Section 195 CrPC: Jurisprudential Evolution and Contemporary Challenges

Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Jurisprudential Evolution and Contemporary Challenges

Introduction

Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”) curtails the otherwise plenary power of criminal courts under Section 190 to take cognisance of specified offences. Conceived as a safeguard against vexatious prosecutions and to preserve the integrity of public justice, the provision stipulates that cognisance of certain offences may be taken only upon a written complaint of the court concerned or of the public servant whose lawful authority has allegedly been infringed. Despite its seemingly procedural character, Section 195 has generated a dense body of jurisprudence owing to its interface with fundamental criminal law norms, evidentiary rules, and constitutional guarantees of access to justice.

Statutory Framework

Section 195 is divided into three limbs:

  • Clause (a) – offences relating to contempt of lawful authority of public servants (e.g., Sections 172–188 IPC);
  • Clause (b)(i) – offences against public justice, notably giving or fabricating false evidence (e.g., Sections 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211, 228 IPC);
  • Clause (b)(ii) – offences involving documents produced or given in evidence in judicial proceedings (e.g., Section 463 IPC and allied Sections 471, 475, 476).

The procedural complement is Section 340 CrPC which empowers the court to conduct a preliminary inquiry and file a complaint when it considers such action “expedient in the interests of justice”.

Historical Trajectory and Leading Precedents

Early Caution: Daulat Ram (1962)

In Daulat Ram v. State of Punjab[1] the Supreme Court held that failure to secure a written complaint from the concerned public servant renders the trial void ab initio, underscoring the mandatory nature of Section 195 even under the 1898 Code.

Conceptual Foundations: Patel Laljibhai (1971)

Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. State of Gujarat[2] located Section 195 in the chapter on “conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings”, stressing its role as an exception to the wide cognisance power of magistrates under Section 190.

Temporal Nexus Doctrine: Sachida Nand Singh (1998) and Iqbal Singh Marwah (2005)

The Court in Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar[3] adopted a restrictive construction of Clause (b)(ii), holding that the bar applies only when the offence is committed after the document enters “custodia legis”. The seven-judge bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah[4] affirmed this reasoning, thereby permitting private prosecutions for pre-litigation forgeries and reconciling competing precedents such as Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh[5].

Distinguishing Sub-clauses (b)(i) and (b)(ii): Bandekar Brothers (2020)

In Bandekar Brothers Pvt. Ltd. v. Prasad Vassudev Keni[6] the Supreme Court clarified that offences under Sections 191–192 IPC (false evidence) fall within Clause (b)(i), not Clause (b)(ii). The decision firmly separated the two sub-clauses, warning against indiscriminate importation of precedents across them.

Procedural Rigour and Void Trials: Saloni Arora (2017) & M.S Ahlawat (1999)

In Saloni Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi)[7] it was reiterated that non-compliance with Section 195 is incurable; a supplementary complaint cannot retrospectively sanctify an invalid cognisance. Earlier, M.S Ahlawat v. State of Haryana[8] set aside a conviction recorded directly by the Supreme Court for perjury, citing violation of Section 195/340 and of Article 21 due process.

Doctrinal Analysis

(i) Mandatory versus Directory

The consistent tenor of Supreme Court authority treats Section 195 as mandatory. The phrase “no court shall take cognizance” is construed as an absolute embargo absent the statutory complaint. Attempts by subordinate courts to cure the defect post facto—as criticised in Saloni Arora—have uniformly failed.

(ii) Rationale: Purity of Justice and Abuse Control

Section 195 aims to balance two competing considerations:

  • preventing litigants from weaponising the criminal process to intimidate adversaries or to derail civil proceedings; and
  • safeguarding the administration of justice by ensuring that serious offences affecting it are prosecuted when the court, as neutral arbiter, deems prosecution expedient.

(iii) The Temporal Nexus under Clause (b)(ii)

The “temporal nexus” doctrine forged in Sachida Nand Singh and fortified in Iqbal Singh Marwah hinges on the words “in relation to a proceeding in any court”. By confining the bar to offences occurring during or after judicial custody of the document, the Court avoided anomalous results whereby a litigant could immunise a pre-existing forgery merely by filing the document.

