Section 114 CPC: Scope and Judicial Interpretations of Review Jurisdiction in India

Section 114 CPC: Scope and Judicial Interpretations of Review Jurisdiction in India

1. Introduction

Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) confers a limited substantive right upon a litigant to seek review of a decision rendered by a civil court. Read conjointly with Order XLVII Rule 1, the provision delineates the circumstances in which a court may revisit its own judgment. Over time, the Supreme Court and various High Courts have moulded the contours of this jurisdiction, balancing the need for finality of litigation with the imperative of corrective justice. This article undertakes a critical examination of the legislative framework, doctrinal underpinnings and judicial exposition of Section 114, drawing substantially upon leading authorities such as Satyadhyan Ghosal, Thungabhadra Industries, Northern India Caterers, BCCI v. Netaji Cricket Club, Kamal Sengupta and Kamlesh Verma.

2. Legislative Framework

2.1 Textual Setting

Section 114 permits an aggrieved person to apply for review of a decree or order from which (i) an appeal is allowed but not preferred, (ii) no appeal is allowed, or (iii) a decision on a reference in the High Court has been given.[1] Order XLVII Rule 1 prescribes three grounds: (a) discovery of new and important matter or evidence, (b) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, and (c) “any other sufficient reason” ejusdem generis with the first two.[2]

2.2 Relationship with Other Remedies

  • Appeal: a continuation of proceedings where the entire merits are open; once an appeal is filed, review is generally barred.[3]
  • Revision (Section 115 CPC): supervisory correction of jurisdictional errors of subordinate courts; conceptually distinct from review which is intra-court.[4]
  • Inherent Powers (Section 151 CPC): residuary authority to prevent abuse of process; cannot be invoked to bypass the restrictive regimen of Section 114.[5]

3. Conceptual Contours

3.1 Review and the Doctrine of Finality

In Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Deorajin Debi the Supreme Court underscored that res judicata promotes decisional finality and judicial economy; a review is therefore an exceptional remedy not to be equated with a second innings in litigation.[6]

3.2 Error Apparent v. Mere Error

The locus classicus Thungabhadra Industries v. State of A.P. clarified that an error apparent must be self-evident and not one that requires elaborate argument to detect.[7] Subsequent rulings have reiterated this distinction, warning that review is not an appeal in disguise.[8]

4. Grounds for Review: Judicial Elaboration

4.1 Discovery of New Evidence

Courts insist on diligence: the evidence must be discovered subsequent to the decree and could not, despite due diligence, have been produced earlier. High Courts have consistently rejected attempts to re-introduce evidence that was available but not adduced.[9]

4.2 Error Apparent on the Face of Record

Thungabhadra Industries remains the touchstone; the principle was later applied in Northern India Caterers v. Lt. Governor, Delhi where the Court dismissed review petitions for want of any patent error in its earlier holding that restaurant transactions constituted service rather than sale.[10]

4.3 Any Other Sufficient Reason

The expansive phrase has been read noscitur a sociis with the first two grounds. In Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati the Supreme Court held that “sufficient reason” cannot transmute review into an appellate exercise.[11] Nevertheless, in BCCI v. Netaji Cricket Club the Court acknowledged that manifest injustice is a sufficient reason, thereby injecting flexibility where procedural aberrations threaten substantive fairness.[12]

5. Procedural Incidents

5.1 Timing and Maintainability

As early as 1917, the Calcutta High Court in Pyari Mohan Kundu v. Kalu Khan held that an application filed before the filing of an appeal remains maintainable even after the appeal is preferred.[13] Conversely, once an appeal is lodged first, the review forum becomes functus officio.

5.2 Review in Special Forums

Section 22(3)(f) of the Administrative Tribunals Act adopts Section 114 CPC. In State of W.B. v. Kamal Sengupta, the Supreme Court curtailed the Tribunal’s attempt to reopen its earlier order on the basis of a later judgment, terming it a jurisdictional error.[14]

5.3 Supreme Court’s Own Review Power

Article 137 of the Constitution and Order XL of the Supreme Court Rules reflect the same narrow yardsticks. The jurisprudence in Ram Sahu v. Vinod Kumar Rawat and allied 2024 High Court decisions illustrates unwavering adherence to the “error apparent” threshold.[15]

6. Critical Analysis of Leading Precedents

6.1 Satyadhyan Ghosal: Res Judicata and the Inhibition on Review

By emphasising that interlocutory orders capable of terminating proceedings attain finality, the Court implicitly warned against recourse to review as a collateral attack on settled issues. The decision animates later rulings which refuse to entertain review aimed at circumventing res judicata.[16]

