The Legal Framework Governing Specimen Signatures of Accused Persons in Indian Criminal Jurisprudence

Introduction

The use of specimen signatures and handwriting of an accused person is a critical aspect of criminal investigation and trial in India. Such evidence plays a pivotal role in establishing the identity of the perpetrator, verifying documents, and linking the accused to the crime. However, the process of obtaining these specimens is circumscribed by constitutional safeguards, statutory provisions, and judicial interpretations aimed at balancing the interests of justice with the fundamental rights of the accused. This article undertakes a comprehensive analysis of the legal regime governing the collection and admissibility of specimen signatures of accused persons in India, drawing upon key legislative enactments and landmark judicial pronouncements.

The central legal questions revolve around the powers of investigative agencies and courts to compel an accused to provide specimen signatures, the protection against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, and the procedural safeguards that must be adhered to. This analysis will delve into the evolution of the law, particularly highlighting the legislative response to judicial observations regarding lacunae in the existing framework.

Constitutional Safeguards: Article 20(3) and Specimen Signatures

Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India provides that "No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself." This protection against testimonial compulsion is a cornerstone of Indian criminal jurisprudence. The question of whether compelling an accused to provide specimen signatures violates this fundamental right has been extensively deliberated by the Supreme Court.

The seminal authority on this issue is State Of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad (1961 AIR SC 1808). The Supreme Court, in this landmark judgment, clarified the scope of Article 20(3). It held that the protection is against being compelled to be a "witness," which means imparting knowledge based on personal information or making a testimonial statement. The Court distinguished between "testimonial compulsion" and the "furnishing of material evidence." It ruled that giving specimen handwriting, signatures, or thumb impressions does not amount to being a "witness against himself" within the meaning of Article 20(3). Such specimens were characterized as material evidence, akin to fingerprints or other physical characteristics, rather than testimonial evidence. The Court reasoned that "the giving of finger impressions or of specimen writing or of signatures by an accused person, though it may amount to furnishing evidence in the larger sense, is not included within the expression ‘to be a witness’" (*State Of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad*, 1961 AIR SC 1808). This principle was also echoed in earlier decisions like *In Re: Palani Goundan* (Madras High Court, 1956), which noted that making a thumb impression or signature does not stand on a different footing from the seizure of documents or articles from the person of the accused.

The Supreme Court in Selvi And Others v. State Of Karnataka (2010 SCC CR 3 1), while dealing with the involuntary administration of techniques like narcoanalysis, polygraph examination, and Brain Electrical Activation Profile (BEAP) test, reaffirmed the principles of "testimonial compulsion." The Court held these techniques to be violative of Article 20(3) because they involve the extraction of testimonial responses from the accused. However, the Court in *Selvi* also referred to *Kathi Kalu Oghad* to distinguish such intrusive techniques from the collection of physical evidence like handwriting samples, thereby implicitly upholding the *Kathi Kalu Oghad* dictum regarding specimen signatures. The Delhi High Court in *Bhim Sain Bhalla v. Jagdev Singh Jaggar & Ors.* (Delhi High Court, 1987) also relied on *Kathi Kalu Oghad* to state that furnishing specimen writing would not amount to testimonial compulsion.

Statutory Framework for Obtaining Specimen Signatures

The power to obtain specimen signatures is primarily derived from the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). The Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920, has a limited role in this specific context.

Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872

Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act empowers a Court to direct any person present in court to write any words or figures for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare the words or figures so written with any words or figures alleged to have been written by such person. The Supreme Court in State (Delhi Administration) v. Pali Ram (1979 SCC 2 158) extensively analyzed this provision. It held that the Court's power under Section 73 is to enable the Court itself to make a comparison, and such a direction can be given in the interest of justice, irrespective of whether the request emanates from the prosecution or the defence. The purpose is to assist the court in arriving at a just conclusion. This power can be exercised when the accused is appearing before the court during an inquiry or trial (*Arti Ramesh Kulkarni v. Ramesh U. Kulkarni And Another*, Bombay High Court, 1997).

