Revisiting Section 397 CrPC: Boundaries, Balances, and Judicial Trends

Revisiting Section 397 CrPC: Boundaries, Balances, and Judicial Trends

Introduction

Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”) constitutes the fulcrum of the Indian revisional jurisdiction, empowering the High Court and the Sessions Judge to examine the record of inferior criminal courts to correct errors of jurisdiction, law, or procedure. Over the last five decades, the provision has generated a formidable corpus of jurisprudence delineating its scope, limitations, and interaction with inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC. This article undertakes a critical analysis of Section 397, drawing extensively upon leading Supreme Court and High Court authorities, with particular emphasis on Vimal Singh v. Khuman Singh[1], Jagir Singh v. Ranbir Singh[2], Krishnan v. Krishnaveni[3], and other seminal decisions.

Statutory Framework

Section 397(1) authorises the revisional court to call for and examine records to satisfy itself as to the “correctness, legality or propriety” of any finding, sentence or order of an inferior court, as well as the regularity of the proceedings. Sub-section (2) bars exercise of this power in relation to interlocutory orders, while sub-section (3) erects a proscription against successive revisions by the same person before different fora. The revisional power is supplemented by Sections 398, 399 and 401, collectively orchestrating the supervisory jurisdiction of higher criminal courts.

Evolution Through Case-Law

(A) Early Construction: Narrowing “Interlocutory”

In Amar Nath v. State of Haryana[4], the Supreme Court rejected a literal understanding of “interlocutory order”, holding that orders substantially affecting the rights of the accused are amenable to revision notwithstanding Section 397(2). The decision signalled an early judicial resolve to prevent procedural bars from defeating substantive justice.

(B) Harmonising with Inherent Powers

Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra[5] refined the doctrine, asserting that Section 482 remains available where denial of revision would occasion injustice, yet cautioning that inherent powers cannot be employed to bypass the legislative policy embedded in Section 397(2). The Court thus adopted a doctrine of “harmonious construction”, balancing legislative intent with judicial duty.

(C) Consolidation and Expansion

The trilogy of Krishnan v. Krishnaveni[3], Rajinder Prasad v. Bashir[6] and Prasanta Kumar Dey v. State of West Bengal[7] clarified that although Section 397(3) bars a second revision, extraordinary situations of miscarriage of justice may still invite inherent jurisdiction. The Court nevertheless admonished litigants against employing Section 482 as a device to circumvent the statutory bar.

(D) Revisional Intervention in Acquittals

Vimal Singh[1] is instructive on the limits of revisional conversion of acquittal into conviction. Relying on K. Chinnaswamy Reddy, the Supreme Court held that Section 401(3), read with Section 397, precludes the High Court from re-appraising evidence to reverse an acquittal unless the order is perverse or illegal. The decision reinforces deference to the fact-finding authority of trial courts and preserves the presumption of innocence.

(E) Interface with Investigative Autonomy

Although Section 173(8) CrPC was central in Kishan Lal v. Dharmendra Bafna[8], the Court invoked Section 397 to admonish the High Court’s re-investigative directives, underscoring the revisional court’s duty to respect police autonomy save for demonstrated illegality.

Doctrinal Themes

1. Scope and Standard of Interference

  • Correctness, legality, propriety: The triad, though broad, is judicially confined to jurisdictional or manifest errors—mere possibility of a different view is insufficient (Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander[9]).
  • “Patent defect” threshold: Revisional jurisdiction targets patent defects or perversity, not routine appreciation of evidence (Sethuraman v. Rajamanickam[10]).

2. The Interlocutory Bar

The interlocutory embargo aims at expeditious trials. Nevertheless, orders which terminate proceedings (discharge, summoning, framing of charge) are not interlocutory (Amar Nath; Asian Resurfacing[11]). Where the order stands at the cusp—neither purely procedural nor finally determinative—the Court employs the “substantial rights” test to decide revisability.

