Second Application for Temporary Injunction under Indian Civil Procedure

Re-Litigation of Interim Relief: The Legal Position of a Second Application for Temporary Injunction in India

Introduction

The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) empowers civil courts to issue temporary injunctions to preserve the status quo pending adjudication (Order XXXIX Rules 1–2). A question that routinely arises in practice is whether, and under what conditions, a party may renew its quest for interim relief after an earlier application has been refused or withdrawn. This article critically analyses the maintainability of a second application for temporary injunction, synthesising statutory text, doctrinal principles, and precedent, with special reference to recent and leading authorities of Indian courts.

Statutory Framework

  • Order XXXIX Rules 1–4 CPC: substantive and procedural conditions for grant, modification, or discharge of temporary injunctions.
  • Order XXIII Rule 1(4) CPC: withdrawal or abandonment of “any suit or part of a claim” bars a fresh suit on the same cause of action; courts have extended its rationale to applications for interim relief via Section 141 CPC (procedural application to “all proceedings”).
  • Section 11 CPC: principle of res judicata, ensuring finality of adjudication.
  • Section 151 CPC: inherent powers to make orders “necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of court.”
  • Section 107 & Order XLI Rule 5 CPC: appellate court’s power to grant incidental interim relief.

Doctrinal Tension: Finality v. Flexibility

Two competing considerations dominate judicial reasoning. On one hand, res judicata and Order XXIII seek to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and inconsistent interim orders; on the other, justice may demand reconsideration when material facts evolve or when procedural irregularities have tainted the earlier refusal. The Supreme Court in Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar recognised that interlocutory orders “are certainly capable of being altered or varied… though normally only on proof of new facts or new situations which subsequently emerge.”[1]

Analytical Survey of Precedent

1. Supreme Court Guidance

  • Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar (1964)[1]
    The Court held that interim orders do not create substantive rights; therefore findings underpinning them are not strictly res judicata. However, a second application absent “new facts” is liable to be rejected as an abuse of process.
  • Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi (1993)[2]
    While primarily addressing ouster of jurisdiction, the Court stressed that injunctions are discretionary and must balance statutory objectives with protection of rights, implicitly endorsing reconsideration when statutory safeguards are threatened.

2. High Court Divergence and Convergence

The High Courts have applied the Supreme Court ratio with contextual nuances:

  • Bar on Re-litigation where no Change of Circumstance
    • S. Narain Singh v. Ram Gopal Madan Lal (Del HC 1980) held a second application barred when the first was withdrawn after hearing, invoking Order XXIII Rule 1(4) via Section 141 CPC.[3]
    • Prem Chand v. Manak Chand (Raj HC 1997) reaffirmed that interim relief cannot exceed what is grantable in the suit and reiterated the necessity of prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury.[4]
  • Permissibility upon Subsequent Events
    • Bhura v. ADJ Jaipur City (Raj HC 2003) upheld maintainability where plaintiffs pleaded new threats post first order.[5]
    • Saraswati Devi v. Brajraj Singh (Raj HC 2007) invoked Section 151 CPC to justify fresh injunction in light of escalated hostility, emphasising “interest of justice.”[6]
  • Appellate Stage Applications
    • Chellappan v. K.P. Varughese (Ker HC 1963) clarified that incidental orders by an appellate court are part of its appellate jurisdiction; dismissal thereof is non-appealable under Section 104(2).[7]
  • Abuse of Process Findings
    • Devendra Rathore v. Jitendra Kumar (Utt HC 2014) censured plaintiffs for filing a second application two days after the first without newly pleaded facts, characterising it as procedural abuse.[8]

Key Legal Tests for a Second Application

  1. Existence of “new facts” or “changed circumstances”
    The applicant must demonstrate events subsequent to the earlier refusal—e.g., fresh threats, violation of status quo, or discovery of crucial evidence—that materially alter the prima facie assessment. Mere re-argument on identical material is insufficient.
  2. Absence of estoppel by withdrawal under Order XXIII Rule 1(4)
    If the first application was withdrawn without liberty, courts view the withdrawal as abandonment, barring a fresh application unless predicated on post-withdrawal developments (as distinguished in S. Narain Singh).
  3. Compliance with Rule 3 of Order XXXIX
    Ex parte relief in the second round must be accompanied by (a) reasons why delay would defeat the object, and (b) compliance with mandatory service and filing requirements (Md. Saifullah Wakf Estate v. Sara Devi Agarwalla).[9]
  4. Judicial Discretion and Section 151 CPC
    In scenarios not squarely covered by Order XXXIX (e.g., post-decree restorative applications), courts may rely on inherent powers, as affirmed in Reboti Ray v. Sashi Kanta Budhia Agarwal.[10]

Interplay with Res Judicata

While res judicata (Section 11 CPC) bars re-litigation of issues finally decided, interim orders are not final determinations of rights. Supreme Court dicta in Arjun Singh and later in Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprise Ltd. v. K.S. Infraspace LLP (2020)[11] underline that findings for interim purposes lack finality. Nevertheless, identical successive applications may be dismissed summarily on grounds of judicial discipline and prevention of abuse, reflecting the doctrine of issue estoppel in a pragmatic rather than technical sense.

Practical Implications for Practitioners

  • Before moving a second application, meticulously document and plead the new circumstances with supporting evidence (e.g., photographs of encroachment, police reports).
  • Anticipate the opposing argument of res judicata; articulate why the earlier order cannot operate as a bar (lack of finality or emergence of new facts).
  • Ensure strict compliance with procedural safeguards—particularly Rule 3’s notice requirement—to avoid dismissal for technical lapses (Dasari Laxmi v. Bejjenki Sathi Reddy).[12]
  • Where the first application was withdrawn, seek explicit liberty from the court or confine the fresh motion to post-withdrawal events.
  • In appellate courts, couple the injunction plea with an application under Order XLI Rule 5 for stay of the decree or order appealed against.

Conclusion

Indian jurisprudence accommodates a second application for temporary injunction, yet conditions its maintainability on a demonstrable change in circumstance or discovery of material previously unavailable. The judiciary thus balances the need for procedural finality with equitable flexibility. Litigants must approach such applications with candour, precision, and evidence, lest the court view the motion as a tactical device to delay proceedings. Ultimately, the principle that interim relief is a discretionary, equitable remedy—rooted in the triad of prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable harm—continues to govern, even at the stage of re-consideration.

Footnotes

  1. Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993.
  2. Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (1993) 3 SCC 161.
  3. S. Narain Singh v. M/s Ram Gopal Madan Lal, Delhi High Court, 1980.
  4. Prem Chand v. Manak Chand, Rajasthan High Court, 1997.
  5. Bhura v. Additional District Judge No. 8, Jaipur City, 2003 SCC OnLine Raj 104.
  6. Saraswati Devi v. Maharao Brajraj Singh, Rajasthan High Court, 2007.
  7. Chellappan v. K.P. Varughese, 1963 SCC OnLine Ker 272.
  8. Devendra Rathore v. Jitendra Kumar, 2014 SCC OnLine Utt 1268.
  9. Md. Saifullah Wakf Estate v. Sara Devi Agarwalla, Gauhati High Court, 1994.
  10. Reboti Ray v. Sashi Kanta Budhia Agarwal, Gauhati High Court, 2006.
  11. Ambalal Sarabhai Enterprise Ltd. v. K.S. Infraspace LLP, (2020) 5 SCC 410.
  12. Dasari Laxmi v. Bejjenki Sathi Reddy, Andhra Pradesh High Court, 2014.