Section 185 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954

Section 185 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954: Jurisdictional Bar, Doctrinal Foundations and Emerging Contours

1. Introduction

The Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 (hereinafter “DLRA”) was enacted to abolish intermediaries and create a uniform body of peasant proprietors in the (now) National Capital Territory of Delhi. A linchpin of this legislative design is Section 185, which channels a wide spectrum of agrarian disputes exclusively to specially constituted revenue courts and, correspondingly, ousts the jurisdiction of ordinary civil courts. Over the past seven decades, courts have grappled with the breadth, limits and constitutional implications of this provision. This article undertakes a critical appraisal of Section 185, drawing on seminal Supreme Court and High Court jurisprudence, statutory context, and comparative doctrinal insights.

2. Legislative Scheme and Textual Setting

Section 185(1) stipulates that “no court other than a court mentioned in column 4 of the First Schedule shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, take cognizance of any suit, application or proceedings mentioned in column 3 thereof.” Columns 5–7 further prescribe the forum, period of limitation and fees payable. Read with Schedule I, the section establishes a closed list of matters—from declaration of bhumidar rights to suits for ejectment of asamis, and from cancellation of unauthorised transfers (s. 151) to partition of holdings (s. 55)—that lie solely before revenue authorities such as the Revenue Assistant, the Collector or the Deputy Collector.

Three statutory features merit emphasis:

  • Comprehensiveness: The DLRA is a self-contained code governing both substantive rights (Chapters II–VII) and procedural remedies (Chapter XIII).
  • Non obstante clause: Section 185 overrides “anything contained” in the CPC or any other law, evincing legislative intent of exclusivity.
  • Schedule-based ouster: Only matters “mentioned” in Schedule I are barred from civil cognizance, preserving residuary jurisdiction for issues outside the schedule.

3. Foundational Jurisprudence

3.1 Supreme Court Canon: Hatti v. Sunder Singh

In Hatti v. Sunder Singh[1] the Supreme Court unequivocally held that civil courts have no jurisdiction over suits for declaration of bhumidar rights or possession of agricultural land—matters expressly assigned to the Revenue Assistant under items 4, 19 and 28 of Schedule I. The judgment articulated a three-step test still applied today: (i) identify the pith and substance of the dispute; (ii) locate the corresponding entry in Schedule I; and (iii) if covered, hold the civil suit barred irrespective of incidental reliefs. The Court further affirmed that a decree rendered by a civil court in contravention of Section 185 is a nullity, echoing the principle later reiterated in Gaon Sabha v. Nathi[2].

3.2 Gaon Sabha Jurisprudence and Public Lands

Gaon Sabha v. Nathi[2] expanded the doctrinal canvas by emphasising the vesting mechanism of communal categories such as gair-mumkin pahar under Sections 3–5 and 154 DLRA, and reinforced that civil courts cannot entertain compensation claims or title suits in respect of such land. The judgment underscores that Section 185 operates in tandem with vesting provisions to safeguard village common lands and prevent forum-shopping.

3.3 Recent Reaffirmation: Mohinder Singh (2023)

In Mohinder Singh (D) thr. LRs v. Narain Singh[3], the Supreme Court reviewed the legislative history of the DLRA while determining whether agricultural land within a notified municipal area attracted the Act. Although the issue pivoted on Section 1(2) exclusions, the Court confirmed that where the Act applies, Section 185 constitutes a “hierarchy of special forums” whose jurisdiction is exclusive and cannot be circumvented by artful pleadings.

4. Key Analytical Dimensions

4.1 Scope of “Suit, Application or Proceeding”

High Courts have consistently applied a substance-over-form approach. In Anil Kumar v. B.R.B. Construction[4], plaintiffs styled their action as an injunction against alleged co-owners to protect possession; nonetheless, the Delhi High Court held that the relief substantially pertained to ejectment under Section 81 and therefore lay before the Revenue Assistant. Conversely, in Siri Ram v. Jai Prakash[5] a declaratory suit tracing heirship, unconnected with any DLRA right, was deemed maintainable in civil court because Schedule I was silent on such suits inter se co-sharers of non-agricultural land. The jurisprudence thus turns on a meticulous mapping of the pleadings onto the Schedule.

4.2 Definition of “Land” and Municipal Expansion

Section 3(13) defines “land” broadly to include village abadi and buildings appurtenant to agriculture, but excludes urbanised belts notified by the Administrator. In Jeet Singh v. Dashrath Yadav[6] the Delhi High Court remanded the matter for evidence on whether the suit land, forming part of an unauthorised colony, still retained its agricultural character. The decision illustrates that urban sprawl does not ipso facto displace the DLRA; formal de-notification under Section 1(2) or a statutory acquisition is necessary before civil jurisdiction revives.

