Section 154 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872: Judicial Discretion, Hostile Witnesses and Evidentiary Value

Section 154 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872: Judicial Discretion, Hostile Witnesses and Evidentiary Value

Introduction

The architecture of the Indian law of evidence recognises that witnesses occasionally deviate from the narrative expected by the party calling them. Section 154 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (“IEA”) equips courts with a discretionary tool to confront this reality by permitting a party to cross-examine its own witness. The provision underpins the truth-seeking function of trials while simultaneously safeguarding the adversarial framework. This article critically analyses Section 154, traces its doctrinal evolution through Indian jurisprudence, and assesses its contemporary contours after the 2006 amendment that introduced sub-section (2). The discussion integrates leading authorities such as Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana[1], Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration[2], and the recent constitution bench ruling in Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi)[3], among others.

Statutory Framework and Legislative History

Section 154, as originally enacted, read:

“The Court may, in its discretion, permit the person who calls a witness to put any question to him which might be put in cross-examination by the adverse party.”

By Act 13 of 2006, the legislature renumbered the original text as sub-section (1) and inserted sub-section (2) clarifying that reliance may still be placed on any part of the evidence of a witness so cross-examined. The amendment codified what the Supreme Court had already pronounced in several decisions: hostility affects weight, not admissibility.

Conceptual Foundations

A. Relationship with Other Evidentiary Provisions

  • Sections 137–138 IEA delineate the sequential stages of examination but do not restrict the timing of an application under Section 154 (Dahyabhai Thakkar[4]).
  • Section 145 IEA governs contradiction by prior statements; Section 154 operates at an anterior stage by allowing the necessary line of questioning that may later attract Section 145 (Emperor v. Ajit Kumar Ghosh[5]).
  • Section 155 IEA provides substantive modes for impeaching credit once Section 154 permission is granted.
  • Section 165 IEA empowers the judge to put any question “in order to discover or obtain proper proof of relevant facts,” a power that complements but does not supplant Section 154 (see Ram Chander v. State of Haryana[6]).

B. The Adversarial Imperative and Truth-Seeking Balance

While party autonomy is central to the adversarial system, the overriding objective remains a just verdict. Section 154 reconciles these interests by allowing adversarial techniques (leading questions, confrontation) to be deployed when the witness’s reliability is in doubt, yet without entirely jettisoning his testimony.

Judicial Discretion under Section 154

A. Grounds for Exercising Discretion

Indian courts have refrained from confining the provision to instances of “hostility” in the strict English sense. The Supreme Court in Sat Paul rejected a rigid typology of “hostile,” “adverse,” and “unfavourable,” holding that the statutory text itself is unqualified[2]. Subsequently, Neeraj Dutta confirmed that “declaration” of hostility is unnecessary; the test is whether cross-examination is expedient for eliciting truth[3].

B. Temporal Dimension

Discretion may be invoked “at any stage of the examination of the witness” (Dahyabhai Thakkar[4]). However, courts discourage undue delay because demeanour and immediacy assist in adjudging hostility (State of Bihar v. Laloo Prasad[7]). The Kerala High Court, surveying precedent, observed that even post-defence recall is permissible where justice so demands (K.V. Vijyadas v. State of Kerala[8]).

C. Applicability to Civil Proceedings

Although most litigation on Section 154 arises in criminal trials, nothing in its text confines it to that context. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in Mattam Ravi[9] and the Delhi High Court in Jugal Kishor Ratnu[10] affirmed its availability in civil suits, stressing that the underlying principle—facilitating truthful adjudication—transcends procedural classifications.

Procedural Mechanics after the 2006 Amendment

  • Sub-section (2) rejects the fallacy that once a witness is cross-examined by his own party, his testimony is obliterated. The court may, and often must, sift the chaff from the grain (Bhagwan Singh[1]).
  • The amendment aligns statutory text with long-standing case law, thereby forestalling objections that evidence of a “hostile” witness is wholly inadmissible.

