointed by the Governor and the other Ministers shall be appointed by the Governor on the advice of the Chief Minister, and the Ministers shall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor." The pleasure in these contexts is largely political, exercised typically on the advice of the Prime Minister for Union Ministers and the Chief Minister for State Ministers. The Supreme Court in Om Narain Agarwal And Others v. Nagar Palika, Shahjahanpur And Others (1993 SCC 2 242), while discussing nominated members of a Municipal Board holding office at pleasure, drew an analogy to these constitutional provisions, implicitly recognizing the political nature of such appointments and removals.

Tenure of Attorney General and Advocate General (Articles 76(4) and 165(3))

Article 76(4) provides that "the Attorney-General shall hold office during the pleasure of the President." Correspondingly, Article 165(3) states that "the Advocate-General shall hold office during the pleasure of the Governor." The tenure of these law officers is often, though not necessarily, co-terminus with the government that advised their appointment (Dinesh @ Dinesh Kumar @ Dinesh Singh v. The Chief Secretary, Patna High Court, 2022, as per provided material, citing M.T. Khan v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2004(2) SCC 267). The Karnataka High Court in H. Rajaiah And Others v. State Of Karnataka And Others (2000, as per provided material) noted that appointments like that of the Attorney General and Advocate General are made during pleasure.

Tenure of Civil Servants (Articles 310 and 311)

Article 310(1) embodies the general principle of pleasure: "Except as expressly provided by this Constitution, every person who is a member of a defence service or of a civil service of the Union or of an all-India service or holds any post connected with defence or any civil post under the Union holds office during the pleasure of the President, and every person who is a member of a civil service of a State or holds any civil post under a State holds office during the pleasure of the Governor of the State."

However, this pleasure is significantly qualified by Article 311, which provides procedural safeguards against arbitrary dismissal, removal, or reduction in rank. Article 311(1) mandates that no civil servant shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which they were appointed. Article 311(2) requires an inquiry, information of charges, and a reasonable opportunity of being heard before such action is taken (Satyavir Singh And Others v. Union Of India And Others, 1985, as per provided material; Government Of Andhra Pradesh And Another v. N. Ramanaiah, 2009 SCC 7 165, as per provided material). The Supreme Court in State Of Bihar v. Abdul Majid (1954 SCC 0 245) held that statutory restrictions (like those in Section 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, analogous to Article 311) make wrongful dismissals justiciable, allowing suits for arrears of salary.

The provisos to Article 311(2) carve out exceptions where the requirement of an inquiry can be dispensed with: (a) conviction on a criminal charge; (b) where it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; or (c) where the President or Governor is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State, it is not expedient to hold such inquiry. In such cases, the pleasure under Article 310 revives in a less fettered form (Union Of India And Another v. Tulsiram Patel And Others, 1985 INSC 155, as per provided material; Chief Mechanical Engineer, E. Railway And Others v. Jyoti Prasad Banerjee And Ors., Calcutta High Court, 1975, as per provided material).

Nature and Exercise of Pleasure

Not a Personal Power

A crucial aspect of the doctrine of pleasure in India is that, generally, it is not exercised by the President or Governor in their personal capacity. Instead, it is exercised on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, in accordance with the principles of parliamentary democracy (Satyavir Singh And Others v. Union Of India And Others, 1985, as per provided material; Ex. Major N.R Ajwani & Ors. v. Union Of India & Others, Delhi High Court, 1994, as per provided material). This was firmly established in Shamsher Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR 1974 SC 2192), which clarified that except in spheres where the Governor is to act in his discretion, the powers are to be exercised on ministerial advice. The earlier view in Sardari Lal v. Union of India (1971 3 S.C.R 461), suggesting that power under Article 311(2)(c) was personal to the President, was modified by this broader understanding.

Limitations on the Doctrine of Pleasure

The doctrine of pleasure in India is subject to several limitations:

  • Express Constitutional Provisions: Article 310(1) itself begins with "Except as expressly provided by this Constitution." This refers to specific tenures and modes of removal for functionaries like Judges of the Supreme Court (Article 124), Judges of High Courts (Article 217, 218), the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (Article 148), and the Chief Election Commissioner (Article 324) (G.L. Shukla And Anr. v. The State Of Gujarat And Ors., Gujarat High Court, 1967, as per provided material; Chief Mechanical Engineer, E. Railway And Others v. Jyoti Prasad Banerjee And Ors., Calcutta High Court, 1975, as per provided material).
  • Article 311 for Civil Servants: As discussed, Article 311 imposes significant procedural safeguards, acting as a restriction on the pleasure doctrine concerning civil servants (B.P. Singhal v. Union Of India And Another, 2010, citing its own judgment text).
  • Fundamental Rights: The exercise of pleasure cannot be arbitrary, irrational, or mala fide, as this would violate Article 14 of the Constitution (Equality before Law). This principle was strongly affirmed in B.P. Singhal regarding the removal of Governors. The Court stated, "The doctrine of pleasure, however, is not a licence to act with unfettered discretion to act arbitrarily, whimsically, or capriciously. It does not dispense with the need for a cause for withdrawal of the pleasure" (B.P. Singhal v. Union Of India And Another, 2010, as per provided material). Similar sentiments were expressed in H. Rajaiah And Others v. State Of Karnataka And Others (2000, as per provided material) and Balde Siddilingam v. The State of Telangana (Telangana High Court, 2024, as per provided material), emphasizing that pleasure must be exercised reasonably and not arbitrarily.

Judicial Review of the Exercise of Pleasure

The extent of judicial review over the exercise of pleasure varies depending on the office in question.

