Section 115(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure: Scope, Limits and Contemporary Relevance

Section 115(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure: Scope, Limits and Contemporary Relevance

Introduction

Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) delineates the revisional jurisdiction of High Courts over subordinate civil courts. While sub-section (1) confers the power, sub-section (2)—inserted by Act 104 of 1976—curtails its exercise by declaring that the High Court “shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies”. The seemingly modest text of sub-section (2) has generated extensive litigation and doctrinal debate, especially after successive amendments in 1999 and 2002 which further restricted revisions and pushed litigants towards either the appellate or constitutional routes. This article critically analyses the provenance, interpretation, and contemporary relevance of Section 115(2), drawing on leading Supreme Court authority, High Court practice, and academic commentary.

Legislative Evolution

Pre-1976 Framework

Prior to 1976, Section 115 comprised a single sub-section empowering High Courts to correct jurisdictional errors in “any case decided” by subordinate courts where no appeal lay. The breadth of the phrase “any case” allowed intervention even at interlocutory stages, as exemplified in Major S.S. Khanna v. Brig. F.J. Dillon (1964)[1].

The 1976 Amendment and Birth of Sub-section (2)

Responding to Law Commission criticism that revisions caused delay and duplicated appeals, Parliament retained Section 115 but introduced: (i) a proviso to sub-section (1) restricting interference with interlocutory orders, and (ii) sub-section (2) barring revision where an appeal lies[2]. The Statement of Objects clarified that, although Article 227 offered supervisory relief, Section 115 was preserved as a “cheap and easy remedy,” provided its scope was “properly restricted.”[3]

Post-1999/2002 Amendments

Act 46 of 1999 (operational from 1 July 2002) deleted the proviso (b) to sub-section (1) and mandated that a revision would lie only if the impugned order, if decided in favour of the applicant, would finally dispose of the suit. The Supreme Court in Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers (2003)[4] upheld the validity of this truncation and, reading sub-section (2) harmoniously, concluded that High Courts have no revisional power over interlocutory orders that do not result in final disposal.

Textual Analysis of Sub-section (2)

“The High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate thereto.” — Section 115(2) CPC

Two cumulative conditions emerge:

  1. The impugned determination must be a “decree or order”.
  2. An appeal must lie against such decree or order.

Once both conditions are met, the revisional power is ipso jure excluded, irrespective of whether an appeal has in fact been filed. Thus sub-section (2) operates as a jurisdiction-limiting clause, not merely a rule of prudence.

Key Judicial Pronouncements

Supreme Court

  • Keshardeo Chamria v. Radha Kissen Chamria (1952): Although pre-1976, the Court emphasised that Section 115 is confined to jurisdictional errors and cannot be used as a second appeal[5]. This restrictive ethos informed the later insertion of sub-section (2).
  • Major S.S. Khanna (1964): Adopted a broad meaning of “case”, but recognised that where a statutory appeal exists, revision is impermissible — a principle subsequently codified in sub-section (2).
  • Shiv Shakti (2003): Treated the 1999 truncation as purely procedural and applied Section 6 of the General Clauses Act only in the absence of a saving clause. Pending revisions, unless satisfying the narrowed test, abated. The Court underscored the bar under sub-section (2).
  • Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai (2003): While acknowledging the curtailment under Section 115, the Court held that Articles 226/227 remain unaffected, thereby offering an alternative remedy when sub-section (2) precludes revision[6].
  • Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath (2015): Overruled Surya Dev Rai on Article 226, but reaffirmed that constitutional supervision under Article 227 persists notwithstanding Section 115(2)[7].

High Court Experience

Diverse High Court decisions illustrate the practical reach of sub-section (2):

  • C. Murugan v. Dr. Thilagavathy (Madras HC 2014): Revision held non-maintainable against an executing-court order treated as a decree because an appeal lay under Order XXI Rule 103 CPC[8].
  • Hans Raj Bhagat v. State (J&K HC 2012): Revision against an award under the Motor Vehicles Act dismissed; appeal under Section 173 lay, activating the bar in sub-section (2)[9].
  • Nallamilli Satyanarayana Reddy (AP HC 1996): Where the special statute declares appellate orders final, Section 115 cannot be invoked; constitutional remedies alone survive[10].

Interplay with Articles 226 and 227

Sub-section (2) does not affect the constitutional jurisdiction of High Courts. Nevertheless, post-Radhey Shyam, the supervisory channel lies predominantly under Article 227, not Article 226. High Courts therefore employ a calibrated test—grave jurisdictional error, manifest injustice, or absence of alternative remedy—before invoking Article 227 to sidestep the bar in Section 115(2).

Practical Consequences

  1. Forum Selection: Litigants must scrupulously ascertain whether an appeal lies; if so, a revision is incompetent.
  2. Delay Reduction: The combined operation of sub-section (2) and the 1999 deletions has substantially reduced interlocutory revisions, aligning with the objective of expeditious trials recognised in Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India (2005)[11].
  3. Shift to Constitutional Remedies: The statistical decline in revisions has been offset by an uptick in Article 227 petitions, prompting calls for clearer demarcation between statutory and constitutional oversight[12].
  4. Intra-Statute Appeals: Special Acts (e.g., Motor Vehicles Act, Arbitration Act) often embed specific appellate hierarchies; Section 115(2) reinforces legislative intent by foreclosing parallel revisional interference.

Doctrinal Critique

While efficiency is laudable, critics argue that the absolute bar in sub-section (2) occasionally forces parties into costlier appeals even for patent jurisdictional errors that a revision could rectify swiftly. Further, uneven High Court practice regarding Article 227 has created doctrinal uncertainty. Law reformers have proposed either restoring a narrow discretionary window within Section 115 or enacting unified rules for Article 227 petitions to preserve uniformity.[13]

Conclusion

Section 115(2) CPC epitomises a legislative policy to streamline civil litigation by eliminating duplicative revisional scrutiny where an appellate remedy exists. Judicial interpretation—culminating in Shiv Shakti and clarified by Radhey Shyam—has cemented its jurisdiction-ousting character. Although the provision advances expedition, it simultaneously shifts the burden to appeals or Article 227 supervision, necessitating vigilance by practitioners in forum selection. Going forward, harmonising statutory curtailment with constitutional oversight remains the central challenge in preserving both efficiency and justice in India’s civil process.

Footnotes

  1. Major S.S. Khanna v. Brig. F.J. Dillon, (1964) 4 SCC 409.
  2. Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act 104 of 1976, Statement of Objects and Reasons.
  3. Bhagwanji Vishavji Thakkar v. Pravinchandra Jivanbhai Patadia, Gujarat HC (1995).
  4. Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, (2003) 6 SCC 659.
  5. Keshardeo Chamria v. Radha Kissen Chamria, AIR 1953 SC 23.
  6. Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675.
  7. Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath, (2015) 5 SCC 423.
  8. C. Murugan v. Dr. Thilagavathy, 2014 SCC OnLine Mad 12697.
  9. Hans Raj Bhagat v. State & Ors., 2012 SCC OnLine J&K 105.
  10. Nallamilli Satyanarayana Reddy v. Tadi Venkata Reddy, 1996 SCC OnLine AP 428.
  11. Salem Advocate Bar Association, T.N. v. Union of India, (2005) 6 SCC 344.
  12. See, e.g., V.B. Nayak v. S.R. Narasimha Murthy, Karnataka HC (2003) emphasising recourse to Article 227 when Section 115 is barred.
  13. Law Commission of India, 163rd Report on Code of Civil Procedure (1998), Ch. 8.