Section 6(iv)(j) of the Court-fees Act: Scope, Tests and Emerging Jurisprudence

1. Introduction

Section 6(iv)(j) of the Court-fees Act represents a distinctive legislative technique: instead of requiring ad valorem fees calculated on “monetary gain or loss to be prevented” it levies a fixed fee where the relief sought is a declaration (with or without injunction or other consequential relief) and “the subject-matter in dispute is not susceptible of monetary evaluation and the suit is not otherwise provided for.”^[1] The provision is most frequently encountered in the Bombay Court-fees Act, 1959, yet analogous clauses appear in other State amendments and are routinely interpreted by courts across India. The present article critically interrogates the scope of § 6(iv)(j), traces its doctrinal evolution, contrasts it with neighbouring clauses such as § 6(iv)(d) and Article 7 of Schedule I, and identifies contemporary challenges—particularly in commercial litigation—through a close reading of leading authorities.

2. Statutory Framework

2.1 Legislative Evolution

The original Court-fees Act, 1870 contained broad charging provisions (notably § 6 and Schedules I & II) premised on ad valorem valuation. State legislatures, invoking Concurrent List entry 3 (“Administration of justice”), have since enacted local amendments. The Bombay Act of 1959 reorganised § 6 into a series of specific situations, introducing clause (iv)(j) to cater to declaratory suits where the financial value is indeterminate. No central amendment has displaced these State provisions; consequently, the clause operates subject to the constitutional test of reasonable classification and to Article 254 in the event of repugnancy.^[2]

2.2 Textual Elements

“In suits where a declaration is sought, with or without injunction or other consequential relief, and the subject-matter in dispute is not susceptible of monetary evaluation, and the suit is not otherwise provided for by this Act, the fee payable shall be a fixed amount of ₹300.”^[3]

The clause thus imposes a triple threshold:

• (i) The primary or ancillary relief is declaratory.
• (ii) The subject-matter cannot be reduced to pecuniary terms by any objective standard.
• (iii) No other charging provision squarely applies.

3. Conceptual Dichotomy: “Susceptible of Monetary Evaluation”

Judicial experience shows that the pivotal enquiry under § 6(iv)(j) is whether the plaintiff’s real and substantive right—discerned from the plaint as a whole—admits of monetary computation. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Shamsher Singh v. Rajinder Prashad^[4] and Commercial Aviation v. Vimla Pannalal^[5] establish two complementary principles:

• (a) Plaint-centric appraisal: valuation is determined exclusively from the averments in the plaint, unhindered by the written statement or by merits.
• (b) Objective standard: where external or statutory benchmarks permit a pecuniary estimate, the court must insist on ad valorem fees; where no such benchmark exists, the plaintiff’s tentative fixed fee is respected.

4. Jurisprudential Development

4.1 Early Formulations

The Madras Full Bench in B. Rangiah Chetty (1910) interpreted the predecessor of § 6(iv)(j) to apply to partition suits by a coparcener in joint possession, treating the share as inherently valuable and therefore outside the fixed-fee clause.^[6] This approach foregrounded the “susceptibility” test but left room for later refinements.

4.2 Supreme Court Guidance

• Shamsher Singh (1973) – Declaratory suits challenging a mortgage decree inherently seek consequential relief; the fee must reflect the value of the decree, not a nominal amount.^[4]
• Neelavathi v. Natarajan (1979) – In a partition suit, joint possession is presumed; court-fee depends on whether exclusion is pleaded. The decision, though rendered under the Tamil Nadu Act, illustrates the insistence on reading the plaint holistically.^[7]
• Commercial Aviation (1988) – In suits for accounts, precise valuation is impracticable; plaintiff’s estimation ordinarily prevails unless “demonstratively arbitrary.”^[5]

4.3 High Court Elaborations

Bombay jurisprudence—where § 6(iv)(j) originates—provides granular tests:

• Gulam Mohamed v. Lalchand Chellaram (1976) – The right “to continue in uninterrupted possession” against a jeopardising transfer is incapable of valuation; § 6(iv)(j) applies.^[8]
• Sai Samrat Security Service v. Rizvi Builders (2006) – A simpliciter suit for injunction to protect existing possession falls within § 6(iv)(j); speculative monetary claims do not alter the nature of relief.^[9]
• Maria Philomina Pereira v. Rodrigues Construction (1990) – Enforcement of statutory rights under the Maharashtra Ownership Flats Act entails fixed fee; a suit is not one for specific performance merely because the agreement is recited.^[10]
• Mukesh Bajapa v. MCGM (2003) – To restrain enforcement of demolition notice (and challenge penalty) the suit may still fall under § 6(iv)(j) unless the plaintiff seeks to avoid a quantifiable demand.^[11]
• G.V. Iyengar v. A.R. Sampathkumar (2008) – Where declaration of heirship to property is sought, the suit transcends mere possession and enters testamentary domain; § 6(iv)(d) (value of property) applies, not § 6(iv)(j).^[12]

