Section 256 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Jurisprudential Evolution and Contemporary Application

Section 256 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Jurisprudential Evolution and Contemporary Application

Introduction

In the architecture of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”), Section 256 occupies a critical yet often misunderstood niche. Positioned in Chapter XX governing the trial of summons-cases by Magistrates, the provision authorises a Magistrate to acquit an accused when the complainant is absent. While the text appears terse, the Supreme Court and various High Courts have consistently emphasised that the power is neither mechanical nor unfettered. This article interrogates the legislative intent, traces the doctrinal development, and evaluates contemporary judicial approaches to Section 256, drawing upon leading authorities such as Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Keshvanand[1], Mohd. Azeem v. A. Venkatesh[2], and recent clarifications in Ranjit Sarkar v. Ravi Ganesh Bharadwaj[3].

Legislative Text and Scheme

Section 256 reads, in substance, that if summons has been issued on a complaint and the complainant does not appear on the appointed day, the Magistrate “shall” acquit the accused unless for some reason it is proper to adjourn the hearing; the proviso empowers dispensation of the complainant’s personal attendance when represented by counsel or when the Magistrate deems it unnecessary. Sub-section (2) extends the clause to cases of the complainant’s death.

Interpreting the word “shall” in consonance with the proviso, the courts have construed the section as conferring a structured discretion rather than imposing an inexorable mandate. The relationship between Section 256 and contiguous provisions (Sections 251–259) underscores a balance between expedition and fairness: while the accused should not be vexed by dilatory prosecution, an inadvertent absence or unavoidable death of the complainant should not defeat substantive justice.

Historical Trajectory and Law Commission Inputs

The 41st Report of the Law Commission recommended equating death with absence to obviate conflicting High Court views on abatement[4]. Parliament accordingly incorporated sub-section (2). The Commission consciously left the decision to continue or terminate proceedings to judicial discretion, acknowledging the impossibility of exhaustively cataloguing fact-situations.

Doctrinal Development Through Case Law

1. Standard of Judicial Discretion: Associated Cement Co.

In Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Keshvanand, the Supreme Court overturned an acquittal predicated solely on the complainant company’s non-appearance, clarifying that before invoking Section 256 the magistrate must evaluate (a) justification for absence, (b) necessity of the complainant’s evidence at that stage, and (c) possibility of adjournment[1]. Importantly, the Court harmonised Section 247 of the 1898 Code with Section 256 of the 1973 Code, thereby cementing the principle that the provision is not a penal sanction against the complainant but a procedural safeguard for the accused.

2. Right to Restoration: Mohd. Azeem v. A. Venkatesh

Reiterating the nuanced discretion under Section 256, the Supreme Court in Mohd. Azeem set aside an order refusing to restore the complaint where sufficient cause for a single day’s absence was demonstrated[2]. The Court observed that precipitous acquittal offends both the complainant’s right to be heard and the overarching aim of criminal justice.

3. Clarificatory Ruling: Ranjit Sarkar v. Ravi Ganesh Bharadwaj

The 2025 decision in Ranjit Sarkar corrected a High Court’s misapprehension that non-appearance automatically entailed acquittal. The Supreme Court held that a “bare reading” of Section 256, especially in conjunction with Chapter XX, reveals that acquittal sans enquiry into reasons is impermissible[3].

4. High Court Jurisprudence

  • Himachal Pradesh: In Harpal Singh v. Lajwanti the High Court emphasised that the Magistrate must record reasons before deciding between adjournment and acquittal and may dispense with personal attendance when representation suffices[5].
  • Kerala: Chettinad Cement Corporation Ltd. v. Rugmini Steels interrogated the temporal limits of Section 256, warning against conflating the ‘appointed day’ and subsequent ‘hearing’ for automatic acquittal[6].
  • Andhra Pradesh: Pasupuleti Subba Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh stressed judicial prudence in granting a brief pass-over instead of immediate acquittal where counsel’s absence is inadvertent[7].
  • Gauhati: The twin judgments in Kushal Kumar Talukdar confirm that legal heirs may continue prosecution after the complainant’s death, illustrating the functional equivalence between death and absence envisaged in sub-section (2)[8].

5. Interplay with Adjacent Procedural Stages

Several decisions underline that the stage at which the complainant is absent affects the propriety of acquittal. In Major K. Mathew Scariah v. K.E. Mathai, the Madras High Court decried acquittal when evidence stood closed and the matter was ripe for judgment[9]. Conversely, pre-charge or pre-summoning absence does not attract Section 256; the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Harpreet Singh v. Harpreet Singh clarified that the provision is inapplicable at the pre-summoning stage[10].

