Section 22 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: Scope, Jurisprudential Evolution, and Contemporary Challenges

Section 22 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: Scope, Jurisprudential Evolution, and Contemporary Challenges

Introduction

The Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (“DRC Act”) constitutes one of the most protective rent control regimes in India. While Part III of the statute generally immunises tenants from eviction except on narrowly construed grounds, Section 22 carves out a special dispensation for certain institutional landlords—companies, local authorities, and public institutions— enabling them to recover possession of residential premises for institutional purposes. This article offers a critical examination of Section 22, tracing its legislative intent, the key jurisprudential milestones, its constitutional underpinnings, and the continuing doctrinal controversies that surround its application.

Legislative Context and Statutory Text

Section 22 reads, in material part, that where the landlord is (i) a company or other body corporate, (ii) a local authority, or (iii) a public institution, and the premises are required for the use of the landlord’s employees (or, in the case of a public institution, for the furtherance of its activities), the Controller may, notwithstanding anything contained in Section 14, evict the tenant if one of the four grounds listed in clauses (a)–(d) is established. Those grounds are:

  • (a) cessation of the tenant’s employment with the landlord at the time of letting;
  • (b) unauthorised occupation by any person other than the employee for whose benefit the premises were let;
  • (c) bona fide requirement of the premises for other employees; and
  • (d) bona fide requirement, in the case of a public institution, for furtherance of its activities.

Section 22 is, therefore, both a substantive ground of eviction and a jurisdictional filter, displacing the broader protective umbrella of Section 14 in favour of a narrower but institution-centred inquiry.

Early Interpretive Trajectory

Hindustan Housing Factory v. Rajinder Singh (1971)

The Delhi High Court, interpreting Section 17 of the 1952 Act (pari materia with Section 22 of the 1958 Act), held that the provision is attracted only where the landlord seeks to evict both the tenant and “every other person in occupation.”[1] The Court underscored that the special remedy is tenant-centric; persons claiming an independent title fall outside its sweep. This early construction laid the groundwork for treating Section 22 as an exception to ordinary eviction law rather than an additional remedy.

The Interface with Section 14 and Summary Procedure

Section 25-B provides a fast-track, summary procedure for eviction petitions under Section 14(1)(e). Because Section 22 is silent on procedure, a controversy emerged: may an institutional landlord invoke Section 14(1)(e) (and, by extension, Section 25-B) for bona fide need, or is Section 22 an exclusive code? The jurisprudence, discussed below, reveals a nuanced—and sometimes conflicting—approach.

Corporate Landlords and Bona Fide Requirement

Satnam Kaur v. Ashlar Stores (P) Ltd. (2009)

The tenants argued that a juristic entity cannot invoke Section 14(1)(e) and must proceed only under Section 22. The Delhi High Court rejected the contention, holding that the word “landlord” in Section 14(1)(e) is not restricted to natural persons.[2] Nevertheless, the Court recognised that if the eviction is sought for the use of employees, Section 22 becomes relevant. Thus, the operative test is the nature of the requirement, not merely the status of the landlord.

Canara Bank v. T.T. Ltd. (2014)

Canara Bank filed an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e); the tenant, filing an out-of-time leave-to-defend application, urged that the petition was inherently incompetent because the real requirement was for bank employees, attracting Section 22. Valmiki J. Mehta, J. observed that where lack of jurisdiction is ex facie, the Controller must examine maintainability even absent a leave-to-defend. However, because factual determination of the landlord’s purpose was required, the Court held that the summary Section 25-B procedure could not be short-circuited.[3]

K.S. Bhandari v. International Security Printers Pvt. Ltd. (2025)

The judgment, while primarily addressing gender-neutral terminology, re-affirmed that “landlord” in Section 14(1)(e) encompasses juristic persons, embracing the purposive reading favoured in Satnam Kaur.[4]

Public and Charitable Institutions

In Ravinder Kumar Verma v. Laxmi Narayan Mandir Nirman Sabha (2016), the tenant contended that a Sabha, as a public institution, was required to sue exclusively under Section 22. The High Court dismissed the plea, emphasising that the petition was filed under Section 14(1)(e) for institutional expansion, not specifically for employees. The Court thereby signalled that Section 22 does not automatically displace Section 14 when a public institution is the landlord; the determinative factor is the object of the demand for possession.[5]

