Revisional Jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC

The Evolving Landscape of Revisional Jurisdiction: An Analysis of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in India

Introduction

Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) has been a critical provision governing the High Courts' power to revise decisions of subordinate courts in India. Its purpose is to ensure that subordinate courts operate within the bounds of their jurisdiction and to prevent miscarriages of justice arising from jurisdictional errors or material irregularities in procedure. Over the decades, the scope and application of Section 115 have been shaped by numerous judicial pronouncements and significant legislative amendments, particularly in 1976 and 1999. This article seeks to provide a comprehensive analysis of Section 115 CPC, tracing its historical context, examining its core tenets, evaluating the impact of legislative changes, and exploring its interplay with the constitutional remedies available under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The analysis draws heavily upon the provided reference materials, integrating statutory provisions and landmark case law to present a scholarly overview of this vital aspect of Indian civil procedure.

Historical Context and Legislative Intent of Section 115 CPC

The revisional jurisdiction conferred upon High Courts by Section 115 CPC is fundamentally supervisory. Its primary aim is not to correct every error of law or fact but to rectify jurisdictional excesses or failures by subordinate courts. Early judicial interpretations, such as those stemming from the principles laid down in Rajah Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh[1] (as cited in D.L.F Housing[1] and Keshardeo Chamria[6]), established that interference was warranted only when a subordinate court acted without jurisdiction, failed to exercise jurisdiction, or acted with illegality or material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction. Even a mere error of law was not considered a sufficient ground for revision, as noted in Golam Sobhan v. Ali Hossain Bahaddar.[24]

Despite the existence of Article 227 of the Constitution, which also grants supervisory powers to High Courts, the legislature chose to retain Section 115 CPC. The rationale, as highlighted by various Law Commission reports and judicial observations, was that the remedy under Section 115 was perceived as "cheap and easy" and less likely to cause delay and expenditure compared to Article 227.[9], [10] The Parliamentary Committee, while considering the omission of Section 115, ultimately recommended its retention with modifications, acknowledging its utility.[9], [10]

The Core Tenets of Revisional Jurisdiction Pre-Amendments

Prior to the significant amendments, the application of Section 115 CPC was governed by several well-established principles.

Jurisdictional Error as the Linchpin

The exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC has always been predicated on the existence of a jurisdictional error. The Supreme Court in D.L.F Housing And Construction Company (P.) Ltd. v. Sarup Singh And Others[1] reiterated the three classic grounds for interference:

  1. The subordinate court has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law;
  2. The subordinate court has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested; or
  3. The subordinate court has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity.
This foundational principle was also emphasized in Keshardeo Chamria v. Radha Kissen Chamria And Others[6] and Baldevdas Shivlal v. Filmistan Distributors (India) (P) Ltd.[5] The High Court's power was confined to these specific situations and did not extend to a general power of review.[23]

Meaning of "Illegally" and "Material Irregularity"

The terms "illegally" and "with material irregularity" were crucial in defining the scope of interference. As interpreted by the Privy Council in N. S. Venkatagiri Ayyangar v. Hindu Religious Endowments Board (cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Keshardeo Chamria[6] and discussed in Arundhuti Nan & Ors. v. P.M. Daryanani[17]), "illegally" meant a breach of some provision of law, while "with material irregularity" referred to committing some error of procedure during the trial that was material in that it might have affected the ultimate decision. If no such illegality or material irregularity was found, the High Court had no power to interfere merely because it differed from the subordinate court's conclusions on questions of fact or law.[17]

"Case Decided"

A significant aspect of Section 115 was the interpretation of the phrase "any case which has been decided." The Supreme Court in Major S.S Khanna v. Brig. F.J Dillon[8] held that the expression "case" is not limited to the entirety of a suit but can include a part of a proceeding or an interlocutory order. If an interlocutory order decided a matter of moment, or affected the rights of parties, or pertained to a question of jurisdiction, it could be considered a "case decided" amenable to revision. This view was also reflected in Baldevdas Shivlal v. Filmistan Distributors (India) (P) Ltd.[5] However, not every order passed during a proceeding would constitute a "case decided."[5]

Distinction from Appellate Jurisdiction

It has been consistently held that revisional jurisdiction is distinct from appellate jurisdiction. An appeal involves a rehearing on law as well as fact, whereas revision is primarily concerned with correcting jurisdictional errors. The High Court, in exercising its revisional powers, does not act as a court of appeal and cannot substitute its own findings for those of the subordinate court, unless the findings are perverse or based on no evidence.[1], [25] The Supreme Court in D.L.F Housing[1] emphasized that High Courts should not treat revision as an alternative to appeal.

