An Analysis of Section 25 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885: Offences, Interpretation, and Privacy Implications
Introduction
The Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 ("the Act") is a foundational piece of legislation governing telecommunications in India. Within this Act, Section 25 delineates specific offences related to the unauthorized interference with telegraph lines and apparatus for the purpose of intercepting messages. This article aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of Section 25, examining its constituent elements, judicial interpretations, particularly in light of landmark cases, its interplay with the fundamental right to privacy, and its distinction from other related provisions of the Act. The discussion will draw heavily upon the provided reference materials to present a scholarly perspective on the scope and application of this provision in contemporary Indian law.
Defining "Telegraph" under the Act
To understand the ambit of Section 25, it is crucial to first comprehend the definition of "telegraph" as provided in the Act. Section 3(1AA) (as per modern numbering, originally Section 3) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, defines "telegraph" expansively. As noted in R. M. Malkani v. State Of Maharashtra . (Supreme Court Of India, 1972, Ref 6, 16), "telegraph" means "any appliance, instrument, material or apparatus used or capable of use for transmission or reception of signs, signals, writing, images and sounds or intelligence of any nature by wire, visual or other electric-magnetic emissions, radio waves or Hertzian waves, galvanic, electric or magnetic means." This broad definition ensures that the Act, including Section 25, remains relevant across evolving communication technologies (State Of Maharashtra v. Bharat Shanti Lal Shah And Others, Supreme Court Of India, 2008, Ref 7).
The Offence Envisaged in Section 25
Section 25 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, penalizes specific acts of interference with telegraph infrastructure. As articulated in R. M. Malkani v. State Of Maharashtra . (Ref 6, 16), Section 25 states (referring to clause (b) thereof):
"If any person intending (b) to intercept or to acquaint himself with the contents of any message damages, removes, tampers with or touches any battery, machinery, telegraph line, post or other thing whatever, being part of or used in or about any telegraph or in the working thereof he shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both."
Essential Ingredients of the Offence
The commission of an offence under Section 25 requires the confluence of two key elements:
- Mens Rea (Criminal Intent): The act must be done with the intention "to intercept or to acquaint himself with the contents of any message." This specific intent is a prerequisite for establishing culpability under this section.
- Actus Reus (Criminal Act): The person must engage in physical acts of interference, namely, "damages, removes, tampers with or touches any battery, machinery, telegraph line, post or other thing whatever, being part of or used in or about any telegraph or in the working thereof."
Both the criminal intent and the prohibited physical act must be proven for a conviction under Section 25.
Punishment
The section prescribes a punishment of imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or a fine, or both.
Judicial Scrutiny of Section 25
The Landmark Case: R. M. Malkani v. State Of Maharashtra .
The Supreme Court's decision in R. M. Malkani v. State Of Maharashtra . (Ref 6, 16, 21, 24) is pivotal to the interpretation of Section 25. In this case, a tape recording of a telephone conversation was challenged as inadmissible, inter alia, on the grounds that it was obtained in contravention of Section 25. The police had recorded a conversation between the appellant and Dr. Motwani with Dr. Motwani's consent by attaching a recording device to Dr. Motwani's telephone.
The Supreme Court held that there was no violation of Section 25. The Court reasoned (Ref 24):
"The police officer in the present case fixed the tape recording instrument to the telephone instrument with the authority of Dr Motwani. The police officer could not be said to intercept any message or damage or tamper or remove or touch any machinery within the meaning of Section 25 of the Indian Telegraph Act. The reason is that the police officer instead of hearing directly the oral conversation between Dr Motwani and the appellant recorded the conversation with the device of the tape recorder. The substance of the offence under Section 25 of the Indian Telegraph Act is damaging, removing, tampering, touching machinery battery line or post for interception or acquainting oneself with the contents of any message. Where a person talking on the telephone allows another person to record it or to hear it, it cannot be said that the other person who is allowed to do so is damaging, removing, tampering, touching machinery battery line or post for intercepting or acquainting himself with the contents of any message."
This interpretation significantly narrows the scope of "interception" and the prohibited acts under Section 25, particularly when one party to the communication consents to the recording or overhearing by a third party using an external device. The Court found no element of coercion or compulsion in attaching the tape recorder. This principle was reiterated in SRI. RAGHAVENDRA T C v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Karnataka High Court, 2025, Ref 23), where recording a conversation using an external device with the consent of one party was held not to be a violation of the Telegraph Act.
Admissibility of Evidence and Section 25
A related issue often arising in the context of Section 25 is the admissibility of evidence allegedly obtained in its contravention. In R. M. Malkani (Ref 22), the Supreme Court, affirming the proposition that "even if evidence is illegally obtained, it is admissible," cited Kuruma, Son of Kanju v. R. [1955 AC 197]. This general rule suggests that a mere violation of Section 25 might not, in itself, render the collected evidence inadmissible, a point also noted in Ashok Alias Bobby v. State (Delhi High Court, 2015, Ref 22) and Shahjahan @ Shahjan Sheikh @ Tunu v. State (NCT Of Delhi) (Delhi High Court, 2017, Ref 21).
