Section 207 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act: Jurisdictional Bar and Contemporary Judicial Discourse

Section 207 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act: Jurisdictional Bar and Contemporary Judicial Discourse

Introduction

Section 207 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (“the 1955 Act”) constitutes the statutory fulcrum regulating the distribution of jurisdiction between revenue courts and ordinary civil courts in Rajasthan. The provision—supported by an exhaustive Third Schedule—dictates that suits and applications relating to agricultural land lie exclusively before the revenue judiciary. Despite its apparently crisp mandate, Section 207 continues to generate sophisticated jurisdictional contests, particularly where litigants frame composite reliefs or question registered instruments affecting agricultural holdings. Recent jurisprudence—chiefly the Supreme Court’s decision in Urban Improvement Trust, Bikaner v. Gordhan Dass[1] and a prolific body of High Court authority—signals a renewed judicial effort to clarify the reach of Section 207(2) and its interaction with the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (“CPC”). This article critically analyses the legislative text, integrates seminal case law, and evaluates the doctrinal tests that determine when a civil suit is barred and when it is maintainable notwithstanding Section 207.

Legislative Framework

Text of Section 207

Section 207 reads:

“(1) All suits and applications of the nature specified in the Third Schedule shall be heard and determined by a revenue court.
(2) No court other than a revenue court shall take cognisance of any such suit or application or of any suit or application based on a cause of action in respect of which any relief could be obtained by means of any such suit or application.”

Relationship with Schedule III and Other Provisions

The Third Schedule catalogues suits/applications triable exclusively by revenue courts—e.g., declarations of khatedari rights, injunctions concerning agricultural holdings, or correction of revenue entries. Section 207 must, therefore, be construed conjunctively with:

  • Section 5(24) (definition of “land”)—broadly covering land “held for agricultural purposes...”[1]
  • Section 16 (bar on declaration of khatedari where land is acquired for public purposes)[7]
  • Section 63 (extinguishment of tenancy upon acquisition)[7]

Because the Act constitutes a self-contained code on agrarian relations, courts consistently treat Section 207 as a legislative ouster of civil jurisdiction where statutory remedies exist[6].

Judicial Interpretation

I. Supreme Court of India

  • Urban Improvement Trust, Bikaner v. Gordhan Dass (2023)[1] – The Court affirmed that, to ascertain the bar, one must examine (i) the scheme of the Act, and (ii) whether the precise relief is available before a revenue court. Where the plaintiff’s prayer can be moulded within Schedule III, Section 207(2) operates as a complete bar.
  • Pyare Lal v. Shubhendra Pilania (2019) 3 SCC 692[19] – Reiterated that civil jurisdiction is ousted for declaration of khatedari rights, yet acknowledged that questions of title based on a registered instrument may still require civil adjudication if the dominant relief is outside Schedule III.

II. Rajasthan High Court

  • Babu Singh v. Hema Ram (2024)[18] – Held that a simple injunction suit concerning agricultural land squarely falls within Schedule III; therefore, the civil court must reject the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
  • Jagdish Narain Pareek v. Kamlesh Jain (2017)[16] – Distinguished between prayers for ownership declaration and ancillary mutation relief; nonetheless emphasised that the overarching cause of action related to agricultural land triggers Section 207.
  • Vijay Singh v. Buddha (2012)[17] – Clarified that Section 207 applies only when the suit is of a kind enumerated in Schedule III and the relief is grantable by a revenue court, thereby introducing the “relief-oriented” test.
  • Sanganer Agro & Cold Storage v. Janki Devi (2013)[22] – Affirmed civil court jurisdiction to cancel a registered sale deed affecting agricultural land because such cancellation is absent from Schedule III and revenue courts lack statutory power to annul registered instruments.
  • Balumal v. J.P. Chandani (1972)[15] – Earlier authority recognising that only disputes expressly catalogued in Schedule III can be entertained by revenue courts; arbitration-related applications fall outside the bar.

Key Analytical Themes

1. Cause of Action versus Nature of Relief

Judicial discourse has coalesced around a dual enquiry: (a) What is the dominant cause of action? (b) Is the principal relief contemplated by Schedule III? The Supreme Court in Gordhan Dass endorsed this approach by filtering claims through the statutory relief-matrix before invoking Section 207(2). The High Court’s reasoning in Vijay Singh echoes similar logic, emphasising that mere involvement of agricultural land does not ipso facto oust civil jurisdiction unless the relief is revenue-oriented.

2. Composite Reliefs and the “Dominant Purpose” Test

Complex suits often bundle declaratory, injunctive, and cancellation reliefs. Where cancellation of a registered sale deed is the nucleus (e.g., Sanganer Agro), civil courts retain jurisdiction because revenue courts lack powers under the Registration Act, 1908. Conversely, if the gravamen is declaration of khatedari rights or injunction over cultivation (e.g., Babu Singh), Schedule III squarely applies. The “dominant purpose” test prevents litigants from artificially appending ancillary prayers to circumvent Section 207.

