Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872

Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872: A Judicial Disquisition on the Presumption of Abetment of Suicide by Married Women

Introduction

Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 ("Evidence Act"), titled "Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman," represents a significant legislative intervention aimed at addressing the societal menace of cruelty inflicted upon married women, often culminating in their tragic suicides. Introduced by the Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act, 1983 (Act No. 46 of 1983)[1], this provision empowers courts to presume, under specific circumstances, that the suicide of a married woman was abetted by her husband or his relatives. This article seeks to provide a comprehensive analysis of Section 113-A, delving into its legislative intent, essential ingredients, judicial interpretation, evidentiary value, and its interplay with substantive penal provisions, primarily Section 306 (Abetment of suicide) and Section 498-A (Cruelty by husband or relatives of husband) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ("IPC").

Legislative Context and Purpose of Section 113-A

The enactment of Section 113-A was a legislative response to the alarming rise in instances of young married women being driven to suicide due to persistent harassment and cruelty, frequently linked to dowry demands, within the confines of their matrimonial homes. The legislature recognized the inherent difficulty in procuring direct evidence of such atrocities, which often occur behind closed doors, shielded from public scrutiny.[2] As observed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Wadde Janardhan v. State Of Andhra Pradesh, the lawmakers realized that the rampant evil of inflicting cruel treatment on a newly married wife with a view to extract dowry, resulting in unnatural death, should be curbed by a more effective law. The provision was intended to soften the rigour of the traditional rule of burden of proof, making the accused accountable for acts of cruelty perpetrated against a woman within seven years of her marriage.[3]

The Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill, 1983, which led to the insertion of Section 113-A, highlighted the increasing number of dowry deaths and suicides as a matter of serious concern. The amendment aimed to deal effectively not only with dowry deaths but also with cases of cruelty to married women by their in-laws. Section 113-A, therefore, forms part of a legislative package that includes Section 498-A of the IPC, both introduced by the same amending Act.

The constitutional validity of Section 113-A has been upheld. In P.N Krishna Lal And Others v. Govt. Of Kerala And Another, the Supreme Court referred to the Andhra Pradesh High Court's decision in Polavarapu Satyanarayana alias Narayana v. Polavarapu Soundaryavalli, which held that Section 113-A does not offend Articles 14, 20(3), or 21 of the Constitution of India. It was reasoned that the presumption is based on paramount social interest and is directed against a specific class of offenders. It does not create a new offence but is an evidentiary provision designed to address peculiar circumstances where evidence is intractable.[4]

Regarding its applicability, Section 113-A, being a rule of evidence and procedure, has been held to be retrospective in operation. The Supreme Court in State Of Madhya Pradesh v. Guman And Others, citing its earlier decision in Gurbachan Singh v. Satpal Singh, affirmed that provisions like Section 113-A do not create any new offence or substantial right but are merely matters of evidence procedure and thus apply retrospectively.[5]

Key Ingredients and Scope of Section 113-A

Section 113-A of the Evidence Act reads as follows:

"113-A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman.—When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “cruelty” shall have the same meaning as in section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)."[6]

For the presumption under Section 113-A to be invoked, the prosecution must establish the following foundational facts:

  1. The woman committed suicide.
  2. The suicide was committed within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage.
  3. Her husband or any relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty.

Once these ingredients are proven, the court "may presume" that the suicide was abetted by the husband or his relative. The term "may presume" signifies that the presumption is discretionary and not mandatory.[7] The court is not bound to draw the presumption merely because the conditions are met; it must consider "all the other circumstances of the case."[8] This implies a careful and cautious application of the presumption, ensuring that it is not invoked mechanically. The presumption is also rebuttable; the accused has the right to adduce evidence to disprove the presumed fact.[9]

The Explanation to Section 113-A clarifies that "cruelty" shall have the same meaning as in Section 498-A of the IPC. Section 498-A IPC defines cruelty as: (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.

The applicability of the presumption is contingent upon a legally valid marriage. As discussed in Balram and Anr. v. State of M.P., citing Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav (in the context of Section 125 CrPC), the term 'wife' generally implies a legally wedded wife, suggesting that the presumption under Section 113-A is intended for suicides by legally married women.[10] If the suicide occurs beyond seven years of marriage, the presumption under Section 113-A cannot be invoked, as was noted in Kishori Lal v. State Of M.P.[11]

Judicial Interpretation and Application

The judiciary has extensively interpreted Section 113-A, particularly its interplay with Section 306 IPC (Abetment of suicide) and Section 498-A IPC (Cruelty).

