The Rule of Law Over the Rule of Discretion: A Judicial Scrutiny of Arbitrariness in Indian Administrative Law

I. Introduction: The Constitutional Mandate Against Arbitrariness

In a constitutional democracy founded on the rule of law, the exercise of public power is necessarily circumscribed. The Indian Constitution, particularly through the prism of Article 14, establishes a robust framework to guard against the arbitrary exercise of state power. The principle that arbitrariness is an antithesis to equality has become a cornerstone of Indian administrative and constitutional jurisprudence. As observed in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Thakur Bharat Singh (1967), the rule of law, as adopted in India, means "the absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power, and excludes the existence of arbitrariness, of prerogative, or even of wide discretionary authority on the part of the Government." This article traces the jurisprudential evolution of the doctrine against arbitrariness, analyzing how the Indian judiciary has defined, delineated, and curtailed discretionary power to ensure that state action remains fair, just, and reasonable.

The journey of this doctrine reveals a dynamic and expansive interpretation of fundamental rights, moving beyond formalistic tests to a substantive review of state action. This analysis will delve into landmark precedents that have shaped this field, examining the conceptual distinction between legitimate discretion and impermissible arbitrariness, and the scope of judicial review over administrative, policy, and even legislative decisions.

II. The Doctrinal Evolution: From Reasonable Classification to the "New Doctrine"

The traditional understanding of Article 14 was confined to the doctrine of "reasonable classification," which permitted differential treatment provided it was based on an intelligible differentia and had a rational nexus with the objective sought to be achieved. However, the Indian Supreme Court, in a series of transformative judgments, infused Article 14 with a more potent character.

A. The Seminal Shift in E.P. Royappa

The decision in E.P Royappa v. State Of Tamil Nadu (1974) marked a watershed moment. Justice Bhagwati, in his concurring opinion, articulated what is now termed the "new doctrine" of equality. He posited that "Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be 'cribbed, cabined and confined' within traditional and doctrinaire limits." The judgment famously declared that "From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact, equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch." This interpretation fundamentally altered the discourse, establishing that any state action that is arbitrary, whether legislative or executive, is inherently unequal and thus violative of Article 14.

B. Procedural Fairness as a Bulwark: The Maneka Gandhi Principle

The principle was further fortified in Maneka Gandhi v. Union Of India (1978). While the case primarily concerned Article 21 (Right to Life and Personal Liberty), the Court established an inextricable link between Articles 14, 19, and 21. It held that the "procedure established by law" under Article 21 must be "right and just and fair" and not "arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive." By holding that the principles of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness are essential elements of equality under Article 14, and that these principles permeate Article 21, the Court ensured that any state action depriving an individual of life or personal liberty must satisfy the test of non-arbitrariness. This created a powerful due process guarantee against capricious state power.

C. Consolidating the Doctrine: State Largesse and Instrumentalities

The application of this doctrine to the executive's contractual and distributive functions was cemented in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority Of India (1979). The Court held that an instrumentality of the State, in that case the Airport Authority, is bound by the standard of non-arbitrariness under Article 14 when granting largesse. It cannot act like a private individual and must adhere to the standards and norms it sets for itself. Any departure from these norms would be considered arbitrary unless based on a rational principle. The Court observed, "It requires that State action must not be arbitrary but must be based on some rational and relevant principle which is non-discriminatory; it must not be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant consideration, because that would be denial of equality."

This principle was unequivocally reiterated in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi (1981), where the Court struck down an admission procedure for an engineering college that allocated an excessive 33.3% of marks to a viva voce examination. Citing Royappa and Maneka Gandhi, the Court found the procedure to be arbitrary and unreasonable, thereby violating Article 14. The Ajay Hasia case is also pivotal for laying down the tests to determine if a body is an "instrumentality or agency of the Government" under Article 12, thus expanding the reach of fundamental rights to entities that perform public functions with deep and pervasive state control.

III. Defining and Identifying Discretion and Arbitrariness

While the judiciary has consistently held that discretion is not absolute, it has also provided guidance on the nature of legitimate discretion and the markers of arbitrariness.

A. The Nature of Discretionary Power

Discretionary power is not a license to act on whim. The Supreme Court in Union Of India v. Kuldeep Singh (2003), and the Allahabad High Court in U.P Shaskiya Adhivakta Kalyan Samiti (2012), clarified this by stating, "The word 'discretion' standing single and unsupported by circumstances signifies exercise of judgment, skill or wisdom as distinguished from folly, unthinking or haste; evidently therefore a discretion cannot be arbitrary but must be a result of judicial thinking." This implies that discretion is a duty coupled with responsibility. It is not an unfettered power but a tool to respond appropriately to specific situations, as noted by the Delhi High Court in Harsh Ajay Singh v. Union of India (2023). The exercise of discretion must be guided by reason and confined by the statutory purpose for which it is conferred. As the Gauhati High Court aptly put it in Hitendra Nath Goswami v. State Of Assam (1984), "in a system based on the rule of law unfettered Government discretion is a contradiction in term."