Governors

In B.P. Singhal v. Union Of India And Another (2010 SCC 6 331), the Supreme Court held that the removal of a Governor is subject to judicial review, albeit on limited grounds. The Court can intervene if the removal is found to be "arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, mala fide, or based on wholly irrelevant grounds" (B.P. Singhal v. Union Of India And Another, 2010 INSC 286, Summary of Judgment). While the President is not required to disclose the reasons for removal, the existence of a valid cause is imperative. The burden of proof would be heavy on the petitioner challenging the removal. The immunity granted to the Governor under Article 361(1) for the exercise of official powers does not bar judicial review of the Union Government's advice leading to the removal, if such advice is unconstitutional (B.P. Singhal v. Union Of India And Another, 2010 SCC 6 331, Analysis section of provided text).

Civil Servants

The dismissal or removal of a civil servant in contravention of Article 311 is unconstitutional and subject to judicial review. Courts can examine whether the procedural safeguards were followed and whether a reasonable opportunity was afforded (State Of Bihar v. Abdul Majid, 1954 SCC 0 245). Even when action is taken under the provisos to Article 311(2), dispensing with an inquiry, the decision is not entirely beyond judicial scrutiny. For instance, the satisfaction of the authority regarding the impracticability of holding an inquiry (proviso (b)) or the expediency in the interest of state security (proviso (c)) must be based on objective material, and a court may examine if such satisfaction was arrived at arbitrarily or on extraneous considerations, though the scope of review is narrow (Union Of India And Another v. Tulsiram Patel And Others, 1985 INSC 155).

Other Appointments at Pleasure

For offices like the Attorney General, Advocate General, or nominated members of statutory bodies holding office at pleasure, the discretion to remove is wider. However, as established in Om Narain Agarwal (1993 SCC 2 242) concerning nominated municipal members, while political considerations may be valid, an action that is patently arbitrary or violative of statutory provisions could still be challenged. The Gujarat High Court in Shree Rajkot District Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd. v. Bhanubhai Labhubhai Mehta (2014, as per provided material), citing B.P. Singhal, reiterated that even in pleasure appointments, a cause must exist, though it may not be disclosed, implying a check against sheer whim.

The immunity of the Governor under Article 361 for official acts was discussed in Nabam Rebia And Bamang Felix v. Deputy Speaker (Supreme Court Of India, 2016, as per provided material), particularly concerning discretionary powers related to the legislature. While this case emphasized broad immunity for such discretionary acts, the specific context of removal of a Governor by the President (acting on Union Government's advice) was more directly addressed in B.P. Singhal, which carved out a path for limited judicial review of the underlying advice.

Distinction from English Doctrine

The doctrine of pleasure in India, while derived from English law, is significantly different in its application. In England, the doctrine historically implied a more absolute power of the Crown. In India, the doctrine is circumscribed by the written Constitution. As observed in State Of Bihar v. Abdul Majid (1954 SCC 0 245), the English common law rule that a civil servant could not sue the Crown for arrears of salary was held inapplicable in India due to statutory provisions providing for such remedies. The Supreme Court in B.P. Singhal (2010 SCC 6 331) also noted that the doctrine in India is moderated by principles of constitutionalism, preventing arbitrary or unjust removals. The incorporation of fundamental rights, particularly Article 14, and specific provisions like Article 311, ensures that the "pleasure" is not absolute but is subject to constitutional limitations and judicial oversight.

Discussion of Key Reference Materials

The jurisprudence on the doctrine of pleasure in India has been shaped significantly by several landmark cases. B.P. Singhal v. Union Of India And Another (2010) stands as a pivotal judgment concerning the tenure of Governors. It meticulously balanced the President's power to remove a Governor at pleasure with the need to prevent arbitrariness, establishing that while reasons need not be disclosed, a valid cause must exist, and the removal is subject to limited judicial review. This case underscored the high constitutional status of the Governor and differentiated their position from that of government employees.

Union Of India And Another v. Tulsiram Patel And Others (1985) authoritatively interpreted Article 310 and the provisos to Article 311(2). It affirmed the executive's power to take disciplinary action against civil servants without a formal inquiry under specified exceptional circumstances, holding that express constitutional provisions (like the provisos) can override general principles of natural justice. However, it did not imply an entirely unchecked power, as the grounds for invoking the provisos must be legitimately present.

State Of Bihar v. Abdul Majid (1954) was crucial in establishing that the English common law restrictions on civil servants suing the Crown for wrongful dismissal or arrears of salary do not fully apply in India. It highlighted that statutory provisions (like Section 240 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and subsequently Article 311 of the Constitution) provide substantive rights and make such matters justiciable, thereby adapting the doctrine of pleasure to the Indian legal and constitutional context.

Collectively, these cases, along with others cited, demonstrate a consistent judicial trend: while acknowledging the necessity of the doctrine of pleasure for effective governance, the courts have progressively infused it with principles of fairness, reasonableness, and non-arbitrariness, ensuring its compatibility with India's democratic and constitutional ethos.

Conclusion

The doctrine of pleasure, as applicable to the President and Governors in India, is a nuanced constitutional concept. It grants significant discretionary power to the executive in determining the tenure of certain high constitutional and administrative offices. However, unlike its more absolute historical counterpart in English law, the Indian version is firmly embedded within a framework of constitutional supremacy, fundamental rights, and specific statutory limitations. The judiciary, through landmark pronouncements, has played a vital role in interpreting the scope of this pleasure, ensuring that it is exercised not as an arbitrary fiat but as a power coupled with responsibility, subject to judicial review on grounds of mala fides, arbitrariness, or unconstitutionality. The doctrine thus represents a balance between executive flexibility and the rule of law, essential for the robust functioning of India's parliamentary democracy and quasi-federal structure.