Proving the Contents of a Document under Indian Evidence Law

Proving the Contents of a Document under Indian Evidence Law: Statutory Framework, Jurisprudential Evolution, and Contemporary Challenges

Introduction

The question of how and when the contents of a document may be deemed proved lies at the heart of the Indian law of evidence. While the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (“IEA”) supplies the principal statutory framework, nearly a century and a half of judicial exposition—from Achuthan Pillai v. Marikar (Motors)[1] to Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal[2]—has shaped the doctrinal contours of this seemingly straightforward enquiry. The distinction between (a) establishing the execution/authorship of a document and (b) demonstrating the truth of the statements contained therein permeates the entire discourse. The present article critically analyses the statutory scheme, the leading authorities, and emerging issues—especially in relation to electronic records—to offer a coherent account of the law governing proof of a document’s contents in India.

Statutory Scheme

2.1 Primary and Secondary Evidence (Sections 61-65 IEA)

Section 61 mandates that the contents of documents “may be proved either by primary or by secondary evidence.” Primary evidence, under Section 62, is the document itself produced for the Court’s inspection; secondary evidence is exhaustively catalogued in Section 63. Section 64 embodies the “best-evidence rule” by requiring primary evidence unless one of the Section 65 exceptions applies. These provisions establish two foundational propositions: (i) evidentiary modus (primary versus secondary) is procedural, and (ii) satisfying that modus does not, by itself, guarantee that the truth of what is recorded has been made out.

2.2 Proof of Signature/Handwriting (Section 67 IEA)

Where authorship is in dispute, Section 67 obliges the propounder to prove that the signature or handwriting “is in the handwriting of that person.” Until execution is duly proved, a court “cannot proceed to consider whether execution is proved”[3]. The evidentiary threshold for authorship is thus more demanding than that for other collateral facts.

2.3 Presumptions and Public Documents (Sections 74-78 and 114(e) IEA; Section 51-A LA Act 1894)

  • Documents satisfying Section 74 are public documents; certified copies thereof are admissible under Sections 76-77 without production of the original.
  • Section 114(e) enables courts to presume that official acts have been regularly performed, bolstering the authenticity (though not necessarily the truth) of public records.
  • Section 51-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, statutorily relaxes the best-evidence rule by allowing certified copies of sale deeds to be “admitted as evidence of the transaction recorded” without more—an issue that spawned conflicting authority, considered in Part 4.3 below.

2.4 Electronic Records (Sections 65-A & 65-B IEA)

The Information Technology Act, 2000 inserted Sections 65-A and 65-B, creating a self-contained code for electronic evidence. Section 65-B(4) demands a contemporaneous “certificate” attesting to the manner of production and integrity of the electronic record; absent such certification, the record is inadmissible, subject only to narrow impossibility exceptions recognised in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar[2].

Conceptual Distinction: Execution v. Truth of Contents

Courts have consistently underscored that “proof of a document” is not synonymous with “proof of the truth of its contents.” In Ramkrishna Girishchandra Dode v. Anand Govind Kelkar, the Bombay High Court drew the classic dichotomy: formal proof merely establishes that the document exists and was executed; only a witness with personal knowledge can attest to the veracity of the recitals.[4] The Supreme Court approved this approach in Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thedani, holding that Sections 91–92 forbid reliance on oral testimony to vary terms of a written contract, but do not obviate the need to prove the truth of substantive assertions recorded therein.[5]

Jurisprudential Evolution

4.1 Private Documents: Handwriting, Hearsay, and Personal Knowledge

The early decisions—Achuthan Pillai[1] and Om Prakash Berlia v. UTI[6]—established three propositions: (a) handwriting proof does not equal proof of contents; (b) statements in private documents are hearsay unless the author is examined; and (c) the rule may be waived on grounds akin to estoppel where the opponent consents to the mode of proof. These principles remain good law, as reiterated in the Income-tax context in CIT v. S.M. Aggarwal[7].

4.2 Public Documents and Certified Copies

In Cement Corporation of India v. Purya, a five-Judge Bench reconciled conflicting precedents and held that a certified copy of a sale deed produced under Section 51-A LA Act is not merely admissible but is “evidence of the transaction,” displacing the need to call the vendor or vendee.[8] Nonetheless, the Court cautioned that the document’s evidentiary value remains open to challenge.[8] This nuanced position accords with the Calcutta High Court’s earlier observation that public documents, though hearsay in form, enjoy a statutory presumption of correctness under Section 114(e) IEA but only as “weak” corroborative evidence unless supported by independent proof.[9]

4.3 Presumptions and Burden of Proof

The Supreme Court has frequently invoked Section 114 (illustrations (g) & (e)) to draw adverse inferences when a party withholds primary documents (Kundan Lal Rallaram v. Custodian)[10] or fails to explain facts within special knowledge (State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram)[11]. These cases confirm that while presumptions may ease the path to proving contents, they never dispense with the fundamental requirement that the source of the statements be ascertainable and, where necessary, cross-examinable.

