Case Title: Manoj Kumar Tiwari v. Manish Sisodia
According to Section 199 of CrPC, the offence of defamation cannot be brought before a court without a complaint from the party which has been harmed.
When defamation is alleged to have been committed against someone who, at the time of the alleged offence, is the President of India, the Vice-President of India, the Governor of a State, the Administrator of a Union territory, or a Minister of the Union or of a State or of a Union territory, or any other public servant employed in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State, Section 199(2) provides a special procedure. In such a situation, a Court of Session may, upon a written complaint from the Public Prosecutor, take cognizance of the offence without having the case committed to it. According to Section 199(4), the Public Prosecutor may only file a complaint after receiving prior approval from the State or Central governments in the following situations: (a) in the case of a person who is or has served as the Governor of a State or a Minister of that State; (b) in the case of any other public servant employed in connection with the affairs of the State; and (c) in any other situation.
Manish Sisodia, a minister in the Delhi government, filed a complaint against Manoj Kumar Tiwari, Vijender Gupta, and others before Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Rouse Avenue Courts, New Delhi, alleging commission of the offences under Sections 499 and 500 read with Sections 34 and 35 of the Indian Penal Code. The summons order was contested by the accused before the Delhi High Court. The High Court denied these petitions, thus the accused appealed to the Supreme Court.
Manoj Tiwari's lone argument before the Supreme Court was that the Court should not have accepted a private complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C., particularly one from a person covered by Section 199(2) of the Code, without first completing the steps outlined in Section 199's subsection (4). Senior Advocate AM Singhvi argued in opposition that the provisions of Section 199(2) of the Code are special procedures that do not preclude the general procedures prescribed under Section 199(6). He also argued that Section 199(6) guarantees the right of a public servant to bring a defamation lawsuit against an individual and that the provisions of Section 199(2) do not apply to Section 199(6).
The court observed that, "The long history of the evolution of the legislation relating to prosecution for the offence of defamation of public servants shows that the special procedure introduced in 1955 and finetuned in 1964 and overhauled in 1973 was in addition to and not in derogation of the right that a public servant always had as an individual. He never lost his right merely because he became a public servant and merely because of the allegations related to the official discharge of his duties. Subsection (6) of Section 199 which is a reproduction of what was recommended in the 41st Report of the Law Commission to be made subsection (13) of Section 198B, 36 cannot be made a dead letter by holding that persons covered by subsection (2) of Section 199 may have to invariably follow only the procedure prescribed by subsection (4) of Section 199. Therefore, the common ground raised by both appellants is liable to be rejected. A person falling under the category of persons mentioned in subsection (2) of Section 199 can either take the route specified in subsection (4) or take the route specified in Sub-Section (6) of Section 199."
Therefore, the panel dismissed Manoj Tewari's appeal, which merely contested the summoning order on this issue. Vijender Gupta, another defendant, filed an appeal, which was upheld on the grounds that his tweets cannot be considered defamatory as defined by Section 499 of the IPC.