Revisional Powers of the High Court in India

Revisional Powers of the High Court in India: A Scholarly Analysis

I. Introduction

Revisional jurisdiction is a critical facet of the judicial architecture in India, empowering High Courts to superintend and correct errors committed by subordinate courts. It serves as an instrument of judicial oversight, ensuring that lower courts operate within the confines of their jurisdiction and apply the law correctly. Unlike appellate jurisdiction, which often involves a rehearing on facts and law, revisional power is generally more circumscribed, focusing primarily on the legality, regularity, and jurisdictional propriety of the proceedings and decisions of inferior courts. This article undertakes a scholarly analysis of the revisional powers of High Courts in India, examining its conceptual underpinnings and its application under both the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). It draws extensively upon statutory provisions and judicial pronouncements to delineate the scope, limitations, and evolving jurisprudence surrounding this significant judicial power.

II. Conceptual Framework of Revisional Jurisdiction

A. Distinction from Appellate Jurisdiction

A fundamental distinction exists between appellate and revisional jurisdiction. An appeal is generally considered a statutory right and often involves a more comprehensive review, potentially including a re-appreciation of evidence (Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander And Others, 1988 SCC 3 131; THANKAMONY AMMA v. OMANA AMMA N., 2019 SCC ONLINE SC 1022). In contrast, revision is typically a discretionary power aimed at correcting specific types of errors, primarily jurisdictional ones or grave illegalities, without undertaking a full rehearing (Pirbux Bilkhi v. Babulal Dwarka, 1985 MP HC; PREM KUMAR v. STATE, 2024 Rajasthan HC). The Supreme Court in Major S.S Khanna v. Brig. F.J Dillon (1964 SCC 4 409) observed that the expressions 'appeal' and 'revision' are distinct, though revisional jurisdiction can be seen as part of the general supervisory power of a superior court. More recently, in Rahimal Bathu And Others v. Ashiyal Beevi (Supreme Court Of India, 2023), the Supreme Court, citing Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatreya Bapat (1969), reiterated that revisional jurisdiction "is a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court as a superior court." However, this characterization does not obliterate the inherent differences in scope and exercise. While an appeal can address errors of both fact and law, revision is typically confined to errors of law or procedure that affect jurisdiction or cause a manifest injustice (PREM KUMAR v. STATE, 2024 Rajasthan HC). The High Court, in revision, does not ordinarily act as a second court of first appeal (Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander And Others, 1988 SCC 3 131; THANKAMONY AMMA v. OMANA AMMA N., 2019 SCC ONLINE SC 1022).

B. Purpose and Object

The primary objective of conferring revisional powers upon the High Court is to ensure that subordinate courts do not exceed their jurisdictional limits, fail to exercise jurisdiction vested in them, or act with material illegality or irregularity in the exercise of their jurisdiction (Hazara Singh v. Bachan Singh, 1998 P&H HC; Sant Lal v. Sudakar, 2000 P&H HC). It is a mechanism to keep the administration of justice by lower courts within the bounds of law and to prevent miscarriages of justice arising from such errors (Sidheswar Sahu v. Arakhita Jena And Another, 1995 Orissa HC). This power is intended to correct manifest errors of law or procedure that would occasion injustice if not rectified (PREM KUMAR v. STATE, 2024 Rajasthan HC). It is a supervisory power designed to ensure the proper functioning of the judicial system (Durga Devi v. Bishwanath Das & Ors., 2010 Patna HC).

III. Revisional Powers under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

A. Statutory Basis: Section 115 CPC

Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is the principal statutory provision governing the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court in civil matters. It empowers the High Court to call for the record of any case decided by a subordinate court, in which no appeal lies thereto, and make such order as it thinks fit if certain conditions are met. The section has undergone significant amendments, notably by the CPC (Amendment) Act, 1976, and more substantially by the CPC (Amendment) Act, 1999, which came into force on July 1, 2002.

B. Grounds for Revision

Historically and under the current framework, Section 115(1) CPC lays down three primary grounds upon which the High Court can exercise its revisional jurisdiction:

  • Where the subordinate court appears to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law.
  • Where the subordinate court appears to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested.
  • Where the subordinate court appears to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.

(Hazara Singh v. Bachan Singh, 1998 P&H HC; Sant Lal v. Sudakar, 2000 P&H HC; Sidheswar Sahu v. Arakhita Jena And Another, 1995 Orissa HC; Cantonment Board, Lucknow And Another v. District Judge (Incharge), Lucknow And Others, 2006 Allahabad HC). An erroneous finding on a jurisdictional fact, upon which the subordinate court's jurisdiction depends, can also be a ground for interference (Chaube Jagdish Prasad And Another v. Ganga Prasad Chaturvedi, 1959 AIR SC 492). The exercise of revisional power is confined to these jurisdictional errors and not to correct mere errors of fact or law unless they have a bearing on jurisdiction (MR. MANISH GOEL v. MR. RAGHAV GOYAL & ANR., 2023 Delhi HC, citing D.L.F. Housing & Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. Sarup Singh, (1969) 3 SCC 807).