4.4 Electronic Evidence: From Navjot Sandhu to Arjun Khotkar

  1. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru (2005) initially permitted electronic records to be proved via oral testimony under Sections 63–65.[12]
  2. Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer (2014) overruled Navjot Sandhu, declaring Section 65-B mandatory.[13]
  3. Shafhi Mohammad (2018) sought to dilute the mandate, but was itself overruled by Arjun Khotkar (2020), which reaffirmed strict compliance while carving out “impossibility” exceptions based on lex non cogit ad impossibilia.[2]

The law now stands settled that, save in exceptional circumstances, a Section 65-B(4) certificate is a sine qua non for admitting electronic contents; without it, the record remains inadmissible, and questions of truth do not arise.

Interaction with Sections 91–92: Contractual Documents

Sections 91–92 operate after a document’s contents have been duly proved. They bar extrinsic evidence that (i) substitutes for production of the document (Section 91) or (ii) contradicts, varies, or adds to its terms (Section 92). However, where the issue is the true nature of the transaction (e.g., licence versus lease in Roop Kumar)[5], surrounding circumstances may still be examined provided they do not infringe the parol-evidence rule. Thus, proving contents remains conceptually distinct from construing legal consequences.

Contemporary Challenges

6.1 Secondary Evidence and Lost Originals

Courts demand a “factual foundation” showing loss or destruction of the original before permitting secondary evidence (Akbarbhai Sipai v. Mohanbhai Patel)[14]. Mere assertion of loss, unsupported by diligent search, is insufficient. Further, the copy itself must be authenticated as a true copy. The rigour manifests the judicial anxiety to preserve evidentiary integrity.

6.2 Interim Admission and Order XVIII Rule 4 CPC

The Kerala High Court recently deprecated premature findings as to the “truth” of certified copies at the stage of marking documents (N. Divakaran v. David Livingston)[15], reiterating that admissibility, relevancy, and weight are sequential and not concurrent enquiries.

6.3 Estoppel by Conduct

In motor-accident claims, the Supreme Court has held that once parties rely on portions of an FIR, they cannot later dispute other portions (Oriental Insurance v. Premlata Shukla)[16]. This doctrine, grounded in fairness, prevents selective acceptance of document contents and underscores that truth may sometimes be inferred from conduct rather than direct proof.

Analytical Synthesis

  • Step 1 – Authentication: Establish authorship/execution under Sections 67–68 (or 65-B for electronic records).
  • Step 2 – Admissibility: Demonstrate compliance with Sections 61-65 (or statutory relaxations such as Section 51-A LA Act).
  • Step 3 – Evidentiary Weight: Prove the truth of recitals through (a) testimony of a person with personal knowledge, (b) statutory presumptions, or (c) estoppel-like conduct. Failure at this stage renders the contents valueless even if admissible.

The jurisprudence reflects a calibrated balance: the law facilitates proof by permitting certified copies, presumptions, and digital records, yet preserves adversarial fairness by insisting that the ultimate fact-finder be convinced of the substantive truth.

Conclusion

Indian evidence law draws a clear demarcation between proving a document as a physical fact and proving the . Statutory innovations (e.g., Sections 65-B and 51-A) and judicial craftsmanship (e.g., presumptions under Section 114, impossibility exceptions under Arjun Khotkar) have progressively liberalised the admissibility enquiry. Nevertheless, the overarching principle endures: the truth of contents demands either direct testimony from a competent witness or a legally recognised presumption. Practitioners must therefore meticulously plan evidence to traverse all three stages—authentication, admissibility, and weight—lest their documentary arsenal prove ultimately ineffective.

Footnotes

  1. Achuthan Pillai v. Marikar (Motors) Ltd., 1982 KLT 872 (Ker)—private document; handwriting v. contents.
  2. Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, (2020) 7 SCC 1—mandatory Section 65-B certificate; impossibility exception.
  3. Bank of Baroda v. Shree Moti Industries, 2008 (6) Bom CR 525.
  4. Ramkrishna Girishchandra Dode v. Anand Govind Kelkar, 1998 (1) Bom CR 284.
  5. Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thedani, (2003) 6 SCC 595.
  6. Om Prakash Berlia v. UTI, 1983 Bom LR 1.
  7. CIT v. S.M. Aggarwal, (2007) 293 ITR 43 (Del).
  8. Cement Corporation of India v. Purya, (2004) 8 SCC 270.
  9. Octavious Steel Co. v. Endogram Tea Co., AIR 1979 Cal 19.
  10. Kundan Lal Rallaram v. Custodian, Evacuee Property, AIR 1961 SC 1316.
  11. State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram, (2006) 12 SCC 254.
  12. State (NCT) of Delhi v. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, (2005) 11 SCC 600.
  13. Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473.
  14. Akbarbhai Kesarbhai Sipai v. Mohanbhai Patel, 2019 (3) GLR 2276.
  15. N. Divakaran v. David Livingston, 2024 (1) KHC 123.
  16. Oriental Insurance Co. v. Premlata Shukla, (2007) 14 SCC 114.