Reassessing Sections 272 and 273 of the Indian Penal Code: Contemporary Indian Jurisprudence on Food Adulteration

Reassessing Sections 272 and 273 of the Indian Penal Code: Contemporary Indian Jurisprudence on Food Adulteration

1. Introduction

Sections 272 and 273 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”) criminalise, respectively, the adulteration of food or drink intended for sale and the sale of noxious food or drink. Enacted in the nineteenth century, these provisions originally contemplated a maximum sentence of six months’ imprisonment and a fine of one thousand rupees. Over time, India’s regulatory landscape for food safety has evolved through specialised legislation such as the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (“PFA Act”) and the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (“FSSA”). The coexistence of the IPC provisions with special statutes, combined with recent judicial and legislative developments, invites a fresh doctrinal appraisal.

2. Statutory Background

2.1 Text and Ingredients

  • Section 272 IPC penalises adulteration “so as to make [the article] noxious as food or drink,” coupled with the intent (actual or likely) to sell.[1]
  • Section 273 IPC targets the sale (or exposure for sale) of any article “which has been rendered or has become noxious.” Mens rea is satisfied by knowledge or reason to believe that the article is noxious.[2]

2.2 Evolution of Sanctions

Although the original IPC ceiling remains, Parliament in 2023 amended related provisions of the FSSA to introduce penalties up to life imprisonment where adulteration causes death.[3] The contrasting punitive frameworks have provoked calls either to raise IPC penalties or to rely exclusively on the specialised statute.

3. Essential Elements Clarified by the Supreme Court

The leading decision in Joseph Kurian Philip Jose v. State of Kerala laid down a four-pronged test for Section 272: (i) the article is food or drink; (ii) it is adulterated; (iii) the adulteration renders it noxious; and (iv) the accused intended, or knew it likely, that it would be sold.[4] The Court underscored that the offence is complete upon introduction of the adulterant, irrespective of subsequent sale. High Courts routinely transpose this formulation when analysing cognate Section 273 charges, focusing on the knowledge requirement at the point of sale.[5]

4. Judicial Application and Divergent High-Court Trends

4.1 Supreme Court

  • Ram Nath v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2024) reaffirmed the textual limits of Sections 272–273 while contrasting them with stringent FSSA penalties, signalling Parliament’s domain for sentencing reform rather than judicial augmentation.[6]

4.2 High Courts

High-Court jurisprudence reveals three discernible trajectories:

  1. Substantive Discharge on Ingredient Failure. The Bombay High Court in Dilipsinh v. State of Maharashtra quashed proceedings where laboratory reports showed statutory labelling violations but not “noxious” quality, holding Section 273 inapposite absent proof that the article had become harmful.[7]
  2. Prima Facie Framing in Liquor Cases. Contrary to Bombay’s restrictive approach, the Allahabad High Court in Toni v. State of U.P. considered smuggled and adulterated liquor inherently “noxious,” refusing to quash charges under both Sections 272 and 273 at the threshold.[8]
  3. Exclusion Owing to Special Statutes. In M/s Pepsico India Holdings v. State of U.P., the same High Court quashed FIRs under Sections 272–273, holding that the FSSA (and earlier PFA Act) as a “special act” eclipses the IPC by virtue of Section 5 IPC when the factual allegations squarely fall within the specialised regime.[9]

5. Interaction with Special Food-Safety Legislation

5.1 Doctrinal Framework: Section 5 IPC

Section 5 IPC stipulates that nothing in the Code shall affect the provisions of any special or local law. The doctrinal question is whether the FSSA (or erstwhile PFA Act) fully occupies the field, thereby ousting IPC application, or whether dual charges may coexist.

5.2 Judicial Treatment

The Allahabad High Court’s finding in Pepsico—that the comprehensive FSSA scheme renders Sections 272–273 redundant—reflects a strict application of the generalia specialibus non derogant principle. Yet other benches have permitted parallel invocation, especially in liquor-related prosecutions where FSSA standards are arguably inapplicable.[10]

5.3 Normative Considerations

While the FSSA prescribes higher penalties and specialised procedures (e.g., Food Safety Officers, designated courts), IPC provisions retain practical utility for:

  • Liquor adulteration which sometimes falls under state excise statutes rather than FSSA;
  • Investigative agility: police officers may register cognisable IPC offences immediately, pending referral to food authorities.

However, inconsistent judicial outcomes create uncertainty, highlighting the need for legislative clarification or authoritative guidance from the Supreme Court.

6. Procedural Nuances: Charge Framing and Conviction Substitution

The Supreme Court’s caution in Ram Jas v. State of U.P. against substituting convictions without satisfying all statutory ingredients is germane. Any inclination to recast charges—for instance, from FSSA contraventions to Section 272 IPC—must pass the Ram Jas test of precise charge framing, evidentiary support for each element, and proportional sentencing.[11]

7. Bail Jurisprudence and Public-Health Concerns

Numerous High-Court orders (e.g., Naseem, Raju Rai, Bhupendra) demonstrate a liberal approach to bail where chemical analysis is pending or quantities are small. Yet courts balance personal liberty with the gravity of public-health risks, frequently imposing stringent conditions to prevent recidivism.[12]

8. Sentencing Policy and the Case for Reform

The stark disparity between the antiquated IPC penalty (six months/₹1,000) and FSSA’s enhanced sanctions has two adverse effects: (i) prosecutors may eschew IPC charges as ineffectual; (ii) where FSSA is inapplicable, the punishment may fail to deter. Legislative proposals to align IPC penalties—mirroring the 2023 FSSA amendments—would promote coherence and deterrence.

9. Conclusion

Sections 272 and 273 IPC continue to occupy a nuanced space within India’s legal architecture on food safety. Supreme Court jurisprudence has crystallised their essential ingredients, but High-Court decisions reflect divergent views on their coexistence with specialised statutes. Procedural safeguards emphasised in Ram Jas and the need for evidentiary rigour persist. To resolve doctrinal uncertainty and strengthen public-health protection, Parliament may either recalibrate IPC penalties or codify an explicit saving clause harmonising IPC and FSSA offences. Until such reform ensues, meticulous charge-framing, laboratory evidence, and judicial consistency remain pivotal to the just enforcement of these century-old provisions.

Footnotes

  1. Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 272.
  2. Indian Penal Code, 1860, s. 273.
  3. Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, as amended by Act 18 of 2023; see Ram Nath v. State of U.P. (2024).
  4. Joseph Kurian Philip Jose v. State of Kerala, (1994) Supreme Court; para 9.
  5. Sangishetty Sidheswar v. State of Telangana, (2023) Telangana HC, applying Joseph Kurian.
  6. Ram Nath v. State of U.P., (2024) SC, paras 16-17.
  7. Dilipsinh v. State of Maharashtra, 2010 Bom HC, paras 14-16.
  8. Toni & Anr. v. State of U.P., 2015 All HC, para 17.
  9. M/s Pepsico India Holdings (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P., 2010 All HC.
  10. Contrast Pepsico with liquor-specific cases such as Toni; see also state excise provisions (e.g., U.P. Excise Act, 1910, s. 60).
  11. Ram Jas v. State of U.P., (1970) 2 SCC 740, emphasising charge specificity.
  12. Naseem v. State of U.P., 2022 All HC; Raju Rai v. State of U.P., 2017 All HC; Bhupendra v. State of U.P., 2017 All HC.