Revisional Jurisdiction under Section 397 CrPC

Revisional Jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: A Scholarly Analysis

1. Introduction

Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) stands as a cornerstone of judicial oversight within the Indian criminal justice system. It vests the High Court and the Sessions Judge with the power of revision, enabling them to scrutinize the proceedings of inferior criminal courts to ensure justice, legality, and propriety. This revisional jurisdiction serves as a critical mechanism to correct miscarriages of justice, rectify errors of law or procedure, and ensure that subordinate courts operate within the confines of their jurisdiction. This article undertakes a comprehensive analysis of Section 397 CrPC, delving into its scope, objectives, limitations, and its intricate interplay with other provisions of the Code, particularly the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC. The analysis draws heavily upon landmark pronouncements of the Supreme Court of India and various High Courts, as reflected in the provided reference materials.

2. The Ambit and Object of Section 397 CrPC

Section 397 CrPC is located in Chapter XXX, which deals with "Reference and Revision." It fundamentally empowers higher courts to exercise supervisory jurisdiction over lower courts.

2.1. Power to Call for Records and Examine Proceedings

Subsection (1) of Section 397 CrPC explicitly states that the High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situated within its or his local jurisdiction. This power is conferred for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality, or propriety of any finding, sentence, or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court (State Of Karnataka v. G. Lakshman, 1993; Puritipati Jagga Reddi, 1978). The Explanation to Section 397(1) clarifies that all Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, are deemed inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this subsection and Section 398 CrPC (State Of Karnataka v. G. Lakshman, 1993).

2.2. Purpose of Revisional Scrutiny

The primary object of revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 CrPC is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law (Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, 2012, as cited in Rakesh Kumar Pandey And Another Revisionists v. State Of U.P. And Another Opposite Parties, 2022 and Anjula Divedi v. State, 2016). This power is not intended to be exercised as an appellate jurisdiction in disguise. Instead, it is a supervisory power to ensure that justice is administered according to law and to prevent the abuse of judicial process. The Supreme Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander (2012) observed that there must be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the revisional court to scrutinize orders which, on the face of it, bear no token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with the law.

3. The Bar on Revision of Interlocutory Orders: Section 397(2) CrPC

A significant limitation on the exercise of revisional jurisdiction is imposed by Section 397(2) CrPC, which bars revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial, or other proceeding (Puritipati Jagga Reddi, 1978). The interpretation of what constitutes an "interlocutory order" has been a subject of extensive judicial deliberation.

3.1. Defining "Interlocutory Order"

An interlocutory order is generally understood as an order that does not decide the main issue in the case and does not terminate the proceedings. It is a temporary or intermediate decision made before the final judgment. The legislative intent behind Section 397(2) CrPC, as noted by the Law Commission and acknowledged by courts, was to reduce delays in criminal trials by preventing parties from challenging every interim order (Amar Nath And Others v. State Of Haryana And Another, 1977).

3.2. Judicial Interpretation of Interlocutory Orders

The judiciary has adopted a nuanced approach to interpreting "interlocutory order" under Section 397(2) CrPC. Key principles emerging from case law include:

  • Substantial Rights Test: In Amar Nath And Others v. State Of Haryana And Another (1977), the Supreme Court held that the term "interlocutory order" in Section 397(2) should not be interpreted broadly to exclude orders that fundamentally affect the rights of the accused. An order summoning an accused, for instance, was held not to be an interlocutory order if it substantially impacted their rights. The Court clarified that orders which, if upheld, would terminate the proceedings are not interlocutory.
  • Intermediate Category of Orders: The Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye v. State Of Maharashtra (1977) further refined this understanding. It recognized an intermediate category of orders that, while not final, are also not purely interlocutory in nature if they decide vital aspects of the trial or affect valuable rights of the parties. Such orders are not barred from revisional scrutiny by Section 397(2).
  • Orders Terminating Proceedings: An order that has the effect of terminating the prosecution, such as an order dismissing a complaint, is not considered interlocutory and is therefore revisable (K.K Patel And Another v. State Of Gujarat And Another, 2000). The Court in K.K Patel relied on Amar Nath (1977), Madhu Limaye (1977), and V.C. Shukla v. State Through C.B.I (1980) to reach this conclusion.
  • Order Framing Charges: The Supreme Court in Asian Resurfacing Of Road Agency Private Limited And Another v. Central Bureau Of Investigation (2018) held that an order framing charges under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, is neither purely interlocutory nor final. While Section 19(3)(c) of the PC Act restricts revision, the constitutional powers of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 remain available in exceptional cases.
  • Orders on Remand: The Gujarat High Court in Kandhal Sarman Jadeja v. State of Gujarat (2009) opined that an order granting police remand is an interlocutory order and not revisable, but an order rejecting remand adversely affects the prosecution's right to investigate and is therefore not interlocutory and thus revisable.

