Section 36 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Scope, Evolution, and Contemporary Jurisprudence

Section 36 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Scope, Evolution, and Contemporary Jurisprudence

1. Introduction

Section 36 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) operates as a deceptively brief but jurisprudentially dense provision. By legislatively deeming every “order” executable “as if it were a decree,” the section collapses otherwise rigid distinctions between two procedural instruments and thereby enlarges the remedial jurisdiction of executing courts. More than a century after the CPC’s enactment, Section 36 continues to animate diverse fields—ranging from commercial litigation to arbitral enforcement and alternative dispute resolution. This article critically analyses the provision’s text, historical rationale, and modern application, drawing on leading judicial authorities and academic commentary in Indian law.

2. Statutory Framework

2.1 Textual Provision

“The provisions of this Code relating to the execution of decrees shall, so far as they are applicable, be deemed to apply to the execution of orders.”[1]

2.2 Relationship with the Wider Execution Code

Section 36 must be read in concert with Sections 37–47 and Order XXI CPC. While Sections 37–39 define the competent executing court, Section 47 confines execution‐stage controversies to the executing court itself, and Order XXI prescribes procedure. By virtue of Section 36, this entire execution apparatus applies mutatis mutandis to orders, unless context renders a rule inapposite.

3. Doctrinal Foundations

Three rationales undergird Section 36:

  1. Procedural Economy. Re-litigating compliance with court orders through fresh suits would undermine judicial efficiency.
  2. Parity of Remedies. Many orders—e.g., injunctions, cost directions, receiver appointments—require the coercive machinery of the State, just as decrees do.
  3. Legislative Continuity. Section 36 traces to Section 244 of the 1882 CPC, indicating a deliberate policy choice that execution rules should extend to all adjudicatory commands capable of enforcement.

4. Key Analytical Questions

4.1 What Constitutes an “Order” for Purposes of Section 36?

The term embraces every formal adjudication that does not qualify as a decree (Section 2(14) CPC). Thus, interlocutory injunctions, costs orders[2], receiver appointments[3], commissioner fee directions[4], and even post-award deposit directions[5] fall within the provision’s ambit. The breadth of this definition explains the judiciary’s repeated invocation of Section 36 in varied contexts.

4.2 Interaction with Section 47 CPC

In Krishna Kumar Mundhra v. Narendra Kumar Anchalia, the Calcutta High Court held that the deeming fiction in Section 36 does not automatically import Section 47’s objections regime into arbitral award enforcement; to hold otherwise would render Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“1996 Act”) otiose.[6] The decision underscores that the statutory fiction is contextual, not absolute; courts must reconcile Section 36 with domain-specific statutes.

4.3 Court of Execution: Sections 37–39 CPC

While Section 36 determines what may be executed, Sections 37–39 determine where. The Telangana High Court in Lakhamraju Sujatha v. Yuvaraj Finance Pvt. Ltd. upheld execution before an Additional District Judge, emphasising that transferee courts share co-extensive powers under Section 39 read with Section 36.[7]

4.4 Costs, Fees, and Ancillary Monetary Orders

Orders awarding adjournment costs (Pogula Kesavayya)[2] or commissioner remuneration (Ramkeshwar Prasad)[4] are quintessential examples of Section 36’s utility. Absent the deeming provision, such orders would require independent suits, contradicting the CPC’s mandate against multiplicity of proceedings.

4.5 Arbitration Interface

  • Statutory Confluence. Section 36 of the 1996 Act expressly adopts CPC execution “as if it were a decree.”
  • Judicial Elaboration. The Supreme Court in Power Machines India Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh affirmed that an award becomes executable once the Section 34 limitation expires, unless a stay is granted.[8]
  • Conditional Stays. In PAM Developments Pvt. Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, the Court clarified that stays under amended Section 36 must ordinarily be conditional, with “due regard” to CPC principles, but not slavish adherence.[9]

4.6 Alternative Dispute Resolution Orders

Although awards passed by Lok Adalats under Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 are deemed decrees of civil court, State of Punjab v. Jalour Singh illustrates the limits of such deeming fictions. Where the Lok Adalat exceeds its conciliatory mandate, its “award” may be void, leaving nothing executable under Section 36 CPC.[10]

4.7 Commercial Courts Act, 2015

Section 16 of the Commercial Courts Act substitutes provisions of the CPC (including costs under Section 35) for commercial disputes. In Patil Automation Pvt. Ltd. v. Rakheja Engineers Pvt. Ltd., the Supreme Court held that such modifications apply at the execution stage as well, by reason of Section 36’s doctrinal reach.[11]

5. Comparative Case-Law Matrix

  • Bhandari Engineers & Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Maharia Raj JV, Delhi HC 2019: Order XXI Rule 41 examinations may be directed against corporations; Section 36 empowers enforcement of such interlocutory orders pending satisfaction of a money decree.[5]
  • Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, SC 1954: Though focused on valuation, the Court reiterated that an executing court cannot question the competence of the decree/order unless jurisdictional nullity is shown, reinforcing finality principles integral to Section 36.[12]
  • Babu Lal v. Hazari Lal Kishori Lal, SC 1982: Execution jurisprudence must avoid multiplicity; Section 36 furthers that aim by permitting possession to be granted in execution of specific-performance decrees without fresh suits.[13]

6. Critical Evaluation

While Section 36 demonstrably furthers procedural economy, its breadth occasionally invites interpretative tension with specialised statutes. The Calcutta High Court’s caution in Krishna Kumar Mundhra is instructive: statutory fictions cannot override express legislative schemes. Likewise, arbitral jurisprudence shows a judicial willingness to temper Section 36’s automaticity through conditional stays, thereby balancing expedition with fairness.

Another concern is the potential for forum shopping in execution of orders—particularly deposit or security orders—given the latitude under Sections 37–39. Clearer legislative guidance or Supreme Court-led harmonisation could mitigate inconsistent applications across High Courts.

7. Conclusion

Section 36 CPC remains a linchpin of India’s execution architecture. By extending the decretal enforcement apparatus to orders, the provision realises the CPC’s foundational objectives of finality and efficiency. Contemporary jurisprudence—spanning commercial disputes, arbitration, and ADR—confirms both the versatility and the limits of the section’s deeming fiction. Future reforms should preserve this functional breadth while ensuring coherent interplay with specialised statutes and emerging procedural regimes.

Footnotes

  1. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, s. 36.
  2. Pogula Kesavayya v. Pogula Venkayamma, Madras HC 1953.
  3. Ge Countrywide Consumer Financial Services Ltd. v. Ganesh Jagannath Thanekar, Bombay HC 2007.
  4. Ramkeshwar Prasad v. Babu Girja Prasad, Patna HC 1957.
  5. Bhandari Engineers & Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Maharia Raj Joint Venture, Delhi HC 2019.
  6. Krishna Kumar Mundhra v. Narendra Kumar Anchalia, Calcutta HC 2003.
  7. Lakhamraju Sujatha v. Yuvaraj Finance Pvt. Ltd., Telangana HC 2009.
  8. Power Machines India Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2017) 9 SCC 744.
  9. PAM Developments Pvt. Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, (2019) 8 SCC 112.
  10. State of Punjab v. Jalour Singh, (2008) 2 SCC 660.
  11. Patil Automation Pvt. Ltd. v. Rakheja Engineers Pvt. Ltd., (2022) 10 SCC 1.
  12. Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340.
  13. Babu Lal v. Hazari Lal Kishori Lal, (1982) 1 SCC 525.