Relationship with Section 306 IPC and Section 498-A IPC

Section 113-A is an evidentiary provision that aids the prosecution in proving the offence of abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC. However, a conviction under Section 498-A IPC for cruelty does not automatically lead to a conviction under Section 306 IPC, even with the aid of Section 113-A. The Supreme Court in Ramesh Kumar v. State Of Chhattisgarh clarified that Sections 306 and 498-A IPC are independent offences. While cruelty is a common element, for Section 306 IPC, the prosecution must establish that the cruelty or harassment was intended to, and did, instigate the suicide.[12] The Court emphasized that the presumption under Section 113-A is permissive and not absolute; a cause-and-effect relationship between the cruelty and the suicide needs to be established.[13]

In Amalendu Pal Alias Jhantu v. State Of West Bengal, the Supreme Court, while upholding conviction under Section 498-A IPC, set aside the conviction under Section 306 IPC due to insufficient evidence directly linking the appellant's actions to the victim's suicide. The Court reiterated the need for clear and direct evidence of instigation or aid.[14] Similarly, in Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal v. State Of Gujarat, the Court acquitted the accused under both Section 498-A and 306 IPC, holding that an extramarital affair, per se, without further evidence of substantial harmful conduct, does not amount to cruelty or abetment, especially when a suicide note exonerated the accused.[15] Conversely, in Brij Lal v. Prem Chand And Another, continuous financial and physical abuse was deemed sufficient to constitute instigation leading to suicide, upholding a Section 306 IPC conviction.[16]

The term "instigation" under Section 107 IPC, which defines abetment, requires active suggestion or stimulation to do an act. As held in Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Government Of Nct Of Delhi), it involves provoking, urging, or encouraging someone, with an implicit understanding of the likely consequences.[17] Mere harassment or quarrels, without a direct link or mens rea to drive the victim to suicide, may not suffice.[18]

Nature and Scope of "Cruelty"

The cruelty contemplated under Section 113-A must be of the nature defined in Section 498-A IPC. This involves wilful conduct likely to drive the woman to suicide or cause grave injury, or harassment for unlawful demands. Not all marital discord or unhappiness qualifies as cruelty. For instance, in Mangat Ram v. State Of Haryana, the Supreme Court held that the husband's failure to take his wife to his place of posting, or leaving her in a village, did not amount to wilful conduct of such a nature as is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide.[19] The perception of cruelty can vary based on individual circumstances, including social and economic status, as noted in Gananath Pattnaik v. State Of Orissa, cited in Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal.[20]

"All Other Circumstances of the Case"

The phrase "having regard to all the other circumstances of the case" in Section 113-A is pivotal. It mandates a holistic assessment by the court. This includes examining the nature of the cruelty, the intensity of harassment, the temperament of the deceased, the presence of any suicide note and its contents, and any other relevant factors.[21] In Hans Raj v. State Of Haryana, the trial court's reliance on Section 113-A was scrutinized, and the Supreme Court emphasized the need to be wary of improvements in the prosecution's story and to establish cruelty convincingly.[22] The Bombay High Court in Sunil v. State Of Maharashtra reiterated that the presumption is discretionary and can be drawn after considering all circumstances, which may either strengthen the presumption or lead the court to abstain from drawing it.[23]

Distinction from Section 113-B of the Evidence Act

It is pertinent to distinguish Section 113-A from Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, which deals with the "Presumption as to dowry death." Section 113-B, read with Section 304-B IPC (Dowry death), uses the term "shall presume," making the presumption mandatory (though rebuttable) once the foundational facts (death within seven years of marriage due to burns/bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances, and subjection to cruelty or harassment for dowry "soon before her death") are established.[24] In contrast, Section 113-A uses "may presume," underscoring its discretionary nature.[25]

Evidentiary Value and Burden of Proof

Section 113-A does not create an offence but is a rule of evidence.[26] It eases the prosecution's burden in cases of abetment of suicide by a married woman by allowing a presumption to be drawn once the predicate facts are established. The initial burden lies on the prosecution to prove that the woman committed suicide within seven years of marriage and was subjected to cruelty by her husband or his relatives. If these are proven, the court may presume abetment, thereby shifting the onus to the accused to rebut this presumption.[27] The accused can rebut the presumption by adducing evidence to show that they did not instigate or aid the suicide, or that the cruelty alleged did not occur or was not of such a nature as to drive the deceased to suicide. The standard of proof on the accused to rebut the presumption is generally that of a preponderance of probabilities, whereas the prosecution must prove the foundational facts beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court's power to draw inferences under Section 113-A can be seen as a specific application of the general power under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, which allows courts to presume the existence of certain facts based on the common course of natural events, human conduct, and public or private business.[28]

Challenges and Areas of Caution

While Section 113-A is a crucial tool for delivering justice in cases of suicide by married women subjected to cruelty, its application requires circumspection. The discretionary nature of the presumption ("may presume") and the requirement to consider "all other circumstances of the case" act as safeguards against its mechanical application. Courts must be vigilant to ensure that the provision is not misused and that innocent individuals are not wrongly implicated. A clear nexus between the alleged cruelty and the act of suicide must be discernible from the evidence.[29] The mere fact of suicide within seven years of marriage, even if some cruelty is shown, does not automatically warrant the drawing of the presumption if other circumstances suggest otherwise, such as a suicide note clearly exonerating the accused or indicating other reasons for the suicide.[30]

Conclusion

Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, embodies a legislative intent to combat the egregious problem of suicides by married women resulting from matrimonial cruelty. By enabling a presumption of abetment against the husband or his relatives under specified conditions, it attempts to address the evidentiary challenges inherent in such cases. However, the judiciary has consistently emphasized that this presumption is discretionary, rebuttable, and must be applied with caution, taking into account the entirety of the circumstances presented in each case. The provision seeks to strike a balance between the societal imperative to protect vulnerable women and the fundamental principles of criminal justice that ensure a fair trial for the accused. Its efficacy lies in its judicious application by the courts, ensuring that it serves as an instrument of justice rather than a tool for unwarranted implication. The continued evolution of jurisprudence around Section 113-A reflects the ongoing efforts to refine the legal framework to effectively address and deter cruelty within matrimonial homes.

