Re-Assessing Section 153-B of the Indian Penal Code: National Integration, Hate Speech, and Judicial Restraint

1. Introduction

Section 153-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”) criminalises certain imputations or assertions that are “prejudicial to national integration.” Although frequently overshadowed by its cognate provision—Section 153-A, which targets promotion of enmity between groups—Section 153-B assumes renewed relevance amid proliferating hate speech litigation and the State’s heightened concern for national security. This article undertakes a doctrinal and jurisprudential analysis of Section 153-B, critically evaluating its scope, constitutional compatibility, procedural safeguards, and interaction with adjacent offences, while drawing upon recent case-law and scholarly commentary.

2. Text and Legislative History

Section 153-B was inserted by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act XXXV of 1969 and later expanded in 1972.^[1] Its operative clauses punish, inter alia, (a) imputations that any class of persons cannot bear true faith to the Constitution, (b) assertions that such class be deprived of citizenship rights, and (c) pleas that create disharmony between such class and others. The offence is cognisable and triable by a Court of Session; imprisonment may extend to three years (five years if committed in a place of worship).

3. Constitutional Context

Article 19(1)(a) guarantees freedom of speech and expression. However, Article 19(2) permits “reasonable restrictions” in the interests of, inter alia, the sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, and public order. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that laws such as Sections 153-A and 153-B are facially compatible with Article 19(2) when construed narrowly to target speech with a proximate nexus to disorder or disintegration (e.g., Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, 1962). The threshold for restriction is therefore high: “mere offence” or “hurt sentiment” is insufficient—speech must create a clear and present danger to societal harmony or national unity.

4. Elements of the Offence

4.1 Mens Rea

Although Section 153-B is silent on intent, Supreme Court precedent on analogous provisions demands proof of mens rea. In Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of A.P. the Court insisted that Sections 153-A/505 offences “presuppose mens rea” and cannot rest on mere possession of materials.^[2] By parity, imputations under Section 153-B must be deliberate or malicious.

4.2 Protected Class and Content

The provision protects “any class of persons” defined by religion, race, language, caste, community or region. Clause (a) concerns faith and allegiance to the Constitution; clause (b) addresses assertions denying rights; clause (c) captures pleas likely to cause disharmony.

4.3 Publication or Communication

The offence may be committed by “words, signs, visible representations or otherwise,” thus encompassing speeches, social-media posts, books, or advertisements (cf. Manzar Sayeed Khan, 2007, on publication standards).

5. Procedural Safeguards

Section 196(1)(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”) bars any court from taking cognisance of Section 153-B offences without prior sanction of the Central or State Government. High Courts have rigorously enforced this prerequisite (e.g., Bharam Singh v. State of Uttaranchal, 2010). The safeguard mitigates chilling effects by interposing executive scrutiny before prosecution.

6. Judicial Treatment

6.1 Sparse Direct Jurisprudence

Reported judgments expressly analysing Section 153-B remain limited. In Karma Dorjee v. Union of India (2016) the Supreme Court reproduced the statutory text while recognising its overlap with Section 505(2) IPC, yet did not pronounce on its contours.^[3] The Madras High Court in Ahmed Mansoor (2024) is currently seized of allegations that YouTube speeches sought to “overthrow the democratic government,” booked under Section 153-B read with UAPA.^[4]

6.2 Analogous Guidance from Section 153-A

In absence of abundant Section 153-B authorities, courts extrapolate from Section 153-A jurisprudence. Three principles emerge:

• Reasonable-person test: The impugned words must be judged by their effect on an ordinary person, not the “thin-skinned” (Manzar Sayeed Khan).^[5]
• Proximity: There must be a clear nexus between speech and likely disturbance—Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab (1995) acquitted slogan-shouters since no crowd reacted.^[6]
• Judicial restraint: In Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan (2014) the Court declined to legislate new hate-speech norms, stressing effective enforcement of existing provisions like Section 153-B.^[7]

6.3 Media and Digital Context

The Supreme Court’s decision in Amish Devgan v. Union of India (2020) consolidated multiple FIRs alleging offences under Sections 153-A/295-A/505, holding that intent, context and likelihood of harm are indispensable.^[8] While the case did not invoke Section 153-B, its doctrinal emphasis on malice and proximate causation is equally applicable.

7. Section 153-B vis-à-vis Other Speech Offences

8. Challenges and Critiques

8.1 Overbreadth and Vagueness

The expressions “prejudicial to national integration” and “disharmony” invite subjective application, risking impermissible intrusion into legitimate dissent. Academic commentary notes that the scope may chill political speech advocating regional autonomy, despite absence of separatist intent.

8.2 Enforcement Deficit

Echoing Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan, subdued conviction rates suggest that Section 153-B is invoked more as a preventive or coercive measure than as a successfully prosecutable offence. Weak investigations and lack of expert evidence on “national integration” hinder trials.

8.3 Digital Proliferation

Social media accelerates dissemination of divisive content, complicating territorial jurisdiction and raising questions on multiplicity of FIRs—a concern partially resolved in Amish Devgan by clubbing all FIRs to the earliest forum.

9. Policy Recommendations

• Clarificatory Guidelines: The Legislature should issue explanatory notes, akin to the UK’s Public Order Act guidance, to outline objective indicators of “prejudice to national integration.”
• Training of Prosecutors and Police: Specialised modules on cyber forensics and hate-speech thresholds can improve evidence gathering.
• Judicial Oversight of Sanction Decisions: High Courts may use writ jurisdiction to review arbitrary grants or refusals of Section 196 sanction, ensuring balance between free speech and public order.
• Alternative Remedies: Civil counter-speech and regulatory self-governance by media houses, as suggested in Pravasi Bhalai, should complement criminal prosecution.

10. Conclusion

Section 153-B IPC occupies a critical—if under-litigated—niche in India’s hate-speech architecture, bridging the gap between communal disharmony and threats to constitutional patriotism. Judicial experience with cognate provisions furnishes valuable interpretive tools: insistence on mens rea, proximity to harm, and a reasonable-person standard. Yet, the provision’s breadth and procedural hurdles render its practical utility contested. A calibrated approach—bolstering investigative rigour, clarifying normative content, and preserving constitutional freedoms—alone can ensure that Section 153-B serves its intended purpose: safeguarding the plural, secular fabric of the Republic without stifling legitimate democratic discourse.

Footnotes

1. Statement of Objects and Reasons, Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill 1968; see also discussion in Amish Devgan v. Union of India, (2020) INSC 682.
2. Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of A.P., (1997) 7 SCC 431.
3. Karma Dorjee & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., W.P.(C) 767/2014, Supreme Court of India (2016).
4. Ahmed Mansoor v. State, Madras High Court, W.P.(Crl.) 9704/2024 (pending).
5. Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 1.
6. Balwant Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214.
7. Pravasi Bhalai Sangathan v. Union of India, (2014) 11 SCC 477.
8. Amish Devgan v. Union of India, (2020) INSC 682.