However, this position must be viewed in conjunction with the evolving jurisprudence on the right to privacy. In Smt. Rayala M. Bhuvaneswari v. Nagaphanender Rayala (Andhra Pradesh High Court, 2007, Ref 5), the High Court held that a husband's secret recording of his wife's telephone conversations was a violation of her right to privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution and deemed such evidence inadmissible in matrimonial proceedings. The court distinguished this from scenarios involving lawful interception, emphasizing that unauthorized recording by a private individual, especially a spouse, infringes upon fundamental rights. This indicates a nuanced approach where privacy considerations under Article 21 can override the general principle of admissibility of illegally obtained evidence, particularly in civil or personal matters.
Application in Cases of Damage to Telegraph Infrastructure
Several cases demonstrate the application of Section 25 in contexts involving physical damage to or theft of telegraph infrastructure. For instance, in Madhu Tripathi @ Maddu v. State Of U.P. (Allahabad High Court, 2015, Ref 17, 19), charges were framed under Section 25 of the Indian Telegraph Act along with Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code (theft). Similarly, in Dushyant Singh v. State of U.P. (Allahabad High Court, 2020, Ref 18), Section 25 was invoked alongside various IPC offences. These cases suggest that Section 25 is frequently utilized to prosecute acts of vandalism, theft, or damage to telecommunication lines and equipment, where the intent to intercept might be inferred or is secondary to the act of damaging or removing infrastructure.
Section 25 and the Right to Privacy (Article 21)
The right to privacy has been unequivocally recognized as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India by the Supreme Court in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) And Another Petitioner(S) v. Union Of India And Others (S) (Supreme Court Of India, 2018, Ref 4), building upon earlier pronouncements like People'S Union For Civil Liberties (Pucl) v. Union Of India And Another (Supreme Court Of India, 1996, Ref 2). The PUCL case specifically dealt with telephone tapping under Section 5(2) of the Act and mandated stringent procedural safeguards to protect privacy.
While Section 25 aims to protect the integrity of telegraphic communication by penalizing unauthorized physical interference for interception, its interpretation in Malkani—allowing recording with one party's consent without implicating Section 25—raises questions in the contemporary privacy landscape. The focus of Section 25 is more on the physical act of tampering with telegraph apparatus with a specific intent, rather than directly regulating surveillance or interception in a manner akin to Section 5(2).
Section 5(2) of the Act empowers the government to order interception of messages under specific circumstances (public emergency or public safety) and is subject to procedural safeguards, including those laid down in Rule 419-A of the Indian Telegraph Rules, 1951, and judicial review (Vinit Kumar v. Central Bureau Of Investigation And Others, Bombay High Court, 2019, Ref 1). Non-compliance with these procedures can render interception orders illegal and the collected evidence inadmissible (Ref 1). Section 25, by contrast, applies to any person and focuses on the act of damaging or tampering with equipment to intercept, lacking the detailed procedural framework that governs state-sanctioned interception under Section 5(2).
The distinction underscores that while Section 5(2) directly engages with the state's power to impinge on privacy under controlled conditions, Section 25 addresses a different category of wrongdoing related to unauthorized physical acts against telegraph infrastructure. However, the act of interception, even if not falling squarely under the Malkani interpretation of Section 25, can still independently violate the right to privacy under Article 21, as seen in Smt. Rayala M. Bhuvaneswari (Ref 5).
Distinction from Section 24 of the Telegraph Act
It is also pertinent to distinguish Section 25 from Section 24 of the Act. Section 24, as mentioned in Ravi Shankar Srivastava v. State Of Raj. & Ors. (Rajasthan High Court, 2005, Ref 10), penalizes "unlawfully attempting to learn contents of messages." It states: "If any person does any of the acts mentioned in section 23 with the intention of unlawfully learning the contents of any message or of committing any offence punishable under this Act, he may (in addition to the fine with which he is punishable under section 23) be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year."
While both sections deal with unauthorized access to messages, Section 25 specifically requires physical acts of damaging, removing, tampering with, or touching telegraph apparatus. Section 24 appears broader in that it pertains to unlawfully attempting to learn the contents of messages by any of the acts mentioned in Section 23 (which deals with intruding into a signal-room, or refusing to quit it, or obstructing a telegraph officer), and carries a lesser punishment. The emphasis in Section 25 is on the physical interference with the telegraph infrastructure itself for the purpose of interception.
Conclusion
Section 25 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885, serves as a penal provision against unauthorized physical interference with telegraph infrastructure with the intent to intercept messages. The judiciary, particularly in R. M. Malkani v. State Of Maharashtra ., has interpreted its provisions to mean that recording a conversation with the consent of one party, without physically damaging or tampering with the telegraph network in an unauthorized manner for such interception, does not constitute an offence under this section. This interpretation, while clarifying the scope of Section 25, exists alongside a robust and evolving jurisprudence on the right to privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution.
While Section 25 primarily addresses the security and integrity of telegraph systems against specific types of physical interference, the broader concerns of privacy in communications are increasingly adjudicated under the direct lens of Article 21 and specific provisions like Section 5(2) of the Act for state-level interceptions. The practical application of Section 25 is also evident in cases involving theft of or damage to telecommunication equipment. Thus, Section 25 remains a relevant, albeit specific, tool in the legal framework governing telecommunications, operating within the larger constitutional guarantees of privacy and due process.