Section 148 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Local Inquiry, Costs and Jurisprudential Evolution

Section 148 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Local Inquiry, Costs and Jurisprudential Evolution

Introduction

Section 148 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) is a comparatively brief yet pivotal provision situated within Chapter X, which empowers the Executive Magistracy to avert breaches of the peace arising out of property-related disputes. While Sections 145 to 147 authorise the Magistrate to determine immediate possession (s. 145), attach property (s. 146) or inquire into a right of user (s. 147), Section 148 provides the procedural toolkit of a local inquiry and the concomitant power to award costs. This article undertakes a doctrinal and jurisprudential analysis of Section 148, tracing its statutory contours, judicial exposition and contemporary relevance, with particular emphasis on the caselaw cited in the reference materials supplied.

Legislative Context and Textual Elements

Section 148 reads, in substance, that where a Magistrate considers a local inquiry necessary for the purposes of Sections 145, 146 or 147, he may direct a subordinate Magistrate or other person to conduct such inquiry, render a report and, after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, may (i) take the report into evidence and (ii) award reasonable costs of the inquiry to any party and direct by whom such costs shall be paid. The provision thus comprises three operative parts:

  • Appointment and scope of the local inquiry (subs. (1)–(2));
  • Evidentiary reception of the report (subs. (2));
  • Assessment and recovery of costs (subs. (3)).

The Rationale of Local Inquiry

Unlike a regular trial, proceedings under Chapter X are essentially preventive, aimed at maintaining public tranquillity rather than adjudicating proprietary title (Bhinka v. Charan Singh, 1959 SC)[1]. A factual impasse regarding identity, boundaries or physical features of the disputed property may impede the summary determination contemplated by Section 145(4). Section 148 equips the Magistrate to break this impasse through an on-the-spot investigation by a neutral agency.

Procedural Architecture

Triggering the Inquiry

Judicial consensus holds that a local inquiry may be ordered either prior to or after the issuance of the preliminary order under Section 145(1), provided the Magistrate records reasons showing its necessity (Oinam Atonungshi Singh, 1963 GAU)[2]. Where identity of land is uncertain, an inquiry preceding the Section 145(4) evidence is advisable; failure to do so may vitiate the final order[3].

Choice of the Inquiry Officer

Although the statute contemplates delegation to any “person,” judicial practice prefers subordinate Magistrates or revenue officials, safeguarding impartiality as stressed in Tikuda v. State (1961 RAJ)[4].

Evidentiary Status of the Report

The report is not conclusive; parties must receive a copy and an opportunity to controvert its findings, failing which the order is vulnerable to revision (Sardha Prasad v. Pitamber Lal, 1912 ALL)[5].

The Power to Award Costs under Section 148(3)

A distinctive feature of Section 148 is the capacity to shift reasonable costs of the local inquiry. The jurisprudence on this aspect is both diverse and instructive:

  • Discretionary yet Judicious – Early cases such as Palaniandi Servai (1922 MAD) emphasised that the Magistrate must articulate reasons and consider actual expenditure.
  • Reasonableness Standard – In Langar v. Bacha (1953 PAT) the Court held that a detailed accounting is unnecessary, but the amount cannot be arbitrary; it must be supportable on the record.
  • Revisionary Control – Where no evidence of expenditure exists, wholesale figures have been struck down (Captain B. D. Naidu, 1956 KAR)[6]. Conversely, modest awards backed by material generally survive scrutiny.

Interface with Sections 145, 146 and 147

Section 148 cannot be understood in isolation; its utility lies in complementing the substantive powers vested in Sections 145–147:

  1. Identity and Possession – Where the dispute concerns precise boundaries, the Magistrate may resort to a local inquiry before deciding “actual possession” under Section 145(4).
  2. Attachment and Continuity of Jurisdiction – In Mathuralal v. Bhanwarlal (1979 SC) the Supreme Court held that attachment under Section 146(1) does not oust the Magistrate’s jurisdiction to proceed with the Section 145 inquiry[7]. Section 148 inquiries therefore remain viable even after attachment.
  3. Right of User Disputes – For Section 147 questions (e.g., easements), a ground-level inspection is often indispensable; Section 148 provides the procedural mechanism.

Judicial Trends and Critical Observations

Early Colonial and Pre-1973 Jurisprudence

Pre-codification practice under Act X of 1872, e.g., Navivahoo v. Narotamdas Candas (1882 BOM), already recognised the need for sanctions against non-compliance with discovery orders, foreshadowing the present cost regime.

Post-1973 Developments

The 1973 Code substantially retained the 1898 structure, and High Courts have continued to:

  • Invalidate orders where the local inquiry suppressed party participation (Oinam Atonungshi Singh).
  • Use costs as a deterrent against frivolous attachments, albeit subject to reasonableness scrutiny (Langar; Captain Naidu).

Constitutional Overlay

Although Section 148 is executive in character, its exercise is amenable to judicial review under Articles 226/227. The Supreme Court in Gulam Abbas (1981 SC) held that even executive orders under Section 144 must respect fundamental rights; the same constitutional disciplines of fairness and proportionality logically extend to Section 148 inquiries which may result in incidental deprivation or restriction of possessory interests.

A Note on Section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act

Recent Supreme Court pronouncements such as Jamboo Bhandari v. MPSIDC (2023 SC) concern Section 148 of the NI Act 1881, which mandates a deposit during the suspension of sentence in cheque-dishonour cases. The conflation of these two distinct provisions must be avoided; nonetheless, the unifying theme is conditional discretion and the insistence on reasoned orders.

Contemporary Challenges

Modern land records computerisation, urban encroachments and criminal-civil overlap (see Amresh Tiwari, 2000 SC, cautioning against parallel proceedings) render Section 148 inquiries both necessary and potentially contentious. Three recurrent issues emerge:

  • Expertise – Inquiry officers often lack surveying skills; interdisciplinary panels could enhance accuracy.
  • Timeliness – Delayed inquiries undermine the preventive object; statutory timelines may be considered.
  • Cost Calibration – Absence of guidelines breeds inconsistency. Judicial parameters (quantum tied to government scale of witness and advocate fees) could foster uniformity.

Conclusion

Section 148 CrPC, though procedurally ancillary, plays a substantive role in the preventive jurisdiction of the Magistracy. It enables fact-finding in situ and empowers the court to tailor cost consequences, balancing administrative efficiency with fairness. Judicial decisions from Palaniandi Servai to Mathuralal consistently underscore two leitmotifs: the indispensability of local inquiry for resolving threshold factual ambiguities, and the need for reasoned, proportionate orders on costs. As land disputes escalate amidst rapid urbanisation, a nuanced appreciation and disciplined application of Section 148 remain essential to sustaining public order while upholding procedural justice.

Footnotes

  1. Bhinka v. Charan Singh, AIR 1959 SC 960.
  2. Oinam Atonungshi Singh v. Akoijam Ningol Sorokhaibam Ongbi Rajani Devi, 1963 SCC OnLine MANI 7.
  3. Id., holding that failure to identify land prior to Section 145(4) evidence vitiates the order.
  4. Tikuda v. State, 1961 RAJ (division bench).
  5. Sardha Prasad v. Pitamber Lal, 1912 ALL HC.
  6. Captain B.D. Naidu v. Sir Babar Shamsheer Jung Bahadur Rana, 1956 KAR HC.
  7. Mathuralal v. Bhanwarlal, (1979) 4 SCC 665.