Section 85A of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948: Jurisdictional Dynamics and Procedural Imperatives

Section 85A of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948: Jurisdictional Dynamics and Procedural Imperatives

1. Introduction

Section 85A of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter “BTALA 1948”) constitutes the procedural fulcrum that allocates institutional competence between civil courts and specialised tenancy authorities. Enacted in 1956, it obliges a civil court to stay a suit and refer to the competent tenancy authority any issue that the Act requires such authority to “settle, decide or deal with”. More than a mere procedural device, the provision embodies legislative policy aimed at (i) protecting tenants through expert forums, and (ii) forestalling conflicting or parallel adjudication. This article offers a doctrinal and jurisprudential analysis of s. 85A, drawing extensively on Supreme Court and High Court authorities, with particular attention to the manner in which courts have construed its mandatory character, its interaction with ss. 70 and 85, and the consequences of non-compliance.

2. Legislative Framework

2.1 Textual Placement

The statutory architecture may be summarised thus:

  • Section 70 enumerates matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Mamlatdar (e.g., determination whether a person is a tenant).
  • Section 85 ousts the civil court’s jurisdiction with respect to matters that the Act requires to be decided by the authorities designated therein.
  • Section 85A operationalises the ouster by compelling the civil court, once a relevant issue “involves” a matter under s. 70, to stay the suit and refer that issue for authoritative determination.

2.2 Statutory Purpose

Parliamentary intent is twofold: (a) ensure expert, expeditious and uniform application of tenancy law; and (b) shield vulnerable cultivators from dilatory tactics within ordinary civil litigation[1]. The provision therefore functions hand in glove with agrarian-reform objectives underpinning BTALA 1948.

3. Historical Evolution of the Doctrine

3.1 Pre-Codification Jurisprudence

Prior to 1956, the Bombay High Court devised a judge-made mechanism: when a defendant pleaded tenancy, the civil court was to direct the party to obtain a Mamlatdar’s decision rather than dismiss the suit outright (Dhondi Tukaram Mali v. Dadoo Piraji Adgale, 1954)[2]. Section 85A codified and refined this practice, rendering the reference obligatory and embedding it in legislative text.

3.2 Key Supreme Court Expositions

  • Bhimji Shankar Kulkarni v. Dundappa Vithappa Udapudi (1966)[3]: clarified that, read with s. 85, s. 85A creates an exclusive forum for tenancy questions, mandating reference even in suits otherwise maintainable in civil court.
  • Gundaji v. Ramchandra (1974) and subsequent cases reiterated the combined effect of ss. 70, 85 and 85A as a “statutory obligation” on civil courts to refer issues once framed.

4. Analytical Themes

4.1 Mandatory Character of Reference and Stay

The linguistic use of “shall” in s. 85A(1) has been consistently construed as peremptory. In Ramchandra Keshav Adke v. Govind Joti Chavare (1975) the Supreme Court, albeit in the context of s. 5(3)(b) BTALA 1948, laid down a wider interpretative principle: where a statute prescribes a specific manner for exercise of a power meant to protect tenants, the manner is exclusive[4]. Applying the same logic, High Courts treat any civil-court adjudication on tenancy issues without prior reference as coram non judice.

4.2 “Involves any Issue” – Breadth of the Trigger

The Gujarat High Court in Baroda Borough Municipality v. Soma Bhaiji (1967)[5] held that once the defendant raises a tenancy plea, the civil court must frame the issue and refer it; it cannot inquire into the bona fides or prima facie strength of the plea. The decision has been followed in Shri Dattatray Surve v. Heeraben Patel (2022)[6], rejecting arguments that reference is contingent upon a preliminary evidentiary showing.

4.3 Stage of Proceedings and Interim Relief

Because the statute commands a stay, not dismissal, interlocutory orders sometimes persist until the tenancy authority decides. Yet the Bombay High Court in Chandrakant Shahajirao Khandve (2019)[7] refused to stay the suit where the tenancy certificate itself was under statutory appeal, illustrating judicial reluctance to permit endless delay.