However, a significant limitation of Section 73 was highlighted in State Of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Babu Misra (1980 SCC CRI 444). The Supreme Court ruled that Section 73 did not empower a Magistrate to direct an accused to give specimen writings *during the investigation stage* when the case was not yet before the Court for inquiry or trial. The Court observed, "The language of Sec. 73 does not permit a Court to give a direction to the accused to give specimen writings for anticipated necessity for comparison in a proceeding which may later be instituted in the Court." This created a legislative lacuna, as investigating agencies lacked a clear statutory basis to obtain such samples from an unwilling accused during investigation, if not voluntarily given. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in *Bojja Krishna Reddy v. State Of A.P.* (Andhra Pradesh High Court, 2002) reiterated this interpretation, emphasizing that the direction under Section 73 is for enabling the Court to compare, not for the investigating agency. The Gauhati High Court in *State Of Manipur v. Warepam Khomdonbi Singh* (Gauhati High Court, 1992), relying on *Ram Babu Misra*, held that specimen signatures taken as per a Magistrate's order during investigation (prior to the CrPC amendment) were not proper.

The Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920

The Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920, empowers certain authorities to take "measurements" of convicted persons and, in some circumstances, of arrested persons. "Measurements" are defined in Section 2(a) of the Act to include finger-impressions and foot-print impressions. The Delhi High Court in Sapan Haldar & Anr. v. State (Delhi High Court, 2012) clarified that handwriting and signatures are *not* "measurements" as defined under this Act. Consequently, an investigating officer cannot obtain handwriting or signature samples from an accused under Sections 4 or 5 of the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920. This ruling further underscored the gap in the law for obtaining such samples during investigation.

Section 311A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

To address the lacuna identified in *Ram Babu Misra* and other cases, the Code of Criminal Procedure was amended by Act No. 25 of 2005, which inserted Section 311A, effective from June 23, 2006. Section 311A CrPC empowers a Magistrate of the first class, if satisfied that it is expedient for the purposes of any investigation or proceeding under the Code, to direct any person, including an accused person, to give specimen signatures or handwriting. The person to whom such an order relates must be produced or attend at the specified time and place and give the specimens. The proviso states that no order shall be made under this section unless the person has at some time been arrested in connection with such investigation or proceeding.

The Delhi High Court in Sapan Haldar & Anr. v. State (Delhi High Court, 2012) explicitly noted that Section 311A CrPC was inserted to remove the lacuna in the law pointed out by the Supreme Court in *Ram Babu Misra*. The Bombay High Court in *Suyog v. State Of Maharashtra* (2014 SCC ONLINE BOM 510) also discussed the interplay between Section 73 of the Evidence Act and Section 311A of the CrPC, acknowledging the Magistrate's power under the latter to order specimens for investigation.

Procedural Aspects and Admissibility

The manner in which specimen signatures are obtained is crucial for their admissibility and evidentiary value. The introduction of Section 311A CrPC has provided a clear procedure for obtaining specimens during investigation through a Magisterial order. When the matter is before the Court, Section 73 of the Evidence Act applies.

Concerns about improper collection have been raised in various cases. For instance, in *N. Raghavender v. State Of Andhra Pradesh, Cbi* (Supreme Court Of India, 2021), it was noted that the specimen signature of the appellant was not taken before any Judicial Authority, though obtained before independent witnesses, which could have implications for its evidentiary weight. The Jammu and Kashmir High Court in *bansi lal zijoo v. state through cbi* (Jammu and Kashmir High Court, 2019) highlighted concerns where an investigating officer took samples without a Magistrate's order, potentially implicating Article 20(3) if compulsion was involved (though *Kathi Kalu Oghad* generally permits taking specimens). The practice of taking signatures on blank papers by police, as mentioned in *K. Dhanasekaran v. State By Inspector Of Police* (Madras High Court, 2002), also raises questions about voluntariness and potential misuse, although the presence of a Village Administrative Officer as an attesting witness was noted in that case. In *Palaniswamy Vaiyapuri Original Accused v. State* (Bombay High Court, 1966), specimen handwritings were taken on multiple occasions in the presence of panchas, indicating a procedural attempt at ensuring fairness.

The Himachal Pradesh High Court in *State Of H.P. v. Sukh Ram & Ors.* (Himachal Pradesh High Court, 2011) dealt with a situation where specimen signatures were taken before an Executive Magistrate (not empowered to inquire into or try the case). However, the court distinguished this from other cases because the witnesses admitted their signatures, which mitigated the procedural irregularity to some extent.