3. Prohibition of Second Revision (Section 397(3))

Jagir Singh[2] construed sub-section (3) literally, holding that once the Sessions Judge is approached, the High Court’s revisional jurisdiction is barred. Yet, later cases retain a narrow residual inherent power for exceptional circumstances (Krishnan). High Courts are thus obliged to ascertain whether the litigant has already exhausted a statutory revision before invoking Section 482 (Urmila Devi v. Yudhvir Singh[12]).

4. Revisional versus Inherent Jurisdiction

Judicial consensus now recognises that Section 482 is not eclipsed by Section 397, but its deployment must honour legislative prohibitions. The Supreme Court in AKanksha Arora v. Tanay Maben[13] reiterated that availability of revision is no per se bar to inherent power, yet the High Court should prefer converting a misconceived Section 482 petition into a revision to preserve procedural discipline.

5. High Court’s Revisional Role in Preventing Abuse

Recent cases emphasise the preventative dimension of Section 397. In Neeharika Infrastructure v. State of Maharashtra[14], although decided under Section 482, the Court cautioned High Courts against indiscriminate interference with investigations—a caveat equally germane to the revisional context. The overarching leitmotif is judicial restraint appointed to avert “fragmentation” of trial processes.

Critical Assessment

Section 397’s architecture is a study in calibrated judicial control: adequate to rectify gross irregularities yet restrained to uphold trial-court primacy. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has skilfully balanced these twin objectives, but certain tensions persist:

  • Semantic Elasticity of “Interlocutory”—Despite authoritative pronouncements, lower courts continue to differ on the revisability of orders such as dismissal of complaints or return of charge-sheets. Uniform legislative clarification may be warranted.
  • Overlap with Section 482—Frequent resort to inherent powers risks undermining the hierarchy envisaged by Section 397(3). A codified checklist for invoking Section 482 after an unsuccessful revision could curb forum-shopping.
  • Standard of Appellate Deference—Cases like State of Maharashtra v. Jagmohan Singh[15] demonstrate occasional lapses where High Courts exceed revisional limits by re-appreciating evidence. Consistent application of the Vimal Singh standard is imperative.

Emerging Trends and Future Trajectories

Two recent developments may reshape Section 397 practice:

  1. Technology-driven delays: Virtual courts expedite record-transmission, diminishing the justification for interlocutory bar rigidity. A nuanced, time-bound revisionary mechanism could be envisaged.
  2. Heightened anti-corruption focus: Asian Resurfacing introduced automatic lapsing of stays. Similar principles could be transplanted to general revisions to prevent dilatory tactics.

Conclusion

Section 397 remains a cornerstone of criminal procedural oversight, its vitality sustained by jurisprudential fine-tuning rather than legislative amendment. The Supreme Court’s iterative exposition—from Amar Nath to AKanksha Arora—reflects a commitment to calibrating judicial intervention in harmony with the objectives of expeditious adjudication and accurate justice. Going forward, disciplined adherence to the doctrinal parameters sculpted by the apex court will fortify the revisional jurisdiction against both judicial overreach and abdication, ensuring that Section 397 continues to serve as an “emergency brake” rather than a parallel appellate tier.

Footnotes

  1. Vimal Singh v. Khuman Singh, (1998) 7 SCC 223.
  2. Jagir Singh v. Ranbir Singh, (1979) 2 SCC 541.
  3. Krishnan v. Krishnaveni, (1997) 4 SCC 241.
  4. Amar Nath v. State of Haryana, (1977) 4 SCC 137.
  5. Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551.
  6. Rajinder Prasad v. Bashir, (2001) 8 SCC 522.
  7. Prasanta Kumar Dey v. State of W.B., (2006) 2 SCC 401.
  8. Kishan Lal v. Dharmendra Bafna, (2009) 7 SCC 685.
  9. Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460.
  10. Sethuraman v. Rajamanickam, (2009) 5 SCC 153.
  11. Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency v. CBI, (2018) 16 SCC 299.
  12. Urmila Devi v. Yudhvir Singh, (2013) 15 SCC 624.
  13. Akanksha Arora v. Tanay Maben, (2024) SCC OnLine SC ___.
  14. Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 6 SCC 501.
  15. State of Maharashtra v. Jagmohan Singh, (2004) 7 SCC 659.