3.3. Legislative Intent and Rationale

The primary rationale behind Section 397(2) CrPC is to prevent undue delays in criminal proceedings that could arise from frequent challenges to intermediate orders. However, the courts have balanced this legislative intent with the need to ensure that significant errors or injustices are not perpetuated under the guise of an order being "interlocutory" (Amar Nath And Others v. State Of Haryana And Another, 1977).

4. The Prohibition Against Second Revision by the Same Person: Section 397(3) CrPC

Section 397(3) CrPC introduces another crucial limitation: "If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them."

4.1. The Scope of the Bar

This provision explicitly bars a second revisional application by the same person to a different forum (High Court or Sessions Judge) once one of them has already been approached (Shiv Kumar And Anr. v. Ramesh Chand, 1993). The objective is to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and forum shopping, thereby lending finality to the revisional order passed by the first forum approached.

4.2. Invocation of Inherent Powers Despite the Bar

Despite the explicit bar under Section 397(3), the Supreme Court has clarified that this provision does not curtail the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC. In Krishnan And Another v. Krishnaveni And Another (1997), the Court held that the High Court's inherent power to prevent abuse of the process of the court or to otherwise secure the ends of justice remains intact. If the High Court finds that there has been a failure of justice or misuse of judicial mechanism, it may, in its discretion, exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, even if a revision application to the Sessions Judge had been unsuccessful. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and cautiously (SEEMA TANEJA v. STATE AND ORS., 2023, citing Krishnan v. Krishnaveni, 1997 and Rajinder Prasad v. Bashir, 2001). The Andhra Pradesh High Court in Puritipati Jagga Reddi (1978) suggested that the principles laid down by the Supreme Court regarding Section 482 vis-à-vis Section 397(2) would apply with equal force to Section 397(3).

5. The Interplay between Section 397 and Section 482 CrPC (Inherent Powers)

The relationship between the revisional powers under Section 397 CrPC and the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC is a significant aspect of criminal procedure. Section 482 preserves the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

5.1. Overcoming Statutory Limitations in Exceptional Cases

The Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye v. State Of Maharashtra (1977) firmly established that the inherent powers under Section 482 are not restricted by the limitations in Section 397(2) concerning interlocutory orders. The Court emphasized that Section 482 could be invoked in exceptional circumstances to prevent abuse of the legal process or to secure the ends of justice. Similarly, as discussed above, Krishnan And Another v. Krishnaveni And Another (1997) affirmed that Section 482 can be invoked despite the bar under Section 397(3).

The rationale is that statutory provisions, while laying down general rules, cannot be exhaustive to cover every conceivable extraordinary situation. The inherent powers serve as a residuary source of authority for the High Court to intervene where grave injustice might otherwise occur (Bhanwar Lal v. Madan Lal, 1977). The bar under Section 397(2) cannot limit the inherent powers of the High Court exercisable under Section 482 CrPC (Anil Bhat : Sandesh Bhat v. Union Of India And Ors., 1997, citing Madhu Limaye, 1977).

5.2. Principles Guiding the Exercise of Inherent Powers

While Section 482 provides a wide ambit, its exercise in the context of Section 397 is guided by caution and restraint. Courts have consistently held that inherent powers should be exercised sparingly, with circumspection, and only in the rarest of rare cases where no other efficacious remedy is available and where interference is necessary to prevent a palpable miscarriage of justice (Madhu Limaye v. State Of Maharashtra, 1977; Anjula Divedi v. State, 2016, citing Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, 2012). The inherent power cannot be invoked to circumvent express statutory prohibitions in a routine manner, but only when the statutory framework proves inadequate to address a manifest injustice or abuse of process.