C. The Proviso to Section 115 CPC: Post-Amendment Landscape

The proviso to Section 115 CPC, particularly after the amendments of 1976 and 1999/2002, has significantly curtailed the scope of revision. Prior to the 1999 amendment, the proviso stipulated that the High Court shall not vary or reverse any order except where the order, if made in favour of the applicant, would have finally disposed of the suit or proceeding, OR the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury (Hazara Singh v. Bachan Singh, 1998 P&H HC; Sant Lal v. Sudakar, 2000 P&H HC; Sidheswar Sahu v. Arakhita Jena And Another, 1995 Orissa HC).

However, the CPC (Amendment) Act, 1999, which came into effect on July 1, 2002, substantially altered this position. As interpreted by the Supreme Court in Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society, Nagpur v. Swaraj Developers And Others (2003 SCC 6 659), the amended proviso (specifically the deletion of clause (b) of the erstwhile proviso) restricts the High Court's power to vary or reverse an order unless "the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings." The Supreme Court held that this amendment was procedural and applied to pending revisions, effectively narrowing the High Court's revisional ambit. The ground that an order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury is no longer available for interference with interlocutory orders that do not finally dispose of the suit or proceeding (Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society, Nagpur v. Swaraj Developers And Others, 2003 SCC 6 659; Cantonment Board, Lucknow And Another v. District Judge (Incharge), Lucknow And Others, 2006 Allahabad HC).

D. Scope of Interference

The revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC is not meant to be a re-appreciation of evidence or a correction of every error of law or fact (Sidheswar Sahu v. Arakhita Jena And Another, 1995 Orissa HC; Pirbux Bilkhi v. Babulal Dwarka, 1985 MP HC). The High Court is not to act as an appellate court (MR. MANISH GOEL v. MR. RAGHAV GOYAL & ANR., 2023 Delhi HC). Interference is warranted only when the subordinate court's order is perverse in the sense that it is in gross violation of the rule of law or procedure (Sidheswar Sahu v. Arakhita Jena And Another, 1995 Orissa HC).

The term "case decided" in Section 115 CPC was interpreted broadly by the Supreme Court in Major S.S Khanna v. Brig. F.J Dillon (1964 SCC 4 409) to include a part of a proceeding or an interlocutory order that adjudicates a substantial question in controversy between the parties affecting their rights, even if the suit is not finally disposed of. However, the impact of this interpretation must now be read in conjunction with the stringent requirements of the amended proviso as laid down in Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society. The power is discretionary, and the High Court is not bound to interfere merely because the conditions of Section 115 are satisfied, especially if substantial justice has been done or if interference would not serve the ends of justice (Pirbux Bilkhi v. Babulal Dwarka, 1985 MP HC).

IV. Revisional Powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

A. Statutory Basis: Sections 397 and 401 CrPC

In criminal matters, the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is primarily governed by Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Section 397(1) empowers the High Court (and the Sessions Court) to call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior criminal court situated within its jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality, or propriety of any finding, sentence, or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. Section 401 CrPC delineates the High Court's powers of revision, stating that in the case of any proceeding the record of which has been called for by itself or which otherwise comes to its knowledge, the High Court may, in its discretion, exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court of Appeal by sections 386, 389, 390 and 391 or on a Court of Session by section 307.

B. Scope and Ambit

The scope of revision under the CrPC is arguably wider in language than under Section 115 CPC, as it includes an examination of the "propriety" of any finding, sentence, or order. However, this power is not to be exercised as an appellate power. The revisional court cannot undertake a meticulous examination of the material on record as an appellate court would (PREM KUMAR v. STATE, 2024 Rajasthan HC). Interference is generally justified to correct a manifest error of law or procedure which would occasion injustice if not corrected (PREM KUMAR v. STATE, 2024 Rajasthan HC). The High Court in revision should be slow to interfere with findings of fact unless there is a glaring defect in the procedure or a manifest error on a point of law, resulting in a flagrant miscarriage of justice (State Of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, 1999 SCC 2 452).