4.3 Partition Suits and Recurring Causes of Action

Although partition of a holding is specifically provided for under Section 55 read with item 11 of Schedule I, issues often arise when co-owners seek partition of mixed assets. The Delhi High Court in Sunil Kumar Gupta v. Pushpa Jain[7] clarified that the recurring nature of a co-owner’s right to demand partition does not dilute the bar of Section 185; if the property is agricultural land, the remedy remains with the Revenue Assistant notwithstanding prior withdrawal of a civil suit.

4.4 Interplay with Other Statutes

  • CPC, 1908. Section 9 CPC confers residual jurisdiction save where expressly or impliedly barred. Section 185, read with its non obstante clause, constitutes an explicit bar meeting the Dhulabhai test for exclusion.
  • Registration Act, 1908. In Bhoop Singh v. Ram Singh Major[8], the Supreme Court held that compromise decrees creating new rights in immovable property require registration. Where such decrees concern agricultural land governed by the DLRA, dual compliance is necessary: registration and pursuit of appropriate revenue remedies if the decree conflicts with Section 161 (restriction on transfer) or Section 151 (voidability).
  • Limitation Act, 1963. While Section 22 recognises continuing causes of action, as discussed in Hari Ram v. Jyoti Prasad[9], limitation questions in DLRA matters are resolved by applying the specific periods in Column 6 of Schedule I, which override the general law under Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act.

4.5 Constitutional Concerns and Article 300A

Critiques of Section 185 occasionally invoke Article 300A (right to property) on the ground that the ouster of civil courts may impair access to justice. In Balbir Singh v. ADM (Rev.)[10] the Delhi High Court acknowledged that the DLRA was not intended to confiscate cultivators’ land without compensation and that statutory remedies before revenue authorities satisfy the constitutional requirement of due process. The absence of appellate and revisional tiers within the revenue hierarchy (Sections 64, 67 DLRA) further assuages due-process concerns.

5. Contemporary Challenges

(a) Urbanisation and Mixed-Use Developments: Rapid peri-urban growth blurs the line between agricultural and non-agricultural lands, spawning disputes over farmhouses, banquet halls and educational institutions erected on erstwhile agricultural holdings. Determining whether Section 185 applies now necessitates nuanced factual inquiries, often culminating in preliminary trials, as evident from Rajesh Kumar v. Shanta Vashisht decisions.

(b) Multiplicity of Proceedings: Parties sometimes institute parallel civil suits and revenue applications, leading to conflicting orders. A strict enforcement of Section 185, coupled with proactive transfer petitions, is essential to uphold judicial discipline.

(c) Digital Land Records: The impending computerisation of revenue records under the Digital India Land Records Modernization Programme (DILRMP) may call for procedural amendments to Schedule I, especially concerning correction-of-records disputes presently falling under items 26 and 27.

(d) Need for Specialised Benches: Given the complex mix of statutory, constitutional and evidentiary issues, creating designated DLRA Benches within the revenue hierarchy could enhance consistency and reduce litigation time.

6. Conclusion

Section 185 serves as the jurisdictional cornerstone of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, anchoring the statute’s transformative objective of agrarian reform within a specialised adjudicatory framework. Judicial pronouncements from Hatti to Mohinder Singh have steadfastly preserved its exclusivity, while also clarifying its limits through a schedule-centric approach. As Delhi’s land-use matrix evolves, courts and lawmakers must calibrate the provision to balance efficient revenue adjudication with equitable access to justice, without diluting the foundational principle that agrarian disputes belong, first and foremost, to the revenue domain envisaged by the legislature.

Footnotes

  1. Hatti v. Sunder Singh, (1970) 2 SCC 841.
  2. Gaon Sabha v. Nathi, (2004) 12 SCC 555.
  3. Mohinder Singh (D) thr. LRs v. Narain Singh, (2023) SCC OnLine SC –––.
  4. Shri Anil Kumar v. B.R.B. Construction (P) Ltd., 2008 SCC OnLine Del 1480.
  5. Siri Ram v. Jai Prakash, 1991 Raj LR 275 (Del).
  6. Jeet Singh v. Dashrath Yadav, 2017 SCC OnLine Del 7570.
  7. Sunil Kumar Gupta v. Pushpa Jain, 2024 SCC OnLine Del —.
  8. Bhoop Singh v. Ram Singh Major, (1995) 5 SCC 709.
  9. Hari Ram v. Jyoti Prasad, (2011) 2 SCC 682.
  10. Balbir Singh v. ADM (Rev.), 1995 SCC OnLine Del 649.