3. Injunctions over Agricultural Holdings

Item 24 of Schedule III specifically earmarks “suits for injunction relating to holding” for the revenue forum. The High Court in Babu Singh reaffirmed that where the sole prayer is to restrain interference with cultivation, civil courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction regardless of alleged trespass or easementary issues.

4. Cancellation of Registered Instruments

Civil courts possess inherent jurisdiction under Section 9 CPC to cancel or set aside registered deeds. Revenue courts, being creatures of statute, enjoy no such power. Decisions like Sanganer Agro and Vijay Singh illustrate that, absent an enabling provision in Schedule III, civil jurisdiction is preserved. Nevertheless, where cancellation is merely incidental to a khatedari declaration, the revenue court may still be competent if framed appropriately; Pyare Lal instructs courts to scrutinise the plaint’s pith and substance.

5. Procedural Intersection with Order VII Rule 11 CPC

Courts frequently employ Order VII Rule 11 to cull suits barred by Section 207. A recent exemplar is Babu Singh, where the plaint was rejected at the threshold. Conversely, in Jagdish Narain Pareek, the court postponed jurisdictional determination until after framing issues, emphasising that factual contestation may require evidence—a prudent stance where pleadings disclose mixed questions of fact and law.

6. Impact of Subsequent Legislative or Factual Changes

The principle that an appeal is a continuation of the suit (recalled by the Supreme Court in K. Ramnarayan Khandelwal v. Pukhraj Banthiya[10]) implies that changes in land-law during pendency of appeals (e.g., statutory amendments expanding Schedule III) could retrospectively affect jurisdiction. Litigants must remain vigilant to legislative dynamics when pursuing long-running land disputes.

Critical Evaluation

While Section 207 endeavours to streamline agrarian litigation, its practical application reveals grey zones. First, the rigid dichotomy between revenue and civil fora does not always accommodate suits involving both personal law (e.g., inheritance) and agrarian tenure. Second, the inability of revenue courts to grant equitable remedies—such as rescission of registered deeds or mesne profits—forces parties into duplicative proceedings. Third, inconsistent High Court precedents occasionally yield forum-shopping. A statutory amendment enlarging the remedial powers of revenue courts (particularly in relation to registered instruments) or a legislative clarification adopting the “dominant purpose” test could mitigate such fragmentation. Alternatively, Rajasthan could emulate states that provide for transfer of suits between forums upon identification of the correct jurisdiction, thereby conserving judicial resources.

Conclusion

Section 207 epitomises the legislature’s intent to centralise agrarian disputes within the specialised revenue judiciary. Contemporary jurisprudence—anchored by Gordhan Dass—has refined the analytical lens: a civil suit is barred only when (i) the cause of action directly relates to agricultural land and (ii) the specific relief is enumerated in Schedule III or otherwise efficaciously obtainable before a revenue court. The High Court’s decisions demonstrate both fidelity to and pragmatic deviation from this core principle, largely depending on whether cancellation of instruments or purely agrarian declarations are in issue. Ultimately, the statutory bar strikes a balance between administrative expertise and judicial accessibility; yet, as land transactions grow complex, incremental legislative and judicial calibration remains indispensable to preserve coherence, prevent multiplicity, and ensure expeditious justice for Rajasthan’s agrarian stakeholders.

Footnotes

  1. Urban Improvement Trust, Bikaner v. Gordhan Dass (Civil Appeal No. 8411 of 2014, Supreme Court of India, 2023).
  2. Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955, s. 5(24).
  3. Babu Singh v. Hema Ram, 2024 SCC OnLine Raj 3403 (Raj HC).
  4. Jagdish Narain Pareek v. Kamlesh Jain, 2017 SCC OnLine Raj 3857.
  5. Vijay Singh & Anr. v. Buddha & Ors., 2012 SCC OnLine Raj 3869.
  6. State of Rajasthan v. Uka & Ors., 2010 (Raj HC).
  7. Ganpat Lal & Ors. v. Rajasthan Housing Board, 2003 SCC OnLine Raj 556.
  8. Balumal & Anr. v. J.P. Chandani & Ors., 1972 SCC OnLine Raj 49.
  9. Sanganer Agro & Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd. v. Janki Devi, 2013 (Raj HC).
  10. K. Ramnarayan Khandelwal v. Pukhraj Banthiya, 2017 (Raj HC).
  11. Pyare Lal v. Shubhendra Pilania, (2019) 3 SCC 692 (cited in ARVIND SHARMA v. Girdhar Gopal Sharma, 2024 Raj HC).