C. Limitations on Revisional Jurisdiction

The CrPC imposes certain specific limitations on the exercise of revisional powers:

  • Bar on revision of interlocutory orders (Section 397(2) CrPC): This sub-section expressly prohibits the exercise of revisional powers in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial, or other proceeding. The Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye v. State Of Maharashtra (1978 SCC CRI 1 10) clarified that the term "interlocutory order" in Section 397(2) is to be given a restricted meaning and does not cover orders which, though not concluding the main dispute, are matters of moment and affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial. Such orders, if they cause prejudice, may not be strictly "interlocutory" for the purpose of the bar.
  • Bar on second revision (Section 397(3) CrPC): This provision states that if an application under Section 397 has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them. This is to prevent multiplicity of proceedings.
  • Revising orders of acquittal (Section 439(4) CrPC): Section 439(4) CrPC explicitly states that nothing in Section 439 shall be deemed to authorize a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. The revisional power against an order of acquittal, especially when invoked by a private complainant, is to be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice require interference due to a manifest illegality or perversity resulting in a gross miscarriage of justice (Satyendra Nath Dutta And Another v. Ram Narain, 1975 SCC 3 398; Ayodhya Dube And Others v. Ram Sumer Singh, 1981 S SCC 83). The High Court must provide reasons for its decision, especially when refusing leave to appeal against acquittal, as the absence of reasons can render the order unsustainable (State Of Orissa v. Dhaniram Luhar, 2004 SCC 5 568). The instances justifying interference are illustrative and not exhaustive (Ayodhya Dube And Others v. Ram Sumer Singh, 1981 S SCC 83).

D. Interplay with Inherent Powers (Section 482 CrPC)

Section 482 CrPC preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court, or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. This power is extraordinary and is to be exercised sparingly, with caution, and in the rarest of rare cases (Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander And Another, 2012 SCC 9 460).

A significant aspect of criminal revision is its interplay with Section 482. The Supreme Court has consistently held that the bar under Section 397(2) against revising interlocutory orders or the bar under Section 397(3) against a second revision does not limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC. In Madhu Limaye v. State Of Maharashtra (1978 SCC CRI 1 10), the Court held that the inherent power can be exercised in relation to an order, even if termed interlocutory, if it results in an abuse of the process of the court or other_wise causes a grave miscarriage of justice. Similarly, in Krishnan And Another v. Krishnaveni And Another (1997 SCC 4 241), the Supreme Court clarified that despite the bar under Section 397(3), the High Court's inherent power under Section 482 remains available to prevent abuse of process or to secure the ends of justice, effectively allowing the High Court to intervene in exceptional circumstances even after a revision has been decided by the Sessions Court. This was also affirmed in Raj Kapoor And Others v. State And Others (1980 SCC 1 43), where inherent powers were invoked to prevent injustice despite procedural limitations under Section 397. The power under Section 482 is to be exercised to prevent abuse of process or to secure justice, even if no specific provision authorizes such intervention (Sheriffa v. Alikutty, 1986 Kerala HC; Puritipati Jagga Reddi, 1978 AP HC FB). However, when exercising powers under Section 482, the High Court should not delve into the merits of the case or evaluate evidence as if conducting a trial (Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander And Another, 2012 SCC 9 460).

V. Comparative Analysis and Judicial Trends

Comparing the revisional powers under CPC and CrPC reveals differences in scope and judicial approach. The language of Section 397 CrPC ("correctness, legality, or propriety") appears broader than Section 115 CPC, which is more strictly focused on jurisdictional errors. The amendments to Section 115 CPC, particularly the 1999/2002 changes, have significantly narrowed its scope, as affirmed in Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society. This reflects a legislative intent to reduce interference with interlocutory orders in civil matters to expedite trial proceedings.

In contrast, under the CrPC, while there are express bars (e.g., Section 397(2) and 397(3)), the judiciary has consistently utilized Section 482 CrPC to ensure that these bars do not become instruments of injustice. This provides a degree of flexibility in criminal matters to address grave miscarriages of justice or abuse of process that might not be available under the more rigid framework of Section 115 CPC post-amendment.

A common thread, however, is the principle of judicial restraint. High Courts are generally cautious and reluctant to interfere in revision unless there is a clear jurisdictional error, a patent illegality, or a manifest injustice (Managing Director (Mig) Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. And Another, Bala-Nagar v. Ajit Prasad Tarway, 1972 SCC 3 195 - though an appellate matter, its emphasis on non-interference unless compelling reasons exist, resonates with the caution in revisional jurisdiction). The power is supervisory and not appellate in nature.

VI. Conclusion

The revisional powers of the High Court are an indispensable tool for maintaining judicial discipline and ensuring the lawful exercise of authority by subordinate courts in both civil and criminal domains. While the scope under Section 115 CPC has been considerably restricted by legislative amendments to promote expeditious disposal of civil suits, the powers under Sections 397 and 401 CrPC, complemented by the inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC, provide a more flexible mechanism for correcting errors and preventing injustice in criminal proceedings.

Judicial pronouncements have consistently emphasized that revisional jurisdiction is not an appellate one and must be exercised with caution, focusing on errors of jurisdiction, manifest illegalities, or gross procedural irregularities that lead to a miscarriage of justice. The evolving jurisprudence reflects a continuous effort to balance the need for finality of lower court decisions with the imperative of ensuring that justice is administered according to law. The High Courts, through their revisional powers, continue to play a vital role as sentinels of justice, ensuring that the legal process remains fair, equitable, and within the bounds of statutory and constitutional mandates.