(iv) Distinction between False Evidence and Forgery

Bandekar Brothers crystallised that Clause (b)(i) encompasses offences against public justice (false evidence), whereas Clause (b)(ii) is confined to document-centric offences (forgery). The analytical error of conflating the clauses was hence corrected, restoring doctrinal clarity.

(v) Extra-Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Proceedings

In Lalji Haridas v. State of Maharashtra[9] it was held that income-tax proceedings, though judicial for IPC Section 193, do not convert an Income-Tax Officer into a “court” for Section 195. The decision underscores that the definition of “court” for CrPC purposes is narrower than for evidentiary purposes.

(vi) Interface with Section 188 IPC and Public Order Offences

Cases such as C. Muniappan v. State of Tamil Nadu[10] and Mohan Kukreja v. State (NCT Delhi)[11] demonstrate that prosecutions under Section 188 IPC without a complaint of the public servant are void, regardless of the gravity of the substantive offence proved otherwise.

Procedural Mechanics under Section 340 CrPC

The twin conditions for a court to invoke Section 340 are: (a) formation of an opinion, based on a preliminary inquiry, that an offence under Section 195(1)(b) appears to have been committed; and (b) a finding that it is expedient in the interests of justice to file a complaint. High Court decisions such as Amarsang Nathaji[12] and Narendra Kumar Srivastava[13] emphasise that “expediency” is not synonymous with mere suspicion; the court must consider factors like seriousness of the misconduct, effect on the judicial process, and availability of alternative remedies.

Contemporary Challenges and Unresolved Questions

  • Overlapping Offences: The same factual matrix may attract both Clause (b)(i) and Clause (b)(ii) offences (e.g., forged affidavit filed in court). The jurisprudence lacks a definitive test to determine the dominant clause when offences intersect.
  • Police Investigations Prior to Court Complaint: FIRs are often registered before the competent court decides on filing a complaint, leading to parallel proceedings and later quashing—an issue highlighted in Gurinder Singh[14] and Court on Its Own Motion v. State[15].
  • Quasi-Judicial Bodies: Post-Lalji Haridas, the status of modern tribunals (e.g., NCLT, ITAT) vis-à-vis Section 195 remains contested, necessitating legislative clarification.
  • Digital Evidence: With the proliferation of electronic records, determining the moment a document enters “custodia legis” (upload to e-filing portal, marking as exhibit, etc.) requires doctrinal adaptation.

Conclusion

Section 195 CrPC operates as a vital procedural checkpoint, mediating the tension between private prosecutorial zeal and the institutional prerogative of courts to safeguard the administration of justice. The Supreme Court’s iterative engagement—from Daulat Ram to Bandekar Brothers—has progressively refined the contours of the provision, yet grey areas persist, especially amid evolving litigation practices and tribunalisation. Legislative fine-tuning—particularly on the definition of “court” and on electronic filings—combined with continued judicial vigilance, is imperative to maintain the delicate equilibrium envisioned by the drafters of the Code.

Footnotes

  1. Daulat Ram v. State of Punjab, AIR 1962 SC 1206.
  2. Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. State of Gujarat, (1971) 2 SCC 376.
  3. Sachida Nand Singh v. State of Bihar, (1998) 2 SCC 493.
  4. Ibrahim (Iqbal) Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah, (2005) 4 SCC 370.
  5. Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh, (1996) 3 SCC 533.
  6. Bandekar Brothers Pvt. Ltd. v. Prasad Vassudev Keni, (2020) SCC OnLine SC 707.
  7. Saloni Arora v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 3 SCC 286.
  8. M.S Ahlawat v. State of Haryana, (2000) 1 SCC 278.
  9. Lalji Haridas v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1964 SC 1154.
  10. C. Muniappan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2010) 9 SCC 567.
  11. Mohan Kukreja v. State (Govt. of NCT Delhi), 2019 SCC OnLine Del 6398.
  12. Amarsang Nathaji v. Hardik Harshadbhai Patel, (2017) 1 SCC 113.
  13. Narendra Kumar Srivastava v. State of Bihar, (2019) SCC OnLine SC 1527.
  14. Gurinder Singh v. State, 1996 SCC OnLine Del 315.
  15. Court on Its Own Motion v. State, 2012 SCC OnLine Del 2681.