Constitutional Dimension: Article 14 and Rational Classification

Although Section 22 has not itself been subjected to a direct constitutional challenge, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in D.C. Bhatia v. Union of India (1994)—upholding an economic threshold classification under Section 3(c) of the DRC Act—offers instructive guidance.[6] The Court endorsed legislative latitude in rent control classifications so long as the distinction bears a rational nexus to statutory objectives. By parity of reasoning, Section 22’s differential treatment of institutional landlords would likely survive scrutiny: it rests on a discernible policy rationale—facilitating essential housing for employees of entities that render public or economic services.

Comparative Analysis of Section 22 and Section 14(1)(e)

  • Subject-matter: Section 14(1)(e) protects a landlord’s personal residential need; Section 22 protects the employer’s functional requirement.
  • Beneficiaries: Under Section 14(1)(e) the beneficiary is the landlord or his dependent family; under Section 22 it is employees or, for public institutions, the public at large.
  • Procedural Framework: Section 14(1)(e) is coupled with Section 25-B’s summary process; Section 22 is silent, leading some Controllers to follow ordinary procedure, thereby affecting expedition.
  • Grounds of Eviction: Section 22’s grounds are closed and exhaustive (only four); Section 14(1)(e) is only one among many grounds under Section 14(1)(a)–(l).

Procedural Nuances and Jurisdictional Questions

The recurring procedural dilemma is whether a tenant may raise, at the threshold, that the petition lies under the “wrong” provision. Canara Bank recognises the Controller’s duty to weed out patent jurisdictional defects, but cautions against adjudicating disputed facts without a leave-to-defend.[3] The decision thus steers a middle path, preserving both the summary ethos of Section 25-B and the tenant’s right to contest mis-classification.

Doctrinal Critique and Policy Considerations

While Section 22 justifiably privileges institutional landlords in defined scenarios, three policy concerns merit attention:

  1. Under-deterrence of Strategic Pleading: Landlords may frame petitions under Section 14(1)(e) to access the swift Section 25-B track, relegating tenants to raise the Section 22 objection defensively. Statutory clarification of an exclusive or alternative hierarchy would enhance certainty.
  2. Limited Procedural Guidance: The absence of a dedicated procedural provision akin to Section 25-B may delay genuine Section 22 petitions, frustrating the legislative intent of facilitating employee housing. A legislative amendment adopting a condensed timeline could remedy this lacuna.
  3. Evolving Corporate Structures: The expansion of non-traditional entities—LLPs, Section 8 companies, charitable trusts—raises questions about their locus under Section 22. Recent cases such as K.S. Bhandari suggest a broad, purposive reading, but legislative updating would obviate interpretive ambiguity.

Conclusion

Section 22 embodies a calibrated legislative balance: it tempers the tenant-protective architecture of the DRC Act with the operational exigencies of institutional landlords. Judicial developments demonstrate a willingness to construe the provision purposively, guided by the nature of the landlord’s requirement rather than the landlord’s juristic character alone. Nevertheless, procedural uncertainties and potential for strategic forum selection persist. A judicious legislative revision—clarifying exclusivity, prescribing an expeditionary procedure, and contemporising the definition of eligible landlords—would fortify the efficacy and fairness of this special provision.

Footnotes

  1. Hindustan Housing Factory (P) Ltd. v. Rajinder Singh, Delhi High Court, 1971.
  2. Satnam Kaur & Ors. v. Ashlar Stores (P) Ltd., 158 DLT 62 (Delhi HC 2009).
  3. Canara Bank v. T.T. Ltd., 2014 SCC OnLine Del 1848.
  4. K.S. Bhandari v. International Security Printers Pvt. Ltd., Delhi HC 2025.
  5. Ravinder Kumar Verma v. Laxmi Narayan Mandir Nirman Sabha, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 6024.
  6. D.C. Bhatia v. Union of India, (1995) 1 SCC 104.