Section 353 Criminal Procedure Code: Pronouncement of Judgment in Indian Criminal Trials

Section 353 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: The Statutory Architecture and Jurisprudence of Pronouncing Judgments

1. Introduction

Section 353 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”) embodies the principle that justice must not only be done but must manifestly be seen to be done. It prescribes how, when and where a judgment of a criminal court of original jurisdiction is to be pronounced. In the constitutional matrix of open courts, it ensures transparency, finality and certainty of criminal adjudication. The provision, though procedural, carries substantive consequences: a judgment not pronounced in conformity with Section 353 is void, necessitating a re-trial in appropriate cases.

2. Textual and Historical Framework

2.1 Text of Section 353 CrPC, 1973

Section 353(1) obliges the Presiding Officer to pronounce judgment in open court immediately after termination of the trial or at a notified subsequent date, by—

  • delivering the whole judgment;
  • reading the whole judgment; or
  • reading the operative part and explaining the substance to the accused or counsel.

Sub-sections (2)-(7) regulate signature, dating, copies to parties, and presence of the accused at sentencing.

2.2 Evolution from the 1898 Code

The predecessor Section 367 of the Code of 1898 governed delivery of judgments. A separate provision—Section 353 (1898 Code)—mandated that evidence be taken in the presence of the accused. While the latter migrated to present Section 273, the numbering of “353” in the 1973 Code was reassigned to judgment-pronouncement. Therefore, older authorities referencing “Section 353” (1898) actually analyse presence-of-accused during evidence, yet remain contextually relevant to today’s emphasis on open-court procedure and fair trial.[1]

3. Objectives and Underlying Principles

  • Open justice: Public pronouncement fortifies institutional legitimacy and deters arbitrary decision-making.
  • Finality: Pronouncement marks the legal moment when the judgment attains operative status; prior drafts have no legal force.
  • Certainty and Notice: Parties acquire crystallised rights to appeal or seek revision only after valid pronouncement.

4. Judicial Construction of Section 353

4.1 Surendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1954)

In a seminal ruling the Supreme Court invalidated a judgment signed by both judges of a Division Bench but read out post-mortem by the surviving judge after the co-judge’s death.[2] The Court characterised judgment-delivery as a “solemn act” that cannot be completed in chambers; public pronouncement is indispensable. Key holdings:

  • A judgment is effective only upon pronouncement or delivery in open court.
  • All members constituting the Bench must be alive and participate at the point of pronouncement; otherwise the decision is non est.
  • Drafts or signed minutes are mere preparatory steps lacking legal efficacy.

4.2 K. Sajeendran v. Thalakulathur Grama Panchayat (2003)

The Kerala High Court invoked Section 353(1) to hold that once a case is posted for judgment, the trial stands “terminated”; recall of witnesses under Section 311 thereafter is impermissible.[3] The decision clarifies the temporal boundary between “trial” and “judgment”, underscoring the finality conferred by Section 353.

4.3 Bigan Singh v. King-Emperor (1927) and R. Chockalingam v. Sundari (1966)

Though analysing the 1898 Code, these cases illuminate the broader doctrine that statutory commands on courtroom procedure are imperative. Non-compliance with Section 353 (1898) — then governing presence of the accused during evidence — was held incurable, leading to quashment of convictions.[4] The logic extends a fortiori to present Section 353: deviation voids the judgment unless validated by express legislative relaxation.

4.4 Section 353 in the Technological Era: State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Praful B. Desai (2003)

While the ruling primarily interpreted Section 273, the Supreme Court adopted a purposive, technology-friendly construction, holding that “presence” may be constructive through video-conferencing.[5] The ratio resonates with Section 353’s mandate of open-court pronouncement: modern technology (live-streaming, virtual courts) can satisfy openness so long as parties and public have reasonable access.

4.5 Effect of Irregular Pronouncement

Failure to adhere to Section 353 is not a mere procedural irregularity curable under Section 465; it strikes at the root of jurisdiction. Surendra Singh remanded the matter for fresh hearing; similarly, judgments delivered in camera without legal sanction, or signed but not pronounced, are void ab initio.

5. Interplay with Adjacent Provisions

  • Section 354: Specifies the contents that must accompany a judgment; Section 353 governs manner, Section 354 the substance.
  • Section 362: Bars alteration of judgment once pronounced, highlighting why the moment of pronouncement is legally pivotal.
  • Section 363: Requires certified copies to be furnished on application; entitlement accrues only after valid pronouncement under Section 353.
  • Section 482: High Court’s inherent power can be invoked to quash defective judgments pronounced contrary to Section 353, as recognised in recent jurisprudence on abuse of process.[6]

6. Contemporary Challenges and Reform Discourse

6.1 Multiple-Judge Benches

Cases of death, transfer or retirement of a judge after arguments but before pronouncement continue to arise. The legislature may consider codifying a mechanism — akin to Order XLI Rule 3-A CPC — permitting re-constitution and rehearing on the record already made to avoid duplication, while respecting Surendra Singh.

6.2 Virtual Courts

Post-COVID-19, High Courts have authorised live-streamed pronouncements. Statutory amendments could expressly recognise electronic pronouncement, ensuring compliance with the “open court” requirement while capitalising on digital infrastructure.

6.3 Delay between Conclusion of Arguments and Pronouncement

Though Section 353 imposes no rigid timeline, constitutional courts have read into it the requirement of reasonable dispatch, consonant with Article 21’s speedy-trial guarantee. Codification of an outer limit, with reasons to be recorded for breach, may enhance certainty.

7. Conclusion

Section 353 CrPC is the linchpin that transforms judicial draftsmanship into binding adjudication. The Supreme Court’s exposition in Surendra Singh remains the touchstone for its interpretation, emphasising collective participation, public pronouncement and procedural sanctity. Subsequent jurisprudence, including technology-oriented decisions, demonstrates the provision’s adaptability when courts remain faithful to its core objectives of transparency and finality. For trial courts, meticulous compliance with Section 353 is not a ritual but a constitutional imperative; for appellate courts, vigilance in enforcing this mandate preserves the legitimacy of the criminal justice system.

Footnotes

  1. See Bigan Singh v. King-Emperor, 1927 SCC OnLine Pat 121; R. Chockalingam v. Sundari, (1966) 2 MLJ 327.
  2. Surendra Singh and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 194.
  3. K. Sajeendran v. Secretary, Thalakulathur Grama Panchayat, 2003 SCC OnLine Ker 641.
  4. Bigan Singh, supra; see also Emperor v. C.W. King, AIR 1926 Cal 237 (power to dispense with personal attendance inferred from Section 353).
  5. State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Praful B. Desai, (2003) 4 SCC 601.
  6. MR Divakar Shetty v. State, Karnataka HC, 2025; State of T.N. v. Thirukkural Perumal, (1995) 2 SCC 449.