6.2 Thungabhadra Industries: Defining “Error Apparent”

The petitioner’s reliance on a misconstrued statement by the High Court was deemed a patent mistake, meriting review. The judgment laid down procedural safeguards: objections to maintainability must be raised ab initio, and surprise revocation of special leave is disallowed, reinforcing procedural fairness.[17]

6.3 Northern India Caterers: Service v. Sale and the Limits of Re-agitation

Post-decision review petitions were dismissed because they attempted to re-argue factual matrices already considered. The case crystallises the doctrine that socio-economic context may guide substantive conclusions, yet once reached, they are insulated from review absent a glaring error.[18]

6.4 BCCI v. Netaji Cricket Club: Flexibility Where Injustice Looms

Here the Court broadened “sufficient reason” to include situations where either a party is deprived of a fair hearing or the court itself commits a procedural lapse. While seemingly diluting rigidity, later cases such as Kamlesh Verma harmonise the precedent by confining such expansion to manifest injustice.[19]

6.5 Kamal Sengupta & Tribunal Review

The decision underscores that specialised tribunals, though emancipated from some CPC technicalities, cannot transgress the substantive limits of Section 114. The Court’s insistence on judicial restraint preserves both administrative efficacy and legal certainty.[20]

7. Section 114 in Contemporary Procedural Ecosystem

  • Commercial Courts Act, 2015: Although Section 16 amends certain CPC provisions, it leaves Section 114 untouched, implying continuity of restrictive review standards even in high-value commercial disputes.[21]
  • Arbitration Regime: Section 41 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (now largely repealed) imported CPC procedures, signalling that a civil court’s review jurisdiction could, in theory, apply to orders passed under the Act, though the trend under the 1996 Act is towards minimal court intervention.[22]

8. Challenges and Recommendations

Despite doctrinal clarity, misuse of review persists—often as a tactical delay mechanism. Courts must therefore (i) scrutinise diligence under the first ground, (ii) apply the Thungabhadra test rigorously for “error apparent”, and (iii) confine “sufficient reason” to cases of palpable injustice or procedural aberration. Judicial trainings and digitised cause-lists that flag repetitive review petitions may further curb abuse.

9. Conclusion

Section 114 CPC epitomises a calibrated compromise between finality and fallibility. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence—particularly Thungabhadra Industries, Northern India Caterers, BCCI v. Netaji Cricket Club, Kamal Sengupta and Kamlesh Verma—coalesces around a stringent yet just standard: review is permissible only when a palpable defect stares at the face of the record or where undiscoverable evidence undermines the foundation of the decree. Any broader reading would erode the doctrine of res judicata and impede judicial efficiency. Consequently, practitioners must approach Section 114 with circumspection, marshalling cogent grounds lest their petitions be dismissed as “appeals in disguise”.

Footnotes

  1. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, s. 114.
  2. CPC Order XLVII r. 1; see also Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati (2013) 8 SCC 320.
  3. Pyari Mohan Kundu v. Kalu Khan (1917) SCC OnLine Cal 190.
  4. See Twentieth Century Fox v. NRI Film Production, (2003) Kant HC.
  5. Smt Neha Shreemal v. ITO (2024) MP HC.
  6. Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Deorajin Debi, AIR 1960 SC 941.
  7. Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. State of A.P., AIR 1964 SC 1372.
  8. State of W.B. v. Kamal Sengupta, (2008) 8 SCC 612.
  9. M/s Gudiyattam Lungi Co. v. Vasantha, (2021) Mad HC.
  10. Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor, Delhi, (1980) 2 SCC 167.
  11. Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati, (2013) 8 SCC 320.
  12. Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Netaji Cricket Club, (2005) 4 SCC 741.
  13. Pyari Mohan Kundu, supra note 3.
  14. Kamal Sengupta, supra note 8.
  15. Ram Sahu v. Vinod Kumar Rawat, (2020) SCC OnLine SC 896.
  16. Satyadhyan Ghosal, supra note 6.
  17. Thungabhadra Industries, supra note 7.
  18. Northern India Caterers, supra note 10.
  19. BCCI v. Netaji Cricket Club, supra note 12.
  20. Kamal Sengupta, supra note 8.
  21. Commercial Courts Act, 2015, s. 16 & Sch.; M/s Patil Automation Pvt Ltd. v. Rakheja Engineers (2022) SC.
  22. See s. 41, Arbitration Act, 1940; Union of India v. Jain & Associates (2001) SC.