Section 494 IPC: The Criminalisation of Bigamy in India

Section 494 IPC: The Criminalisation of Bigamy in India

Introduction

Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”) makes the act of contracting a second marriage during the subsistence of a valid first marriage a cognisable offence popularly termed “bigamy.”[1] Although only one of six provisions in Chapter XX IPC (Offences Relating to Marriage), Section 494 has spawned an extensive body of case-law, constitutional debate, and policy discourse over more than a century. Recent judicial pronouncements—from Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande (1965) to Lily Thomas (2000) and beyond—have refined its ingredients, clarified its interface with personal laws, and highlighted its gender-justice implications. This article undertakes a doctrinal and critical analysis of Section 494, synthesising leading authorities and statutory provisions in Indian law.

Statutory Framework

Text and Elements

Section 494 IPC punishes—by imprisonment up to seven years and fine—“whoever, having a husband or wife living, marries in any case in which such marriage is void by reason of its taking place during the life of such husband or wife.”[1] Four ingredients emerge from the plain text and case-law:

  1. A prior subsisting marriage valid in law;
  2. The second marriage must be marriage—i.e., solemnised with essential ceremonies recognised by the parties’ personal law;[3]
  3. The second marriage is void solely because it occurs during the lifetime of the first spouse;
  4. None of the statutory exceptions apply (judicial declaration of nullity, seven-year absence, etc.).

Interface with Personal Laws

Section 17 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (“HMA”) imports Section 494 into Hindu law, declaring that any Hindu marriage solemnised in violation of monogamy is void and punishable.[19] Contrastingly, Muslim personal law continues to permit limited polygamy, yet Muslim husbands may still attract Section 494 where a second marriage contravenes conditions under a special or civil statute,[14] or where the first marriage was solemnised under the Special Marriage Act.

Procedural Safeguards

By virtue of Section 198(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”), courts can take cognisance of offences under Chapter XX IPC only upon a complaint by an aggrieved person—ordinarily the spouse.[2] Nevertheless, complaints by near relatives or statutory commissions have been sustained when they fall within the provisos or when the complainant is demonstrably “aggrieved.”[24] Venue rules in Section 182(2) CrPC allow prosecution at the place where the first wife resides after the alleged offence.[21]

Jurisprudential Evolution

A. Validity of the Second Marriage: The “Solemnisation” Requirement

The Supreme Court has consistently held that an invalid or incomplete second union does not constitute “marriage” for Section 494. In Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande, the Court acquitted the accused because essential Hindu rites—homa and saptapadi—were not proved.[4] Kanwal Ram reiterated that mere admissions of marriage are insufficient; the prosecution must prove due ceremonial compliance.[3] The principle was reaffirmed in Priya Bala Ghosh, stressing that the burden of proof rests squarely on the complainant.[5]

B. Monogamy, Religious Conversion, and Abuse of Personal Laws

A distinct line of authority confronts attempts to evade monogamy through conversion. In Sarla Mudgal the Court held that a Hindu husband who converts to Islam and remarries without dissolving the first marriage commits bigamy under Section 494 IPC, notwithstanding polygamy under Islamic law.[7] Lily Thomas fortified this ratio, emphasising that such “fraudulent conversion” does not dissolve the first marriage and that personal law cannot be manipulated to defeat penal statutes.[8]

C. Applicability to Scheduled Tribes and Customary Practices

Where parties fall outside the HMA (e. g., certain Scheduled Tribes), prosecution under Section 494 hinges on whether any existing law prescribes monogamy. In Dr. Surajmani Stella Kujur the Court declined to import an asserted tribal custom to create criminal liability, reiterating that custom cannot by itself create an offence absent statutory backing.[9]

D. Evidentiary Thresholds and Burden of Proof

  • Ceremonial Proof: Documentary evidence (marriage registers, invitations) or oral testimony must establish the specific rites required by the parties’ faith.[3][4][5]
  • Admissions: Extrajudicial admissions or cohabitation do not dispense with proof of solemnisation.[3][5]
  • Presumption of Innocence: The prosecution must disprove all exceptions and prove each ingredient beyond reasonable doubt.[13]