Limitations: Errors of Fact and Law

A fundamental limitation of Section 115 CPC was that it did not empower the High Court to correct mere errors of fact or law, however gross or patent they might be, unless such errors had a direct bearing on the jurisdiction of the subordinate court.[1], [6], [23] As observed in Pandurang Dhoni Chougule v. Maruti Hari Jadhav (cited in Sarwan Singh[23]), an erroneous decision on a question of law that had no relation to the court's jurisdiction could not be corrected under Section 115. Similarly, the High Court could not reappreciate evidence unless the findings of the subordinate court were perverse.[25]

Impact of Legislative Amendments on Section 115 CPC

Section 115 CPC has undergone significant amendments, notably in 1976 and 1999, which have considerably altered its scope, particularly concerning interlocutory orders.

The 1976 Amendment

The Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act 104 of 1976), effective from February 1, 1977, brought substantial changes. The original Section 115 was renumbered as sub-section (1), and a proviso was added to it. Additionally, sub-section (2) and an explanation were inserted.[10], [11] The proviso to sub-section (1) stipulated that the High Court shall not vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where:

  • (a) the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings, or
  • (b) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made.
The legislative intent, as reflected in the Statement of Objects and Reasons, was to curtail interference with interlocutory orders while retaining the core revisional power.[10]

The 1999 Amendment (w.e.f. July 1, 2002)

The Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1999 (Act 46 of 1999), which came into force on July 1, 2002, further significantly modified Section 115. Section 12 of the Amending Act substituted the existing proviso to sub-section (1) with a new proviso and inserted sub-section (3).[11] The new proviso reads:

"Provided that the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings."

A crucial change was the omission of clause (b) of the erstwhile proviso, which allowed revision if an interlocutory order occasioned a failure of justice or caused irreparable injury.[9], [13] This amendment substantially curtailed the High Court's power to revise interlocutory orders. Now, a revision against an interlocutory order is maintainable only if the order, had it been passed in favour of the applicant, would have led to the final disposal of the suit or proceeding.[2], [13]

The Supreme Court in Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society, Nagpur v. Swaraj Developers And Others[2] extensively analyzed the impact of the 1999 amendment. It held that the amendment was procedural and thus applied to pending proceedings.[2], [12] The Court affirmed that the legislative intent was to restrict the scope of revision to prevent delays in the trial of suits. The deletion of the "failure of justice or irreparable injury" ground meant that this consideration was no longer relevant for maintaining a revision under Section 115 against an interlocutory order.[2], [13] Sub-section (3) was also inserted, clarifying that a revision shall not operate as a stay of suit or other proceeding before the subordinate court except where such suit or other proceeding is stayed by the High Court.[11]

Section 32(2)(i) of the Amending Act of 1999 provided that the amended Section 115 would not apply to or affect any proceeding for revision which had been finally disposed of before the commencement of Section 12 of the Amending Act.[11]

Interplay of Section 115 CPC with Constitutional Remedies (Articles 226 & 227)

The curtailment of revisional powers under Section 115 CPC, especially by the 1999 amendment, brought into sharp focus its relationship with the High Courts' constitutional powers under Articles 226 (power to issue writs) and 227 (power of superintendence over subordinate courts).

The Supreme Court in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai And Others[4] authoritatively held that the amendments to Section 115 CPC do not and cannot curtail the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227. The power of superintendence under Article 227 and the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 remain unaffected and untrammeled by the statutory amendments.[4], [13] Therefore, even if a revision under Section 115 CPC is not maintainable against an interlocutory order (because it does not satisfy the "final disposal" test), a party aggrieved by a grave error of jurisdiction or a patent illegality resulting in substantial injustice may still approach the High Court under Article 227.[13], [15]

However, it is important to note that proceedings under Section 115 CPC and Article 227 are distinct. The Supreme Court in Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad[21] (reiterated in Chhote Lal Singh[18]) held that a revision petition under Section 115 cannot be automatically converted into a petition under Article 227, as they are separate and distinct proceedings. The scope of interference under Article 227 is also circumscribed by judicial self-restraint and is generally exercised in cases of grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of law by subordinate courts and tribunals, resulting in manifest injustice.

Prior to the 1999 amendment, in Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar v. Krishnaji Dattatreya Bapat,[20] the Supreme Court had considered whether the High Court could interfere under Articles 226 and 227 with an order when a Section 115 revision against the same order had been previously dismissed. It was held that despite the dismissal of the revision, interference under the constitutional provisions was possible if a proper case was made out. However, Surya Dev Rai[4] provides the more contemporary understanding in the context of the amended Section 115, clarifying that the constitutional avenues remain open precisely because the statutory remedy under Section 115 has been curtailed.

