Section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960: Jurisdictional Contours and Interpretive Challenges

Section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960: Jurisdictional Contours and Interpretive Challenges

Introduction

Section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (“the 1960 Act”) constitutes the procedural fulcrum for resolution of intra-co-operative disputes in the State of Maharashtra. Framed with a sweeping non obstante clause, the provision purports to confer exclusive jurisdiction upon the Co-operative Courts over “any dispute touching the constitution, elections, general meetings, management or business of a society” when such dispute is between the categories of persons enumerated in clauses (a) to (e) of sub-section (1). The breadth of the phraseology has, however, generated sustained litigation respecting (i) the true amplitude of the words “touching the … business of the society”, and (ii) the extent to which civil courts and other specialist fora remain competent notwithstanding the statutory ouster. This article critically analyses the evolving jurisprudence, with particular emphasis on the seminal decision in Deccan Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Dalichand Jugraj Jain[1], subsequent doctrinal refinements, and statutory amendments, so as to locate the contemporary limits of Section 91.

Legislative Framework and Purpose

The co-operative movement, historically rooted in principles of mutual aid and democratic governance, demanded a dispute-resolution mechanism that was expeditious, inexpensive, and sensitive to sector-specific realities. Chapter IX of the 1960 Act therefore substituted the Registrar-centric arbitration model of earlier legislation with an institutionalised Co-operative Court system (post-1974 amendment). Section 91(1) opens with the words “Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force”, signalling legislative intent to create a self-contained code for enumerated disputes[2]. Yet, as will be illustrated, the apparent absolutism of the clause is moderated by constitutional principles, interpretive canons, and doctrinal limitations recognised by the courts.

Essential Preconditions for a Valid Reference

1. Nature of the Dispute

A dispute must “touch” the constitution, elections, general meetings, management, or business of the society. In Deccan Merchants, the Supreme Court adopted a purposive yet restrained construction, holding that the expression “business” refers to the primary commercial activities as envisaged by the objects clause of the bye-laws[1]. Consequently, a landlord-tenant dispute involving premises mortgaged to a bank-society, though factually connected to the society, was held extraneous to its business. The Court also warned against reading Section 91 so broadly as to deprive tenants of the protections of rent-control legislation, underscoring a policy of harmonious construction between special statutes.

2. Locus of the Parties

Even where the subject-matter qualifies, Section 91 further conditions jurisdiction on the parties falling within clauses (a)–(e). The Supreme Court in Margret Almeida v. Bombay Catholic Co-operative Housing Society[3] reaffirmed the two-fold test articulated in Marine Times Publications[4]: (i) the dispute must be of the kind described in sub-section (1), and (ii) the litigants must belong to one of the enumerated categories. A failure on either limb is fatal to maintainability.

Exclusive Jurisdiction and the Ouster of Civil Courts

The interaction between Section 91 and Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) has been the epicentre of jurisdictional contests. The Bombay High Court in Top Ten v. State of Maharashtra[5] emphasised that the non obstante clause “clearly show[s] legislative intent to override Section 9 CPC”. Nevertheless, three doctrinal constraints circumscribe the ouster:

  1. Constitutional Review: Following Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh[2], exclusion of civil jurisdiction cannot bar scrutiny of constitutional ultra-vires issues. Hence, civil suits remain competent where the validity of statutory action itself is impugned.
  2. Lack of Statutory Competence: Courts have declined to apply Section 91 where the dispute entails adjudicatory powers foreign to the Co-operative Court, e.g., grant of tenancy status under rent legislation[1].
  3. Statutory Exceptions: The proviso after clause (e) expressly removes matters such as recovery proceedings under Section 101 from the ambit of Section 91. The Bombay High Court in Shetkari Sahakari Sangh Ltd.[6] held that an adjudication already conducted under Section 101 is immune from re-litigation as a “dispute”.

Interface with Specialised Statutes

1. Rent Control Legislation

Section 28 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Small Causes Courts over landlord-tenant matters. The Supreme Court in Deccan Merchants harmonised the two statutes by giving primacy to the specialised rent-control forum over the general co-operative forum where tenancy rights are at stake[1]. Subsequent Bombay High Court authority reflects deference to this judicial mapping; injunctions restraining Section 91 proceedings are discouraged but not precluded when rent-control rights will otherwise be rendered illusory[12].