E. Procedural Challenges and Locus Standi

High Courts have quashed proceedings where complaints were filed by non-aggrieved persons (Suresh Kumar v. State of Rajasthan) or where the complaint failed to aver essential rites (Sudhir S.).[24][23] Conversely, proceedings have been sustained when instituted by the first wife’s father (Kaur alias Kulvinder Kaur) or where the Women’s Commission initiated action, on the footing that the complainant was “aggrieved” by the matrimonial wrong.[12][24]

Policy Dimensions and Gender-Justice

Although Section 494 is ostensibly gender-neutral, its practical significance lies in protecting women from desertion and economic deprivation. The provision dovetails with Section 125 CrPC (maintenance) and Section 498-A IPC (cruelty). In Reema Aggarwal, the Court adopted a purposive interpretation of “husband” under Section 498-A to include men whose marriage is void, reinforcing the protective objective of matrimonial offences.[17]

Judicial advocacy for a Uniform Civil Code (Article 44, Constitution) in Sarla Mudgal and Lily Thomas highlights the normative thrust toward monogamy and harmonisation of personal laws. Nonetheless, the Court has acknowledged that legislative action—not judicial fiat—is the appropriate avenue for comprehensive reform.[7][8]

Contemporary Challenges

  • Proof in the Digital Age: Informal ceremonies and destination weddings complicate the evidentiary burden under Section 494, necessitating innovative evidentiary approaches (e.g., electronic records, social-media evidence).
  • Community-Specific Anomalies: Differential treatment of personal laws, especially for Muslims and Scheduled Tribes, raises constitutional questions of equality yet remains politically delicate.[14][9]
  • Over-Criminalisation v. Enforcement Gaps: While women often find Section 494 difficult to prove, men’s rights groups argue that criminalisation of marital status may be disproportionate where civil remedies suffice.

Conclusion

The jurisprudence on Section 494 IPC represents a dynamic equilibrium between personal-law pluralism and the State’s commitment to monogamy, gender justice, and social order. Courts have carefully delineated the statute’s reach: insisting on strict proof of a valid second marriage, repelling stratagems of religious conversion, and tempering prosecution with procedural safeguards. Yet persistent evidentiary and normative challenges underscore the need for legislative refinement—possibly through a comprehensive family-law code—to ensure that the criminal law continues to serve, not subvert, its protective purpose.

Footnotes

  1. Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 494.
  2. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, s. 198(1).
  3. Kanwal Ram v. Himachal Pradesh Administration, AIR 1966 SC 614.
  4. Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 1564.
  5. Smt Priya Bala Ghosh v. Suresh Chandra Ghosh, (1971) 1 SCC 864.
  6. Gopal Lal v. State of Rajasthan, (1979) 2 SCC 170.
  7. Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India, (1995) 3 SCC 635.
  8. Lily Thomas v. Union of India, (2000) 6 SCC 224.
  9. Dr. Surajmani Stella Kujur v. Durga Charan Hansdah, (2001) 3 SCC 13.
  10. Tummala Madhusudhana Rao v. Tummala Prameela, 1985 AP HC.
  11. Kakarala Purnachandra Rao v. Sita Devi, 1979 AP HC.
  12. Kaur alias Kulvinder Kaur v. State of Haryana, 1997 P&H HC.
  13. Kakarala Purnachandra Rao, supra note 11 (on burden of proof).
  14. Venugopal K. v. Union of India, 2015 Ker HC.
  15. Sri Swapan Chakma v. State of Tripura, 2022 Tri HC.
  16. Ushaben v. Kishorbhai Talpada, (2012) 6 SCC online.
  17. Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam, (2004) 3 SCC 199.
  18. Sowmithri Vishnu v. Union of India, (1985) Sup Court Rpt.
  19. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, s. 17.
  20. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, ss. 5, 11.
  21. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, s. 7.
  22. Constitution of India, art. 44.
  23. Sudhir S. v. Dr. Ambily Kadannayil, 2023 Ker HC.
  24. Suresh Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, 1997 Raj HC.