The Doctrine of Lis Pendens and the Rights of a Subsequent Purchaser

The Doctrine of Lis Pendens and the Rights of a Subsequent Purchaser: A Juridical Analysis under Indian Law

I. Introduction

The edifice of civil adjudication rests upon the principle of finality. A court's decree must be binding and effective, lest litigation becomes an interminable exercise. The ancient legal maxim, ut lite pendente nihil innovetur—let nothing new be introduced while litigation is pending—gives voice to this imperative. In Indian jurisprudence, this doctrine is statutorily enshrined in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 ("TPA"). It governs the legal status of property transferred while it is the subject matter of a contentious suit, creating a complex legal position for the individual who purchases such property—the lis pendens purchaser or transferee pendente lite.

This article provides a comprehensive analysis of the rights, liabilities, and procedural standing of a lis pendens purchaser under Indian law. It navigates the judicial tightrope walk between upholding the sanctity of judicial proceedings and accommodating the interests of a transferee who, while not an original party, acquires a substantial stake in the litigated property. Drawing upon a wealth of Supreme Court and High Court precedents, this analysis will dissect the nature of a pendente lite transfer, the purchaser's right to be impleaded in the pending suit, the availability of substantive legal defences, and their precarious position during the execution of the final decree.

II. The Foundation: Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882

Section 52 of the TPA codifies the doctrine of lis pendens. It provides that during the pendency of any suit or proceeding which is not collusive and in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the Court and on such terms as it may impose.

The Supreme Court, in Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayyaswami And Others (1972 SCC 2 200), articulated that the purpose of Section 52 is not to annul the conveyance but only to render it subservient to the rights of the parties to the litigation. The doctrine is intended to protect the parties to the litigation against alienations by their opponents during the pendency of the suit. This principle is so fundamental that it extends beyond voluntary sales to encompass involuntary alienations, such as court-auction sales and revenue sales (Samarendra Nath Sinha And Another v. Krishna Kumar Nag, 1966; Smt. Sabitri Dibya v. Smt. Chandramani Panda And Others, 1987). The pendency of the suit itself serves as constructive notice to the world, and a purchaser is deemed to be bound by the decree that is ultimately passed (SHINGARA SINGH v. DALJIT SINGH, 2024).

III. The Status and Validity of a Pendente Lite Transfer

A critical, and often misunderstood, aspect of the doctrine is that a transfer pendente lite is not void or illegal ab initio. As between the transferor (the party to the suit) and the transferee (the purchaser), the conveyance is perfectly valid and operates to vest the transferor's title in the transferee (Joginder Kour and another v. Capt. Gandharb Singh and another, 2017). The transaction is, however, subject to the rights established by the decree in the pending suit.

The effect of Section 52 is to subordinate the transfer to the outcome of the litigation. The Bombay High Court in Shyamabai Shriram Sharma v. Ramkisan Prabhatilal Mittal (2007) held that the conveyance in favour of the subsequent purchaser is treated "as if it had never any existence" relative to the rights of the plaintiff in the suit for specific performance. This view was echoed by the Himachal Pradesh High Court in PRAKASH CHAND AND ANOTHER v. SATISH CHAND AND OTHERS (2024). The purchaser is bound by the result of the litigation, and their title is contingent upon the title of their vendor being upheld in the suit.

However, the Supreme Court in T.G Ashok Kumar v. Govindammal And Another (2010 SCC 14 370) introduced a nuanced equitable consideration. In that partition suit, where the vendor was ultimately allotted a specific one-fourth portion of the property, the Court upheld the sale to the lis pendens purchaser to the extent of that allotted share. This demonstrates that while the purchaser's rights are subject to the decree, they are not automatically extinguished, and equity may be moulded to protect the transaction to the extent the vendor's title is established.

IV. The Right to Participate: Impleadment and Substitution of a Lis Pendens Purchaser

While a lis pendens purchaser is bound by the decree, their right to participate in the proceedings to protect their interest has been a subject of extensive judicial deliberation. The plaintiff is under no obligation to implead a transferee pendente lite. However, the courts are vested with discretionary powers under Order 1, Rule 10 and Order 22, Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ("CPC") to permit such a purchaser to be joined as a party.