The role of handwriting experts, under Section 45 of the Evidence Act, is significant in comparing disputed signatures with specimen/admitted signatures. As affirmed in *State (Delhi Administration) v. Pali Ram* (1979 SCC 2 158), the court can avail itself of expert assistance. However, the Supreme Court in State Of Maharashtra Complainant v. Sukhdev Singh And Another Accused (1992 SCC 3 700) cautioned that the science of handwriting identification is not infallible, and prudence demands that the court be fully satisfied about the authorship of admitted writings used for comparison. The court itself can also compare writings under Section 73. The evidentiary material often includes specimen writings and signatures marked as exhibits, as seen in *Mohammad Irfan v. State Of Karnataka* (Supreme Court Of India, 2022).

Applications for further investigation to re-take specimen signatures, especially when a report from a Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) is already on file and many witnesses have been examined, may be dismissed by the trial court, as was the case in *NAND KISHORA v. STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS* (Punjab & Haryana High Court, 2021).

Judicial Scrutiny and Evidentiary Value

Courts exercise careful scrutiny over the collection and use of specimen signatures. The principles of fair trial, as emphasized in *Raj Kumar v. State* (Delhi High Court, 2012), demand that procedures for obtaining such evidence are just and do not unduly prejudice the accused. The evidentiary value of handwriting comparison, whether by experts or by the court, often serves as corroborative evidence rather than conclusive proof.

The Supreme Court in *State Of Maharashtra Complainant v. Sukhdev Singh And Another Accused* (1992 SCC 3 700) reiterated that evidence regarding the identity of the author of a document can be tendered by (i) a person familiar with the handwriting, (ii) an expert, or (iii) by the court's own comparison. Given that handwriting analysis is not an exact science, courts must be cautious, especially when relying solely on expert opinion without robust corroboration or clear admitted samples for comparison.

While the focus of this article is on specimen signatures in the context of identification and document verification in criminal cases, it is pertinent to note that issues of consent and intent are paramount in other types of criminal allegations. For example, in *Sonu Alias Subhash Kumar v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Another (S)* (2021 SCC ONLINE SC 181), the Supreme Court quashed a charge sheet for rape where the allegation was based on a broken promise of marriage, finding no evidence that the promise was false from the outset. This highlights the nuanced approach courts take to different forms of evidence and intent in criminal law, distinct from the physical evidence of signatures. Similarly, specimen signatures play a role in commercial and financial contexts, such as in cheque dishonour cases under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, where signature verification by banks is crucial (*Rajesh Bhalchandra Chalke v. State Of Maharashtra And Another*, 2010 SCC ONLINE BOM 1858). The general principle of obtaining specimen signatures for expert comparison also extends to civil litigation, as seen in *SRI M MUNIKRISHNAPPA v. SMT KAMALAMMA* (Karnataka High Court, 2015), where a trial court was directed to refer documents along with admitted signatures for expert opinion.

Conclusion

The law governing the procurement and use of specimen signatures of accused persons in India has evolved significantly, striving to balance the necessities of criminal investigation with the constitutional rights of individuals. The initial framework under Section 73 of the Evidence Act, while empowering courts, left a critical gap concerning the powers of investigating agencies during the investigation phase, as highlighted in *Ram Babu Misra*. The insertion of Section 311A into the CrPC has largely addressed this lacuna by providing a specific Magisterial procedure for obtaining such specimens during investigation, provided the accused has been arrested.

The landmark decision in *Kathi Kalu Oghad* firmly established that compelling an accused to provide specimen signatures does not violate the right against self-incrimination under Article 20(3), as such specimens are considered material evidence, not testimonial acts. Courts continue to emphasize the need for procedural fairness in the collection of such evidence and exercise caution in relying on handwriting expert opinions, often treating them as corroborative rather than conclusive proof.

Ultimately, specimen signatures remain a valuable tool in the administration of criminal justice, aiding in the ascertainment of truth. The legal framework, shaped by legislative enactments and judicial pronouncements, seeks to ensure that this tool is employed in a manner that is fair, just, and consistent with the fundamental tenets of Indian constitutional and criminal law.