References

  1. Rajiv Narula v. State (Delhi High Court, 2009), para 14; State Of Madhya Pradesh v. Guman And Others (Supreme Court Of India, 2002), para 36.
  2. P.N Krishna Lal And Others v. Govt. Of Kerala And Another (Supreme Court Of India, 1994), citing Polavarapu Satyanarayana alias Narayana v. Polavarapu Soundaryavalli 1987 1 Andh LT 762 AP.
  3. Wadde Janardhan v. State Of Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Pradesh High Court, 1999), para 8.
  4. P.N Krishna Lal And Others v. Govt. Of Kerala And Another (Supreme Court Of India, 1994).
  5. State Of Madhya Pradesh v. Guman And Others (Supreme Court Of India, 2002), paras 36-37.
  6. Section 113-A, Indian Evidence Act, 1872. See also Kailash S/O. Ramrao Nalawade v. State Of Maharashtra Others (Bombay High Court, 2006), para 8.
  7. Ramesh Kumar v. State Of Chhattisgarh (2001 SCC 9 618, Supreme Court Of India, 2001), para dealing with Section 113-A; Sunil v. State Of Maharashtra (Bombay High Court, 2015), para 26.
  8. Kailash S/O. Ramrao Nalawade v. State Of Maharashtra Others (Bombay High Court, 2006), para 8; Balasubramanian… v. State, Rep. By, Deputy Superintendent Of Police... (Madras High Court, 2014), para 12.
  9. Wadde Janardhan v. State Of Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Pradesh High Court, 1999), para 9; Sunil v. State Of Maharashtra (Bombay High Court, 2015), para 26.
  10. Balram and Anr. v. State of M.P. (Madhya Pradesh High Court, 1998), para 6.
  11. Kishori Lal v. State Of M.P . (2007 SCC CRI 3 701, Supreme Court Of India, 2007), para 5.
  12. Ramesh Kumar v. State Of Chhattisgarh (2001 SCC 9 618, Supreme Court Of India, 2001).
  13. Sunil v. State Of Maharashtra (Bombay High Court, 2015), para 26, citing Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh AIR 2001 SC 3837.
  14. Amalendu Pal Alias Jhantu v. State Of West Bengal . (2010 SCC 1 707, Supreme Court Of India, 2009).
  15. Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal v. State Of Gujarat . (2013 SCC 10 48, Supreme Court Of India, 2013).
  16. Brij Lal v. Prem Chand And Another (1989 SUPP SCC 2 680, Supreme Court Of India, 1989).
  17. Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Government Of Nct Of Delhi) . (2010 SCC CR 3 367, Supreme Court Of India, 2009).
  18. SHAIKH IMAMS SHAIKH BANU v. STATE OF MAH & ORS (Bombay High Court, 2018).
  19. Mangat Ram v. State Of Haryana . (2014 SCC 12 595, Supreme Court Of India, 2014), para 27.
  20. Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal v. State Of Gujarat . (2013 SCC 10 48, Supreme Court Of India, 2013), citing Gananath Pattnaik v. State Of Orissa (2002) 2 SCC 619.
  21. Ramesh Kumar v. State Of Chhattisgarh (2001 SCC 9 618, Supreme Court Of India, 2001).
  22. Hans Raj v. State Of Haryana . (2004 SCC 12 257, Supreme Court Of India, 2004), para 10.
  23. Sunil v. State Of Maharashtra (Bombay High Court, 2015), para 17, 29.
  24. Kans Raj v. State Of Punjab And Others (2000 SCC 5 207, Supreme Court Of India, 2000); SANKAR PRASAD GOPE & ORS. v. STATE (Calcutta High Court, 2024), para 28-29.
  25. K. Prema S. Rao And Another v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao And Others (2003 SCC 1 217, Supreme Court Of India, 2002), para comparing Section 113-A and 113-B implicitly through discussion of 304-B.
  26. P.N Krishna Lal And Others v. Govt. Of Kerala And Another (Supreme Court Of India, 1994).
  27. Wadde Janardhan v. State Of Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Pradesh High Court, 1999), para 8.
  28. Ved Parkash Kharbanda v. Vimal Bindal (Delhi High Court, 2013), discussing Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act.
  29. Ramesh Kumar v. State Of Chhattisgarh (2001 SCC 9 618, Supreme Court Of India, 2001).
  30. Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal v. State Of Gujarat . (2013 SCC 10 48, Supreme Court Of India, 2013).