B. The Contours of Arbitrariness

Arbitrariness, as an abstract concept, has been given concrete meaning through judicial interpretation. In East Coast Railway v. Mahadev Appa Rao (2010), the Supreme Court referenced Black's Law Dictionary to define "arbitrary" as an action "depending on individual discretion... determined by a judge rather than by fixed rules, procedures, or law" or "founded on prejudice or preference rather than on reason or fact." The Supreme Court in Praveen Singh v. State Of Punjab (2000) simply stated that "Arbitrariness being opposed to reasonableness is an antithesis to law." An action becomes arbitrary when it is irrational, perverse, or based on non-application of mind to relevant factors. This was highlighted in Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board (1966), where the Court held that an order based on the formation of an "opinion" under a statute can be challenged if the circumstances necessary for the formation of that opinion did not exist, or if the opinion was based on irrelevant considerations. Similarly, in Vijay Shanker Tripathi v. Hon’ble High Court (2007), it was held that if power "is exercised on the basis of facts which do not exist and which are patently erroneous, such exercise of power will stand vitiated."

IV. The Scope and Limits of Judicial Review

The doctrine against arbitrariness is enforced through the power of judicial review. However, the courts have been careful to delineate the boundaries of their intervention, distinguishing between the legality of the decision-making process and the merits of the decision itself.

A. Scrutiny of Administrative Action

In matters of administrative action, particularly in contracts and tenders, the courts do not sit as an appellate authority. The standard of review was clearly articulated in Tejas Constructions And Infrastructure Private Limited v. Municipal Council, Sendhwa (2012), where the Supreme Court reiterated that while the State is bound to adhere to its own norms, judicial interference is warranted only if the decision-making process is "vitiated by mala fides, unreasonableness and arbitrariness." The Court will intervene only when the decision is so arbitrary and irrational that no responsible authority could have reached it, or when overwhelming public interest requires it. This cautious approach respects the autonomy of the executive while ensuring accountability.

B. Deference in High Policy and Political Questions

The judiciary exercises even greater restraint when reviewing decisions involving high policy. As stated in Harsh Ajay Singh v. Union of India (2023), the judicial approach becomes narrower, and interference is limited to cases where the policy is contrary to statute, discriminatory, or manifestly arbitrary. However, this deference is not absolute. The landmark decision in S.R. Bommai v. Union Of India (1994) is a testament to the judiciary's power to review even high-level political decisions. The Court held that the exercise of power under Article 356 to impose President's Rule is subject to judicial review on grounds of mala fides and arbitrariness, thereby curbing the potential for its misuse for political ends and reinforcing the federal structure.

C. The Expanding Reach: Personal Law and Legislation

The doctrine's application has expanded into novel domains. In Shayara Bano v. Union Of India (2017), the Supreme Court, by a majority, struck down the practice of instant Triple Talaq (talaq-e-biddat) as unconstitutional. The majority reasoning found the practice to be "manifestly arbitrary" because it allowed a Muslim man to capriciously and whimsically end a marriage, which was violative of the fundamental right to equality under Article 14. This judgment demonstrated the doctrine's power to scrutinize practices within personal law that are codified or recognized by statute.

This stands in some contrast to the earlier view in State Of A.P v. Mcdowell & Co. (1996), where the Court had expressed reservations about striking down legislation solely on the ground of "arbitrariness," suggesting that a law enacted by a competent legislature could not be invalidated on such a vague ground. However, the Shayara Bano decision, by invalidating a statutory practice on the grounds of manifest arbitrariness, has clarified and arguably expanded the grounds for judicial review of legislation, affirming that no law can stand if it is patently capricious and irrational.

V. Conclusion: The Enduring Legacy of the Doctrine of Non-Arbitrariness

The evolution of the doctrine against arbitrariness represents one of the most significant contributions of the Indian judiciary to the protection of the rule of law. From its genesis in E.P. Royappa, it has grown into a formidable principle that animates the entire constitutional fabric, ensuring that state power, in all its manifestations, is exercised with fairness, reason, and accountability. The judiciary has skillfully balanced the need for administrative discretion with the constitutional imperative of equality, crafting a jurisprudence that holds power accountable without usurping it. By insisting that discretion must be structured, guided by relevant considerations, and free from whim, the courts have reinforced the fundamental tenet that in a republic governed by a Constitution, no authority is absolute. The enduring legacy of this doctrine lies in its continuous affirmation that the government must operate under law, not above it, thereby securing legal freedom for its subjects.