Evidentiary Value of Testimony after Section 154 Cross-Examination

A. Hostility Does Not Equal Expunction

In Bhagwan Singh the Court cautioned that the grant of permission “does not completely efface his evidence”[1]. The principle was reiterated in Gura Singh[11] and in Himanshu v. State (NCT of Delhi)[12]. The judicial task is evaluative: credit may be given to parts of the testimony that find corroboration from independent evidence.

B. Corroboration and Caution

When a witness turns against the prosecution, any inculpatory fragment must be scrutinised more anxiously (Sat Paul[2]). The Supreme Court in Raja Ram v. State of Rajasthan[13] allowed the appeal because the only incriminating evidence—a dying declaration—stood compromised by suggestions of tutoring; hostile cross-examination would not have salvaged the prosecution.

C. Falsus in Uno Not Applicable

Indian courts have consistently declined to adopt the doctrine “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.” The Bombay High Court’s survey in Babu Nathu Gond[14] typifies the approach: credibility is dissected issue-wise, not jettisoned wholesale.

Inter-Relationship with Procedural Statutes

  • Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 311: Allows the court to summon or recall witnesses. The discretionary spirit underlying Section 311 mirrors that of Section 154, as seen in Hanuman Ram v. State of Rajasthan[15].
  • CrPC, Section 162 Proviso: In Sat Paul, the Supreme Court admonished the High Court for using police statements for corroboration, illustrating that Section 154 permission does not loosen other exclusionary rules.

Policy Considerations and Contemporary Challenges

A. Preventing Witness Turning-Hostile Syndrome

High-profile acquittals often draw public ire at recanting witnesses. While Section 154 provides one procedural remedy, systemic reforms—witness protection, audio-visual deposition, and deterrent perjury sanctions—must complement judicial discretion.

B. Technological Evolution

The 2013 amendment to the IEA inserting Section 65-B acknowledged electronic records. Courts may increasingly confront hostile witnesses in virtual environments, necessitating flexible but principled application of Section 154.

Conclusion

Section 154 of the Indian Evidence Act remains a pivotal instrument of judicial pragmatism. Its evolution—textually via the 2006 amendment and jurisprudentially through decisions from Sat Paul to Neeraj Dutta—has clarified that the court’s discretion is wide yet disciplined by the overarching quest for truth. Hostility of a witness is a matter of weight, not admissibility; timing of the request is elastic but should be prompt; and the provision is as applicable to civil disputes as it is to criminal prosecutions. Ultimately, Section 154 exemplifies the Indian judiciary’s commitment to balancing adversarial rights with the imperative of substantive justice.

Footnotes

  1. Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana, (1976) 1 SCC 389.
  2. Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration, (1976) 1 SCC 727.
  3. Neeraj Dutta v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2022) SC Civ Appeal No. of 2022, ¶154.
  4. Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1964 SC 1563.
  5. Emperor v. Ajit Kumar Ghosh, 1944 SCC OnLine Cal 72.
  6. Ram Chander v. State of Haryana, (1981) 3 SCC 191.
  7. State of Bihar v. Laloo Prasad, (2002) 9 SCC 626.
  8. K.V. Vijyadas v. State of Kerala, 2017 SCC OnLine Ker 20599.
  9. Mattam Ravi v. Mattam Raja Yellaiah, 2017 SCC OnLine AP 148.
  10. Jugal Kishor Ratnu v. Meena Tevary, 2014 SCC OnLine Del 1282.
  11. Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 2 SCC 205.
  12. Himanshu alias Chintu v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2011) 2 SCC 36.
  13. Raja Ram v. State of Rajasthan, (2005) 5 SCC 272.
  14. Babu Nathu Gond v. State of Maharashtra, 1975 SCC OnLine Bom 45.
  15. Hanuman Ram v. State of Rajasthan, (2008) 15 SCC 652.