Revisiting Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957: Jurisdictional Nuances and Judicial Trends

Revisiting Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957: Jurisdictional Nuances and Judicial Trends

1. Introduction

Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957 (“the Act”) constitutes a deliberate legislative departure from the general territorial principles embodied in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”). By providing an additional forum to the copyright owner, it seeks to remove geographical impediments to enforcement and to facilitate access to justice. Notwithstanding its ostensibly plain phrasing, the provision has generated substantial jurisprudence on the interface between statutory intellectual-property (IP) forums and the conventional rules under Section 20 CPC.[1] This article critically examines the evolution, scope and contemporary limits of Section 62(2), interrogating whether judicial interpretation has remained faithful to the legislative objective of easing, rather than restricting, enforcement.

2. Legislative Framework

2.1 Text and Purpose

“For the purpose of sub-section (1), a ‘District Court having jurisdiction’ shall, notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, … include a District Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, at the time of the institution of the suit … the person instituting the suit … actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for gain.”[2]

The operative verb “include” signals expansion—not restriction—of jurisdiction.[3] The Joint Committee report (1956) expressly recorded that many authors were deterred from litigation because the appropriate forum lay “at a considerable distance from the place of their ordinary residence”; sub-section (2) was intended to remove that impediment.

2.2 Relationship with Section 20 CPC

Section 20 CPC permits suits where (a) the defendant resides or carries on business, or (b) the cause of action arises, wholly or in part.[4] Section 62(2) adds a plaintiff-centric ground. The legislative architecture therefore contemplates a cumulative set of fora, the special provision augmenting—rather than displacing—the general rule.

3. Jurisprudential Evolution

3.1 The Expansionist Phase: Exphar SA v. Eupharma

In Exphar SA v. Eupharma Laboratories[5], the Supreme Court underscored the breadth of Section 62(2), holding that service of a “cease-and-desist” notice formed part of the cause of action and that the plaintiff could sue in Delhi where it carried on business, irrespective of where the defendant was situated. The Court emphasised that the word “include” manifests legislative intent “to facilitate easier access to legal recourse.”

3.2 Jurisdictional Retrenchment: Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi

The tide receded with Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi[6]. The Court held that Section 62(2) applies only to copyright causes; a composite suit primarily alleging trade-mark infringement could not ride on Section 62(2). The decision also articulated a three-fold test for “carries on business,” laying down that (i) the agent must act exclusively for the principal, (ii) must be a true agent, and (iii) the essential part of the business must occur at the chosen venue. This restrictive construction signalled judicial sensitivity to forum-shopping concerns.

3.3 Divergent High-Court Readings

  • IPRS v. Sanjay Dalia (Delhi HC 2008): The Court, while acknowledging the Dhodha House ratio, held that where the entire cause of action arose in Maharashtra, the plaintiff’s Delhi branch office could not alone sustain jurisdiction.[7]
  • Wipro v. Oushadha Chandrika (Madras HC 2008): Reiterated that Section 62(2) adds to, rather than supplants, Section 20 CPC, thereby preserving plaintiff latitude.[8]
  • Manugraph India v. Simarq (Bombay HC 2016): Post-Dalia (2015), the Court clarified that a corporate plaintiff may always sue at the place of its principal office, but cannot rely on a satellite office when the cause of action and defendant are situated elsewhere.[9]

3.4 The Apex Court’s Re-Calibration: IPRS v. Sanjay Dalia (2015)

The Supreme Court finally addressed the divergent positions in Indian Performing Right Society v. Sanjay Dalia[10]. Construing Section 62(2) and its trade-mark analogue, Section 134(2), the Court harmonised the special statutes with Section 20 CPC. It held:

  • The plaintiff retains the privilege of suing at the place of its principal office.
  • However, where the cause of action arises only in the city of a subordinate office, the suit must be instituted there to prevent oppression of the defendant.

Thus, the Court preserved legislative intent while curbing tactical forum selection.