2. Labour and Employment Statutes

While paid employees are “persons other than members” under clause (d), the Bombay High Court in Shri Pundalik Manwadkar[20] held that mere service grievances (e.g., transfer orders) may alternatively be litigated in civil courts or labour fora because they do not necessarily “touch” the management or business of the society in the Section 91 sense. The decision illustrates the contextual evaluation undertaken by courts to prevent jurisdictional overreach.

Procedural Particularities

1. Limitation

Section 92 prescribes variable limitation periods, with sub-section (2) importing the Limitation Act, 1963 by deeming the Co-operative Court a “civil court” for most disputes. In Balaji Ramaiya Manthanwar[21], the Bombay High Court confirmed that proceedings before the Registrar or his nominee under Section 91 constitute “civil proceedings” for Section 14 of the Limitation Act, thereby permitting exclusion of time spent in bona fide prosecution of such disputes.

2. Execution of Awards

Awards under Section 91 are executable under Section 98 read with Chapter X. Where the successful party opts for recovery as arrears of land revenue under Section 101, the proceedings are statutorily insulated from being re-opened as a “dispute” owing to the proviso to Section 91(1)[5].

Critical Evaluation

The jurisprudence demonstrates a calibrated balance between the autonomy of the co-operative sector and the overarching objectives of other welfare statutes. Three observations merit articulation:

  • Functional v. Formal Tests: Courts increasingly employ a functional inquiry—does the dispute require specialised co-operative expertise?—rather than a formalistic reliance on party status alone. This evolution preserves sector-specific efficacy while avoiding forum shopping.
  • Need for Legislative Clarification: Case-law driven delineation has led to patchwork exceptions. Codifying illustrative inclusions/exclusions, especially vis-à-vis tenancy and consumer disputes, would enhance certainty.
  • Comparative Perspective: The Multi-State Co-operative Societies Act, 2002 adopts arbitration (Section 84) with near-total exclusion of consumer fora[9]. Maharashtra’s hybrid court-arbitration model may be preferable for larger states with extensive co-operative activity, but harmonisation across jurisdictions could be contemplated.

Conclusion

Section 91 embodies the legislature’s attempt to establish an efficient, expert mechanism for intra-co-operative disputes. Judicial interpretation has, however, rightfully restrained its application where competing specialised regimes or constitutional mandates would otherwise be undermined. Contemporary doctrine therefore positions Section 91 as primus inter pares—the primary forum within its legitimate sphere, yet not an omnipotent one. Future reforms should aim for textual clarity and procedural integration with parallel statutory frameworks so that the co-operative sector continues to benefit from expeditious justice without compromising substantive rights safeguarded elsewhere in Indian law.

Footnotes

  1. Deccan Merchants Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Dalichand Jugraj Jain, 1969 AIR SC 1320 (SC 1968).
  2. Dhulabhai etc. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1969 AIR SC 78 (SC 1968).
  3. Margret Almeida & Ors. v. Bombay Catholic Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., (2012) 5 SCC 642.
  4. Marine Times Publications (P) Ltd. v. Shriram Transport & Finance Co. Ltd., (1991) 1 SCC 469.
  5. Top Ten, A Partnership Firm v. State of Maharashtra, 2011 SCC OnLine Bom 1338.
  6. Shetkari Sahakari Sangh Ltd. v. Shahuwadi Taluka Shetkari Kharedi Vikri Sangh, 1998 SCC OnLine Bom 105.
  7. Shriram Dhonduji Raut v. Bahu Uddesiyab Sahakari Sanstha Virsi, 2003 SCC OnLine Bom 915.
  8. Daman Singh v. State of Punjab, (1985) 2 SCC 670.
  9. Hiteshgiri Kantigiri Gosai v. Sahara Credit Co-operative Housing Society, District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (2022).
  10. Maharashtra Co-operative Courts’ Bar Association v. State of Maharashtra, 1990 SCC OnLine Bom 236.
  11. Vasant Jobanputra v. Bank of India Staff Sampada Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., 2004 SCC OnLine Bom 792.
  12. Krishnadevi P. Gupta v. Banwarilal H. Tibrewala, 1975 SCC OnLine Bom 33.
  13. The Hindu Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. State Information Commission, 2011 SCC OnLine P&H 16431.
  14. Narayanan Nambiar v. Dy. Registrar of Co-operative Societies, 1973 KLT 213.
  15. Shri Pundalik Ishwar Manwadkar v. Commissioner of Sugar, 2005 SCC OnLine Bom 157.
  16. Balaji Ramaiya Manthanwar v. Gulabrao Ganpatrao Bakade, 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 193.