The Contours of Civil Revisional Jurisdiction in India: An Analysis of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and its Interplay with Constitutional Remedies

Introduction

The power of civil revisional jurisdiction, primarily enshrined in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), represents a cornerstone of judicial oversight within the Indian legal system. It empowers the High Court to superintend the functioning of subordinate courts, ensuring they operate within the confines of their vested jurisdiction. This power is fundamentally distinct from appellate jurisdiction, which involves a comprehensive review of both law and fact.^[1] Revision, in contrast, is a mechanism for course correction, aimed not at the merits of a decision but at the legality and regularity of the process by which the decision was reached. The scope of this jurisdiction has been a subject of continuous judicial interpretation and significant legislative modulation, reflecting a persistent tension between the need for judicial supervision and the imperative of preventing procedural delays. This article traces the evolution of civil revisional jurisdiction in India, analyzing its foundational principles, the impact of legislative amendments, and its complex interplay with the High Court's extraordinary powers under the Constitution of India.

The Foundational Principles of Revisional Jurisdiction

The Supreme Court of India, in a series of authoritative pronouncements, has firmly established the limited and specific nature of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the CPC. The provision is not a tool for correcting every error of law or fact committed by a subordinate court. Its application is strictly confined to the three distinct clauses enumerated within the section itself. As clarified in D.L.F. Housing and Construction Company (P.) Ltd. v. Sarup Singh, the High Court may interfere only where a subordinate court has: (a) exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law; (b) failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested; or (c) acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.^[2]

This principle was reiterated in earlier judgments like Keshardeo Chamria v. Radha Kissen Chamria, which drew upon the Privy Council's decision in Rajah Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh to hold that Section 115 "applies to jurisdiction alone, the irregular exercise or non-exercise of it or the illegal assumption of it" and "is not directed to conclusions of law or fact in which the question of jurisdiction is not involved."^[3] An erroneous conclusion on a question of law, unless it pertains to the court's very authority to adjudicate, does not constitute a jurisdictional error amenable to revision.^[4] The Calcutta High Court in Arundhuti Nan & Ors. v. P.M. Daryanani lamented the "rather liberal use of this jurisdiction," which had inundated courts with unmerited litigation, underscoring the judiciary's own recognition of the need for restraint.^[5]

A further prerequisite for invoking revisional jurisdiction is the existence of a "case which has been decided." The interpretation of this phrase has evolved. In Major S.S. Khanna v. Brig. F.J. Dillon, the Supreme Court adopted a broad interpretation, holding that "case" is not restricted to the entirety of the suit but can include an interlocutory order that adjudicates a substantial question affecting the rights of the parties, separate from the main dispute.^[6] However, in Baldevdas Shivlal v. Filmistan Distributors (India) (P) Ltd., the Court cautioned that not every order passed during a suit amounts to a "case decided," thereby setting a crucial threshold for revisional interference.^[7]

Legislative Curtailment: The Amendments to Section 115

Concerned with the mounting arrears and delays in civil litigation, often exacerbated by frequent challenges to interlocutory orders, the Parliament of India introduced significant amendments to Section 115 of the CPC, first in 1976 and more consequentially through the Amendment Act of 1999 (effective from July 1, 2002). The 1976 amendment introduced a proviso restricting the High Court from varying or reversing any order made in the course of a suit, except where the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury.^[8]

The 1999/2002 amendments went further, substituting the old proviso with a more stringent one. The Supreme Court, in Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society, Nagpur v. Swaraj Developers, definitively interpreted the effect of this amendment. It held that the legislative intent was to drastically narrow the scope of revision. Post-amendment, a revision against an interlocutory order is maintainable *only* if the order, had it been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings.^[9] The Court clarified that the right of revision is not a vested substantive right but a procedural one, and therefore, the amended law would apply to all pending revisions.^[10] This was affirmed in cases like Sawal Singh v. Ramsakhi, where the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that an order allowing an amendment application, being interlocutory and not finally disposing of the suit, was no longer revisable.^[11]

The Interplay with Constitutional Remedies: Article 227 and the Rise and Fall of Article 226

The legislative curtailment of Section 115 led litigants to seek alternative remedies under the Constitution, specifically through writ petitions under Article 226 and petitions invoking the High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227. This opened a new chapter in the jurisprudence of judicial oversight.

The *Surya Dev Rai* Era: An Expanded Avenue

In the landmark case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, the Supreme Court held that the amendment to Section 115 did not and could not curtail the constitutional powers of the High Court. The Court ruled that judicial orders of civil courts were amenable to a writ of certiorari under Article 226 and that the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 remained a potent tool to correct jurisdictional errors.^[12] This decision effectively created a workaround to the restrictions imposed by the amended Section 115, allowing High Courts to interfere with interlocutory orders that caused a "patent perversity" or "gross and manifest failure of justice." The principle that High Courts retain constitutional jurisdiction independent of statutory revisions was also noted in Salem Advocate Bar Association, T.N v. Union Of India.^[13]

The Correction in *Radhey Shyam*: A Recalibration

The expansive view taken in *Surya Dev Rai* was later reconsidered by a larger bench of the Supreme Court in Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath. In a significant ruling, the Court overruled *Surya Dev Rai* to the extent that it held judicial orders of a civil court to be amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226.^[14] The Court reaffirmed the long-standing principle from Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra that a writ of certiorari does not lie to quash the judgments of inferior courts of civil jurisdiction.

However, the Court in *Radhey Shyam* clarified that the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 remains distinct and available. This power is not to be confused with an appeal and is to be exercised sparingly, primarily to ensure that subordinate courts and tribunals act within the bounds of their authority.^[15] Thus, while the broad avenue of Article 226 was closed for challenging civil court orders, the narrow constitutional safety valve of Article 227 was preserved for exceptional cases of jurisdictional transgression.

The Nature and Discretionary Power of Revision

Conceptually, the Supreme Court has characterized revisional jurisdiction as a facet of the High Court's general appellate jurisdiction. In Snehadeep Structures Private Limited v. Maharashtra Small-Scale Industries Development Corporation Limited, the Court observed that when the High Court's aid is invoked on the revisional side, it is an exercise of its power as a superior court to rectify errors of a court below, and "basically and fundamentally it is the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court which is being invoked and exercised in a wider and larger sense."^[16]

Crucially, the power under Section 115 is discretionary. The High Court is not obligated to interfere merely because the conditions of the section are satisfied. As held in Pirbux Bilkhi v. Babulal Dwarka, the court will only intervene when the "cause of justice demands it" and will refuse to do so unless "grave injustice or hardship would result from failure to do so."^[17] The primary consideration is whether the order sought to be revised has occasioned a failure of justice.

Conclusion

The journey of civil revisional jurisdiction in India has been one of constant refinement, balancing the need for superintendence with the goal of procedural efficiency. From its foundational interpretation as a power limited to correcting jurisdictional errors, it was legislatively curtailed to prevent its misuse in delaying trial proceedings. The judicial response saw a temporary expansion through constitutional remedies, which was subsequently recalibrated by the Supreme Court in Radhey Shyam. The current legal framework is clear: Section 115 provides a highly restricted statutory remedy against orders that are final in nature. For other grave jurisdictional errors by civil courts, the supervisory power under Article 227 of the Constitution serves as a limited but vital safeguard. This settled position respects the legislative intent of ensuring finality in litigation while preserving the High Court's essential role as the guardian of jurisdictional propriety within the judicial hierarchy.