3.5 Digital Commerce and the Elastic Cause of Action

The Delhi High Court’s decision in Burger King v. Techchand Shewakramani[11] extended Section 20 CPC principles to the digital sphere, recognising online franchise solicitations as constituting “use” of a mark within Delhi. Although a trade-mark case, the reasoning signals that copyright plaintiffs invoking Section 62(2) may similarly rely on virtual acts to establish juridical nexus.

3.6 Recent Trends

Subsequent decisions such as Vintage Distillers v. Ramesh Chand Parekh[12] confirm that Section 62(2) continues to afford an additional forum, subject to the tempered approach mandated by Sanjay Dalia. Courts now enquire whether the invocation is bona fide or merely vexatious, balancing plaintiff convenience against defendant hardship.

4. Analytical Issues

4.1 Meaning of “Carries on Business”

Following Dhodha House, three cumulative elements-–exclusive agency, genuine agency, and substantive activity-– must be established. Corporate plaintiffs should therefore lead evidence of actual exploitation of the copyrighted work (e.g., licensing, distribution) at the chosen venue, not mere token presence. High-court decisions post-Dalia have demanded detailed pleadings to this effect.

4.2 Composite Causes of Action

Where copyright claims accompany trade-mark or design allegations, the copyright limb alone cannot expand the forum for the entire suit. Plaintiffs may consider severing causes or demonstrating that the copyright claim is bona fide and not a jurisdictional ploy.

4.3 The Digital Dimension

Acts of infringement increasingly occur through streaming platforms, downloads and cloud services. Given the Supreme Court’s purposive interpretation, the plaintiff’s place of business via an interactive website may qualify under Section 62(2) provided substantive exploitation occurs there (e.g., subscription revenues credited, servers located, or licensing negotiations conducted).

4.4 Policy Concerns

  • Access to Justice: Restricting Section 62(2) unduly would resurrect barriers the legislature sought to dismantle.
  • Forum-Shopping: Unlimited plaintiff discretion risks oppressive litigation; the Dalia balancing test offers a pragmatic equilibrium.
  • Technological Neutrality: Courts must adapt the jurisdictional analysis to digital realities without eroding statutory safeguards.

5. Comparative Note: Trade-Mark Jurisdiction

Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 is textually identical to Section 62(2). Judicial readings of one inevitably inform the other. The Supreme Court’s synchronised interpretation in Sanjay Dalia underscores the desirability of uniformity across IP statutes, while allowing contextual nuances—such as the absence of an equivalent provision in the Trade Marks Act at the time of Dhodha House—to temper application.[13]

6. Conclusion

Section 62(2) remains a cornerstone of India’s copyright-enforcement architecture. From the expansionist vista of Exphar SA to the calibrated restraint of Sanjay Dalia, courts have oscillated between plaintiff facilitation and anti-abuse safeguards. Contemporary jurisprudence exhibits a principled balance: plaintiffs may ordinarily sue where they reside or conduct their principal business, yet cannot invoke distant branch offices when the entire controversy is localized elsewhere. As infringement migrates to virtual domains, courts must continue to interpret Section 62(2) purposively, ensuring that the provision fulfils its original mandate of access while preserving fairness in forum selection.

Footnotes

  1. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, s 20.
  2. Copyright Act, 1957, s 62(2).
  3. Exphar SA v. Eupharma Laboratories Ltd., (2004) 3 SCC 688.
  4. CPC, s 20.
  5. Exphar, supra note 3.
  6. Dhodha House v. S.K. Maingi, (2006) 9 SCC 41.
  7. Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Sanjay Dalia & Anr., 2008 SCC OnLine Del 1238.
  8. Wipro Ltd. v. Oushadha Chandrika Ayurvedic India (P) Ltd., Madras HC, 2008.
  9. Manugraph India Ltd. v. Simarq Technologies Pvt. Ltd., 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 5334.
  10. Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Sanjay Dalia & Anr., (2015) 10 SCC 161.
  11. Burger King Corporation v. Techchand Shewakramani, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 10881.
  12. Vintage Distillers Ltd. v. Ramesh Chand Parekh, Delhi HC, 2022.
  13. Trade Marks Act, 1999, s 134(2).