6. Procedural Aspects and Specific Applications of Section 397 CrPC

6.1. Concurrent Jurisdiction and Inferior Courts

Section 397 CrPC confers concurrent revisional jurisdiction upon the High Court and the Sessions Judge (Shiv Kumar And Anr. v. Ramesh Chand, 1993). As per Section 397(1), both forums can call for records from "inferior Criminal Courts" within their respective local jurisdictions. The Explanation to Section 397(1) clarifies the hierarchy for this purpose (State Of Karnataka v. G. Lakshman, 1993).

6.2. Orders Subject to Revision: Specific Instances

The revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 CrPC can be invoked against a variety of orders, provided they are not interlocutory and satisfy the criteria of correctness, legality, or propriety. Examples include:

It is pertinent to note that a person committed to prison under Section 123 CrPC (security for good behaviour) is not considered to be undergoing a "sentence of imprisonment" in the context of the erstwhile Section 397 of the CrPC, 1898, which dealt with concurrent sentences (In re Joghi Kannigan…Accused., 1908). While the current Section 397 deals with revision, this highlights the specific meaning of "sentence" in criminal jurisprudence.

Furthermore, it is important to distinguish revisional jurisdiction from review. Once a High Court has pronounced a judgment in its appellate or revisional jurisdiction, it generally cannot review or revise that judgment, as there is no specific provision in the CrPC enabling such review (Mr. A. Govindaraju v. Smt. K. Usha, 2011, discussing provisions of the old CrPC but with continuing relevance regarding finality).

6.3. Stay of Proceedings and Other Ancillary Powers

When calling for records, the revisional court may direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record (Section 397(1) CrPC). In the context of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the Supreme Court in Asian Resurfacing Of Road Agency Private Limited And Another v. Central Bureau Of Investigation (2018) mandated that stay orders granted by High Courts (under Article 227) in PC Act trials would automatically lapse after six months unless extended by a speaking order, underscoring the need for expeditious trial in corruption cases. While specific to PC Act, this reflects a broader concern about delays caused by stays.

7. Standards of Judicial Scrutiny in Revisional Jurisdiction

The revisional court's examination is directed towards the "correctness, legality or propriety" of any finding, sentence, or order, and the "regularity" of proceedings. The Supreme Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander (2012) (as cited in Anjula Divedi v. State, 2016 and Rakesh Kumar Pandey, 2022) elaborated on the grounds for invoking revisional jurisdiction:

"The revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous and there is no compliance of the provisions of law, the finding is recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but merely indicative."

The revisional court is not meant to act as an appellate court and re-appreciate evidence unless the findings of the lower court are perverse or based on no evidence. The focus is on correcting errors of law or jurisdiction and ensuring that the proceedings have been conducted fairly and in accordance with established legal principles.

The power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, often read alongside revisional powers, is also all-pervasive, though exercised with self-restraint, particularly where justice is seriously jeopardized (Paltu Dutta v. S.M Nibedita Roy, 1989).

8. Conclusion

Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, embodies a vital supervisory mechanism within the Indian criminal justice framework. It empowers the High Court and Sessions Judge to ensure that inferior courts dispense justice correctly, legally, and with procedural propriety. While the bar on revising interlocutory orders under Section 397(2) and the prohibition on a second revision by the same person under Section 397(3) aim to streamline proceedings and prevent delays, the judiciary has astutely balanced these limitations with the overarching need to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice, primarily through the invocation of inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC.

The jurisprudence surrounding Section 397 CrPC, enriched by decades of judicial interpretation, underscores a commitment to fairness, legality, and the correction of manifest errors. It remains a critical tool for maintaining the integrity of criminal adjudication, ensuring that while procedural efficiency is valued, the substantive rights of parties and the paramount interest of justice are never compromised.

9. References