4.4 Appellate and Revisional Oversight

Once the Mamlatdar decides, that decision is subject to the Act’s appellate ladder but not to supervisory correction by civil courts. The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Pandurang Dhondi Chougule (1965) on the limited compass of Section 115 CPC underscores that revisional jurisdiction cannot be used to re-adjudicate factual determinations resting within specialised tribunals[8].

4.5 Consequences of Non-Compliance

Where a civil court ignores s. 85A and adjudicates tenancy, its decree is nullity for want of jurisdiction. The Gujarat High Court in Maganbhai Madhavbhai Patel (1980) and the Supreme Court in Sau. Saraswatibai Gaikwad (2002) treat such decrees as legally unenforceable, reinforcing the exclusivity principle.

5. Comparative Note: Procedural Rigidity and Tenant-Protective Statutes

The strict approach to s. 85A mirrors the Court’s stance in Ramchandra Keshav Adke. In both settings, procedural safeguards function as substantive rights: failure to verify surrender (s. 5(3)(b)) or failure to refer tenancy issues (s. 85A) vitiates the proceeding ab initio. The unity of doctrine is grounded in the larger constitutional commitment to agrarian reform and social justice.

6. Critical Evaluation of Leading High Court Decisions

6.1 Bapu Sitaram Adsule v. Appa Mhadgonda Patil (1973)

The Bombay High Court held that once the civil court has referred an issue, the tenancy authority cannot decline jurisdiction; any other reading would create a remedial vacuum. The ruling reinforces the doctrine of institutional comity between forums.

6.2 Dinkar Vithoba Salgaonkar v. Sharad Jagannath Kulkarni (1998)

The Court probed the substantive content of tenancy by examining the nature of crop-sharing arrangements, yet still respected the limitations imposed by s. 4(b) BTALA 1948. The case illustrates that reference does not immunise the authority’s decision from scrutiny on grounds of statutory misapplication.

6.3 Gujarat Line of Authority

Decisions such as Koli Sona Deva v. Shah Somalal Mathurdas (1966) extend the Dhondi Tukaram logic to analogous agrarian statutes lacking an express s. 85A. This comparative trajectory highlights s. 85A’s influence beyond the BTALA framework.

7. Tensions and Unresolved Questions

  • Temporal Effect: Whether s. 85A applies to decrees passed before the tenancy plea is taken (the “post-decree certificate” problem) remains contested, though Sau. Saraswatibai leans towards prospective application.
  • Scope of “Any Issue”: Ambiguity persists on whether collateral issues—e.g., validity of sale deeds—must also be stayed if tenancy determination is incidental.
  • Delay and Efficiency: Critics argue that mandatory stay encourages dilatory pleas. Recent High Court jurisprudence seeks to balance legislative mandate with case-management discretion at the interim-relief stage.

8. Conclusion

Section 85A operationalises the jurisdictional divide envisaged by agrarian-reform legislation. Judicial interpretation, faithful to the tenor of tenant-protective policy, has rendered the reference mechanism mandatory, automatic, and conclusive with respect to tenancy issues. The Supreme Court’s broader jurisprudence on statutory compliance (Ramchandra Keshav Adke) and limited revisional oversight (Pandurang Dhondi Chougule) fortifies this approach. While concerns of delay merit procedural innovation, the doctrinal core of s. 85A—exclusive tenancy jurisdiction—remains integral to India’s agrarian justice architecture.

Footnotes

  1. Statement of Objects and Reasons, Bombay Act XIII of 1956.
  2. Dhondi Tukaram Mali v. Dadoo Piraji Adgale, 1954 AIR (Bom) 100.
  3. Bhimji Shankar Kulkarni v. Dundappa Vithappa Udapudi, AIR 1966 SC 166.
  4. Ramchandra Keshav Adke v. Govind Joti Chavare, (1975) 1 SCC 559.
  5. Baroda Borough Municipality v. Soma Bhaiji, ILR 1967 Guj 882.
  6. Shri Dattatray Ganpatrao Surve v. Heeraben Patel, 2022 (Guaj) unreported.
  7. Chandrakant Shahajirao Khandve v. Nitin Madan Nagarkar, 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 3221.
  8. Pandurang Dhondi Chougule v. Maruti Hari Jadhav, AIR 1966 SC 153.