Analytical Issues

A. Nature of the Power: Mandatory or Discretionary?

While the operative word “shall” ostensibly commands acquittal, the embedded proviso and judicial gloss convert the mandate into a conditional power. The Supreme Court’s balancing approach in Associated Cement Co. demonstrates that the Magistrate must: (i) verify representation, (ii) ascertain necessity of complainant’s evidence, and (iii) evaluate reasons for absence. Failure to articulate such assessment renders the order vulnerable on appeal under Sections 378 and 401 CrPC.

B. Corporate and Juristic Complainants

Section 256 neither differentiates between natural and juristic complainants nor contemplates the complexities of corporate representation. Nonetheless, Associated Cement Co. holds that a corporate body must appear through a natural person; absence of such representative triggers the section, albeit subject to the same discretionary safeguards.

C. Death of the Complainant

Sub-section (2) crystallises the Law Commission’s recommendation equating death with absence. Courts remain empowered to allow legal heirs or power-of-attorney holders to prosecute, particularly in offences under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act where the cause of action survives the payee’s demise[8].

D. Interface with Article 21

Although Section 256 primarily protects the accused, excessive adjournments to accommodate complainant’s default may infringe the accused’s fundamental right to a speedy trial. The principle articulated in Pankaj Kumar v. State of Maharashtra, albeit under Section 482, informs the discretionary calculus: prolonged stagnation cannot be perpetually justified in the name of leniency towards the complainant[11].

E. Appellate Powers

Pursuant to Pasupuleti Subba Rao and Associated Cement Co., an appellate court exercises the same plenary authority as the trial court to evaluate whether acquittal was warranted. Thus, restoration of a complaint is viable when the magistrate’s order is perfunctory or ignores material circumstances.

Comparative Note: Section 256 vis-à-vis Section 258

Section 258 empowers stoppage of proceedings in summons-cases instituted otherwise than on complaint, enabling discharge or acquittal without a complainant. The Supreme Court in Renuka v. State of Karnataka traced its lineage to Section 249 of the 1898 Code[12]. While Section 256 operates on complainant default, Section 258 addresses prosecutorial cessation in police-reported cases. The two provisions together furnish a comprehensive mechanism to prevent oppressive continuance of trivial prosecutions.

Policy Considerations and Recommendations

  • Magistrates should institutionalise a reasoned-order protocol, succinctly addressing cause of absence, representation, and prejudice to the accused before invoking Section 256.
  • Judicial academies ought to incorporate modules on the calibrated use of Section 256 to minimise appellate reversals and align with Article 21 imperatives.
  • Legislative clarification on electronic appearance of complainants could reduce involuntary defaults, dovetailing with e-Courts initiatives.
  • In corporate complaints, mandatory filing of a board resolution nominating authorised representatives may prevent technical acquittals.

Conclusion

Section 256 CrPC embodies a delicate equilibrium between the complainant’s prosecutorial interest and the accused’s right to be shielded from indefinite litigation. Judicial exposition—most notably by the Supreme Court—has converted the ostensibly automatic mandate of acquittal into a nuanced, fact-sensitive discretion. Ensuring that Magistrates apply this discretion judiciously, transparently, and in harmony with constitutional principles remains vital for preserving both expedition and fairness in the criminal process.

Footnotes

  1. Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Keshvanand, (1998) 1 SCC 687.
  2. Mohd. Azeem v. A. Venkatesh, (2002) 7 SCC 726.
  3. Ranjit Sarkar v. Ravi Ganesh Bharadwaj, (2025) SCC (pending citation).
  4. Law Commission of India, 41st Report (1969), Ch. 33.
  5. Harpal Singh v. Lajwanti, 2017 SCC OnLine HP (case extract).
  6. Chettinad Cement Corporation Ltd. v. Rugmini Steels, 2014 SCC OnLine Ker (case extract).
  7. Pasupuleti Subba Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2023 SCC OnLine AP (case extract).
  8. Kushal Kumar Talukdar v. Chandra Prasad Goenka, (2004) SCC OnLine Gauh (companion judgments).
  9. Major K. Mathew Scariah v. K.E. Mathai, 1985 LW (Cri) 225.
  10. Harpreet Singh v. Harpreet Singh, 2024 SCC OnLine P&H.
  11. Pankaj Kumar v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 16 SCC 117.
  12. Renuka v. State of Karnataka, (2009) 12 SCC 496.