A. The Discretionary Power of the Court

The judiciary has evolved from a position of caution (Policherla Veeraraghava Reddi v. Cherla Subba Reddi, 1919) to a more pragmatic approach that recognizes the purchaser's substantial interest. The Supreme Court in Amit Kumar Shaw And Another v. Farida Khatoon And Another (2005 SCC 11 403) held that where the transferees hold the "only existing and subsisting rights to the property," their exclusion would be unjust and render the litigation ineffective. The Court emphasized that their substitution under Order 22, Rule 10 CPC was necessary for a fair adjudication.

B. A Proper, if not Necessary, Party

The landmark decision in Thomson Press (India) Limited v. Nanak Builders And Investors Private Limited And Others (2013 SCC 5 397) solidified the position. The Supreme Court held that a subsequent purchaser is a "necessary and proper party" for the effective adjudication of a specific performance suit. Impleading the purchaser is crucial to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings and to ensure that the decree can be effectively enforced against the person who currently holds the title. This is particularly true where the original defendant (the vendor) may not diligently defend the suit after having sold the property. The court in Shuvam Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Smt. Babita Mohanty & Anr. (2009) observed that an alienee would ordinarily be joined as a party to enable him to protect his interests.

C. Special Considerations in Partition Suits

In partition suits, the impleadment of a lis pendens purchaser is often considered essential. High Courts have held that such purchasers are necessary parties to enable the court to work out the equities of the case and to ensure a complete and final division of the property, thereby preventing future litigation (KANNAN, v. KITTU, 2021; Sk. Siraj Others v. Nilamani Mohapatra Others, 2008).

V. The Lis Pendens Purchaser and Defences in Substantive Law

A significant consequence of the doctrine of lis pendens is the foreclosure of certain substantive defences for the purchaser. The most critical of these is the defence of being a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, as provided under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

The law is settled that a transferee pendente lite cannot avail this defence. The very doctrine of lis pendens imputes constructive notice of the pending litigation upon the purchaser. The Supreme Court and various High Courts have unequivocally held that Section 52 of the TPA is not subject to Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act (Thomson Press, 2013; SANKAR PRASAD DASH v. DR. MANJULATA DASH & ANOTHER, 2015). The purchase during the pendency of the suit is considered a speculative transaction, and the purchaser takes the property subject to the hazards of the litigation. Similarly, the protection afforded to transferees from an ostensible owner under Section 41 of the TPA is not available to a lis pendens purchaser (PRAKASH CHAND, 2024).

VI. The Final Hurdle: The Lis Pendens Purchaser in Execution Proceedings

The doctrine's full force is most acutely felt at the stage of execution. The law is clear and stringent: a transferee pendente lite is bound by the decree and has no independent right to resist or obstruct its execution.

This principle is statutorily fortified by Order 21, Rule 102 of the CPC, which explicitly states that Rule 98 and Rule 100 (which provide a mechanism for adjudication of claims of third parties resisting execution) shall not apply to resistance or obstruction by a transferee from the judgment-debtor pendente lite. The Supreme Court in Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram And Others (2008 SCC 7 144) and reaffirmed in SHINGARA SINGH v. DALJIT SINGH (2024), held that Rule 102 is a declaration that there should not be any resistance by a transferee pendente lite. Such a purchaser cannot question the legality of the decree during execution proceedings (RAJENDRA V DESHPANDE v. MYSORE CROP CARE PVT.LTD., 2015). Their fate is inextricably tied to that of their vendor, the judgment-debtor.

VII. Conclusion

The legal framework governing the lis pendens purchaser in India reflects a carefully calibrated balance. On one hand, it robustly protects the integrity of the judicial process and the principle of finality by ensuring that a court's decree is not frustrated by mid-litigation transfers. The transfer is rendered subservient to the decree, the purchaser is bound by the outcome, and the potent defence of being a bona fide purchaser is denied.

On the other hand, modern jurisprudence, led by seminal Supreme Court decisions like Amit Kumar Shaw and Thomson Press, has recognized that a blanket refusal to hear the purchaser would be contrary to the principles of natural justice. While not entitled to be impleaded as of right, the purchaser is now largely seen as a proper party whose presence is often necessary for a complete adjudication, to prevent collusion, and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. The courts have carved out a discretionary space to allow the purchaser to defend their acquired interest on its merits. This evolution marks a shift from viewing the lis pendens purchaser as a mere interloper to recognizing them as a stakeholder whose voice, in the interest of substantive justice, ought to be heard.