Specific Issues in Revisional Jurisdiction

Revisions against Orders under Inherent Powers (Section 151 CPC)

The Supreme Court in Keshardeo Chamria v. Radha Kissen Chamria And Others[6] clarified the High Court's limited revisional jurisdiction over orders passed by subordinate courts under their inherent powers (Section 151 CPC). An order passed under Section 151 CPC is generally not appealable (as it may not fall under Section 47 CPC or other provisions for appeal). The High Court can interfere in revision under Section 115 CPC only if the subordinate court, in exercising its inherent powers, commits a jurisdictional error as contemplated by Section 115. Mere disagreement with the subordinate court's exercise of discretion under Section 151, without a jurisdictional flaw, is not a ground for revision.[6], [14]

Revisions against Revisional Orders (Second Revision)

A significant issue has been the maintainability of a "second revision" to the High Court against an order passed in revision by a District Court (where such power is conferred on the District Court by State amendments). The Supreme Court in Vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad,[21] dealing with the U.P. State amendment, held that the High Court is not vested with revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC over a revisional order made by the District Court under that section. This is because the legislative scheme often intends to create mutually exclusive revisional jurisdictions. This principle has been followed in subsequent High Court decisions.[16], [18]

Impact of State Amendments

It is pertinent to note that the CPC allows for State amendments. Some states have made their own amendments to Section 115 CPC, which can alter the scope and hierarchy of revisional jurisdiction within those states. For instance, the provisions of Section 115 CPC applicable in Uttar Pradesh differ from the Central Act, leading to specific interpretations regarding the forum for revision based on the valuation of the suit or the nature of the proceeding.[16], [21]

Retrospective Application of Amendments

The general legal principle, as affirmed in Keshavlal Jethalal Shah v. Mohanlal Bhagwandas And Another,[22] is that statutory provisions affecting substantive rights (like a right of appeal or revision, if considered vested) are not to be applied retrospectively unless expressly stated or by necessary intendment. Procedural amendments, however, are generally retrospective. The 1999 amendment to Section 115 CPC was held to be procedural and applicable to pending proceedings by the Supreme Court in Shiv Shakti Coop.[2] and by the Bombay High Court in Bharatkumar Shrimannarayan Agrawal v. Anita Trust.[12] Furthermore, the Amending Act of 1999 itself contained a saving clause (Section 32(2)(i)) regarding its non-applicability to revisions already finally disposed of.[11]

The case of K.C Skaria v. Govt. Of State Of Kerala And Another[3], while provided as a reference, primarily deals with the rights of independent contractors to sue for rendition of accounts and the application of Section 149 CPC concerning court fees. It does not directly address the interpretation or application of Section 115 CPC, though it touches upon procedural aspects of the CPC more broadly.

Contemporary Understanding and Judicial Approach

The current understanding of Section 115 CPC, particularly after the 1999 amendment, emphasizes a strict interpretation of its proviso. The High Courts' power to interfere with interlocutory orders is significantly curtailed and is available only if the order, if passed in favour of the revision petitioner, would have finally disposed of the suit or proceeding.[2], [13] This reflects the legislative intent to expedite the trial process and reduce delays caused by frequent revisions against interim orders.

While the scope of Section 115 CPC has been narrowed, the constitutional remedies under Articles 226 and 227 serve as a crucial safety net to address grave injustices or jurisdictional errors that may not fall within the strict confines of the amended Section 115.[4], [13] Some High Court judgments, like Durga Devi v. Bishwanath Das & Ors.,[15] have noted instances where the Supreme Court, even after Shiv Shakti[2] and Surya Dev Rai,[4] adjudicated revisions against interlocutory orders on merits, suggesting a nuanced approach in exceptional cases of perversity or material prejudice. However, the dominant judicial trend is to adhere to the restrictive conditions of the amended Section 115 CPC.[13]

Conclusion

Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, has undergone a significant transformation from its original conception. Initially a broad supervisory power to correct jurisdictional errors, its scope, especially concerning interlocutory orders, has been progressively narrowed by legislative amendments, most notably in 1999. The judiciary has consistently interpreted these amendments in line with the legislative intent to curb delays and ensure expeditious disposal of suits. While the statutory remedy of revision under Section 115 is now more restricted, the constitutional powers of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 remain an inviolable safeguard against jurisdictional excesses and manifest injustice. The evolution of Section 115 CPC reflects an ongoing effort to balance the need for judicial oversight with the imperative of procedural efficiency in the Indian civil justice system.

References