4.4 Crystallised Tests

1. Identify the dominant relief. If cancellation of a document, recovery of money, or enforcement of a monetary liability is integral, § 6(iv)(j) is ousted.
2. Search for objective standards. Statutory penalties, consideration stated in a contract, or market value of property supply a workable yardstick, directing the court to other clauses (e.g., § 6(iv)(a), § 6(iv)(d), Article 7).
3. Assess consequential impact. Even where the plaint couches relief as a bare declaration, if success will inevitably confer a pecuniary benefit capable of calculation, the fixed-fee provision is inapplicable.

5. § 6(iv)(j) vis-à-vis Neighbouring Clauses

6. Contemporary Challenges

6.1 Commercial Courts Act Interface

The Telangana High Court in M/s Sri Venkateshwara Developers (2022) clarified that the “specified value” under § 12 of the Commercial Courts Act must be read in harmony with the Court-fees Act; where the latter prescribes valuation other than market value (e.g., § 6(iv)(j)), the Commercial Court cannot re-value the suit merely to satisfy its pecuniary threshold.^[13]

6.2 Statutory-Right Enforcement Suits

High Courts have routinely applied § 6(iv)(j) to actions enforcing statutory entitlements—e.g., the right to immediate possession under § 6 of the Specific Relief Act (Badal Mittal, 2017)^[14]—on the premise that such rights are intangible and non-pecuniary.

6.3 Pleadings and Order VII Rule 11

Mis-valuation often surfaces through a defendant’s application under O. VII r. 11(b) CPC. Anil Asegaonkar (2025)^[15] illustrates that, in a suit for declaration of ownership by adverse possession, courts scrutinise whether the prayer effectively seeks a transfer of a monetisable interest (market value), or only declaration of an existing status. The outcome dictates which clause—and therefore which court—has jurisdiction.

7. Critical Appraisal

While § 6(iv)(j) secures access to justice by fixing a modest fee for indeterminate rights, three issues merit attention:

• Predictability v. Subjectivity. Determining “susceptibility of valuation” remains fact-intensive, fostering inconsistent orders and satellite litigation. Codified illustrations could curtail uncertainty.
• Erosion by inflation. The ₹300 figure, static since 1959, undermines revenue considerations and creates disparity with States that have revised fixed fees. Legislative revision or indexation is overdue.
• Constitutional Equity. The classification with a nominal fee—while valid under Rahim Khan (1972)^[16]—may invite scrutiny if abused to forum-shop by under-valuing substantial proprietary disputes.

8. Conclusion

Section 6(iv)(j) occupies a narrow but essential niche in the Indian court-fee landscape, shielding litigants who seek the court’s imprimatur on non-monetisable civil rights. Half-a-century of case-law has honed workable tests: courts must interrogate the real relief, probe available valuation standards, and refuse nominal fees where concrete economic benefit lurks beneath declaratory phrasing. Harmonised application across jurisdictions—particularly after the advent of Commercial Courts—will preserve both fiscal fairness and unfettered access to the civil justice system.

Footnotes

1. Bombay Court-fees Act, 1959, § 6(iv)(j).
2. Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann, (2001) 4 SCC 262 (doctrine of repugnancy).
3. Fixed fee amount as substituted by Maharashtra Act XIX of 1985. Figures vary across States.
4. Shamsher Singh v. Rajinder Prashad, (1973) 2 SCC 524.
5. Commercial Aviation & Travel Co. v. Vimla Pannalal, (1988) 3 SCC 423.
6. B. Rangiah Chetty v. B. Subramania Chetty, ILR 33 Mad 548 (FB).
7. Neelavathi v. N. Natarajan, (1980) 2 SCC 247.
8. Gulam Mohamed Yunus v. Lalchand Chellaram, 1976 Bom LR 286.
9. Sai Samrat Security Service v. Rizvi Builders, 2006 SCC OnLine Bom 666.
10. Maria Philomina Pereira v. Rodrigues Construction, 1990 SCC OnLine Bom 38.
11. Mukesh Bajapa v. MCGM, 2003 SCC OnLine Bom 56.
12. G.V. Iyengar v. A.R. Sampathkumar, 2008 SCC OnLine Bom 249.
13. M/s Sri Venkateshwara Developers v. A. Jeevan Rao, 2022 SCC OnLine Tel 587.
14. Badal M. Mittal v. Omprakash M. Mittal, 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 9252.
15. Anil Asegaonkar v. Avinash Asegaonkar, 2025 (Bom HC).
16. Rahim Khan v. Ghulam Ahmed Wani, 1972 Kashmir LJ 27 (classification and Article 14).