Property Rights of Children Born from Void or Voidable Marriages in India: An Evolving Jurisprudence

Property Rights of Children Born from Void or Voidable Marriages in India: An Evolving Jurisprudence

1. Introduction

The status of children born outside a valid Hindu marriage has long vexed Indian jurists. While the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA) endeavoured to eliminate the social stigma of “illegitimacy”, it retained complex limitations on succession. Interpreting Section 16 of the HMA, courts have oscillated between restrictive and expansive readings of the property rights enjoyed by such children. This article critically examines that evolution, situating recent Supreme Court pronouncements within the broader constitutional and doctrinal framework governing Hindu succession.

2. Historical Background

Classical Hindu law differentiated sharply between legitimate sons (aurasa) and sons born outside wedlock (dāsi-putra). Yet Privy Council decisions under colonial rule incrementally recognised a Sudra father’s illegitimate child as entitled to a fractional share of his estate, particularly when no legitimate male issue survived (e.g., Ramalinga Muppan v. Pavadai Goundan, 1901;[1] Kamulammal v. Visvanathaswami Naicker, 1923;[2] Vellaiyappa Chetty v. Natarajan, 1931[3]). These cases laid the normative foundation that later informed Section 16 of the HMA.

3. Statutory Framework

  • Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 16(1)–(2) confers legitimacy on children of void and voidable marriages; Section 16(3) restricts property rights “to the property of the parents”.
  • Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Governs intestate succession; post-2005 amendment, daughters acquire coparcenary rights, indirectly influencing the quantum of a parent’s share available to all children.
  • Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 112 creates a presumption of legitimacy from long cohabitation; Section 114 illustratively permits the court to infer marriage from conduct.
  • Constitution of India – Articles 14 and 39(f) mandate substantive equality and protection of children, shaping teleological interpretation of Section 16.

4. Judicial Trajectory Post-1955

4.1 The Foundational Case: Parayankandiyal v. K. Devi (1996)

The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Section 16 and affirmed that children of a void marriage are legitimate and entitled to inherit their father’s property.[4] Emphasising legal fiction as a device of social reform, the Court, however, stopped short of clarifying whether “property” encompassed ancestral assets.

4.2 The Restrictive Trilogy: 2003–2010

Jinia Keotin v. Kumar Sitaram Manjhi (2003)[5], Neelamma v. Sarojamma (2006) and Bharatha Matha v. R. Vijaya Renganathan (2010)[6] construed Section 16(3) narrowly, limiting inheritance to self-acquired property. The decisions argued that extending rights to coparcenary property would impermissibly “re-legislate” Section 16.[7]

4.3 Doctrinal Reorientation: Revanasiddappa v. Mallikarjun (2011)

A two-Judge Bench decisively departed from the trilogy, holding that the unqualified word “property” in Section 16(3) embraces both self-acquired and ancestral shares of the parents.[8] Drawing on Articles 14 and 39(f), the Court reasoned that a child’s innocence required the fullest possible recognition of proprietary rights, subject only to the express statutory bar against claiming property of third persons.

4.4 Subsequent Divergence and Clarification

High Courts continued to cite the earlier restrictive line (e.g., Kenchegowda v. Krishnappa, 2008;[9] Vempati Anasuyamma v. Venkateswarloo, 2008[10]), creating doctrinal dissonance. In 2023, a larger Bench in Revanasiddappa clarified that legitimacy under Section 16 confers rights only in the parents’ property but that such property includes the parents’ share in joint family property, albeit not by birth as a coparcener.[11]

5. Key Doctrinal Issues

5.1 Meaning of “Property of the Parents”

The semantic breadth of “property” has driven judicial controversy. The expansive view (2011, 2023) finds textual support in Parliament’s deliberate omission of qualifiers and aligns with constitutional values. The restrictive view rests on the perceived need to protect the expectations of other coparceners and on legislative history indicating no intent to disrupt Mitakshara principles.[12]

5.2 Coparcenary Status versus Inheritance

Even post-2023 clarification, an illegitimate child is not a coparcener. Rights crystallise only on partition or death of the parents, when their notional share becomes separate property. Thus, the child’s entitlement is derivative, not by birth, preserving the internal logic of Mitakshara coparcenary while advancing child-centred equity.

5.3 Interaction with Section 112 Evidence Act

The presumptions of legitimacy under long cohabitation (S.P.S. Balasubramanyam v. Suruttayan, 1992)[13] bolster the evidentiary basis for invoking Section 16, yet remain rebuttable. The Supreme Court in Bharatha Matha cautioned that such presumptions must be displaced only by “compelling evidence”, ensuring stability in property titles.

5.4 Constitutional Imperatives

Every expansion of Section 16 has invoked Article 14 to dismantle “innocence-based” discrimination. The jurisprudential pivot from status of the parents to rights of the child echoes international obligations under the Convention on the Rights of the Child, reinforcing purposive construction.

6. Unresolved Questions

  • Whether an illegitimate child can seek partition during the lifetime of the parents remains unsettled; conflicting High Court views persist.[14]
  • A pending reference to a larger Bench (SLP No. 18858/2019) may reconsider the interface between Section 16 and coparcenary rights.[15]
  • The effect of the 2005 amendment to the Hindu Succession Act on gender-neutral coparcenary participation of such children awaits authoritative clarification.

7. Conclusion

The jurisprudence on property rights of children born from void or voidable marriages has travelled from colonial paternalism to constitutional empathy. While Parayankandiyal initiated the modern discourse, it is Revanasiddappa (2011) and its 2023 reiteration that now chart the operative terrain: legitimacy is complete, but proprietary claims are confined to the parents’ estate, including their notional ancestral share. The approach delicately balances the objectives of social reform with the structural integrity of Hindu joint family property. Future clarification by a Constitution Bench may finally harmonise the remaining doctrinal fissures, but the trajectory unmistakably points toward fuller realisation of a child-centric constitutional vision.

Footnotes

  1. Ramalinga Muppan v. Pavadai Goundan, ILR 24 Mad 555 (1901).
  2. Kamulammal v. Visvanathaswami Naicker, AIR 1923 PC 8.
  3. Vellaiyappa Chetty v. Natarajan, AIR 1931 PC 294.
  4. Parayankandiyal Eravath Kanapravan Kalliani Amma v. K. Devi, (1996) 4 SCC 76.
  5. Jinia Keotin v. Kumar Sitaram Manjhi, (2003) 1 SCC 730.
  6. Bharatha Matha v. R. Vijaya Renganathan, (2010) 11 SCC 483.
  7. Karnataka High Court in Sri Kenchegowda v. K.B. Krishnappa, ILR 2009 KAR 1590.
  8. Revanasiddappa v. Mallikarjun, (2011) 11 SCC 1.
  9. Sri Kenchegowda, supra note 7.
  10. Vempati Anasuyamma v. Gouru Venkateswarloo, 2008 SCC OnLine AP 533.
  11. Revanasiddappa v. Mallikarjun, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 650.
  12. Contrast drawn in Govind Shankar Malme v. Bhagwan Govind Malme, 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 7488.
  13. S.P.S. Balasubramanyam v. Suruttayan, (1992) 1 SCC 304.
  14. Raghunath Nana Patil v. Nana Rama Patil, 1985 SCC OnLine Bom 233.
  15. Sri Rajashekara v. Kemparaju S., 2021 SCC OnLine Kar 1993.